

Index

- Acquaintance, 80–81, 198n8,
201n23
- Act-object conception of experience, 195n16
- Anscombe, G. E. M., 209n4,
209n6
- A priori knowledge
fallibility of, 201n24
and intelligibility, 2, 114
of intelligible causal powers,
3–4, 76–77
and philosophy, 6–10
synthetic, 84, 199n11
- Armstrong, David M., 12, 32,
192n16, 193n17, 193n18,
193n1, 193n3
- Attention, 88–92, 93–94, 97–99,
100–101, 105, 108–110, 170,
199n15, 200n18, 200n19
- Basing relation, 134–135, 207n22
- Bealer, G., 201n23
- Beliefs
vs. acceptances, 122
- evaluative, 150, 153–154,
211n13
- ideal form of, 137, 139–140
- intelligible causal powers of, 99–
103, 107, 118–120, 123–124,
150
- intelligible causes of, 85–109,
115
- intrinsic nature of, 100, 113,
137, 205n11
- phenomenal properties of,
104–105
- rationality of, 112–113, 115
- reasons for, 113, 126–128
- standards for, 137–139
- Bodily sensations. *See* Sensations,
bodily
- BonJour, L., 190n6, 198n8,
198n9, 199n13, 201n23,
201n24, 203n1, 204n4, 204n5,
204n7, 205n13, 205n15,
205n17, 206n18, 207n21
- Byrne, A., 193n2, 194n6, 194n10

- Carroll, L., 201n20
- Causal overdetermination, 22
- Causal powers, intelligible. *See* Intelligible causal powers
- Chalmers, D. J., 81, 192n12, 192n13, 199n10
- Chisholm, R., 190n6, 199n13, 206n14
- Cohen, S., 203n1, 205n9
- Coherence, 116–117
- Cohentism, 132–133
- Colors
 intelligible relations holding among, 34
 vs. phenomenal properties, 35–36
 sensory nature of, 31–32
- Conee, E., 207n20
- Consciousness. *See also* Phenomenal properties
 importance of, 5, 73–74, 140, 141, 182–183
 intelligibility of, 2–4, 14, 24
 and intelligible causation, 3–4, 73, 86–89, 103, 114
 and phenomenal character, 54–61, 185
 and propositional attitudes, 113, 186–187
 and rationality, 111, 113–114, 141, 187
 the relational nature of, 55
 and representation, 56–57
- Desires
 globally rational, 151, 153–157, 159, 163–166, 166–168, 176
 ideal form of, 179–183
 instrumental, 147–149, 150–152, 166
 intelligible causal powers of, 148–149
 intelligible causes of, 147–150, 159–160, 161–163, 173–176, 211n13
 intrinsic nature of, 141, 145–146, 179–180, 209n6
 rationality of, 142–147
 and the rationality of beliefs, 205n11
 and reasons for action, 152–154
 standards for, 142–146, 179–182
 and value, 145–147, 181–183, 209n6
- Direction of fit, 208n1
- Direct realism, 42, 44, 87, 194n8, 195n16
- Disjunctivism, 44–45
- Dualism, 13, 17, 18, 19, 23, 192n13, 193n18. *See also* Nonreductionism
- Emotions, 168, 212n21
- Epiphenomenalism, 81–83, 199n11
- Epistemic conservatism, 128–129, 206n14
- Epistemic regress problem, 129–130
- Evans, G., 199n14
- Experiences
 act-object conception of, 195n16

