

Preface

My project in this book is to chart the boundaries of the psychology of moral agency. My method is to unite two discussions in philosophical psychology that have to date proceeded independently of each other. On one hand there is the booming interdisciplinary work done in philosophical moral psychology since the 1990s. In those years, when I was a student, this field was nascent. Now it is arguably the most active corner of both philosophical psychology and moral philosophy. Despite my criticisms of that work, I have been greatly impressed by the philosophers and psychologists who have jointly shed so much light on the psychological capacities that make us moral agents. On the other hand there is the philosophical debate about the role of agents' contexts in their minds. That debate, between "individualists" and "externalists," has its roots in work done in the 1970s on mental meaning, but since 1998 its focal point has broadened into what is often called the "Extended Mind Hypothesis." Individualists hold that an agent's context can provide input only to cognitive processes—i.e., contextual features are not parts of cognitive processes themselves. Externalists argue that features of an agent's context can be constitutive parts of cognitive systems, not just sources of input. I have become convinced that the individualism/externalism issue should be seen as an empirical one. If progress is to be made here, it will be made by designing both individualistic and externalistic hypotheses and testing their ability to explain psychological phenomena. Since philosophy and psychology tend toward individualism, relatively few externalistic hypotheses have been formulated and tested. I aim to fill this gap partially by presenting a generally externalistic position about human moral psychology. I call this the Wide Moral Systems Hypothesis.

It is composed of more particular hypotheses about moral judgment, moral reasoning, the attribution of moral responsibility, and the production of action.

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The depths and shallows of psychological externalism, *Philosophical Studies* 138 (2008), no. 3: 193–208

A social model of moral dumbfounding: Implications for studying moral reasoning and moral judgment, *Philosophical Psychology* 20 (2007), no. 6: 731–748

Two views of emotional perception, in *The Modularity of Emotions* (special supplement to *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 2006), edited by C. Tappolet and L. Faucher

Like-Minded is about the way context can be a part of our minds. Thus, I would be particularly remiss if I did not acknowledge the context in which the book was born. Having acknowledged my professional context, I should now acknowledge two more personal debts of gratitude. First, I spent a great deal of time thinking about this project and these topics while walking my dog through the streets of my Ottawa neighborhood. Certain blocks in Wellington Village and Westboro still evoke thoughts about moral judgment, moral responsibility, moral dumbfounding, and related topics for me. I find this very pleasant. I consider myself very

fortunate to live in such an enriching and enjoyable place. Second, my wife, Debbie, has known me since before I took my first course in philosophy. She has been with me as I have worked through these and other topics, sometimes fruitfully and sometimes pointlessly. During my work on the book, she has been a psychological subject, a philosophical colleague, and a beloved companion on many of those walks with our dog. This is for her.