FREEDOM:
Reassessments and Rephrasings

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Phrygian Liberty Cap—worn by paleo-Christians, Yezidi Muslims, "The Three Wise Men," Mithra, Marianne, enfranchised slaves in Rome, revolutionaries in France, and patriots in the American War of Independence—is on the state flag of New York. —*Ed*.

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Freedom? The Very Thought of It!

Jose V. Ciprut

In every freedom there nestles a voluntary form of enslavement. Humans meet their freedom under myriad guises; and between birth and death, liberation comes in many forms. Some have measured freedom in discrete instants,[1] others by the amount of justice it embodies,[2] the attitudes it affords,[3] the mistakes it forgives,[4] and the serious responsibilities that it entails.[5] Sören Kierkegaard once suggested that "people demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use." For U.S. politician Barry Goldwater, freedom was too precious a commodity to be entrusted in the hands of the indifferently semi-sovereign: "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." Lastly, when it comes to defending liberty, one "should never put on one's best trousers" when going out "to fight for freedom," warns Henrik Ibsen in *The Enemy of the People*.

In 1940, the town of Oswiecim in Poland became Auschwitz under the German Wehrmacht's occupation. The path to "freedom" for Jews, and also for Gypsies, in the model death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau, passed through the cleansing/gassing facilities and the crematorium's smokestack, both serviced with exemplary *tüchtigkeit*.[6] The German death camp's wrought-iron entrance gate bore a black ornamental inscription. It read *"Arbeit Macht Frei"* (toil sets free). But that iron

1. Jeffrey Borenstein: ". . . that instant between when someone tells you to do something and when you decide how to respond."
2. Edmund Burke: "Whenever a separation is made between liberty and justice, neither, in my opinion, is safe."
3. Viktor Frankl: "The last of the human freedoms is to choose one's attitudes."
4. Mahatma Ghandi: "Freedom is not worth having if it does not include the freedom to make mistakes."
5. G. Bernard Shaw: "Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it."
6. "Proficiency" in German.

dictum rested on an ironic conundrum: for those who had decreed "the final solution," as for those who triaged, processed, and dispatched the Jews to their "freedom" promptly upon arrival, *die Juden* were *"arbeitsunfähig"* (unsuited for work) to begin with. The automatic "liberation" of the frail, the sick, the newborn, and the elderly among those reaching their destination in cattle cars was a foregone conclusion. Healthy slaves could wait for their turn: all in good time. In this version of freedom, liberty was death; and life, a Hobson's choice. Not quite so for the American revolutionary in early colonial times, who felt free enough to perceive—indeed, to demand—a distinction twixt death and liberty.[7]

For the bard, by contrast, freedom is but a way of life—*chacun à sa façon*—"Like a bird on the wire, like a drunk in a midnight choir I have tried in my way to be free."[8] Some philosophers ideate freedom as a state; others view it as an ideal, the pursuit of which, by self and by other—whereas often projected in absolute terms—is neared relatively at best, if asymptotically at most. Not so for the embattled statesman and idealist man of faith, who perceives causal links among personal freedoms, societal democracy, and global peace, and for whom

> [t]here is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom . . . . Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities . . . . [M]oral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right . . . will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude, or that any human being aspires to live at the mercy of bullies . . . . [R]ights must be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human liberty . . . . Liberty for all does not mean independence from one another [but] relies on men and women who look after a neighbor and surround the lost with love . . . value the life [they] see in one another . . . and must always remember that even the unwanted have worth . . . . We have confidence because freedom is the permanent hope of mankind, the hunger in dark places, the longing of the soul . . . . When the [U.S.] Declaration of Independence was first read in public and the Liberty Bell was sounded in celebration, a witness said, "It rang as if it meant something." In our time it means something still. (Bush 2005)

7. Patrick Henry: "Give me liberty or give me death."
8. Leonard Cohen, Stranger Music Inc. (BMI). © Sony Music Canada.

In this cross-disciplinary volume, we reassess and rephrase the conceptualizations and theorizations of freedom and their appropriate applicability to daily practices. We situate our analytic-synthetic perspectives in historical contexts. This permits us to reinterpret and to update the elusive promise long attributed to this polyvalent and multifaceted thought. The framework bases itself on contemporary quests for meaning. The field-specific studies, besides having an insightful illustrative value, help to reconcile theory and practice, keeping the past, the present, and especially the possible future of that thought in mind. Here is how the authors voice their respective sensitivities, appreciations, and concerns in interconnecting arrays of thoughts and arguments, inside a shared ideational framework that quite correctly and completely can be paraphrased in six short words, a question mark, and a (muted) exclamation point, on this occasion: Freedom? Beware what you wish for(!)

Freedom and the Free Man

In chapter 2, Classicist Jeremy McInerney sets out to explore two notable features of the Classical Greek notion of freedom. The first is that *eleutheria*,[9] as a thought, entered political discourse at a precise moment: the time of the Persian Wars. The origins of Greek concepts of freedom, therefore, can be traced to a critical moment of self-definition for Greek culture. As the Greeks forcefully assert a Hellenic identity, "freedom" emerges as one of the defining characteristics of the Hellens. Somehow, the Greeks seem incapable of imagining freedom without its negative: Eastern despotism, and, more specifically, in the persona of the Persian Empire. This is perhaps most clearly displayed in Aeschylus's *Persae*, first performed only eight years after the Greek victory at Salamis. "Who is their king?" asks Atossa, the Persian queen, only to be answered by the Messenger, "They call no man king. They are a free people."

The second notable feature of *eleutheria*, as understood by the Greeks, is that freedom is not conceptualized as a right—certainly not as a universal right. One does not fight to win freedom, that is, to assert one's right to be free. Rather, for the Greeks, freedom is the condition enjoyed by a "free man." This is more than a tautology. Freedom is a status that derives from a host of actual and ethical factors. Most

9. Pronounced "e-leph-te-ri-a" in Greek.

important, it is a quality enjoyed by a citizen, a man, one enmeshed in the fabric of military, religious, and civic performances that constitute citizenship.[10] Poorly theorized, freedom is seen by the Greeks as connected to such civic and personal virtues as autonomy and autarchy, temperance and moderation. Aristotle's famous justification of slavery in the *Politics* identifies the free man with one who uses his rationality, as opposed to the slave who is a human creature that chooses not to use his rational faculties. Yet Aristotle's attempt to distinguish between the free and the enslaved according to temperament, skills, and abilities is atypical. For the most part, the Greeks are untroubled by the notion that a slave might be a human whose right to freedom has been denied. By conceptualizing freedom as a quality demonstrated by the actions of the free man, the Greeks were able to assert their own freedom while denying that of others.

Freedom, then, in the Greek context, cannot be divorced from a series of dialectical relations: Greek versus barbarian, and citizen versus slave. It is thus a contingent, not a universal, phenomenon.

