Job Name: -- /417971t

Contents

Foreword by Jean Tirole xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
Academic Influence xvii
Practitioners' Influence xix

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Why Electricity? 1
1.2 The Challenge 4
1.3 The Answer: The Toolbox 6

I WHOLESALE MARKETS 15

2 Marcel Boiteux Forever: Peak-Load Pricing 17
2.1 The Simplest Peak-Load Pricing Story 17
2.2 A More Realistic Story 30
2.3 The Simple Equations behind the Story 55
2.4 Completely Inelastic Demand 59
2.5 A More Realistic Peak-Load Pricing Story 63
2.6 Operating Reserves 75
2.7 An Illustrative Example 77

3 From Enron with Love 85
3.1 Prelude: The California Crisis 85
3.2 How Is Market Power Exercised? 87
3.3 Why Is Exercise of Market Power a Serious Issue in Power Markets? 93
3.4 How Can Exercise of Market Power Be Mitigated? 99
3.5 Academic Models of Imperfect Competition in Spot Markets 104
3.6 Imperfect Competition at the Investment Stage 112
3.7 Impact of Price Cap on Investment and Net Surplus 116

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Job Name: -- /417971t

II RETAIL MARKET 123

4 Selling Power to the People: Retail Competition and Vertical Structure of the Power Industry 125
4.1 Introduction 125
4.2 Retail Electricity Markets 126
4.3 Forward Commitments 131
4.4 Horizontal Differentiation and Imperfect Competition 138
4.5 Economic Analysis of Forward Commitments 142

5 A Kuhnian Paradigm Shift: Price-Responsive Electricity Demand 151
5.1 Introduction 151
5.2 An Economic and Technical Reality 153
5.3 Which Contractual Approach for Demand Response? 155
5.4 Which Customers Should Be Incentivized to Respond to Spot Prices? 160
5.5 Policy Implications 168
5.6 Peak-Time Resale: An Economic Representation 169
5.7 An Economic Model of Switching to Real-Time Pricing 171

III NETWORK ISSUES 177

6 Fred Schweppe Meets Marcel Boiteux: Transmission Pricing 179
6.1 Introduction 179
6.2 Short-Term Congestion Management 190
6.3 Optimal Generation and Transmission Expansion 201
6.4 Generation Investment under Different Congestion Management Regimes 208
6.5 Transmission Grid Expansion under Different Regimes 212
6.6 Loop Flows and Nodal Pricing on a Three-Node Network 218
6.7 Extension to a General Network 225

7 Serious Games: Market Power and Transmission Constraints 239
7.1 Introduction 239
7.2 Models of Local Market Power 241
7.3 FTRs and Local Market Power in the Simplest Setting 249
7.4 FTRs and Local Market Power in a Richer Setting 253

IV POLICY ISSUES 265

8 Gone with the Wind (and the Sun): Renewable Energy Sources Entry into Electricity Markets 267
8.1 Introduction 267
8.2 The Energy Transition Challenge 267

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Job Name: -- /417971t

8.3 The Tools to Fight Climate Change 275
8.4 A Model of the Electric Power Market with RES 300
8.5 Marginal Impact of Renewables 305
8.6 Application to the Case of Great Britain 317

9 The Highly Visible Hand: Capacity Mechanism 325
9.1 Introduction 325
9.2 Rationale for Capacity Mechanisms 326
9.3 Experience from Capacity Mechanisms 334
9.4 A Model of Capacity Mechanisms and Market Power 343
9.5 Capacity Mechanisms and Generation Adequacy 351

10 Concluding Observations 359
10.1 Economic Research Questions 359
10.2 Policy Choices 362

Afterword by Jean-Bernard Lévy 367
Bibliography 369
Index 377

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be set to Always in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding this option.