



Strategies and Games, 2e

Theory and Practice

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Second Edition Highlights:

- Comprehensively updated to reflect the last twenty years of game theory, featuring nine new chapters
- New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines such as OPEC, voting, climate change, and school choice
- Extensive coverage of game theory applied to the political arena
- Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings

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