It is conventional to see the Greeks as the source of modern notions of freedom; yet a closer inspection of Athenian culture reveals that the Classical understanding of freedom was not at all like its modern counterpart. For the Greeks, freedom was not a right but a privileged status—enjoyed by fully enfranchised, male adult citizens. The Greek understanding of freedom was conditioned by the omnipresence of slaves and by the realization that enslavement was the potential fate of every individual and community. Notions such as freedom of speech and freedom of privacy, conceived in modern times as rights requiring protection, were virtually unknown to the Greeks. Their nearest equivalents, for example, relate not to the right to speak but to the characteristic behaviors of free men: participation in civic life and democratic discourse. Freedom, in fact, served as a marker of inclusion within the democratic community. Fear of losing that freedom was played out in stories of enslavement, in which women served as the embodiment of "servitude."

The historical circumstances that made freedom a concern to the Greeks were the Persian invasions of the early fifth century. As a result of the Greeks' victory, freedom was established not as a private right but as a community's ideal, equivalent to autonomy. Freedom was not

10. For different perspectives on the evolution of this concept, see J. J. Mulhern, "The Political Economy of Citizenship: A Classical Perspective," or Edward L. Rubin, "The Dangers of Citizenship," or yet, Mark P. Gaige, "Citizen: Past Practices, Prospective Patterns," all in *The Future of Citizenship* (Ciprut 2008).

internalized by the Greeks as a matter of integrity or piety, as it would be later by Stoics and Christians; it came to be viewed as an inherent quality of the Greeks, as opposed to the innate servility of barbarians.

Boxed In, Boxed Out—Whither Freedom?

Communication expert Elvira Arcenas brings the discourse forward in time and looks at the tug-of-war within modern human aspirations, between our yearnings to be free and our longings for discipline and order at the same time. She explores how in this dialectical process it is possible actually to free our 'fettered' freedoms; this thereby helps her to envision alternate conceptions and practices of freedom.

We are "boxed in" by genetic inheritance, by culture, and by our own choices, she argues: the box can be as large as we can make it so that it includes as many people as possible. But inevitably, at least some people will be shut out. Boxes are defined by their suffocating walls which serve as limits; existence itself cannot but be bounded, lest it cease being simply "being." Likewise, human freedom is 'boxed in', if it is to be human at all. Within the confines of our box, we are free to act and to create. So, the question is no longer whether we are free, but what kind of freedom we have and want—or, rather, what kind of freedom is "worthy" of us as human beings?

Herein dwells the paradox: while we are free within the confines of our life's "box," we are forever seeking to be liberated from our limits. We can read our life's trajectory as more or less a conscious quest for an 'otherness'. Thus, drawn by the allure of the diversity with which life is so profuse, we may at our best moments aspire to get out of our human-made box, break out of the often boringly narrow cocoon of our self-interests, and propel ourselves into an exciting realm of uncommon encounters with hitherto unknown others, like us, if somewhat differently so in many respects. But then, often, electing homophily over heterophily, we may prefer to return to the relatively facile comforts of living and dealing with our "more similar" others, and opening our doors only to those of our own color, race, creed, or persuasion, for example. The freedom sensed within the familiar but correspondingly shallower boxes of our lives can be so self-absorbing that it can deprive us of the edifying surprises, the mind-stretching and self-renewing possibilities of communication with unknown others, who share our common humanity in their own fashion. But such freedom brings unease and feelings of guilt, which, for Kenneth Burke, are rooted in our individual inability to be "consubstantial" with other

human beings. And so the tug-of-war goes on, between our being free as we think we are and our being desirous to be free as we think we would, should, or ought to want to be.

We face a dilemma: if we cannot free ourselves of our man-made existential "boxes," what alternatives do we have to become free? And even then, pray what would our merited or earned freedom be good for? Freedom seeks self-accomplishment. But one cannot "actualize" oneself without one's other(s). George Herbert Mead suggested that the self is "social": almost inexorably, we define each other reciprocally for better or worse. And thus, fulfilling the best in us is tantamount to fulfilling the best in others. This is called love, and the highest fulfillment of freedom is love. For love is not just sentiment, but a will to see the good in others come to fruition. It is an offering of oneself to others; what I give I do not lose, but allow to potentiate itself into becoming even more fruitful. Hence, to be free, I must be endowed to enable others' freedoms through my human love for them.

Although Dr. Arcenas is also a consecrated Catholic layperson, it is impossible to read her without thinking of the recollections of Viktor Frankl (1959, 1995), a Jewish survivor of Nazi extermination camps: "We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of human freedoms—to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances—to choose one's own way."

Freedom that is fed by selfishness, by self-aggrandizement, is destined to sterility. And nothing is more self-destructive than sterility.[11]

11. Cf. Pablo Neruda (born in 1904, Nobel Laureate in Literature in 1971): "Muere lentamente quien no . . . encuentra gracia en si mismo . . . quien se transforma en esclavo del hábito . . . o bien no conversa con quien no conoce . . . quien evita una passión y su remolino de emociones, justamente éstas que regressan el brillo a los ojos y restauran los corazones destrozados . . . quien no arriesga lo cierto ni lo incierto para ir atrás de un sueño" [which I take to mean "dies slowly whoever does not find grace in oneself, who enslaves oneself to habit, or does not converse with a stranger, who eschews a passion for fear of its emotional swirls, the very ones that return to the eyes their shine and help restore shattered hearts, who does not jeopardize the certain or the uncertain in order to go behind a dream . . ."]. I was reminded of this passage when my childhood classmate—and, much later in life, friend—Ergun (through his wife, Rengin) Avunduk of Turkey serendipitously e-mailed to me a series of touching pictures at the time of this writing. Ergun and I studied humanities, trained as technologists, served as plant managers, engaged in industrial business on an intercontinental scale, and even went to Army Officers' School together prior to receiving our marching orders and going our separate ways to serve at the strangest of remote places—liberating experiences one and all.

If we fearlessly can recognize and unmask those unjust structures in our personal and social lives, imposed by historical accidents and institutional designs; if we can speak the truth where we see it, with the humility that comes via the awareness that we can be wrong; if we can choose other paths, however unconventional, that make life better for others; and if we can risk our lives so that others may have life abundantly, we are not merely acting *as if* we were free, but are, in fact, enabling others to be as free as possibly they can become, while also breaking down the oppressive walls around our personal and social lives and building a habitat worthy of humankind.

We need to "liberate" freedom fettered by greed and strife, by egoism and suspicion. To do it requires that we acknowledge the rich diversity of life—pure white *and* wholly pigmented, male *and* female, young *and* old, God-fearing *and* unbelieving, destitute *and* affluent. It is in this reciprocity, through shared humanity and self-giving, that freedom can be allowed to attain its fullest possible expression and longevity.[12]

Today, the conventional notion of human freedom as 'liberation from earthly obstacles that stand in the way of volition and desire' is being challenged by humanity's daily experience of myriad evolving aspects of the natural world, whether occasioned by modern structural necessities, or also by the novel communicative/relational character of human interactions. Even when that notion finds strong support in material realizations and, defying the barricades, the quest attains its objective, liberation invariably comes off hollow, as if it were an *accident de parcours*, devoid of "substance," in terms of modernized Aristotelian terminology. Such emptiness becomes evident in the urge to smash newer barriers, in the search for content apt to confer mass to form, and in the quest to impart a state of stable equilibrium to turbulent existence, for instance.

