

# **The Case for Qualia**

edited by Edmond Wright

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## Index

- Abrahamsen, A., 208  
Adorno, T., 361  
Afterimages. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception  
Albers, J., 47  
Aldrich, V. C., 1, 36  
Alter, T., 31, 136, 138, 243, 247–267  
Anscombe, E., 65, 66  
Anstis, S., 191  
Aphasia, 255–256  
Aquinas, T., 347  
Aristotle, 10  
Armstrong, D. M., 1, 61–62, 70, 209, 243  
Attention, 9  
Austin, J. L., 1, 23, 60–61, 66–67  
Ayer, A. J., 344–345
- Bach, K., 158  
Baehr, J., 250–251  
Ball, D., 262  
Baumgartner, W., 120, 123  
Beaton, M., 263  
Bechtel, W., 208  
Beloff, J., 206, 207  
Bennett, K., 137  
Bennett, M. R., 176  
Ben-Yami, H., 244  
Ben Ze'ev, A., 361  
Berkeley, G., 49  
    ideal objectivity lodged in God, 12  
    view of sensing as passive, 12
- Bermudez, J. L., 346  
Binding problem. *See* Sense modalities  
Bitbol, M., 27–28, 155–173  
Blake, R., 304  
Blake, W., 341  
Blakeslee, S., 32, 191, 193, 197–198, 297  
Bloch, E., 359  
Block, N., 1, 170, 175, 297, 315, 337, 342, 347, 360  
    “access consciousness,” 90  
    orgasm as not entirely cognitive, 2, 31, 232–233  
    population of China argument, 2  
    sensory differences between persons, 10  
Boghossian, P., 297, 349  
Boring, E. G., 47, 209  
Boyle, R., 10, 30, 54  
Brain, W. R., 28, 36, 207, 208  
Brain-in-a-vat argument, 102, 113–114, 119  
Brandom, R., 354, 358  
Brentano, F., 119, 347  
Brewer, W., 356–357  
Broad, C. D., 7, 195, 359  
    objects as defined by postulates, 351  
Brown, H. I., 1, 23–24, 45–58  
    twin illustration, 56  
Burge, T., 182  
Byrne, A., 31, 130–131, 153, 209, 271, 272, 274–275, 279–281

- "Caloric," 212  
 Carruthers, P., 161  
 Cavanagh, P., 191  
 Chalmers, D., 1, 129, 136, 171, 247, 256, 260–261, 263, 264  
   on a priori deducibility of phenomenal experience, 251  
   on "Edenic perception," 12, 352, 353, 355, 359–360  
   neural systems and reduction, 166–167  
   and object-causal theory of perception, 359  
   zombie argument, 2  
 Chisholm, R., 66, 70, 75, 120  
 Chomsky, N., 255, 256  
 Churchland, Patricia, 29–30, 161, 192–193, 203–221  
   neurophilosophy, 209  
 Churchland, Paul, 29–30, 127, 160–161, 162, 163, 203–221  
   as confounding phenomenology with vector representations, 217  
   as naive realist, 204, 207  
 Clark, A., 1, 21, 271, 304, 309  
 Collins, A. W., 1, 6  
 Color(s), 143–153  
   anomaloscope experiments, 146–147  
   as appearance properties, 316–318  
   blackness, 10, 27, 47–48, 144, 337, 345  
   color-blindness, 52, 145–146  
   as requiring contrast, 144  
   four elemental hues, 147–149  
   as represented by length of lines, 333–334  
   metamerism, 2, 143  
   as natural kinds, 147–148  
   not as property of objects, 3  
   ostending color, 329–334  
   oversaturation, effects of, 152  
   as nonreducible, 318–320  
   responses in women vs. men, 146–147  
   spectral inversion, 151  
   and spectral power distribution (SPD), 143–144  
   terms, mundane use of, 70  
   visual system calculating relative vs. absolute values of, 145  
 Condillac, E. B. de, 13–14  
 Connectionism, 216–217  
 Consciousness  
   connectionist cognitive models, 111–112  
   dynamical cognition (DC), 115–116, 121–122  
   intentionality as intrinsic character of, 92  
   failure of materialist explanations of, 322–324  
   as essentially motivated, 347  
   total cognitive states (TCS), 109, 119, 121–123  
 Content  
   determinacy of, 101  
   externalist theories of, 99–100  
   morphological content (MC), 112  
 Crane, T., 31, 32, 90, 243, 244, 271, 275–276, 279, 281  
   on hallucinations as always objectified, 360  
 Crick, F., 191, 196, 197  
 Crook, S., 129  
 Crooks, M., 29–30, 171, 203–221  
 Cussins, A., 353  
  
