## Rational Choice

## Itzhak Gilboa

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## Index

Absurdity, 8
Acts, 7-8
Adaptation level theory, 144, 148
Adverse selection, 131-132
Aesop's fox, 3-4
Aggregation of preferences, 73-90
approval voting, 82-85
Arrow's theorem, 78-80
Condorcet's paradox, 77-78
Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, 83-85
grading systems and scoring rules, 80-83
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 79-81
marginal utility, 76
Pareto optimality / efficiency, 85-90
partial orders, 88-90
subjective probabilities, 90
summation of utilities, 73-77
unanimity, 79
Akerlof, George, 130-131
Altruism, 97-98
Anger, 140-142
Approval voting, 82-85
Arrow, Kenneth, 78-79, 132
Arrow's theorem, 78-80
Aspirations, 143-144
Attainability, 7-8
Aumann, Robert, 113
Axiomatic approach, 39, 46
Backward induction, 117-118
Bank run example, 110
Base probabilities, 58
Battle of the sexes game, 108-109, 111-112
Bayes, Thomas, 55
Bayesian approach, 55-56
Bentham, Jeremy, 73
Bernheim, Douglas, 104

Bernoulli, Daniel, 39
Bidding systems, 135-136
Borda count, 82
Brams, Steven, 82
Brickman, P., 144-145, 147

Campbell, Donald, 147
Cardinal utility function, 77
Casino example, 38, 42
Categorical imperative (CI), 101-103
Causal independence, 53-54
Causation, 64-67
Choice, 20-22, 71-72, 97-98, 145
Coates, D., 144-145
Commitment, 111-113
Common knowledge, 113
Communism, 98, 101
Comparison, complete and transitive, 17
Competitive equilibrium, 124-130, 132-133
Completeness axiom, 17
Concave utility function, 42, 76
Conditional probability, 57-59
Condorcet's paradox, 77-78
Constrained optimization, 25-32
constraints and objectives, 25-27
consumer problem, 27-29
marginality principle, 29-32
Consumer problem, 27-29
Consumers, 123-124, 133-134
Continuity axiom, 40
Controlled experiments, 66-67
Convex utility function, 42
Correlation, 64-67
Course selection problem, 135-136
Credible threats, 116-117

Damasio, Antonio, 142
Day Reconstruction Method, 146
de Borda, Jean-Charles, 82
Debreu, Gérard, 132
Decision makers, 71-72
Decision problem, 25-27
Decision variables, 25
Descriptive theory, 19-20, 72
Desirability, 3-9
Desirable outcome, 7
Dictatorial functions, 79-80
Disutility minimization, 22-23
Dominance, 94
Dominated strategies, 92-95
Dresher, Melvin, 96
Easterlin, Richard, 143
Efficiency, 86-87
Emotions, 139-142
Equilibrium, competitive, 124-130, 132133. See also Games; Nash equilibria

Equilibrium price, 125-126, 130
Evolutionary view of emotions, 139-142
Expected utility, 35-47
and adding utilities, 74
elicitation of, 44-46
expected gain and loss, 35-36, 38, 41, 43
i.i.d. random variables, 36-37
law of large numbers, 37-39
maximization, 39-47
maxmin, 56
prisoner's dilemma, 95-97
prospect theory, 43-44
risk aversion, 41-42
uniqueness, 40-41, 47
vNM theorem, 39-40, 44-46
Extensive form games, 113-114

Family size example, 59-60
Feasibility, 3-9
Feasible outcome, 7
First welfare theorem, 124-129, 133-136
Fishburn, Peter, 82
Flood, Merrill, 96
Free markets, 119-136
adverse selection, 131-132
asymmetric information, 130-131
competitive equilibrium, 124-130, 132133
course selection problem, 135-136
equilibrium price, $125-126,130$
externalities and public goods, 129-130
first welfare theorem, 124-129, 133-136
globalization, 119-123
irrationality, 133-134
labor market efficiency, 126-127
lump-sum transfers, 134-135
market power, 130
moral hazard, 132
Pareto optimality / efficiency, 123-129
preference formation, 133
principal agent problems, 132
product allocation, 127-128
second welfare theorem, 134-135
Frequencies, relative, 52-54
Gambling, 42-43
Games
backward induction, 117-118
battle of the sexes, 108-109, 111-112
commitment, 111-113
common knowledge, 113
credible threats, 114-117
dominated strategies, 92-95
equilibrium selection, 107-111
extensive form, 113-114
mixed strategies, 105-107
Nash equilibria, 99, 103-107
perfect equilibria, 116-117
perfect information, 114
prisoner's dilemma, 91-103
pure coordination, 107-108
repetition, 100-101, 104
stag hunt, 109
tiger and she-bear, 140-142
Game theory, 39
Gibbard, Allan, 84
Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, 83-85
Globalization, 119-123
Golden Rule, 103
Grading systems, 80-83
Groucho Marx's Club, 3-4
Group choice, 71-72, 97-98
Halpern, Joseph, 113
Happiness, 143
Harsanyi, John, 74, 109
Hedonic treadmill, 147
Helson, Harry, 144
Historical events, 64-65
Hypothesis testing, 67-70
Identical and independent distribution, 36-37
i.i.d. random variables, $36-37$