In chapter 3, Arcenas tackles the paradox of human freedom—"boxed in" by the determinacy and constraints of earthly conditions and yet incessantly seeking, by means both natural and cultural, to break out of the "box"—in a search for greater actualization of the human self. She sees the self, no matter how autonomous, as something that

12. In the lyrics of Piazzola's *Libertango*, this state of being has been idealized as follows: "Mi libertad es tango que baila en diez mil puertos / y es rock, malambo y salmo y es opera y flamenco. / Mi libertango es libre, poeta y callejero, / tan viejo como el mundo, tan simple como un credo." Or, as I interpret it: "My freedom is a tango that is danced at ten thousand ports, / it's rock, psalm, and creole malambo, and opera, too, and flamenco. / My libertango is unbound, all at once poet and hobo, / as ancient as old mother Earth, yet as simple as a credo."

cannot—and does not—exist without its *Altro* (its Other). As self and other mutually define and sustain each other, fulfillment via self-actualization is achieved in social interaction and through dialogue. The ideal form of dialogue for unity in diversity is human communion.

Her essay is structured into two main parts. The first part is on "whether" freedom. It describes some of the typical manifestations of being "boxed in," say, by biological, geopolitical, psychosocial, technological, global, and symbolic fences, illustrating the argument with examples of related attempts to destroy, redraw, or elude those boundaries. Our symbolic fences, erected tallest particularly through human language, often also embody the highest of challenges to human liberation when they are utilized to create social exclusions of all kinds. They are the most refractory, since habits of communicated thought often are more resistant to change. The potentiality for language to be a menace to freedom nevertheless also bears a promise for the fulfillment of freedom, where freedom fosters sincere and mutual efforts by self and other to go beyond words and to reach out to each other as members of a far-flung if inclusive human community.

The second part of Arcenas's chapter addresses the question of "whither" freedom. A break out, from human-made boxes via dialogical encounters, can help. Facilitated by the habit of reflection that of itself provides the necessary condition for self-awareness and the experience of intersubjectivity, dialogical encounters (Krippendorff 2000) offer context and condition for communion, by which our common humanity—transcending the natural, social, and cultural differences that box it in—can be experienced and enjoyed as a community of co-presences. With communion, or at least through a sincere effort to achieve it, freedom finally ceases to be just a flight from, or fight between obstacles, but a fulfillment of the human self which is not quite an island to itself. And in the twenty-first century, where else could one discover a better foundation for a free and democratic society than in the hearts and minds of citizens consciously working toward a more vibrant global communion?

Freedoms Lost, Freedoms Regained

David Williams and Jacques Barber are two psychologists practicing psychiatry. They view the practice of psychotherapy as an art. Just as in the practice of any other profession, from architecture to medicine,

engineering to law, the psychotherapist's "art" is applied to the medium of human freedom—more specifically, to the individual person's apparent capacity for voluntary behavior, cognitive as well as physical.

Their chapter (chap. 4) provides a sense of how psychotherapists generally regard human freedom: its loss, its recuperation, the tools available to support its recovery, and the experience of working with it. They address "freedom" as a widely recognized attribute of individual human experience. Williams and Barber treat freedom as "the exercise of liberty"; they see in psychopathology a failure to exploit liberty fully, with the consequent attenuation of freedom. They discuss the concept of psychopathology in some detail, viewing it as the negative part of a continuum of well-being and self-management that begins with "serious mental disorder," continues through "ineffective utilization of liberty," and moves on to a positive side that ranges from "adequate" to "fully functioning." In the course of characterizing the regions of this spectrum of well-being, they reassess the concepts of "mental disorder" and "needless self-limitation."

As "freedom workers," psychotherapists have a variety of tools to choose from. Here discussed are those frequently used for interventions, the many ways of working with a person's biology, environment, feelings, voluntary behavior, and relational concerns included. The variety of tools comes with a matching array of rationales for their construction and use. Williams and Barber tread lightly past those, focusing instead on a generic conception of human nature based on cognitive science's "Theory of Mind" concept and on a strict definition of empathy as "the power of projecting one's personality into (and thus fully comprehending the object of) contemplation." Within this context, it is possible to address freedom as a human experience, whatever its scientific basis, and whatever the purpose of the experience might be. They illustrate the use of the psychotherapist's tools, and their impact on individuals, with examples from their own work as psychotherapists, explaining also how working with others' freedom impacts the therapists' access to their own.

The psychotherapist's practical experience with freedom makes a unique contribution to the general understanding of the concept. Freedom, an enigma to psychological science, is an important part of its healing practice. For those suffering from severe mental disorders, freedom must be restricted; for those with lesser impairment, the exercise of full personal freedom can be supported by interventions aimed

at reducing the intrusion of needless self-limitations into the process of everyday living. In their chapter, Williams and Barber explore the way psychotherapists approach the topic of freedom: honoring the canons of cognitive science while also taking the time-honored subjective experiences of awareness and personal agency into account. They discuss the most common interventions available to psychotherapists as freedom workers: changing a person's environment through full or partial hospitalization, adjusting their biology through medication, and, through experience-based persuasion, altering the cognitive maps by which people create meanings that guide their lives. They relate these interventions to specific regions of the spectrum of self-management effectiveness, focusing on clinically significant dysfunction, disordered personality, and the various degrees of success people achieve as they attempt to produce a fully satisfactory experience of living. They propose that freedom can be usefully seen to involve an important subjective experience occurring *inside* individuals, as they go about reconciling the conflicting demands and opportunities found in the inner and outer worlds they perceive. The very experience of freedom influences the therapist's choice of interventions and provides a trustworthy beacon that guides psychotherapy as a process of liberation.

Viewed as an opportunity to exercise the possibilities that liberty permits, the experience of personal freedom affects those who provide psychotherapy as well as those who receive it: the therapist encounters costs but also benefits from the empathically based self-scrutiny that is a normal part of the therapy process. Focus on freedom as an experience reveals an impact quite distinct from its role as a *problématique* in the natural and social sciences.

Degrees of Freedom: Jazz and the Art of Improvisation

William Parberry is a professional musician: a director and performer of classical, choral, and jazz music. For him, freedom and music are very intimately related. Throughout the history of Western music, Classical music has been documented on paper. The composer, usually after numerous drafts over weeks, months, or sometimes years of labor, finally puts his *Deo gratias* on the final page and sends the work to his publisher. Such a creative process would represent the opposite of spontaneity, or freedom. Improvisation, on the other hand, is the ultimate expression of freedom in music, and only in jazz is the art of

improvisation the central means by which the performer relatively freely communicates his music.

A recording of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony by the Boston Symphony Orchestra is not particularly different from a recording of the same composition performed by the Philadelphia Orchestra, because both ensembles are *trying* to interpret the symphony exactly (cf. Reise 2008) as Beethoven wrote it. But the 1939 recording of Coleman Hawkins's inspired sax solo on Johnny Green's "Body and Soul" is unique, never to be performed the same way again. Had Hawkins's solo not been recorded, the improvisation that he created, undocumented, would never have reached our ears. In jazz, the performer (Hawkins), not the composer (Green), determines the *quality* of the music: freedom is deeply personal, while also collectively liberating, beginning with its fleetingly perceived manifestation.

