Rational Choice

Itzhak Gilboa

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Index

Absurdity, 8 Acts, 7-8 Adaptation level theory, 144, 148 Adverse selection, 131-132 Aesop's fox, 3-4 Aggregation of preferences, 73-90 approval voting, 82-85 Arrow's theorem, 78-80 Condorcet's paradox, 77-78 Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, 83-85 grading systems and scoring rules, 80-83 independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 79-81 marginal utility, 76 Pareto optimality/efficiency, 85-90 partial orders, 88-90 subjective probabilities, 90 summation of utilities, 73-77 unanimity, 79 Akerlof, George, 130-131 Altruism, 97-98 Anger, 140–142 Approval voting, 82-85 Arrow, Kenneth, 78–79, 132 Arrow's theorem, 78-80 Aspirations, 143–144 Attainability, 7-8 Aumann, Robert, 113 Axiomatic approach, 39, 46 Backward induction, 117-118 Bank run example, 110 Base probabilities, 58 Battle of the sexes game, 108–109, 111–112 Bayes, Thomas, 55 Bayesian approach, 55–56

Bentham, Jeremy, 73

Bernheim, Douglas, 104

Bernoulli, Daniel, 39 Bidding systems, 135–136 Borda count, 82 Brams, Steven, 82 Brickman, P., 144–145, 147

Campbell, Donald, 147 Cardinal utility function, 77 Casino example, 38, 42 Categorical imperative (CI), 101–103 Causal independence, 53-54 Causation, 64-67 Choice, 20-22, 71-72, 97-98, 145 Coates, D., 144-145 Commitment, 111–113 Common knowledge, 113 Communism, 98, 101 Comparison, complete and transitive, 17 Competitive equilibrium, 124-130, 132-133 Completeness axiom, 17 Concave utility function, 42, 76 Conditional probability, 57-59 Condorcet's paradox, 77-78 Constrained optimization, 25-32 constraints and objectives, 25-27 consumer problem, 27-29 marginality principle, 29-32 Consumer problem, 27-29 Consumers, 123-124, 133-134 Continuity axiom, 40 Controlled experiments, 66-67 Convex utility function, 42 Correlation, 64-67 Course selection problem, 135-136 Credible threats, 116-117 Damasio, Antonio, 142

Day Reconstruction Method, 146

de Borda, Jean-Charles, 82 Debreu, Gérard, 132 Decision makers, 71-72 Decision problem, 25-27 Decision variables, 25 Descriptive theory, 19-20, 72 Desirability, 3-9 Desirable outcome, 7 Dictatorial functions, 79-80 Disutility minimization, 22-23 Dominance, 94 Dominated strategies, 92-95 Dresher, Melvin, 96 Easterlin, Richard, 143 Efficiency, 86-87 Emotions, 139-142 Equilibrium, competitive, 124-130, 132-133. See also Games; Nash equilibria Equilibrium price, 125-126, 130 Evolutionary view of emotions, 139-142 Expected utility, 35-47 and adding utilities, 74 elicitation of, 44-46 expected gain and loss, 35-36, 38, 41, 43 i.i.d. random variables, 36-37 law of large numbers, 37-39 maximization, 39-47 maxmin, 56 prisoner's dilemma, 95-97 prospect theory, 43-44 risk aversion, 41-42 uniqueness, 40-41, 47 vNM theorem, 39-40, 44-46 Extensive form games, 113-114 Family size example, 59-60 Feasibility, 3-9 Feasible outcome, 7 First welfare theorem, 124-129, 133-136 Fishburn, Peter, 82 Flood, Merrill, 96

Flood, Merrill, 96 Free markets, 119–136 adverse selection, 131–132 asymmetric information, 130–131 competitive equilibrium, 124–130, 132– 133 course selection problem, 135–136 equilibrium price, 125–126, 130 externalities and public goods, 129–130 first welfare theorem, 124–129, 133–136

globalization, 119–123 irrationality, 133-134 labor market efficiency, 126-127 lump-sum transfers, 134-135 market power, 130 moral hazard, 132 Pareto optimality/efficiency, 123-129 preference formation, 133 principal agent problems, 132 product allocation, 127-128 second welfare theorem, 134-135 Frequencies, relative, 52-54 Gambling, 42-43 Games backward induction, 117-118 battle of the sexes, 108-109, 111-112 commitment, 111-113 common knowledge, 113 credible threats, 114-117 dominated strategies, 92-95 equilibrium selection, 107-111 extensive form, 113-114 mixed strategies, 105-107 Nash equilibria, 99, 103-107 perfect equilibria, 116-117 perfect information, 114 prisoner's dilemma, 91-103 pure coordination, 107-108 repetition, 100-101, 104 stag hunt, 109 tiger and she-bear, 140-142 Game theory, 39 Gibbard, Allan, 84 Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, 83-85 Globalization, 119-123 Golden Rule, 103 Grading systems, 80-83 Groucho Marx's Club, 3-4 Group choice, 71-72, 97-98

Halpern, Joseph, 113 Happiness, 143 Harsanyi, John, 74, 109 Hedonic treadmill, 147 Helson, Harry, 144 Historical events, 64–65 Hypothesis testing, 67–70