- how bodily sensations are similar to, 160–161
- and feelings, 170–173
- intelligibility of, 25–27
- intelligible causal powers of, 27, 78–79, 81, 85–99, 121, 127–128, 154, 167, 172–173, 178, 207n23
- ontological structure of, 55–57
- phenomenal properties of, 29–30, 105 (*see also* Phenomenal properties)
- as providing foundational justification for beliefs, 132
- representational properties of, 46, 56–58, 196n19
- as revelatory of the world, 25–27, 44, 64–65, 78–79, 127, 167, 186
- Externalism (about reasons for action), 154
- Feelings
 - and bodily sensations, 168, 173–175
 - and emotions, 168, 212n21
 - intelligible causes of, 172–173
 - intelligible causal powers of, 173–176
 - and their intelligible connections to value, 171–173
 - intrinsic nature of, 171, 174–175
 - as perceptions of value, 168–173, 176–179
 - and perceptual experiences, 170–173
 - phenomenal properties of, 169, 213n24
 - as properties of acts of consciousness, 171, 174–175
 - value of, 172–173
- Feldman, R., 199n15, 207n20
- Foster, J., 192n15, 195n16, 196n18
- Foundationalism, 131–132, 199n18
- Fumerton, R., 198n8, 201n23, 207n20
- Functionalism, 12–13, 83–85, 191n9, 199n11, 199n12
- Gaita, R., 213n27
- Gettier, E., 136
- Gettier counterexamples, 139–140, 207n26
- Given, the, 80–81, 131, 198n8, 198n9, 206n16
- Goldie, P., 212n21
- Goldman, A., 203n3, 205n12, 206n18, 207n21, 207n22
- Greco, J., 132, 206n18
- Hallucinations, 43–45, 68, 95, 97–99, 200n19, 201n24
- Harman, G., 194n6, 201n21, 204n8, 205n10, 206n14
- Hawthorne, J., 198n7
- Heck, R., 49
- Helm, B., 209n6, 211n14, 212n20, 212n21
- Hilbert, D., 193n2
- Hume, D., 40, 76–77, 118, 143–144, 189n3, 194n5, 198n4, 198n5, 204n6, 209n3, 211n15

- Identity theory, 12–13, 20
- Illusions, 43, 45–46
- Inference
 deductive, 100–103, 123
 explanatory, 96, 204n8
 inductive, 118–119, 123–124, 204n7, 204n8
 and intelligible causation, 99–103, 118–120
 practical, 147–148
 and rationality, 116–118
- Instantiation, two kinds of, 51–52, 62–65, 69, 88–91, 186
- Intelligibility
 and a priori knowledge, 2, 114
 of consciousness, 2–4, 14, 24
 definition of, 2
 of experiences, 25–27
 and introspection, 7, 17–18, 33–34
 of our lives, 74
 and necessary connections between distinct existences, 7–8, 75–76
 and nonreductionism, 14, 16
 and philosophy, 6–10, 17–18
 and reason, 2, 4
- Intelligible causal powers
 of beliefs, 99–103, 118–120, 123–124, 148–149
 of bodily sensations, 159–160, 161–163, 191n8, 198n7
 definition of, 71
 of desires, 148–149
 of experiences, 27, 78–79, 81, 85–99, 121, 127–128, 154, 167, 172–173, 178, 207n23
 of feelings, 173–176
 of intuitions, 105–106, 127–128
- Intelligible causation
 and brute causation, 71–73, 76–77, 79–80, 82, 90–91, 119
 and consciousness, 3–4, 73, 86–89, 103, 114
 definition of, 71
 our implicit commitment to the idea of, 77–79, 83–85
 and inference, 99–103, 118–120, 148–149
 and introspection, 106–109
 and justification, 130–135, 203n3
 and rationality, 114–116, 124–125, 141, 148–150, 162–163, 203n3
 and reflection, 103–104
 resistance to the idea of, 74–80, 85
- Intelligible relations, definition of, 3
- Intentionalism. *See* Representationalism
- Internalism
 about epistemic justification, 133–134
 about reasons for action, 153–156, 210n11
- Introspection
 difficulty of, 37, 109, 202n26
 and intelligibility, 7, 17–18, 33–34, 109–110
 and intelligible causation, 106–109

