Contents

Preface ix

1 Majority Judgment 1

- 1.1 Inputs and Outputs 1
- 1.2 Messages of a Common Language 2
- 1.3 Majority-Grade 3
- 1.4 Majority-Ranking 5
- 1.5 Majority-Value 6
- 1.6 Majority-Gauge 9
- 1.7 Nomenclature 18
- 1.8 The Thesis 19

2 Voting in Practice 21

- 2.1 United States of America 23
- 2.2 Zürich, Switzerland 27
- 2.3 Mexico 29
- 2.4 United Kingdom 32
- 2.5 Australia 33
- 2.6 France 36
- 2.7 The Lessons 45

3 Traditional Social Choice 47

- 3.1 Traditional Methods and Concepts 47
- 3.2 IIA and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 56
- 3.3 Restricting the Domain 62

4 Electing versus Ranking in the Traditional Model 67

- 4.1 Condorcet's Method of Ranking 68
- 4.2 Borda's and Sum-Scoring Methods 71
- 4.3 Objections to Condorcet-Consistency 74
- 4.4 Borda-Winners and Condorcet-Rankings 79
- 4.5 Incompatibility of Electing and Ranking 83
- 4.6 Preferences over Rank-Orders 89

5 Strategy in the Traditional Model 93

- 5.1 Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorem 96
- 5.2 Galton's Middlemost 100
- 5.3 Majority Judgment Methods 102
- 5.4 The Majority Judgment for the Traditional Model 107

6 Fallacies of the Traditional Model in Voting 111

- 6.1 Unrealistic Inputs 112
- 6.2 Statistical Left-Right Spectra 117
- 6.3 Borda's and Condorcet's Bias for the Center 121
- 6.4 Conclusion 127

7 Judging in Practice 129

- 7.1 Students 130
- 7.2 Employees 134
- 7.3 Musicians 136
- 7.4 Skaters and Gymnasts 139
- 7.5 Divers 147
- 7.6 Countries 148
- 7.7 Wines 149
- 7.8 The Paris Wine Tasting of 1976 156
- 7.9 Conclusion 158

8 Common Language 161

- 8.1 Examples of Common Languages 161
- 8.2 Measurement Theory 164
- 8.3 Common Languages of Grading 166
- 8.4 On the Optimal Number of Grades 169
- 8.5 Interval Measure Grades 171
- 8.6 The Lesson 174

9 New Model 175

- 9.1 Inputs 176
- 9.2 Social Grading Functions 176
- 9.3 Social Ranking Functions 181
- 9.4 The Role of Judges' Utilities 183

10 Strategy in Grading 187

- 10.1 Strategy-Proofness in Grading 189
- 10.2 Order Functions 190
- 10.3 Minimizing Manipulation 194
- 10.4 Implications 197

11 Meaningfulness 199

- 11.1 Reinforcement and Conformity 199
- 11.2 Language-Consistency 201

- 11.3 Order-Consistency 202
- 11.4 The Meaning of Arrow's Theorem 204

12 Majority-Grade 209

- 12.1 Middlemost Aggregation Functions 209
- 12.2 Majority Decision 210
- 12.3 Minimizing Cheating 211
- 12.4 Maximizing Social Welfare 213
- 12.5 Crankiness 215
- 12.6 Majority-Grade 216
- 12.7 Implications 217

13 Majority-Ranking 219

- 13.1 Strategy-Proofness in Ranking 220
- 13.2 Majority-Value 223
- 13.3 Characterization 226
- 13.4 Juries of Different Sizes 230

14 Large Electorates 235

- 14.1 Majority-Gauge 236
- 14.2 Abbreviated Majority-Value 239
- 14.3 Other Rules 244

15 Common Language: Voting 251

- 15.1 The 2007 Orsay Experiment: Validation 254
- 15.2 Common Use of Grades: Raw Data 265
- 15.3 Measuring Homogeneity of Voters' Grades 268
- 15.4 Conclusion 277

16 Objections to Majority Judgment 279

- 16.1 "Majority" and "Average" Objections 280
- 16.2 No-Show Objections 285
- 16.3 Conclusion 291

17 Point-Summing Methods 293

- 17.1 Point-Summing Methods: Theory 294
- 17.2 Point-Summing Methods: Practice 306
- 17.3 Conclusion 313

18 Approval Voting 315

- 18.1 Traditional Arguments 315
- 18.2 The Game of Approval Voting 318
- 18.3 Approval Judgment 325
- 18.4 Practice 329

19 Comparisons of Voting Methods 339

- 19.1 Bias for the Center 340
- 19.2 Manipulability 343
- 19.3 Conclusion 349

20 The Game of Voting 351

- 20.1 Equilibria 352
- 20.2 Honest Equilibria 355
- 20.3 Best Response Equilibria 360
- 20.4 Best Response Dynamics 366
- 20.5 Strategic Majority Judgment Winner 370
- 20.6 Condorcet-Judgment-Winner 373
- 20.7 Conclusion 374

21 Multicriteria Ranking 375

- 21.1 Aggregating Criteria 376
- 21.2 Common Language: Wine Competitions 378
- 21.3 Multicriteria Majority Judgment 382

22 A Summing Up 387

References395Name Index405Subject Index409