

Knowledge and Skepticism

edited by

Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein

A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England

© 2010 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.

MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. For information, please email special_sales@mitpress.mit.edu or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142.

This book was set in Stone Serif and Stone Sans on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong. Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference (7th : 2004 : Pullman, Wash., and Moscow, Idaho)

Knowledge and skepticism / edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein.

p. cm. — (Topics in contemporary philosophy)

"A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 978-0-262-01408-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-262-51396-8

(pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Knowledge, Theory of—Congresses. 2. Skepticism—Congresses. I. Campbell, Joseph Keim, 1958–. II. O'Rourke, Michael, 1963–. III. Silverstein, Harry S., 1942–. IV. Title.

BD161.I56 2010

121—dc22

2009037402

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Index

- Acceptance, 21, 313–318, 321
Adler, Jonathan, 310, 313
Agreement, 166–172, 239–240, 245,
332–334, 348, 350
Airport Case, 40, 112–115, 117–118, 122
Alston, William, 46, 56, 57, 65, 67, 176–
178
Ancient Trilemma, 1, 5–6, 11, 22
Anti-individualism, 2, 20, ch. 11 *passim*
Appearing, theory of, 176–177, 277
Arcesilaus, 338
Arguments for skepticism. *See* Skepti-
cism, arguments for
Ascription sentences, 17, 85–96, 98, 101
explicit, 89, 91, 94–96, 101
simple, 17, 89–90, 91–96
third-person, 17, 91, 94, 96
Asserted/stated/claimed, what is, 93,
137, 138, 145, 147–158, 159, 160
pragmatic determinants of, 18, 137,
145, 147–158, 159, 160
Audi, Robert, 21, 53, 57, 67, 289, 290,
350
Austin, John L., 101, 347
Awareness, 19, 20, 45, 177, 183, ch. 9
passim, 275
Ayer, A. J., 101, 348
Bacchus, Fahiem, 224, 255, 256
Bach, Kent, 46, 55, 57, 99, 129, 130, 132,
133, 144, 150, 160
Bank Case, 40, 112–117, 118, 122,
138–139, 141–142, 151, 154, 156,
160
Barry, Melissa, 307
Beattie, James, 325, 329, 330
Belief, chs. 1–3 *passim*, 95, 100, 106,
111–119, 122, 127, 130–133, 168,
ch. 7 *passim*, 181, 187–188, 190, 194,
200, 204, 208, 210–212, 215–217,
230, 277, 280, 287, chs. 12–13 *passim*,
328–329, 336, 339, 341–343, 345,
346, 347
de re, 208
justified, reliable process theory of, 174,
177
threshold for, 17, 113–115, 126, 132
Bergmann, Michael, 306
Berkeley, George, 18, 165, 270, 273, 323,
328, 347
Bernecker, Sven, 9
Bilgrami, Akeel, 216
Black, Tim, 99
Boghossian, Paul, 200, 281, 282
Bolton, Martha, 178
BonJour, Laurence, 6, 46, 54, 57, 59, 67,
68, 289
Borg, Emma, 150
Braithwaite, R. B., 224
Brandom, Robert, 56, 57, 67, 100
Brown, Jessica, 99, 130, 282
Brueckner, Anthony, 282, 283