 Dainton, B., 95, 104  
 Davidson, D., 361  
 Dennett, D., 2, 28, 29, 31, 36, 90, 103, 104–105, 175, 176–177, 181–182, 207, 218, 248–249, 263, 270, 344, 346. *See also* Knowledge argument on belief in qualia as fantasy, 341  
   view of mental imagery, problems with, 360  
   robot's punctiform list, counterintuitive character of, 346

- Descartes, R., notion of malignant demon, 9, 14, 101–102
- Desire, 8
- Ding an sich*, 2
- Dinnaga, 8, 9, 16
- Disney, W., 33
- Domhoff, G. W., 188
- Dreams. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception
- Dretske, F., 5, 91, 158, 230, 233  
on hallucination, 235–236
- Dualism, 223  
property dualism, 126, 133, 135
- Edelman, G., 26, 348
- Ehring, D., 138
- Eliminativism, 29–30, 191, 203–221  
excluding sensory phenomena, 204
- Empiricism, logical, 211–212, 214
- Entity  
unthinking commitment to notion of, 2  
criteria of entity-selection, 9
- Epiphenomenalism, 126, 133, 136, 223  
and reference, 224
- Evans, G., 20–21, 361  
guided submarine analogy, 353 (*see also* Wright, E., Bomb-Defusers Analogy)
- Evidence  
“blank evidence,” James’s view of sensation as, 18–19  
vs. information, 4  
sensory evidence vs. perceptual information, 15
- Faith  
and concept of God, 355  
as ethically secondary to love, 354  
as moral requirement in language, 354  
as moral requirement in perception, 35–36  
as basis of objectivity, 12
- Fear, 8
- Fehér, H., 193
- Feigl, H., 204
- Feuerbach, L., 16
- Feyerabend, P., 218
- Fitzgerald, P., 1, 342
- Flanagan, O., 104
- Flanery, M. A., 304
- Fodor, J., 111, 196  
language of thought, 111, 114–115, 121
- Foster, J., 1
- Fumerton, R. A., 359
- Galilei, Galileo, 28, 36, 175–176
- Ganzfeld, the. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception
- Gardiner, A., 361
- Garnett, A. C., 1
- Gelade, G., 304
- Gendler, T. S., 2, 3, 7, 14, 17, 21
- Georgialis, N., 98
- Gibbons, J., 77
- Gibson, J. J., 5
- Giere, R., 171
- Gillett, C., 129
- Gloning, I., 193
- Gloning, K., 193
- Goldman, A., 104
- Goodman, N., 332, 338
- Graham, G., 25, 89–107
- Grayling, A. C., 361
- Gregory, R. L., 1, 36, 176, 208  
perceptions as hypotheses, 18
- Grice, H. P., 33, 191  
on binding problem, 301–303  
notion of natural sign, 3, 14  
and object-causal theory of perception, 359
- Hacker, P. M. S., 176
- Hallucination. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception

- Hamlyn, D. W., 8, 65
- Hanraths, U., 355
- Hardin, C. L., 1, 24, 26–27, 32, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 143–153, 207, 280–281, 317
- Hare, P., 2
- Harman, G., 5, 31, 91, 271, 286–287  
non-existence of “mental paint,” 331, 342
- Harrison, J., 1, 36
- Hawthorne, J., 2, 3, 7, 14, 17, 22
- Hearing, differences in frequency response, 9–10
- Heat  
as molecular kinetic energy (MKE), 27–28, 155  
as sensory experience, 27–28, 48, 155  
as not representing temperature, 155, 163–165
- Heffner, J., 1
- Heil, J., 138, 264
- Heller, M., 361
- Hellie, B., 130–131, 264
- Helmholtz, H. von, 361  
on afterimages overlaying vision, 348  
on the non-epistemic, 17–19  
perceptions as hypotheses, 18  
reality of visual experience in all its forms, 345  
on stereoscopic vision, 344
- Hering, E., 147
- Hermelin, B., 5–6
- Hilbert, D., 153, 209, 279–281
- Hirst, R. J., 359
- Hobbes, T.  
on direct sensing in the brain, 344  
on selectivity of attention, 9
- Hochberg, J. E., 208, 209
- Hoff, H., 193
- Hoffman, J., 361
- Holism, 112, 114, 120, 121–122
- Holman, E. L., 1
- Holt, E. B., 178, 183
- Hooker, C. A., 160, 171, 210, 213, 217–218
- Hopkins, R., 338
- Horgan, T., 25, 89–107, 110, 111, 120
- Horst, S., 204, 215, 216
- Howell, R. J., 26, 125–140. *See also* Subjective physicalism
- Hubbard, E. M., 304
- Hume, David, 230, 232, 243, 263, 360  
missing shade of blue, 247, 251  
and play, 11–12
- Hurley, S. L., 184
- Hyman, J., 1
- Idealization of Reciprocity, 350–356, 359. *See also* Schutz, A.  
equivalent to “taking for granted,” 351
- Identity, intertheoretic, 210–213, 216, 217
- Illusions, 45–49. *See also* Phenomena  
not immediately related to direct perception  
bent stick illusion, 53  
as providing evidence for sense data, 60  
subjective contours, 46
- Imagery, mental, 216  
aural, 131, 215, 348  
hypnagogic and hypnopompic (*see* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception)  
olfactory, 348  
tactile, 348  
visual, 215, 295–296, 348  
voluntary and involuntary, 348
- Intention, 16
- Intentionality  
aboutness of phenomenal state, 165–166  
“inseparably” intentional vs. “exhaustively” intentional, 91, 98, 110  
phenomenal (qualitative) intentionality, 92, 95, 110

- strong and weak intentionalism, 271–275, 279–282
- Intrinsicity of sensation. *See* Qualia
- Introspection. *See* Qualia
- Inwagen, P. van, 361
- Jackson, F., 1, 59, 60, 62, 65, 127, 129, 136, 175, 176, 248, 263. *See also* Knowledge argument
- as abandoning support for qualia, 28
- rejection of knowledge argument, 224
- James, W., 18–19, 180, 360
- Jessel, T. M., 176
- Johnson, A. B., 361
- Jones, O. R., 1
- Kalat, J., 205, 206
- Kandel, E. R., 176
- Kant, I., 15
- Dinge-an-Sich* as imagined catalyts, 358–359
- on knowledge and faith, 358
- notion of *noumena*, 131
- Katz, S., 361
- Kelley, D., 209
- Kelly, J. S., 1
- Kenny, A., 256, 347
- Kerr, N., 188
- Kim, J., 137
- Kind, A., 32, 156, 170, 264, 285–298
- Kirk, R., 264, 355, 358
- Kleiser, R., 194
- Knowledge argument, 2, 223–245. *See also* Jackson, F.
- deviant phenomenal knowledge, 254–258
- the experience requirement, 249, 262
- explanation of original argument, 225–226
- flaw in, 15
- as entailing incompleteness of physics, 128
- the indirect argument against, 257–259
- key nondeducibility claim, 248, 249, 251–253
- having knowledge of phenomena without having phenomenal experience, 247–9
- Dennett’s version of argument, 249–253, 254
- Mandik’s argument, 253–254
- Mary as learning intrinsic basis of recognitional capacities, 92–93
- as basis for nonphysical phenomenal truths, 248
- objection from conceptual parity, 259–262
- objections that covertly presuppose qualia, 31
- as directed against objectivism, 127
- Köhler, W., 206, 207
- Kovács, I., 193
- Krekelberg, B., 194
- Kriegel, U., 104, 120
- Kripke, S., 100, 164, 359
- Kuehni, R. G., 148, 150, 153
- Lalanne, C., 307
- Landesman, C., 1
- Learning, as essentially motivated, 346–347
- Leibniz, G. W., 196
- Levin, J., 354
- Levine, J., 175, 243, 270, 338
- Lewes, G. H., 16
- Lewis, C. I., 175, 361
- Lewis, D., 127, 129, 136, 243, 247, 255, 263, 264
- Livingstone, M., 50, 51, 52, 53
- Loar, B., 132, 162, 242–243, 247, 248
- Locke, J., 54, 263
- blackness as positive color, 27, 345
- hands in lukewarm water experiment, 169–170
- as confused on sensation vs. “reflection,” 11