The only style of jazz that does not involve improvisation is ragtime, and it is the earliest documented style for that very reason. Written examples of ragtime and piano rolls predate the first recording of improvised jazz by the Original Dixieland Jazz Band in 1917. Once improvisation was captured on vinyl, music scholars and critics began to evaluate the jazz artists, and the recordings served as a teaching tool for young performers who were eager to learn the very difficult discipline of improvising jazz.

As the styles of jazz progressed through the twentieth century, the degree of freedom in improvisation changed from one period to the next. Curiously, the change was not always toward greater freedom as history moved forward. During the 1920s, Classic jazz (commonly called Dixieland jazz) contained abundant improvisation, both solo and ensemble; but in the decade that followed, the Swing era ushered in dance music, and written arrangements with brief improvised solos became the standard practice. Jazz reached a popular peak in the 1930s and early 1940s because it performed a function—catering to the millions of Americans whose primary leisure time activity was dancing. As a consequence, however, the jazz soloist felt restricted melodically and rhythmically because he was neither free to roam far from the popular tunes familiar to the listener, nor free to play complicated rhythmic patterns that might confuse the dancer. Bebop's progressive style in the forties and fifties broke away from the formula-ridden approach to improvisation in Swing. Young dancers in the 1950s chose Rock and Roll over the Swing era's "businessman's bounce," and jazz, no longer dance music, became nonfunctional—a chamber art, purely

for listening. More than any other traditional style, Bebop required a high degree of skill in the art of improvisation. Kenny Clarke, one of the first drummers to play Bebop with the likes of Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie, explained how difficult it was to keep pace with the masters of the new style: "We'd play Epistrophy or I've Got My Love To Keep Me Warm just to keep the other guys off the stand, because we knew they couldn't make those chord changes. We kept the riff-raff out and built our clique on new chords" (Parberry, chap. 5): but freedom cannot survive for long as mere *boutade*. For, a whim freedom is not—never was, and never could be.

From Classic jazz to Bebop, the art of improvisation varied in the amount of freedom that the artist had; the process was based on certain rules, such as matching the improvised phrases to specific chords that were written to the original melody, for example, the chords that Johnny Green wrote to "Body and Soul." The greatest degree of freedom is reached when the jazz artist improvises without having to observe those traditional rules. Two styles, Modal jazz and Free jazz, both beginning in 1959 with the albums *Kind of Blue* by Miles Davis (trumpet) and *The Shape of Jazz to Come* by Ornette Coleman (sax), abandon traditional chord progression for improvisation based on a modal scale (Davis) or no scale at all (Coleman). Released from a regularly recurring pattern of chords, the rhythm section was also freed, since an audible timing factor that kept track of when chords changed was no longer needed. The improviser in these avant-garde styles could experiment melodically, harmonically, and rhythmically, without any preset conditions or conventions. Initially, the sixties saw a reduction in the sale of jazz recordings because the progressive sounds of Modal and Free jazz were not accessible to the average listener. Today, however, with the help of jazz scholars, the charlatans have been weeded out, and the recordings of premier avant-garde performers such as Miles, John Coltrane, Eric Dolphy, and Charles Mingus are staples in the collections of open-minded listeners. To those who would question that the increase in freedom was a positive development in the art of improvisation, one need only point to *Kind of Blue*, now the most critically acclaimed and largest selling album in the history of jazz.

In his chapter on freedom in music William Parberry describes the history of jazz improvisation, which, more than any other musical genre, represents an artist's immediate—hence free—expression in the creative process. By tracing the changes in improvisation through the evolution of jazz styles in the nineteenth century, he explains the

varying degrees of freedom that have occurred. Any music that accompanies dance is functional; and hence jazz improvisation was limited by the demands of that function from 1917 (the first recording of improvised jazz) to the decline of the Swing era in the late 1940s. During the first half of the twentieth century, rhythmic, melodic, and harmonic conventions controlled the amount of freedom that the improvising artist had. In the early 1940s, Bebop arose as an alternate, nonfunctional style of jazz, running concurrently with Swing. Bebop and the rapid succession of styles that followed formed a body of music that was "art for art's sake": the modern era of jazz. The greater freedoms accessible to jazz musicians, as improvisation progressed without the restrictions of the dance, led to the gradual removal of musical conventions, until an impression of total freedom was reached with the arrival of Free jazz in the 1960s. As the archetype of free expression by the improvising artist, however, Free jazz was neither commercially nor artistically successful. Instead, those modern styles that offered the artist freedom with a modicum of traditional theory or sonority seemed to endure. On the market for sounds, might there be practical bounds to free expression? The 1959 recording of *Kind of Blue*, still the largest selling jazz album, supports just such a conclusion: that complex improvisation by skilled artists, when set in a traditional structure or familiar sonority, results in a more successful communication between musician and listener than if the need for intelligibility were overlooked. While the freedom expressed in the art of jazz improvisation may seem unique, the same conclusion drawn here would apply to any art. Greater artistic freedom generally elicits a corollary abatement in appreciation on the part of one's audience in poetry, literature, painting, and Classical music, just as it does in jazz. Yet, unlike the other arts, jazz improvisation is a spontaneous creation, and as such, it is the most temporal of the arts, with a uniquely ephemeral beauty. Demanding unusual musical skills from the artist and nothing short of acute listening skills from the audience, jazz will always remain the purest form of free artistic expression.

Freedom and Risk

As a mathematician engaged in the formulation of risk, and in the definition of optimal proactive responses to unforeseeable factors that can threaten operational freedoms under conditions of uncertainty, Paul Kleindorfer views the area of decision making under risk to be at

the center of many problems in business strategy, public policy, and individual choice. Theory about such choices in all of these contexts foresees a set of primitives, or givens, underlying particular decision acts: values and preferences of the decision maker, alternatives, feasibility constraints, beliefs about uncertain events that may influence the outcome, and mental models linking alternatives and possible scenarios to potential outcomes. The decision maker is imagined to reflect on possible futures, given the alternatives, and to choose among alternatives to achieve some positive confluence with the decision maker's values and preferences. In reality, of course, decision making under risk does not present itself in such neat terms; and a rich literature, both theoretical and empirical, has noted over the years the many ways in which actual decision making departs from a quasi-rational view of consistent execution of decision acts, governed by some underlying paradigm of choice. The first point to note about the "freedom *to* risk," therefore, is the need to agree that the nature of actual choice (in Herbert Simon's words) is only "boundedly rational," comprising many systematic and understandable flaws that are present and predictable about actual choice under uncertainty. What to do about this is somewhat perplexing and has given rise to several puzzles, especially in the public arena where the state has limited rights to intervene, to sanction, or to constrain choices in many areas—from market activity to pension planning to setting environmental standards. A typical puzzle is the one posed by Cass Sunstein in his work on social norms under the rubric of "libertarian paternalism," a term that attempts to capture the idea of granting freedom-to-risk to appropriately informed and mature agents in the polity, while still reserving for the state the right to "frame" the problem and to insist on certain features of decision contexts in order to improve overall outcomes. This is but one of many issues that surround the basic problem of allowing mature and free adults in a society the right to choose and to risk in the process, while also constraining their choice problems in ways that the paternalistic state must argue are reasonable interventions. Given all of this, Kleindorfer highlights in his opening comments of chapter 6 some of the classic limitations of human decision makers in risky choice problems, buttressing his argument with examples that illustrate in the public policy arena the tensions between an excess of liberty and an excess of paternalism.