Identical and independent distribution, 36–37 i.i.d. random variables, 36–37

Index

Impossibility theorems, 78-85 Income, 143-144 Independence axiom, 40 Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 79-81 Information sets, 114 Insurance company example, 38, 41-42, 131-132 International politics example, 112–113 Irrationality, 133-134 Janoff-Bulman, R., 144–145 Kahneman, Daniel, 43, 146, 148 Kant, Immanuel, 73, 101-102 Labor market efficiency, 126-127 Landon, Alfred, 59 Law of large numbers (LLN), 37-39, 53 LeDoux, Joseph, 142 Legislation, 100 Leisure, 28 Lemons, 130-131 Lewis, David, 113 Linear regression, 61-62 Loss aversion, 43 Lump-sum transfers, 134-135 Marginality principle, 29–32 Marginal utility, 29-30, 42, 76 Markets. See Free markets Marx, Groucho, 3-4 Matching pennies, 105 Mathematical models, 28-29 Mathematician example, 7-9 Mathematics, 19 Maxmin expected utility, 56 Measurement, 21-22 Mill, John Stuart, 73 Mixed strategies, 105–107 Models, mathematical, 28-29

Monopoly, 130 Moral hazard, 132

Morgenstern, Oskar, 39

Nash equilibria, 99, 103–107

equilibrium selection, 107-111

credible threats, 116-117

mixed strategies, 105–107 Normative theory, 18–19, 72

Moses, Yoram, 113 Motivation, 23

optimization; Utility maximization Optimum, 88 Ordinal utility function, 22, 40, 77 Overfitting, 62 Paradigm, 9 Pareto dominance, 85, 88, 93 Pareto optimality/efficiency, 85-90 and equilibrium, 133 free markets, 123-129 limitation of, 134-135 Partial orders, 88–90 Pearce, David, 104 Perfect equilibria, 116-117 Perfect information games, 114 Possible outcome, 7 Preference formation, 133 Prices, equilibrium, 125-126, 130 Principal agent problems, 132 Prisoner's dilemma, 91-103 altruism, 97-98 categorical imperative (CI), 101-103 dominated strategies, 92-95 expected utility, 95-97 Golden Rule, 103 repetition, 100-101 rules change, 99-100 Probability, 49–56. See also Statistics base probabilities, 58 Bayesian approach, 55-56 conditional. 57-59 empirical relative frequency, 53 frequentist approach to, 52-54 and law of large numbers, 53 subjective, 54-56, 90 Progressive taxation, 76 Prospect theory, 43–44 Public services, 98-99 Pure coordination games, 107–108 Pure strategies, 106–107 Questionnaires, 145–147 Random variables, 35–37 Rationality defined, 5-6 in economic choice models, 5 Rationalizability, 104-105

Objective function, 26

optimality/efficiency

Optimality, 30-32, 88-90. See also Pareto

Optimization, 3-9. See also Constrained

Rawls, John, 74, 148 Regression analysis, 61–64 Regression to the mean, 63 Relative frequencies, 52-54 Respect for law example, 110 Revealed preference paradigm, 145 Revolution example, 109-110 Rhetoric, 19, 39 Risk aversion, 41-42, 76 Risk-neutral behavior, 43 Risk-seeking behavior, 42-43 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 59 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 109 Satterthwaite, Mark, 84 Scoring rules, 80-83 Second welfare theorem, 134-135 Selten, Reinhard, 109, 116 Significance, statistical, 67–70 Significance level, 69-70 Sincere voting, 85 Social choice problem, 74 Social norms, 100 Stag hunt game, 109 States, 7-8 Statistics, 56–70. See also Probability biased samples, 59-61 conditional probabilities, 57-59 correlation and causation, 64-67 regression analysis, 61-64 significance, 67-70 Strategic voting, 84 Strict domination, 92-94 Subgame perfect equilibria, 116–117 Temporal precedence, 64

Terms, definition of, 20 Theory, 9 axiomatic approach, 39 descriptive, 19–20, 72 normative, 18–19, 72 Tiger and she-bear game, 140–142 Transitive axiom, 17, 47, 79 Truthful reporting, 75, 128–129 Tversky, Amos, 43

Uncertainty, 6–7, 74. *See also* Probability Utilitarianism, 73–74 Utility. *See also* Expected utility and choice, 145 interpersonal comparisons of, 76–77, 87– 88

marginal, 29-30, 42, 76 and well-being, 134, 143-148 Utility functions, 143 adding, 73-77 concave/convex, 42, 76 and constraints, 27 degrees of freedom, 20-22 dictatorial, 79-80 expected utility, 40-41 objective function, 26 ordinal/cardinal, 22, 40, 77 Utility maximization, 11-23, 46-47, 143 and consumer behavior, 134 descriptive, 19-20 disutility, 22-23 measurement, 21-22 metascientific, 20 normative, 18-19 sum of utilities, 74-75 transitive comparison, 17

- Value maximization, 39, 41 vNM theorem, 39–40, 44–46, 106 von Neumann, John, 39 Voting systems, 82–85
- Waiting time example, 60 Weak domination, 92–94 Weber, Robert, 82 Welfare theorem first, 124–129, 133–136 second, 134–135 Well-being, 134, 143–148 Winner's curse example, 60–61 Wishful thinking, 3–4

Zen, 8