- Locke, J. (cont.)  
 “white paper” analogy and the non-epistemic, 350
- Lockwood, M., 1
- Lorenceau, J., 307
- Lotto, R., 47, 50, 52
- Lotze, H., 342
- Love, G., 254
- Lovejoy, A. O., 206, 207
- Lowe, E. J., 1, 24, 59–72, 271
- Ludlow, P., 243
- Lycan, W. G., 157, 178, 263, 307  
 dismissal of hallucinations, 236
- Lying, sometimes conveying truth, 361
- MacClachlan, D. L. C., 1
- Mach bands. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception
- Mackie, J. L., 2, 36
- Macpherson, F., 337
- Malcolm, N., 60
- Malebranche, N., on *voir vs. regarder*, 9
- Mandelbaum, M., 2
- Mandik, P., 136, 247, 248, 249, 253–254, 264
- Manzotti, R., 28, 175–190
- Marois, R., 304
- Martin, M. J. M., 30–31, 243, 276–278  
 theory of hallucination, 237–239  
 characterizing hallucinations as always objectified, 360
- Matilal, B., 8
- Matthen, M., 10, 17, 344  
 and real singularity of entities, 354
- Maturana, H. R., 361
- Maund, J. B., 2, 269–284, 317  
 content used as mode of reference to qualia, 33  
 on weaknesses of transparency thesis, 31–32
- Mauthner, F., 360
- Mayne, Z., 13
- McDougall, W., 347
- McDowell, J., 15–16, 552  
 “bare presence,” dismissal of qualia as, 341, 346  
 belief in external objects, 356–357  
 his “mysterious” ploy, 20, 342
- McGinn, C., 104, 243
- McKittrick, J., 264
- Metamerism. *See* Color
- Metzinger, T., 171, 175
- Millar, A., 272–273
- Millikan, R., 81, 356
- Mind  
 as fully physical, 130  
 mind–brain identity theory, 196, 213–214
- Montero, B., 136
- Moore, G. E., 286, 355–356
- Motivation  
 McDougall’s view on, in perception, 347  
 mind as essentially motivated, 35  
 relation to pain and pleasure, 8  
 ignored by qualiaphobes, 17  
 as sovereign in perception, 6, 16, 20, 35, 346–347
- Mozart, W. A., power and detail of aural imagery, 348, 360
- Mueller, C. G., 209
- Muir, E., 355
- Mulhall, S., 1
- Mundle, C. W. K., 2, 63
- Nagasawa, Y., 243, 264
- Nagel, T., 210, 243
- Neitz, J., 146
- Neitz, M., 146
- Nelkin, N., 344
- Nemirow, L., 256–257, 263, 264
- Neural systems  
 as digital, 195  
 relation with phenomenal, 168–170  
 relation with physical, 166
- Nida-Rümelin, M., 33–34, 146, 309