His chapter examines whether the presence of uncertainty and risk imparts any restrictions or limits to the notion that "freedom" is

tantamount to unconstrained "liberty to choose." His basic thesis is that there are such palpable limits and that these derive both from the limitations and biases that humans exhibit in decision making and from whatever restrictions society chooses to impose on allowed outcomes. For example, in situations involving personal bankruptcy, society may deem it unacceptable that an individual or his or her dependents be required to meet obligations that may be so large as to imply long-term penury if these obligations are honored. These social constraints on the outcomes of free choice under uncertainty are complicated even further by behavioral biases that represent systematic departures of human choice from certain rational ideals. The central issue that then arises is whether the state, the family, or other entities acting as surrogates of the state or the family should be given the power to constrain such choices in a manner that is intended to "de-bias" individual choices—protecting the individual from herself, as it were. If de-biasing individual choices is considered a desirable option, then a whole range of social and personal interventions come into view. In one sense, such de-biasing arises naturally, if society is required to bear the burden of poor choices by its members, or even of good choices that may entail unlucky outcomes. At the same time, however, the nature and extent of constraints imposed in the name of correcting individual decision biases may affect the scope and nature of freedom that individuals have in specific contexts. The chapter explores this issue, for individual choices—such as insurance and pension planning—as well as for social choices, involving the design of social safety nets for individuals who may experience bad outcomes from their choices. He concludes the essay with a discussion of issues of legitimation that arise when the state intervenes in personal choice, and he notes from this the balance that must be struck between freedom and risk.

Liberation and Freedom in Jewish Liturgy and Practice

Rabbi Levi Haskelevich is a Lubavitcher.[13] He argues that at the very start of this new millennium, just as humankind began to think it was

13. Popularly known as the Loubavitch, the Chabad movement, in opposition to the Hassidism grounded on the human heart and on human sentiments, once so very widely practiced by the less cultivated masses in Ukraine and Volhinia, restored to its place of pride the human intellect as an instrument of Ashkenazic Jewish religious life. Chabad's principal sphere of influence was Russia, where human knowledge had always been fostered. Chabad eased Hassidism's return to the rabbinical tradition.

relearning how to live in peaceful coexistence, and contemplating transforming some of its deadliest swords into benign ploughshares, a new kind of threat impacted the world scene, vying to turn box cutters and jumbo jets full of people and fuel into deadly weapons in order to hijack the hard-earned freedoms of civilian society, out of ill-guided motives to ill-conceived intents. Now blinded by hate and intoxicated by blood, this ancient new enemy is selflessly suicidal, heartlessly self-destructive, and mindlessly self-deluded about his destination, dreaming of an erotic paradise in which his feckless soul, freed at last from his faceless frame, will be rewarded in heaven for causing death, for inflicting injury and suffering to hundreds of thousands of innocents, including many faithful Muslims. This bitter faithless foment, this senseless Armageddon devoid of divine justification, goes against the values of any religion. Is the human soul really so evil? How has this come to be? This war is forcing the civilized world to reassess its basic values of liberty, equality, and human brotherhood. Hence, it makes perfect sense for this chapter to look to the Mother of all monotheistic religions for an answer to the question: "What is the meaning of Freedom, and what is the true nature of the Soul?"

The concept of freedom in Judaism goes back to the very early days of Israel as a nation: to the Exodus from Egypt. For Jews everywhere, freedom is a sacred concept; celebrated with religious ceremonies during Passover, it is but a way of life in daily context. Freedom is the ability to articulate one's conscience, or true will. Freedom has many levels, depending on the intellectual horizon of a person's mind and the spiritual elevation of his soul. If man's human content is created in the Image of his Creator, then man's innermost meaning of freedom can reside only in the acknowledgment of his true innate Self.

The yearning in man's Heavenly Soul for becoming one with one's Creator is meditated in *Tefillah*—prayer. Prayer is self-education. It sets the Spirit free of the body's lowly animal cravings. Through such learning, and hence by association with the Creator's Wisdom and Will, man accomplishes his life's mission. This inner Wisdom, the Jew finds in the Torah. It is when the Torah is engraved on the tablets of his heart that he senses he is truly free.

The ancient Hebrew prophets knew that a liberated world would be filled with perfect wisdom—the knowledge of God. For how else could there endure prosperous and peaceful coexistence between the wolf and the lamb? Filled with knowledge of High Wisdom, the Creator's wisdom, man will discover his ultimate freedom by knowing Creation

and Source, not by inventing his liberty through the defeat and demise of others.

Human Freedom: A Christian Understanding of Salvation as Liberation

Jesuit Fr. Roger Haight is a scholar of systematic and historical theology. His review of Paul Knitter's work (2002), under the title "Placing Christianity in a Pluralistic World" (Nov. 8, 2002) in the *National Catholic Reporter*, reminded us that Christian theology of religion asks such questions as: "Are all religions equal? Does Christianity supersede all other religions? Is there some way to state clearly how one should relate to Jesus Christ in today's world that strikes a balance between these two extremes?"; that "no set of questions engages Christian theologians today more"; and that "no questions have more practical relevance in the most religiously pluralistic country in the world"—the United States of America. In that article, Fr. Haight summarized Knitter's four models as housing "a collection of theologians who may live on different floors but share the same roof": First, ironically from right to left, the 'replacement model' "understands Christianity to supersede all religions. Typical of some evangelical Christians, this view underlines the importance of the biblical witness for theology, the centrality of Christ relative to a real need for salvation. But it appears unrealistic to most mainline Christians today." To its left, "the 'fulfillment model' represents Vatican II and the mainline Protestant position in holding that Christ recapitulates and brings to perfection the salvific power that exists in other religions. Some versions of this view assert the distinct truth and salvific value of other religions, but its critics ask how one can assert real openness to other religions at the same time as the absoluteness of Jesus Christ." Third in that line-up, "the 'mutuality model' regards other religions on a rough par with Christ and Christianity, so that the revelation and truth of all have to be taken seriously as mutually exercising a claim to respect, understanding, and even normalcy. The vision reflects a new situation of a humanity actually interacting, sharing really distinct versions of the truth in a mutually critical way. Some critics believe this wipes out traditional Christological claims." As the last one, "the 'acceptance model' is a study in paradox. It begins with the premise of a new recognition of how deep cultural, linguistic, and religious differences really are: no more commonality among religions; autonomy and difference reign.