- of nonphenomenal properties, 106–108
- and nonreductionism, 17–24, 32–33, 191n11, 192n13
- and perception, 17, 106–108
- of phenomenal properties, 30–31, 37, 108–110
- Intuitions, rational, 83
- how experiences are similar to, 104, 124, 201n23
- hallucinatory, 201n24
- intelligible causal powers of, 105–106, 127–128, 154, 211n13
- phenomenal properties of, 105
- as providing foundational justification for beliefs, 132
- as revelatory of the abstract world, 105–106, 127, 186
- Jackson, F., 49, 192n12, 193n18, 195n15, 196n18, 199n10
- John, J., 195n14
- Johnston, M., 168, 194n8, 195n16, 212n20, 212n21, 212n23, 213n25
- Justification, epistemic, 129–137, 203n3, 205n12
- Kim, J., 191n9
- Knowledge, 129
 - and experiences, 26–27, 64–65, 78–79
 - as ideal belief, 137, 139–140
 - importance of, 135, 140
 - inexpressible, 31–34
 - unity of, 136–137
- Korcz, K. A., 134, 207n22
- Kripke, S., 20, 192n12
- Laws of nature, 72–73, 197n1, 197n2
- Lehrer, K., 206n18, 207n22, 207n26
- Lewis, D., 12, 83, 190n7, 191n11, 192n14
- Loar, B., 193n17, 193n18
- Logue, H., 194n10
- Mackie, J., 212n22
- Martin, M. F. G., 194n8, 194n10, 194n12, 199n15, 200n17
- Materialism. *See* Physicalism
- McDowell, J., 25, 194n8, 194n10, 196n17, 198n8, 198n9, 211n12
- McGinn, C., 14, 45, 191n11, 194n4
- Millgram, E., 210n11, 211n12, 212n20, 213n26
- Mind–body problem, 11, 18–19
- Moore, G. E., 195n16, 202n26
- Moser, P. K., 134, 207n22
- Nagel, T., 14, 30, 51, 210n9
- Naive realism. *See* Direct realism
- Necessary connections between distinct existences, 7–8, 75–76, 79, 84, 190n7
- Nonconceptualism, 49–50
- Nonreductionism, 13, 15–16
 - arguments for, 19–21, 24

- Nonreductionism (cont.)
 and common sense, 18–19, 23, 193n18, 193n3
 and the intelligibility of the mind, 14, 16
 introspective evidence for, 17–24, 32–33, 191n11, 192n13
- O'Shaughnessy, B., 198n7
- Pains
 bodily (*see* Sensations, bodily)
 psychological (painful feelings) (*see* Feelings)
- Papineau, D., 192n14, 193n18
- Pautz, A., 48
- Phenomenal character. *See* Phenomenal properties
- Phenomenal externality, 66–70, 91–92, 95–99, 121, 196n19
- Phenomenal properties
 attending to, 89
 of beliefs, 104–105
 of bodily sensations, 161–162
 vs. colors, 35–36
 and consciousness, 54–61
 of experiences and thoughts, 46–50
 of feelings, 169
 as grounding intelligible causal powers, 74, 88–99, 108, 161–162
 ineffable nature of, 31–33
 of intuitions, 105
 vs. observable properties, 51–52
 how observable properties explain, 39–41, 53–56, 57, 58–61
 how observable properties are similar to, 37–39, 50–51, 62
 and representational properties, 46–47, 53, 56–58, 196n19
 as a special kind of instantiation, 62–65, 69, 88, 93–94, 104–105
 unity of, 66–68, 98–99, 196n19
- Philosophy
 a priori nature of, 6–10
 difficulty of, 9–10
 and empirical facts, 6, 7, 18
 and intelligibility, 6–10, 17–18
 and rationalism, 7, 9
- Physicalism
 causal argument for, 22–23
 eliminative, 191n10
 and functionalism, 12–13, 191n9
 and the identity theory, 12–13
 and the intelligibility of the mind, 14
 and the mind–body problem, 11, 18–19
 nonreductive, 14
 reductive, 12–19, 21–23, 191n9, 191n11, 192n14
- Physical properties
 kinds of, 12
 nature of, 11–12
 reductive, 12, 18–19, 20
- Plantinga, A., 201n23, 206n18, 207n21
- Pleasures. *See* Bodily sensations; Feelings