- Burge, Tyler, 53, 57, 60, 67–68, 216, 277, 281, 282, 283
- Buridan, Jean, 326
- Burke, Edmund, 345, 351, 352
- Burnyeat, Myles, 15, 314
- Butler, Joseph, 340
- Byrne, Alex, 200
- Cappelen, Herman, 137, 139–141, 144, 146, 148, 150–151, 157–160
- Carnap, Rudolf, 242, 255
- Carneades, 338
- Carston, Robyn, 147, 150
- Cartesianism, 16, 45, 47–49, 53–54, 57, 61, 62
- Casullo, Albert, 64, 66
- Cavell, Stanley, 335, 350
- Chalmers, David, 216
- Chisholm, Roderick, 52–53, 57, 63, 176, 190, 287, 289
- Cicero, 338
- Closure, epistemic, 12, 13, 17, 75–78, 82, 124, 129, 138, 139, 146, 153–155
deductive, principle of, 12, 13, 17, 138–139, 146, 153–155
- Cognition, 288, 290, 291, 294–295, 298–299, 302, 306
- Cohen, L. Jonathan, 21, 313, 321
- Cohen, Stewart, 40, 41, 65, 97, 98, 99–100, 101, 113, 139, 142
- Coherentism, 3, 4–6, 15, 22, 45, 46, 50, 52, 54, 56–59
- Color(s), 19, 167, ch. 8 *passim*, 212, 267, 327
dispositional theories of, 184–185, 198–199
presentation, 190–192, 194–195, 197, 200
secondary quality account of, 167, 185–186
- Commitment principle, 93, 95, 96, 100
- Conee, Earl, 45, 59
- Confidence, threshold of. *See* Doxastic confidence, threshold of
- Context(s), 1–2, 7–10, 14, 17–18, 22, 28, 31, 37, 40, 78, 81, chs. 4–6 *passim*, 272, 274, 276, 279, 310–311
high-standard, 8–9, 17, 90, 113–117, 124, 126–127, 138, 310
low-standard, 8–9, 17, 113, 122–124, 127, 130, 138
- Context-bound, 106, 107, 109, 126
- Context-sensitive, 8, 18, 85, 90, 92, 106–107, 109, 112–113, 129, ch. 6 *passim*
sentences, 109
terms, 8, 18, 85, 106–107, 112–113, 128, ch. 6 *passim*
- Contextualism, 8–9, 14, 16–18, 22, 27, 31, 34–36, 39–40, ch. 4 *passim*, 105–107, 109–110, 113, 117, 126–129, 131, ch. 6 *passim*
attributor, 17, 22, 40, 106, 113–117, 119, 122–123, 126, 130–131, 138, 146, 153–157
epistemic, 27, 34, 40, 105, 126
Generality Objection to, 90–91
linguistic arguments against, 137, 139–140, 143
speech-act version, 145–148, 151–153, 159
spirit of, 17, 137, 140–141, 143, 145–146, 150, 152–157, 160
subject, 98
type-semantics version, 145, 148, 151
- Crossproduct principle, 229, 233
- Cruz, Joseph, 5, 53, 57, 287, 289–291, 306, 307
- Dancy, Jonathan, 9
David, Marian, 82
- Davidson, Donald, 54, 59, 277, 283
- Davie, George, 352
- Deductive epistemic closure, principle of. *See* Closure, epistemic, deductive, principle of