This fixation on difference then becomes the premise for each religion harboring its own absolute claims, unassailed, which leads to a reassertion of pre-modern and modern claims of Christian supremacy." But in an earlier short essay, titled "Jesus and Salvation: An Essay in Interpretation" (1994), Fr. Haight had already made it clear that central to all models of Christianity, past, present, and future, is the concept of salvation. I transcribe his words with his advance permission: from a historical perspective, the experience of Jesus as savior is the very basis from which the Christian movement sprang. This religion arose and continues to exist because Christians experience Jesus as a bringer of God's salvation. In its narrow sense of defining the status of Jesus before God and human beings, Christology depends upon soteriology.[14] Yet, despite this centrality and importance, the Church has never formulated a conciliar definition of salvation, nor has it provided a universally accepted conception. This is not necessarily something negative, but it still leaves us with a pluralism in the domain of the theology of salvation, the meaning of which remains open and fluid. The meaning of salvation *is* elusive: like time, every Christian knows its meaning—until asked to explain it. Because of its centrality, the problems that surround the concept of salvation are rendered even graver. Indeed, many of the traditional expressions of how Jesus saves are expressed in myths that no longer communicate to educated Christians; some are even offensive. And some of the traditional theological "explanations" of salvation through Christ do no better. Often treatments of salvation are largely devoted to rehearsing traditional theories or presenting models or types that seem to inject some order into the disarray. But no one can assume that these are credible today, and too little attention is given to intelligible present-day reinterpretation.

Given the pluralism of conceptions, is there a way to establish systematically a center of gravity on the salvation mediated by Jesus that will be clear and definite, but open and not exclusive? In the face of the confusion about the nature of salvation, can one formulate the present-day questions and inner crises to which Jesus provides a salvific answer? And given the incredibility of the mythological language when it is read at face value, can one find a symbolic formulation of this doctrine that is closer to actual human experience today?

14. Soteriology is the study of the doctrine of salvation. It is derived from the Greek word *soterios* (salvation). Some of its topics concern atonement, imputation, and regeneration in Christianity. For more details, see any dictionary of theology.

Because salvation in its religious sense can come only from God, many of the theories of salvation that emerged after the first century in both the Greek and Latin traditions focused on Jesus as a divine figure, or on the divinity of Jesus. Moreover, their language drifted away from the concrete historical ministry of Jesus. On the one hand, these theories are beginning to sound unrealistic: even when they are interpreted symbolically they are much too far removed from ordinary experience to command respect. On the other hand, this situation is reinforced by present-day historical consciousness and its proneness to highlight the humanity of Jesus. How does the prominent place that the historical Jesus is assuming in Christology come to bear upon salvation theory? More deeply, how is the salvation mediated by Jesus to be understood within the framework of a historicist imagination?

These issues serve as a backdrop for the main query that guides Roger Haight's chapter for our volume (chap. 8) as an attempt at interpretation. In his contribution, Professor Haight discusses an understanding of salvation from the viewpoint of its relationship to liberation and human freedom. The chapter unfolds in two parts: first, the author sets the logic of the problem and the method of approach; next, he provides a constructive theological interpretation, before closing.

Framing the Discussion

The language of salvation is close to the core of Christian faith and to the believer's self-understanding. For Christians, Jesus is the savior. If human existence is understood fundamentally as a form of freedom, it is this very freedom that is saved. How then should such process be understood?

This discussion is set within a framework that contains a number of problems. Several Christian teachings connected with salvation seem archaic and thus complicate the discussion in modern times. The very conception, for instance, of an original sin and a fall of humankind portrays a pervasive negativity; and yet a dark side does indeed seem intrinsic to human freedom. Another background conception provides a division between two spheres of human existence—one, natural; and the other, supernatural—that accompanies Christianity as a religion based on revelation; and yet human beings do have experiences of contingency and gratuity and gift that signal transcendence. Still another problem area emerges with the idea of redemption occurring at a precise moment as if it were a historical transaction; and yet

Christians, rather consistently, do look back to Jesus of Nazareth as the answer to the religious question. The central issue that these cumulative questions pose, both to Christians themselves and to those who inquire from outside the circle of Christian faith, regards the intelligibility of this salvation in a time marked by a heightened sense of historicity, the social construction of consciousness, and the sheer diversity of religious beliefs.

As the theological method for addressing the meaning of salvation shapes the logic and affects the intelligibility of the response, Fr. Haight continues the discussion with brief statements about the nature of theological language as intrinsically symbolic but not "merely" so. The phrase "a hermeneutical method of critical correlation" summarizes the elements of the reasoning process to follow. That process appeals to two principal sources: the first evokes common human experience; the second invokes standard Christian symbols. The former appeal seeks to make the language broadly intelligible, whereas the latter makes it Christian. These two sources for reflection are brought into intimate conjunction with each other, each criticizing and illumining the other, and thereby generating an interpretive discussion.

In sum, the first part highlights four problems that surround the Christian language of salvation: (1) a tendency toward a dualism of a natural and a supernatural order of history; (2) a pervasive negativity portrayed in a doctrine of sin; (3) the incredibility of a salvation for all, wrought in a single moment of history; and (4) the problematic character of extending the religious idea of salvation into the public social order. To address these problems, Roger Haight brings up the symbolic character of religious language and employs a hermeneutical method of critical correlation between historical Christian symbols and present-day experience.

Salvation as Liberation of Human Freedom

The constructive interpretation of salvation as a liberation of innate human freedom unfolds in four stages, each of which takes a classical Christian symbol and elicits its meaning through a brief phenomenology of human experience.

First, the symbol of creation refers primarily not to something that God did "in the beginning" but to the permanent power of being that holds finitude in existence and on which all things are most absolutely dependent. The doctrine implies that there is no "space" between God

and the physical world, that the presence of God to reality is personal, benevolent, and loving, and that this is the basis for the language of God as Spirit at work in the world. The doctrine of creation by a loving creator entails a divine will for human flourishing and fulfillment, and yet creation is intrinsically characterized by finitude and death.

Second, the symbol of sin refers not to objective evil but, as Augustine and, more recently, Paul Ricoeur have shown, to a condition of human freedom itself prior to the exercise of choice and decision. This is described on both the personal and the social levels, for these two dimensions of human freedom cannot be separated, and the analysis helps to provide a context within which the very notion of salvation will be meaningful.

Third, the root meaning of the Christian symbol of salvation draws from the basic religious questions of why human existence is at all, and of what it is for. In the late twentieth century, the meaning of salvation has been portrayed as liberation: liberation in this world, discussed in that section; and final or eschatological liberation, discussed in the following section. On the personal level, salvation may be construed as liberation of human freedom from internal bondages such as egoism, and the release of freedom toward altruistic values. On the social level, salvation may be interpreted as a solidarity that enhances the freedom of groups and supports a common good. In the measure in which, beyond law and its enforcement, these require also transcendent power—which is marked by gratuity and comes as gift—they can be construed as Salvation. In this view of salvation, Jesus is not considered as its efficient cause but as its revealer, a view that, among others, is supported by the Christian Bible called the New Testament.

Fourth, heaven is an eschatological symbol that appeals to hope. Neither faith nor hope is the equivalent of knowledge, but both have cognitive aspects. Hope is faith based in some form of religious experience reaching into the future. And although the future remains absolutely unknown, it is imagined on the basis of a projection of faith experience in the present. On this logic, therefore, salvation as fulfillment in the future has meaning on the basis of faith in the present. But as future, it draws the present into a wider horizon of meaning that promises to redeem the innocent suffering of the past and the future.

