

Rational Choice

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Contents

Preface xiii
Suggested Reading xvii

I Optimization 1

1 Feasibility and Desirability 3

- 1.1 Examples 3
- 1.2 Separating *Can* from *Want* 3
- 1.3 What Is Meant by *Rational*? 5
- 1.4 Uncertainty 6
- 1.5 Zen and the Absurd 7
- 1.6 On Theories and Paradigms 9

2 Utility Maximization 11

- 2.1 Example 11
- 2.2 Two Points 17
- 2.3 Interpretations 17
 - 2.3.1 *Normative* 18
 - 2.3.2 *Descriptive* 19
 - 2.3.3 *Metascientific* 20
- 2.4 Measurement Issues 21
- 2.5 Utility and Disutility 22

3 Constrained Optimization 25

- 3.1 General Framework 25
- 3.2 Example: The Consumer Problem 27
- 3.3 Marginality Principle 29

II	Risk and Uncertainty	33
4	Expected Utility	35
4.1	Examples	35
4.2	Expected Value Maximization	36
4.2.1	<i>i.i.d. Random Variables</i>	36
4.2.2	<i>Law of Large Numbers</i>	37
4.2.3	<i>Practical Meaning of Expected Value</i>	38
4.3	Expected Utility Maximization	39
4.3.1	<i>von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theorem</i>	39
4.3.2	<i>Uniqueness of Utility</i>	40
4.3.3	<i>Risk Aversion</i>	41
4.3.4	<i>Prospect Theory</i>	43
4.4	Elicitation of Utility	44
4.5	From Simple to Complex	46
5	Probability and Statistics	49
5.1	What Is Probability?	49
5.2	Relative Frequencies as Objective Probabilities	52
5.3	Subjective Probabilities	54
5.4	Statistical Pitfalls	56
5.4.1	<i>Confounding Conditional Probabilities</i>	57
5.4.2	<i>Biased Samples</i>	59
5.4.3	<i>Regression to the Mean</i>	61
5.4.4	<i>Correlation and Causation</i>	64
5.4.5	<i>Statistical Significance</i>	67
III	Group Choices	71
6	Aggregation of Preferences	73
6.1	Summation of Utilities	73
6.2	Condorcet's Paradox	77
6.3	Impossibility Theorems	78
6.3.1	<i>Arrow's Theorem</i>	78
6.3.2	<i>Scoring Rules and Grading Systems</i>	80
6.3.3	<i>Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Theorem</i>	83
6.3.4	<i>An Argument for Approval Voting</i>	85
6.3.5	<i>Conclusion</i>	85
6.4	Pareto Optimality/Efficiency	85
6.5	Limitations of Pareto Optimality	87

6.5.1	<i>Silent on Equality</i>	88
6.5.2	<i>A Partial Order</i>	88
6.5.3	<i>Subjective Beliefs</i>	90
7	Games and Equilibria	91
7.1	Prisoner's Dilemma	91
7.1.1	<i>The Basic Story</i>	91
7.1.2	<i>Dominated Strategies</i>	92
7.1.3	<i>Back to Prisoner's Dilemma</i>	95
7.1.4	<i>The Meaning of Utility</i>	95
7.1.5	<i>Main Lessons</i>	97
7.1.6	<i>Changing the Rules of the Game</i>	99
7.1.7	<i>Repetition</i>	100
7.1.8	<i>Kant's Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule</i>	101
7.2	Nash Equilibria	103
7.2.1	<i>Definition</i>	103
7.2.2	<i>Justifications</i>	103
7.2.3	<i>Mixed Strategies</i>	105
7.3	Equilibrium Selection	107
7.3.1	<i>Stylized Examples</i>	107
7.3.2	<i>Real-Life Examples</i>	109
7.4	The Power of Commitment	111
7.5	Common Knowledge	113
7.6	Extensive Form Games	113
7.7	Perfectness and Credible Threats	114
7.7.1	<i>Backward Induction</i>	117
8	Free Markets	119
8.1	Example: The Case for Globalization	119
8.2	The First Welfare Theorem	123
8.3	Limitations of Free Markets	129
8.3.1	<i>Externalities and Public Goods</i>	129
8.3.2	<i>Market Power</i>	130
8.3.3	<i>Asymmetric Information</i>	130
8.3.4	<i>Existence versus Convergence</i>	132
8.3.5	<i>Formation of Preference</i>	133
8.3.6	<i>Irrational Behavior</i>	133
8.3.7	<i>What Is Measured by Utility?</i>	134
8.3.8	<i>A Limitation of Pareto Optimality</i>	134
8.4	Example	135

IV	Rationality and Emotions	137
9	Evolutionary View of Emotions	139
10	Utility and Well-Being	143
	10.1 Money Isn't Happiness	143
	10.2 Qualifications	145
	10.2.1 <i>The Validity of Questionnaires</i>	145
	10.2.2 <i>Don't Push Others off the Hedonic Treadmill</i>	147
	10.2.3 <i>People Don't Adjust to Everything</i>	148
	Epilogue	149
	Notes	151
	Index	155

Contents of Online Appendixes

Available at <http://mitpress.mit.edu/rationalchoice>.

A	Mathematical Preliminaries
	A.1 Notation
	A.2 Sets
	A.3 Relations and Functions
	A.4 Cardinalities of Sets
	A.5 Calculus
	A.5.1 <i>Limits of Sequences</i>
	A.5.2 <i>Limits of Functions</i>
	A.5.3 <i>Continuity</i>
	A.5.4 <i>Derivatives</i>
	A.5.5 <i>Partial Derivatives</i>
	A.6 Topology
	A.7 Probability
	A.7.1 <i>Basic Concepts</i>
	A.7.2 <i>Random Variables</i>
	A.7.3 <i>Conditional Probabilities</i>
	A.7.4 <i>Independence and i.i.d. Random Variables</i>
	A.7.5 <i>Law(s) of Large Numbers</i>
B	Formal Models
	B.1 Utility Maximization
	B.1.1 <i>Definitions</i>
	B.1.2 <i>Axioms</i>

- B.1.3 *Result*
- B.1.4 *Generalization to a Continuous Space*
- B.2 **Convexity**
 - B.2.1 *Convex Sets*
 - B.2.2 *Convex and Concave Functions*
 - B.2.3 *Quasi-convex and Quasi-concave Functions*
- B.3 **Constrained Optimization**
 - B.3.1 *Convex Problems*
 - B.3.2 *Example: The Consumer Problem*
 - B.3.3 *Algebraic Approach*
 - B.3.4 *Geometric Approach*
 - B.3.5 *Economic Approach*
 - B.3.6 *Comments*
- B.4 **vNM's Theorem**
 - B.4.1 *Setup*
 - B.4.2 *The vNM Axioms*
 - B.4.3 *Continuity*
 - B.4.4 *Independence*
 - B.4.5 *The Theorem*
- B.5 **Ignoring Base Probabilities**
- B.6 **Arrow's Impossibility Theorem**
- B.7 **Nash Equilibrium**

C Exercises

D Solutions