- de Finetti, Bruno, 256
- Deism, 328, 337, 348
- Deleuze, Gilles, 326, 330–333
- Deontologism, 49, 59, 65
- DeRose, Keith, 4, 9, 11, 13–14, 16–17, 22, 31, 40, 41, 73–74, 81, 86–91, 94, 96–97, 98, 99, 100, 113, 115–116, 125, 129, 131, 138–139, 152–153, 159
- Descartes, René, 5, 21, 111, 119, 270, 280, 292, 293–294, 296, 309, 316, 327–328, 331, 338–339, 343, 346
- Devitt, Michael, 64
- Dewey, John, 56, 57
- Direct inference, 225–227, 239–244, 248–249, 254, 256
- Discriminating evidence principle (DE), the, 21, 289, 294–295, 299–304, 306
- Dispositions, 184–187, 198–199, 200
- Dogmatism, 329, 343–344, 351
- Douven, Igor, 159
- Doxastic confidence, threshold of, 113–115, 126, 128, 132
- Dreier, James, 159
- Dretske, Fred, 3, 9, 13, 15, 27, 33–34, 37, 40, 42, 73, 75, 142, 159, 214, 215, 217, 282, 283
- Elgin, Catherine Z., 56, 57, 319
- Ellis, R. L., 256
- Empiricism, 187, 271, 329–331, 333
- Epistemic principles, 2, 16, 21, 46–52, 54–55, 57, 60–63, ch. 12 *passim*, 319
- Evans, Gareth, 212
- Evidence, 3, 5, 11, 15, 17, 21, ch. 1 *passim*, 45–46, 49, 51, 53, 62–65, 67, 92–93, 95–96, 99–100, 107, 112–117, 119–121, 126–127, 131, 132, 133, 142, 160, 171–172, 175, 177–178, 207, 217, 253, ch. 12 *passim*, 310–312, 315–316, 322, 328
- Externalism, 3–5, 7, 12, 13, 15–16, 45, 46, 50, 59–60, 61, 65, 66–68, 73, 131, 133, 266–270, 271, 273, 281–283
- content, 131, 266–270, 271, 273, 281–283
- about justification, 3–5, 12, 15, 45, 46, 50, 59–60, 65, 66–68
- about knowledge, 7, 13, 16, 73, 133
- radical, 60, 61, 68
- reasonable, 60, 61
- semantic, 266–270, 271, 273, 281–283
- Fallibilism, 49, 57, 105, 118, 133, 281, 296
- Fantl, Jeremy, 131
- Feldman, Richard, 45, 52–53, 57–59, 98, 130, 160
- Field, Hartry, 56–57, 65
- Fisher, R. A., 224
- Floridi, Luciano, 348
- Fogelin, Robert J., 98, 352
- Foley, Richard, 56–57, 67
- Fosl, Peter, 343, 346, 348, 350, 351, 352
- Foundationalism, 3–6, 11, 15, 16, 22, 45–46, 50–52, 54, 56–59, 169, 281, 329
- Frede, Michael, 15
- Frege, Gottlob, 267
- Fricker, Elizabeth, 211, 216
- Fumerton, Richard, 54, 57, 65, 67, 68
- Gallilei, Galileo, 327, 346
- Gallois, André, 216, 217, 281
- Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel, 215
- Garrett, Don, 345, 352
- Gassendi, Pierre, 327, 346
- Gettier, Edmund, 6, 22
- Gettier examples, 6–7, 46, 106, 132, 133
- Gilson, Étienne, 348
- Goldman, Alvin, 4, 5, 7, 13, 40, 45, 55, 57, 64, 66–67, 305
- Goodman, Nelson, 230, 290
- Graham, Peter, 66, 323
- Grandy, Richard, 100
- Greco, John, 9, 55, 57, 292, 306
- Grice, Paul, 41, 92, 100, 160

- Gricean conversational maxims, 41, 92–96, 100
- Haack, Susan, 66
- Haldane, John, 283
- Hallucinations, 176, 208–210, 271
- Halpern, Joseph, 224, 256
- Harman, Gilbert, 133, 220, 307
- Hawthorne, John, 13, 41, 82, 119–121, 124, 130, 131, 132, 159
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 56, 57
- Heidegger, Martin, 349
- Heil, John, 67
- Heller, Mark, 98, 129
- Hempel, Carl, 348
- Hilbert, David, 200
- Hintikka, Jaakko, 255
- Hobbes, Thomas, 332, 349
- Huemer, Michael, 53, 57
- Hume, David, 2, 21–22, 109, 112, 264–265, 273–276, 299, 301, 314, 316, 323, ch. 14 *passim*
- Implicature, conversational, ch. 4 *passim*, 101, 147, 150, 151
- Independence, statistical, 20, 222–223, 229, 233, 235–237, 239, 241, 243, 245, 248, 249, 254
- Indifference principle, 231–236, 254, 256
- Infallibilism, 5, 49, 58, 105, 280, 283
- Infinetism, 22
- Inheritance, 243–246, 248–249, 254–255
- Internalism, 3–4, 6, 7, 15–16, 45–46, 50, 59–62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 131, 266–271
 combined, 59–61, 66, 67, 68
 content-, 131
 epistemic, 59–61, 67, 68, 131
 about justification, 3–4, 6, 7, 15–16
 about knowledge, 7
 ontological, 59–61, 67
- Introspection, 1, 10, 18, 20, 45, 47, 50, 54, 59–61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 207, 264–266, 273–277, 279–281, 282, 283
- Intuition(s), 8, 17, 19, 54, 62–63, 85, 87–89, ch. 5 *passim*, 144–145, 148–150, 158, 172, 183–186, 269–270, 273, 306, 310, 328, 340, 347
 commonsense/Moorean, 108
 contextualist, ch. 5 *passim*
 Lockean, 19, 183–186
 skeptical, 8, 88, 108–110, 112–116, 122–124, 127, 306
- Intuitionism, 16, 45, 47–49, 51–53, 55–57, 60–62, 65
- Invariantism, 8, 39, 41, 86–87, 88, 95–96, 99, 111, 115, 117–119, 122–123, 126, 130–131
 conversational defense of, 86
 moderate, 115, 117, 122–123, 131
 nonskeptical, 41, 87, 130
 skeptical, 41, 87, 117, 130
 subject-sensitive, 106, 117–118, 126
- Jeffrey, Richard, 256
- Johnston, Mark, 181–182, 187, 191, 200
- Judgment, suspension of, 294, 296, 303, 310–317, 341, 351
- Justification, 1, 3–7, 10–11, 14–16, 21, ch. 2 *passim*, 92, 94–96, 119, 126, 129, 177, 207, 217, 289–291, 293, 295–299, 301, 304, 307
 actual-result, 15–16, 45, 47, 56–57, 63, 68
 evidentialism, 3, 5–6, 11, 53, 92, 94–96, 126
 prima facie, 5, 21, 47–48, 51, 53–55, 59, 65, 66, 177, 289, 295–298, 301, 307
 proper-aim, 15–16, 45, 47, 55–57, 63
- Kahn, Charles H., 349
- Kant, Immanuel, 317, 319–321, 323, 347

