

**Pension Strategies
in Europe and the
United States**

Edited by
Robert Fenge,
Georges de Ménéil,
and Pierre Pestieau

 Seminar Series

The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England

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This book was set in Palatino on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong.
Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pension strategies in Europe and the United States / Robert Fenge, Georges de Ménéil, and Pierre Pestieau, editors.

p. cm.—(CESifo seminar series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-262-06272-5 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Pensions—Europe. 2. Pensions—United States. 3. Pension trusts—Europe.

4. Pension trusts—United States. I. Fenge, Robert. II. De Ménéil, Georges, 1940–
III. Pestieau, Pierre, 1943–

HD7105.45.E85P46 2008

331.25'22094—dc22

2007020847

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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