- Nietzsche, F., 360
- Noë, A., 9, 16, 171, 342, 344, 346, 347, 361
- Nonconceptual, the, 3, 20–22  
 co-present with conceptual representation, yet separable from it, 274  
 vs. the non-epistemic, 20
- Non-epistemic, the  
 definition of, 3–8  
 evolutionary advantage of, 5  
 Garnett's view, 6–7  
 history of notion of, 8–20  
 McDowell's view, 341, 346  
 as outside motivation, 11, 350  
 Price's view, 6  
 W. S. Robinson's view, 25  
 Warnock's view, 6  
 as always underlying perception, 95, 346, 350
- Normal observer, question of the, 77–78, 81–83  
 personal differences as an epistemic problem, 150–151  
 dubiousness of, in relation to color, 145–150  
 no non-arbitrary way of defining, 280–281
- Oakes, R., 2
- Object-causal theory of perception, 359
- Objectivity  
 notion of God sustaining objectivity, 355, 357 (*see also* Berkeley, G.)  
 as linked with faith, 353, 358  
 as radically hypothetical, 353  
 "objective" mistakenly used as synonym for "real," 127  
 danger of neurotic oversecurity, 357  
 play in all objectivity, 357  
 projection of pure objectivity superstitious, 354
- O'Connor, D. J., 63, 67
- O'Dea, J., 28, 32–33, 299
- O'Regan, K., 342, 344, 346, 347, 361
- Pain, 274, 291–292  
 as enforcing memories invested with fear, 8  
 location of, 292, 295  
 coinstantiated physical complement, 134–135  
 varieties of, 282
- Pain/pleasure regime, 346, 347, 353
- Palmer, S., 343
- Palmeri, T. J., 304
- Papathomas, T. V., 193
- Papineau, D., 132, 137, 247, 248, 338
- Pautz, A., 337
- Peacocke, C., 2, 338  
 "scenario" concept, 2, 21–22
- Pei, I. M., 144
- Pennycuik, J., 2
- Perception  
 as brain-construct, 49, 194–195  
 corrigible nature of, through feedback, 55–56  
 as direct access to world, 156  
 external causes, displays as numerically distinct from, 49  
 and knowledge, 23  
 no perceiving without a perceiver, 157  
 nonveridical, 186–187  
 not as given response to preexisting entities, 23  
 percepts as hypotheses, 55–56 (*see also* Gregory, Sellars, R. W.)  
 its "object-determinate" level, 4–5  
 shape perception, 320  
 as viable, 20
- Perkins, M., 2, 274, 279, 342
- Peschard, I., 27–28, 155–173
- Phantom limbs. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception
- Phenomena not regarded as direct perception  
 afterimages, 20, 185–186, 289, 294, 348  
 chimerical colors, 253–254  
 dreams, 20, 185

- Phenomena not regarded as direct perception (cont.)
- hallucinations, 20, 235–239
    - as caused by past experiences, 184
    - as disturbing supposed link to external objects, 230, 235
    - as providing evidence for sense data, 60, 65–67
    - non-objectified, 31, 60, 349
    - mistakenly characterized as always objectified, 360
  - hypnagogic imagery, 31
  - hypnapompic imagery, 31
  - Ganzfeld, the, 193
  - illusory depth via stereoscope, 215
  - migraine fortification patterns, 20
  - Mach bands, 215
  - phantom limbs, 197–198
  - phosphenes, 10, 20, 30, 32, 187–188, 289
    - as non-epistemic, 232
    - can be rendered epistemic, 345
  - visual filling-in, 215
- Phenomenal qualities. *See* Qualia
- “Phlogiston,” 212
- Phosphenes. *See* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception
- Physicalism, 73, 80, 214
- no causal competition between objective and subjective properties, 134
  - committed to a purely objective account of the world, 242
  - as not completely describing the world, 126
  - exclusive form of (subjective physicalism), 126, 129–132, 135–136
    - and mental causation, 133–135
    - vs. property dualism, 133
  - inclusive form of (metaphysical physicalism), 126, 135–136
    - defined 129–130
  - monistic metaphysics of, 125
  - and qualia, question of its accounting, 83, 125
- Physics, incompleteness of not necessarily ontological, 128
- Piaget, J., 346
- Pitcher, G., 1, 60, 62, 63–64
- Pitt, D., 104
- Pleasure, as enforcing memories
  - invested with desire, 8
- Potrč, M., 109–124
- Price, H. H., 2, 6, 195, 263
- Purves, D., 47, 50, 52
- Putnam, H., 100, 163, 178, 182
- Qualia, 73. *See also* Color; Heat; Realism
  - as including attitude content, 25, 31, 93–94
  - as awareness, 156–157
  - as “cement” of experiential world, 112, 114–117
  - and content, intimate relation with, 310–312
  - context of, 121
  - as episodes of consciousness, 86, 89–90, 94–95
  - definitions of, 7, 70–71, 74–75, 78, 181–182, 191, 269–273
  - epiphenomenal, presumed to be, 224
  - examples of, 309–310
  - experience of essential for understanding, 26
  - as semi-occult fantasy, 36
  - first use of term (C. I. Lewis), 175
  - not explicable as functional, 161
  - first-person intuitions, supported by, 325–326
  - graspable only when instantiated by agent concerned, 132
  - in higher-dimensional space, 195–196
  - supposed incorrigibility of, 349
  - ineffability theory of, 130–132
    - not ineffable at level of field, 346
  - as informational, 226
  - inner awareness as constitutive of, 120
  - as intentional, 25–26, 110–111, 115–119