- Kaplan, David, 140
 Kaplan, Mark, 56–57
 Kitcher, Philip, 55, 57, 64, 66
 Klein, Peter, 6, 22, 130, 283, 338, 350, 352
 Kneale, William, 256
 Knowing, 19, 74, 78, 82, 90, 110–111, 114, 118–119, 124–125, 129, 133, 142, 155, 159, 183, 186, ch. 9 *passim*, 234, 253, 265, 273, 280, 342
 doxastic condition on, 118–119, 130
 Knowledge, introduction *passim*, chs. 1–3 *passim*, 85–86, 89–92, 94, 96–99, chs. 5–7 *passim*, 182, 184, 186–187, 194, 204, 211–212, 214–217, 219, 221–223, 225–226, 242, 244, 248, 252, 254, ch. 11 *passim*, 292, 306, 323, 328, 338–339, 343, 347
a posteriori, 10, 16, 57, 266
a priori, 10, 16, ch. 2 *passim*, 265–266, 269–270, 282
 ascriptions/attributions, 9, 17, 31, 85–98, 101, 139, 153, 283
 certain, 18, 165–167, 172–173
 conditional vs. categorical, 107, 122–125, 127
 fundamentalism/nonfundamentalism, 16, 45, 47, 54, 56–57, 64, 65, 66
 introspective, 1, 10, 18, 64, 265–266, 282, 283
 perceptual, 1, 18, 171, 173–174
 Platonic analysis of, 2, 3, 6–7
 probabilistic, 10, 20, 230
 procedural, 10, 18
 propositional, 10, 18, 159
 rational, 1, 10, 18, 221, 291, 305
 real vs. verbal, 169
 reflective, 16, ch. 3 *passim*
 reliable-process theory of, 174, 177–178
 self-, 10, 20, ch. 11 *passim*
 sensitive, 18, ch. 7 *passim*
 standards for, 1, 8–9, 14, 17, 28–31, 35–37, 40, 61, 85, 90–91, 97, 98, 99–100, chs. 5 and 6 *passim*, 309–310, 319–320, 322
 Kornblith, Hilary, 110, 130
 Korsgaard, Christine M., 323
 Kripke, Saul, 203
 Kyburg, Henry, 224, 225, 256
 Laird, John, 343
 Landesman, Charles, 55, 57
 Laws of nature, 254, 269, 328–330, 335–337, 340, 347, 348
 Lehrer, Keith, 6, 22, 52, 57
 Lepore, Ernest, 137, 139–141, 146, 148, 150–151, 157–158, 159, 160
 Lewis, David, 12, 14, 40, 41, 82–83, 98, 105, 119–120, 127, 132, 142, 160, 310
 Livingston, Donald W., 343, 345, 346, 348, 352
 Locke, John, 18, ch. 7 *passim*, 183, 186, 200, 327, 332, 342, 346
 Lottery, 2, 3, 30–32, 36–37, 41, 124–125, 133
 Luper, Steven, 82
 Lycan, William, 82, 215
 Mackie, J. L., 348
 Malcolm, Norman, 14, 160
 Malebranche, Nicholas, 327, 346
 McCormick, Miriam, 350
 McDowell, John, 272, 281, 284
 McGrath, Matthew, 131
 McGrew, Timothy, 54, 57
 McKinsey, Michael, 263–265, 282
 McKinsey argument, the, 263–265, 279–281
 McLaughlin, Brian, 273, 282, 283
 Michaud, Yves, 348
 Miller, Richard W., 282
 Moore, G. E., 12, 108–110, 116, 130, 160
 Morris, William E., 345
 Moser, Paul, 9
 Mossner, Ernest, 350