- Pollock, J. L., 134
- Price, H. H., 87, 195n16, 198n8, 199n14
- Primitivism, 193n2
- Propositional attitudes, 100, 104, 112–115, 132, 145, 176, 180, 186–187, 208n1
- Qualia, 41–43, 46, 49. *See also* Phenomenal properties
- Rachels, S., 212n18, 212n19
- Rationalism, 7, 9
- Rationality
 - of beliefs, 112–113
 - of beliefs about the external world, 120–121, 127–128, 167
 - and consciousness, 111, 113–114, 141
 - of desires, 142–147
 - global and local, 124–129, 130–131, 137, 151
 - of inductive inference, 118–119, 123–124
 - instrumental, 147–149, 150–152, 205n11
 - and intelligible causation, 114–116, 124–125, 141, 148–150, 162–163, 203n3
 - and justification, 129–131
 - of lottery beliefs, 120
 - nature of, 112
 - and practical inference, 147–148
 - and propositional attitudes, 112
 - and reasoning, 116–118, 130–133
 - and reasons, 126–128, 145–146
- Reason, faculty of
 - function of, 4
 - and intelligibility, 2, 4
 - and philosophy, 6–10
 - and rationalism, 7
- Reasoning. *See* Inference
- Reasons
 - for action, 152–154
 - for belief, 113, 126–128, 138–139
 - for thinking that objects of desire have value, 145–147, 150–151, 155–156, 159, 164, 166–167, 179
- Reference, 86–92
- Reflection, 103–104. *See also* A priori knowledge
- Reliabilism, 132–133, 206n18, 206n19
- Representationalism, 41, 46–50, 194n6, 196n19
- Russell, B., 190n6, 195n16, 198n8, 199n14
- Scanlon, T., 210n9
- Scheler, M., 212n20
- Schueler, G. F., 152, 209n7, 210n9, 210n11
- Searle, J. R., 14, 208n1
- Sellars, W., 198n9, 204n4
- Sensations, bodily, 158
 - and feelings, 168, 173–175
 - intelligible causal powers of, 159–160, 161–163
 - intrinsic nature of, 160–161

- Sensations, bodily (cont.)
 how perceptual experiences are similar to, 160–161
 phenomenal properties of, 161–162, 164–165
 value of, 159–160, 164–165, 211n16
- Sense-data theory, 195n16, 196n18
- Shoemaker, S., 197n1, 202n25
- Skepticism, 69–70, 99, 120–121, 132, 205n9
- Smart, J. J. C., 12, 193n17, 193n1
- Smith, A. D., 194n7, 194n9, 194n12
- Smith, M., 208n1, 208n3, 210n8
- Snowdon, P., 194n8
- Sosa, E., 200n18, 206n18, 207n20, 207n21
- “Speckled hen” argument, 200n18
- Sprigge, T. L. S., 191n8, 198n7, 211n15, 212n17, 212n18
- Stampe, D. W., 209n6, 209n7, 210n9
- Stocker, M., 168, 209n6
- Strawson, G., 14, 194n11
- Stroud, S., 198n5, 205n9
- Swoyer, C., 197n1
- Thau, M., 195n14
- Thoughts, 46–50. *See also* Beliefs;
 Propositional attitudes
- Tye, M., 48, 194n6, 194n13
- Value
 of activities, 177
 eliminativism about, 169
 of feelings, 172–173
 hallucinations of, 178
 of human beings, 177–178
 perception of, 167–173, 176–179, 182–183
 of pleasures and pains, 159–160, 164–165, 211n16
 and the rationality of desires, 145–147, 209n6
 and supervenience, 169–170, 176–178
- Velleman, J. D., 143, 194n6, 208n1, 208n2, 209n5, 209n6
- Volition, acts of, 77
- Wedgwood, R., 212n21
- Williams, B., 210n9, 210n11
- Williamson, T., 136, 207n24
- Wishes, 143, 208n2
- Wishful thinking, 123–124