Impossibility theorems, 78-85
Income, 143-144
Independence axiom, 40
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 79-81
Information sets, 114
Insurance company example, 38, 41-42, 131-132
International politics example, 112-113
Irrationality, 133-134
Janoff-Bulman, R., 144-145
Kahneman, Daniel, 43, 146, 148
Kant, Immanuel, 73, 101-102
Labor market efficiency, 126-127
Landon, Alfred, 59
Law of large numbers (LLN), 37-39, 53
LeDoux, Joseph, 142
Legislation, 100
Leisure, 28
Lemons, 130-131
Lewis, David, 113
Linear regression, 61-62
Loss aversion, 43
Lump-sum transfers, 134-135
Marginality principle, 29-32
Marginal utility, 29-30, 42, 76
Markets. See Free markets
Marx, Groucho, 3-4
Matching pennies, 105
Mathematical models, 28-29
Mathematician example, 7-9
Mathematics, 19
Maxmin expected utility, 56
Measurement, 21-22
Mill, John Stuart, 73
Mixed strategies, 105-107
Models, mathematical, 28-29
Monopoly, 130
Moral hazard, 132
Morgenstern, Oskar, 39
Moses, Yoram, 113
Motivation, 23
Nash equilibria, 99, 103-107
credible threats, 116-117
equilibrium selection, 107-111
mixed strategies, 105-107
Normative theory, 18-19, 72

Objective function, 26
Optimality, 30-32, 88-90. See also Pareto optimality / efficiency
Optimization, 3-9. See also Constrained optimization; Utility maximization
Optimum, 88
Ordinal utility function, 22, 40, 77
Overfitting, 62
Paradigm, 9
Pareto dominance, 85, 88, 93
Pareto optimality/ efficiency, 85-90
and equilibrium, 133
free markets, 123-129
limitation of, 134-135
Partial orders, 88-90
Pearce, David, 104
Perfect equilibria, 116-117
Perfect information games, 114
Possible outcome, 7
Preference formation, 133
Prices, equilibrium, 125-126, 130
Principal agent problems, 132
Prisoner's dilemma, 91-103
altruism, 97-98
categorical imperative (CI), 101-103
dominated strategies, 92-95
expected utility, 95-97
Golden Rule, 103
repetition, 100-101
rules change, 99-100
Probability, 49-56. See also Statistics
base probabilities, 58
Bayesian approach, 55-56
conditional, 57-59
empirical relative frequency, 53
frequentist approach to, 52-54
and law of large numbers, 53
subjective, 54-56, 90
Progressive taxation, 76
Prospect theory, 43-44
Public services, 98-99
Pure coordination games, 107-108
Pure strategies, 106-107
Questionnaires, 145-147
Random variables, 35-37
Rationality
defined, 5-6
in economic choice models, 5
Rationalizability, 104-105

Rawls, John, 74, 148
Regression analysis, 61-64
Regression to the mean, 63
Relative frequencies, 52-54
Respect for law example, 110
Revealed preference paradigm, 145
Revolution example, 109-110
Rhetoric, 19, 39
Risk aversion, 41-42, 76
Risk-neutral behavior, 43
Risk-seeking behavior, 42-43
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 59
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 109
Satterthwaite, Mark, 84
Scoring rules, 80-83
Second welfare theorem, 134-135
Selten, Reinhard, 109, 116
Significance, statistical, 67-70
Significance level, 69-70
Sincere voting, 85
Social choice problem, 74
Social norms, 100
Stag hunt game, 109
States, 7-8
Statistics, 56-70. See also Probability biased samples, 59-61
conditional probabilities, 57-59
correlation and causation, 64-67
regression analysis, 61-64
significance, 67-70
Strategic voting, 84
Strict domination, 92-94
Subgame perfect equilibria, 116-117
Temporal precedence, 64
Terms, definition of, 20
Theory, 9
axiomatic approach, 39
descriptive, 19-20, 72
normative, 18-19, 72
Tiger and she-bear game, 140-142
Transitive axiom, 17, 47, 79
Truthful reporting, 75, 128-129
Tversky, Amos, 43
Uncertainty, 6-7, 74. See also Probability
Utilitarianism, 73-74
Utility. See also Expected utility
and choice, 145
interpersonal comparisons of, 76-77, 8788
marginal, 29-30, 42, 76
and well-being, 134, 143-148
Utility functions, 143
adding, 73-77
concave / convex, 42, 76
and constraints, 27
degrees of freedom, 20-22
dictatorial, 79-80
expected utility, 40-41
objective function, 26
ordinal / cardinal, 22, 40, 77
Utility maximization, 11-23, 46-47, 143
and consumer behavior, 134
descriptive, 19-20
disutility, 22-23
measurement, 21-22
metascientific, 20
normative, 18-19
sum of utilities, 74-75
transitive comparison, 17
Value maximization, 39,41
vNM theorem, 39-40, 44-46, 106
von Neumann, John, 39
Voting systems, 82-85
Waiting time example, 60
Weak domination, 92-94
Weber, Robert, 82
Welfare theorem
first, 124-129, 133-136
second, 134-135
Well-being, 134, 143-148
Winner's curse example, 60-61
Wishful thinking, 3-4

Zen, 8