In sum, these four symbols are interlocking; and their only validation is that—for a whole body of ordinary Christians—they redeem ultimate meaning for human freedom from an alternative of sheer contingency. Here, they are phenomenologically discussed in terms of the

experience they elicit for Christians: creation, sin, salvation, and heaven. Each one of these interlocking symbols conveys elements of the meaning of the fundamental narrative that defines Christian identity and gives an account of salvation in Christian terms. Hence, this chapter provides both a reinterpretation of the meaning of the Christian symbol of salvation relative to human freedom and its liberation; and, no less, a definition of how the symbol appeals to human praxis. For the Christian imagination, the symbol of salvation itself is able to redeem ultimate meaning for human freedom from alternatives of sheer contingency.

Theorizing Freedom

In chapter 9, political scientist Nancy Hirschmann examines the concept of freedom in the discipline of political theory. In the middle of the twentieth century, noted Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin developed two concepts of liberty, which he called negative and positive liberty, and which have since dominated contemporary political thinking. Hirschmann's chapter articulates the differences between these two models as a difference between the external factors of freedom (conditions that prevent or enable one in doing what one wants) and the internal factors of desire and will. The latter elements tend to be ignored by contemporary political theorists, who instead focus on debates over what constitutes an external barrier to freedom (for instance: is poverty a barrier to freedom, or is it simply an inevitable condition that defines the limits of certain people's ability?). This inattention to the internal aspects arguably stems from Berlin's thinly veiled hostility to them specifically, and to positive liberty more generally: because of Cold War politics, the internal dimensions of freedom once were associated with totalitarian mind control, whereas Western liberal democracy was seen as providing for the maximum amount of freedom from restriction to develop one's own mind. Not only does this naively ignore the ways in which class, race, and gender construct desire for Western liberal citizens, but it also ignores the historical foundations of Berlin's typology.

Attention to the internal dimensions of desire, and of will, is warranted, as these play important roles in the theories of the major figures of the modern canon, ranging from Hobbes and Locke to Kant and Mill. In these theories, both desire and will are "socially constructed" through the production of individuals and citizens, who are taught to want the right things. Attending to the canon of freedom theory thus shows that

Berlin's fundamental conceptualization of freedom into negative and positive components is intellectually correct—but that, rather than treating them as opposing structures, we must recognize each of the components as embodying a complementary half of a single, unified conception of freedom.

Freedom and Culture

The central proposition of anthropologist Greg Urban's chapter (chap. 10) is that freedom is a metacultural concept: simultaneously *part of* culture (for being socially learned and transmitted) yet also *about* culture (for representing a reflection on what guides human action). As such, one goal of his chapter is to place the concept of freedom within the context of other possible reflections on what guides human action.

One finds a good illustration, if fictionalized example, of the strong contrast between an idea of freedom and any other metacultural conceptualization of action in the film *Lawrence of Arabia*: When Lawrence, an Englishman, is told by Sherif Ali, a Bedouin Arab, that he should not concern himself with a (tragic) event in this world because "it is written"—meaning preordained by God—he retorts that "nothing is written." Later, after Lawrence has displayed remarkable stamina in crossing the Nefud desert and defeating the Turks at Aqaba, Ali concedes: "for you, Aurens, truly nothing is written."

Although freedom can be viewed as one among an array of possible cultural conceptions of human action and what guides action, another question of interest in Greg Urban's chapter is what active role such a concept plays in shaping culture, not merely in reflecting on it. Metaculture in general being an active force affecting the motion of culture through the world, Urban asks: What are the peculiarities of the freedom concept as it affects culture? His hunch is that freedom goes along with—and facilitates an idea of—change, innovation, and modernity.

Instead of emphasizing how present action is determined by what comes from the past—by our received ways of doing things—freedom emphasizes the differences between past and present conduct. While the freedom concept is part of culture, and hence received from the past, it focuses conscious attention on emergence, on both the possibility and the reality of the desirable new, sometimes at the expense of its undesirable counterpart. Such a focus is crucial to the dissemination of

culture where one is endeavoring (as in the case of corporations) to move new culture (new products) into existing pathways.

Freedom has a peculiar property as metaculture: it is used to inhibit the flow of another culture. This peculiar twofold character explains its tendency to move around the globe and to be taken up by people who find reason to resist the imposition of other culture(s). Looked at from the point of view of cultural motion, several among the earlier philosophical attempts to grapple with freedom in relation to culture—such as those by Kant and Habermas—make sense. But the limitations of those and other single-level accounts of freedom become also apparent: they all fail to grasp adequately freedom's paradoxical qualities; in particular that, although freedom is about the absence of constraint, it also presents itself as a duty, and hence as a kind of constraint. These paradoxical qualities make sense from the point of view of freedom as simultaneously cultural and metacultural. A metacultural account also provides a window to the possible futures of the freedom concept. Greg Urban's chapter is just such an account.

Shades of Freedom in America

There is no more powerful a word in the American vocabulary than "freedom." Long before Jamestown, Thomas More in "Utopia" (1516) saw the New World as a place unencumbered by the past, and thus free to be the site of a perfect society—a society free of the greed and the ambition that produced oppression in Europe. The Puritans came to Massachusetts Bay not only to escape the established Church but also to build a biblical Commonwealth, a "city on a hill," so all the world could see how God meant for people to live. Theirs was a commitment to God, in whose service is perfect freedom. When the Jubilee Year, the 50th anniversary, of the Charter of Liberties (1702) approached, the Pennsylvania legislature decided to commission a bell to celebrate this guarantor of home rule, adopting a verse from Leviticus as the adequate inscription: "Proclaim Freedom throughout the land." That bell, probably rung to mark the formal adoption of the Declaration of Independence, was not known as the Liberty Bell until the 1830s, when the Abolitionists adopted it as their symbol of the quest for a very different kind of individual liberty.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary generation had transformed the religious sense of mission into an earthly experiment in democracy, a simultaneous commitment to both freedom and equality, a very peril-

ous balancing act. One can understand the Civil War as a conflict between two very different meanings of freedom: on one side, the individual freedom of human beings from slavery; and, on the other side, the freedom of local communities to determine their own laws and customs.

Freedom is such an appealing concept that almost all serious social conflict in the United States eventually gets expressed as a battle between opposing understandings of freedom. Robber barons insisted on their freedom to make contracts with individual laborers, while workers insisted on their right to organize and oppose the tyranny of the bosses. On the heels of the Great Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill announced in the Atlantic Charter a worldwide goal of "freedom from want." Shortly after World War II, the Civil Rights movement insisted on "Freedom Now," meaning the abolition of segregation and a more vague demand of equal opportunity. In turn, the counterculture of the 1960s wanted freedom of the individual from the constraints of bourgeois culture. Given this rich history, it is not surprising that U.S. intervention in the Fertile Crescent was known as "Operation Iraqi Freedom."