- Nagel, Ernest, 348
 Nagel, Thomas, 15
 Naturalism, 21–22, 291, ch. 14 *passim*
 Neto, José R., 350
 Newton, Isaac, 327, 337, 346
 Nichols, Shaun, 131
 Nozick, Robert, 16, 73, 75, 82
- Pain. *See* Sensations, pain
 Paine, Thomas, 348
 Paller, Bonnie, 65
 Pap, Arthur, 348
 Pappas, George, 178
 Paradox, 15, 100, 107, 108, 110, 123
 Particularism, 52, 63
 Peacocke, Christopher, 53, 57, 64, 66, 212
 Pearl, Judea, 223
 Peirce, Charles Saunders, 56–57, 224, 256
 Perception, 1, 3, 5, 10, 18, 45, 47–48, 50–51, 53, 55–56, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 92, 111, 130, ch. 7 *passim*, 181, 183, 184, 190, 197–198, 200, 205, 210, 212, 215, 271–273, 278–279, ch. 12 *passim*, 310, 327–328, 332, 342, 344, 347, 351
 indirect realist account of, 18, 165, 166, 173–178
 Perry, John, 147, 150
 Pitcher, George, 215
 Plantinga, Alvin, 4, 5, 7, 13, 65, 289
 Plato, 2–3, 7, 22, 338, 349
 Pollock, John, 5, 20, 46, 53, 57, 63, 220, 221, 224–228, 230–231, 239, 241–242, 256, 257, 289–291, 306, 307
 Popkin, Richard H., 344–345, 348
 Popper, Karl, 224, 235, 348
 Practical Interests, 107, 115, 117–119, 130
 Pragmatics, 34, 145, 146, 156, 159, 160
 Pragmatism, 16, 45, 47–49, 55–57, 62, 65, 305
- Principle (R), 310–313
 Pritchard, Duncan, 98
 Probability, 2, 10, 18–20, 30, 36, 166, ch. 10 *passim*, 338–339, 351
 Probable probabilities, 20, 223, 227, 230–231, 234–235, 237–238, 244, 249, 253–255
 Projectibility constraint, 230, 290
 Projection principle, 229, 256
 Proportions, 20, 227–238, 242
 Pryor, Jim, 67
 Pust, Joel, 64, 67
 Putnam, Hilary, 217, 267, 268, 282, 283, 323
- Qualities, 18, 19, 167, 171–172, 175, 178, 185–186, 188, 190–192, 194, 200, 207, 210, 215, 216, 327–330, 336, 338
 intrinsic, 330, 336
 primary vs. secondary, 19, 167, 185–186, 200, 327–329, 338
 sensory-, 183, 192, 210
 Quine, Willard van Orman, 59, 347
 Quotation, 140–141, 158, 200–201
- Randall, John, 342
 Rationalism, 49, 187, 326, 328–329, 331, 347
 Realism, 18, 66, 173–178, 295, 303, 337, 343, 350
 commonsense, 295, 303
 direct/indirect, 18, 173–178
 representative, 173
 Reasoning, 6, 9, 13, 18, 19, 21, 54, 59–61, 172, ch. 10 *passim*, 265, 287, 289–291, 294, 298–299, 301–302, 305, 306, 307, 314–316, 319–322, 325, 328, 338, 340, 347
 deductive, 13, 50, 54, 61, 328
 default, 132
 defeasible, ch. 10 *passim*
 hypothetical, 265

