

# **Exchange Rate Regimes in the Modern Era**

**Michael W. Klein and Jay C. Shambaugh**

The MIT Press  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
London, England

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This book was set in Palatino on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong.  
Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Klein, Michael W., 1958–.

Exchange rate regimes in the modern era / Michael W. Klein and Jay C. Shambaugh.  
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-262-01365-9 (hbk. : alk. paper)

1. Foreign exchange rates. 2. Foreign exchange. I. Shambaugh, Jay C. II. Title.

HG3851.K57 2010

332.4'5—dc22

2009014104

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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