A scholar of American history in general, and of the history of the U.S. South and of the 1960s in particular, Sheldon Hackney in his chapter for this volume (chap. 11) describes and explains these various meanings of freedom in their historical context.

He views "freedom"—the most powerful word in the American vocabulary—as clearly implicated in the meaning of the U.S. American identity. It is in the nation's founding documents, patriotic songs, and the rhetoric of its leaders. The problem is that, historically, it has meant very different things at different times and places and to different individuals and groups. For the New England Puritans, it was the freedom *to* build in the "wilderness" a society that would abide by God's explicit wishes, in which conforming individuals would be free of sin. The "liberty" inscribed on the Liberty Bell had to do with local control in the colony as opposed to the power of the Proprietor in England, though its meaning was later converted by the Abolitionists to freedom *from* being individually enslaved. The Civil War, for the North, was about preserving the union and freeing the slaves; while, for the South, it was about states' rights and local control. Freedom has signified the absence of governmentally imposed rules, and it has meant government aid to the individual person in overcoming obstacles to success. Throughout the history of the United States, Americans

have prized the freedom *of* self-invention. Hence, the dialogical relationship between individualism and community is one of the principal themes of American history; and a constant problem has been the recognized need to reconcile freedom and order. The only way to do this successfully has been to recognize individual freedom *as* a community enterprise, one that depends for its health and longevity on the sustained active commitment of the citizenry.

Outside In/Inside Out: The Ordering of Liberty in a Globalizing International Political Economy

In an *Alumni Bulletin* received from my undergraduate Alma Mater—the (erstwhile American) Robert College of Istanbul—the text of an award-winning essay by a young undergraduate woman on the complexity ensconced in the modern dilemma of having to choose between freedom and security sets out to interpret a phantasmagoric work of fine art: "There is a painting by the Belgian surrealist René Magritte," notes the author,

> depicting the concept of human liberty as a room with one window opening onto a bright blue sky with clouds like puffs of smoke and another onto a Renaissance-style female nude. In the middle of the boxlike room, where the three walls are as intimidating as the windows are liberating, there is a cannon aimed at the viewer of the painting. Magritte's perspective on human liberty invites reflection on the concepts of freedom versus security . . . a central dilemma for thinkers who have aimed at creating the best form of state. How far can a state *allow* its individuals to be free? Is there, or should there be a limit to freedom, and where and how can a state *draw the line* between what is a necessary limit to freedom and what would be described as an infringement upon the 'natural' rights of human beings? In modern societies the cannon has been turned towards 'the other', who is intruding upon the scene with different notions of liberty, as well as to the window depicting the infinity of the sky, which can be interpreted as the freedom of society as a whole.[15]

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, D.C., on edifices symbolic of U.S. monetary and military power, and the composition of the perpetrators, made one lesson very clear: nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on warfare or on warlike violence (see Ciprut 2001). Nineteen individuals, with a mere several hundred thousand dollars, inflicted more damage and took more lives

15. (Pamuk 2007) My italics to accentuate my reading of a young twenty-first-century citizen's vision of *freedom vs. security* in terms of *state-run democracy as natural setting*.

in one day than the mightiest of armies normally would. This new reality—the very fact that individuals can possess statelike force without the tethers of a geographic base and/or the habitual restraints of a national polity—poses not only a direct and serious primary threat to national/international order, but potentially and indirectly a parallel menace to democratic freedoms, too, considering that commensurate responses on the part of democratic and open societies would have to wield the kind of decisive power that criminal entities merit, require, and understand. This new demand imparts to democratic citizenship a *global* meaning—an expansive ethic of freedom that, at its very best, stands on *individual* shoulders, yet, through unity in a higher aspiration, and diversity in wherewithal or technique, makes of humanity an indivisibly inclusive whole, at once free *and* secure.

In chapter 12, jurist Viet Dinh, who has had a significant role in the formulation of the U.S. Patriot Act, takes the reader through the development of the sovereign nation-state as the well-established building unit of political organization, the more intelligibly next to expose the threat that transnational terrorism explicitly presents to an international order predicated upon national sovereignty. His outside-in analysis is complemented with an inside-out reexamination of how patriotism—or, put less unabashedly, nationalism—contributes to the safeguard of sovereignty and to the upholding of international order. He takes care to express some thoughts on where all of this may lead; and, more important perhaps, *whereto* a willed recommitment to national sovereignty and dedication to national ideals should *not* lead a democratic nation and an open (yet principled) society such as the United States of America.

Dinh contends that, when predicated on a healthy foundation of nationalism able and willing to act in defense of their own societal democratic freedoms, strong nation-states thereby also can provide a powerful impediment to acts or threats of worldwide terrorism out to hurt personal and societal freedoms regionally and globally, as well.

Beyond Ideology, Toward a New Ethic of Freedom?

Kevin Cameron is a scholar in the field of political theory and law. In chapter 13 he attempts to carve out a new ethic of freedom, beyond the limits placed on freedom through ideological constructions of the "good." Thus it concerns the interrelation between transcendental freedom and ideological interpellation. In particular, he examines the

possibilities for freedom against the backdrop of terms laid out by the dominant ideology that accompanies the political-economic process known as globalization. In the face of ideological hegemony, he argues that ideological definitions of freedom tend to cloud the relationship between reason and freedom so central to more rigorous definitions of freedom such as the one offered in Kant's critical philosophy. In this manner, ideology functions to impart to heteronomous acts (non-free acts in the Kantian sense) the appearance of being transcendentally free acts. The goal of ideology, then, is to prevent the subject from recognizing itself as free in any way other than that prescribed by ideology. The rigor of Kant's definition of freedom may not prevent it from being susceptible to ideological constrictions.

To overcome this possible shortcoming in Kant's theory, Cameron first ascertains whether one can supplement it with Kierkegaard's notion of the "teleological suspension of the ethical." Next, he investigates whether, by means of Kierkegaard's understanding of faith, he can begin to situate an agent that actually transcends the confines of the ideological determination of the "good" and thus begins to determine the grounds of its own freedom. Lastly, he applies this theory both to the contemporary process of globalization and to the hegemonic ideology accompanying that process, in order to seek and maybe even to find a nonideological space for freedom, one beyond that of the political-economic hierarchy offered by crass globalism.

Conclusion

And this brings us to the end of this introductory chapter. One may ask: How do these chapters interrelate? They do so by intimately interlinking the past, present, and future of what is understood by liberty, at the individual, societal, and global levels of analysis along perspectives and within contexts that, moreover, help to expose the different and differently evolving meanings of freedom and their implications and consequences across time and space for all of the stakeholders. One may also ask: What—if any—is the unifying central message of the resultant narrative? That freedom has both objective external and subjective internal components which are not always nor necessarily in harmony within, let alone between or among, their neat categorical groupings; that history, therapy, spirituality, faith, prayer, improvisation, risk, culture, ideology, law, politics, etc., . . . each has its own ways of addressing one or more aspect(s) of this multifaceted thought that

freedom is; and that the greater one's exposure to such complex polyvalence is, the greater becomes the probability of attaining and emitting even higher, deeper, and broader freedoms likely to reward the one and the many across time and space.

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