- inductive, 316
 practical, 132
 Reasons, 3, 14, 22, 38–39, 50, 52, 63, 67, 73, 92, 98, 116–118, 121–122, 126–127, 130, 132, 168, 171, 207, 212, 226, 230, 233, 236, 239–240, 242–243, 245, 253, 277, 280, 289–290, 305, 310–312, 315, 318, 320–322, 347
 conclusive, 73
 concurrent, 168, 171
 defeasible, 226, 230, 233, 236, 240, 242–243, 245, 253, 289
 epistemic, 117–118, 132
 practical, 116–118, 122, 132
 prima facie, 127, 290
 skeptical, 122, 347
 Reichenbach, Hans, 225, 244, 256
 Reid, Thomas, 178, 203, 325
 Relevance, epistemic, 32, 41, 107, 306, 311
 Relevant alternatives view, 13–14, 28–32, 35–37, 39, 40, 41, 117, 119, 127, 129, 310–311
 speaker-sensitive, 28–30, 35–37, 40, 41
 subject-sensitive, 28, 32, 37, 40, 41
 Reliabilism, 16, 45, 47–48, 54–57, 62, 65, 73, 132
 Renyi, Alfred, 235
 Restricted content problem, 166–167, 175, 178
 Revelation, Doctrine of, 19, 181–188, 190–192, 198, 199
 Role/occupant analysis, 195, 201
 Rorty, Richard, 54, 56, 57, 59, 67, 68, 350
 Ross, W. D., 52
 Russell, Bertrand, 4, 182, 200, 224, 267, 282, 301, 348
 Ryle, Gilbert, 347
 Rysiew, Patrick, 41, 101, 115, 130, 160
 Saliency, 32, 41, 106–107, 119, 126, 130
 Saturated expression meaning, 147–151, 156–157, 160
 Savage, L. J., 223, 256
 Sawyer, Sarah, 282, 283
 Schaffer, Jonathan, 41, 129, 160
 Schiffer, Stephen, 98, 128–129, 160
 Schmitt, Frederick, 55, 57, 67
 Searle, John, 147, 150, 282
 Self-intimation principle, 19, 207–214
 Sellars, Wilfrid, 306
 Semantics, 8, 20, 34, 123, 125, 127, 140–141, 144–149, 151, 157, 158, 183, 227, 256, 268
 Sensations, 11, 18, 19, 166–167, 172, 176–178, 186, ch. 9 *passim*, 274, 333–335, 341, 349
 pain, 18, 19, 176, ch. 9 *passim*, 333–335, 349
 Sense impressions, 197–198, 350
 Sextus Empiricus, 338–341, 343–344, 350, 351
 Sherman, Brett, 133
 Shoemaker, Sydney, 215, 216
 Sidgwick, Henry, 52
 Siewert, Charles P., 215, 216
 Skeptical hypotheses, 1, 4–6, 11–14, 22, ch. 1 *passim*, 89, 91–96, 99, 108–112, 115–117, 119, 130, 217, 282, 288, 292–293, 295–297, 301, 310–312
 Ancient Trilemma, 1, 5–6, 11, 22
 brain-in-a-vat (BIV) hypothesis, 4, 11–13, 89, 92–96, 99, 108–112, 116, 119, 130, 217, 282, 288, 297
 evil demon hypothesis, 12, 115, 119, 138, 292–293, 295–297, 301
 vs. relevant alternatives, 13–14, ch. 1 *passim*, 117, 119, 127, 129, 310–311
 Skepticism, ch. 1 *passim*, 29–32, 36–41, chs. 4–5 *passim*, 137–138, 146, 153–154, 156–157, 159, 160, 165, 178, 213, chs. 11–14 *passim*
 Academic, 2, 21, 326, 337–339, 344, 346, 350, 351

- Skepticism (*cont.*)
 ancient, 316, 329, 337–339, 342, 344
 arguments for, 1, 11–15, 21
 Cartesian, 20, 263–264, 323
 commonsense response to, 12, 108
 concessive responses to, 14–15
 external-world, 263–264, 279–281,
 292–293, 295–296, 298–299, 301
 Humean, 109, 264–265, 273–276, 301,
 323, ch. 14 *passim*
 Moore's response to, 12, 108–110, 116,
 129, 130, 160
 physical-object, 263, 278–279
 Pyrrhonian, 2, 21, 314, 316, 326, 338–
 346, 350–351, 352
 Russellian, 301
 Sklar, Lawrence, 224
 Skyrms, Brian, 256
 Smith, Adam, 351
 Smith, Norman Kemp, 325
 Sosa, Ernest, 7, 9, 13, 63, 64, 73, 78–79,
 81, 82, 98, 100, 130, 289
 Sparse Probability Knowledge, Problem
 of, 19, 219–223, 226–227, 254
 Speaker-world magnets, 140–141,
 144
 Speech reports, 140–141
 Sperber, Dan, 147, 150, 160
 Stainton, Robert, 149, 150
 Stalnaker, Robert, 83, 160
 Stampe, Dennis, 282, 283
 Stanley, Jason, 41, 128, 131–132, 137,
 141–144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 157–
 159
 Statistical syllogism, 230–231, 233–234,
 236, 240–241, 249, 253–253
 Stich, Stephen, 64, 131
 Stine, Gail, 13, 138, 155
 Stoljar, Daniel, 215
 Strawson, Galen, 183, 200
 Strawson, Peter, 15, 282
 Stroud, Barry, 14, 68, 99, 287, 292
 Sturgeon, Scott, 306
 Subproperty, 227, 230–231, 240–243,
 254
 Substantial form, 326–328
 Thagard, Paul, 54, 59
 Thoughts, 53, 77, 120–122, 147, 159,
 191, 192, 200, ch. 11 *passim*, 288, 290,
 302, 331, 340–341, 351
 ordinary-standard, 109–110, 130, 160
 skeptical-standard, 109–110, 159
 Travis, Charles, 150, 160
 Truth, 3, 5–6, 8, 15–19, 36, 40, 42, 45–
 49, 52–56, 62–64, 66, ch. 3 *passim*,
 85–92, 96–97, 110, 113–117, 120,
 122, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, ch. 6
passim, 169–170, 182, 186–187, 211–
 212, 222, 263–264, 277, 339, 347, 352
 conditions, 8, 16–18, 40, 78–79, 86–87,
 90, 96, 113, 115, 117, 126, 131, 139,
 145, 147–148, 151–153, 156, 160,
 212
 -values, 85, 97, 106, 108, 110, 115,
 117, 127, 130, 139, 144, 151–152,
 157, 159
 Truth tracking, 16, ch. 3 *passim*
 Twin Earth thought experiments, 265,
 267–269
 Tye, Michael, 215, 273, 282, 283
 Unger, Peter, 8, 14, 22, 41, 99, 130, 138,
 142, 159
 Utterance, 17, 85, 106, 116, 128, 131,
 133, 140, 144, 145–146, 148–149,
 151, 156, 159, 160, 269
 van Cleve, James, 306
 van Fraassen, Paul, 224
 Velleman, David, 200
 Venn, John, 256
 Vogel, Jonathan, 16, ch. 3 *passim*, 98
 Warfield, Ted, 82, 282
 Warrant, 7, 131, 138, 216, 311, 313, 327

- Warranted assertibility maneuver
(WAM), 9, 16–17, ch. 4 *passim*, 131,
156
- Weinberg, Jonathan, 131, 307
- Weitzman, Leora, 283
- Williams, Michael, 57–59, 98
- Williamson, Timothy, 99, 100, 131, 306
- Wilson, Deirdre, 147, 150, 160
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 3, 15, 56–57, 101,
263, 267, 274, 279, 282, 283, 334,
335, 347, 350, 352
- Woodfield, Andrew, 282, 283
- Wright, Crispin, 216
- Wright, John P., 342, 345