- as internal to the brain, 91
- as neither purely internal nor external, 179–181
- as intrinsic properties, 33, 92, 96
- introspection as argument for, 97–99, 158, 162
- lack of agreement among supporters of, 23, 125
- lack of direct resemblance to input, 10, 35, 54–55
- as having part in creating the “Manifest Image” of the world, 240
- as material, 26, 123
- as present in mundane perception, 32
- neglect of arguments for, 1, 2
- as nonphenomenal computations, 206
- as nonphysical, 2
- objections to
  - copying of external entities, 1
  - folk psychology, phenomenal language as, 161
  - pictorial reproduction, 2
  - danger of relativism, 341
  - speckled hen problem, 5, 104, 342
  - danger of solipsism, 341, 352
  - “veil of perception” argument, 7–8, 20, 341, 353
  - vicious regress of homunculi, 28, 196, 342
- intractable to objective description, 131
- ontological status of, 54, 70–71, 191–199
- two kinds of opposition to, 285–286
- “phenomenal” vs. “scientific,” 159
- as physical, 347
- pictorial notion of, 197, 343
- process-oriented view of, 180
- reduction to judgments about objects, 76, 230
- not reducible to physicalistic language, 160–161, 210–216, 247, 311
- the “qualia freak,” 2
- qualitative infallibility, 119–120
- as real but nonmaterial, 24–25
- as allowing evolving refinement of perception, 26, 109–110
- relation to representation, 78–81, 310–311
- relation to veridicality conditions, 310–311
- strong version of, 270–271
- as component of subjectivity, 94, 96
- Qualitative event realism. *See* Realism
- Quine, W. V. O., 100, 122, 159–160, 161, 304
- Rachels, S., 264
- Raffman, D., 34–35, 325–329, 342
- Ramachandran, V. S., 32, 191, 193, 197–198, 297, 304
- Realism
  - direct, 28
    - as default position in philosophy, 45
    - as facing similar problems as indirect realism, 54
    - as failing to explain need for qualitative identity, 57
  - indirect, 1
    - and appearance, 64–65
    - as supported by empirical considerations, 45
  - naive, 178, 180, 192, 205, 207, 238
  - qualia, 89–107
  - qualitative event, 85–86
- Reduction
  - attempted reduction of phenomena to neural systems, 209–216
  - failure of reductionist argument, 281
- Reid, T., 3
  - on intersubjectivity, 14–15
  - sensations as natural signs, 14
- Relativism, 15
  - regarded as infecting indirect realism, 7–8, 36

- Relativity of response from person to person  
 sensory, 77–78, 154–151, 164–165  
 relation to trust, 353–355
- Representation  
 by means of identity, 183–184  
 in tension with physicalism, 73
- Representationalism, 79–81  
 confusing use of term by Tye, 2–3, 227  
 defined, 228–231  
 as a form of direct realism, 234  
 new, 1  
 painting analogy, 332–333  
 including notion of “tracking,” 80–81  
 related to transparency, 229  
 Tye’s version, 2, 227–233  
 color as mental predicate, 327  
 as not matched to a concept, 327  
 as leaving out intrinsic character of conscious experience, 92  
 objections to, 84–85  
 as physicalist, 83, 228–237  
 weak and strong, 328
- Retina, structure of, 50–53  
 fovea, 51
- Richards, I. A., 345
- Robertson, L. C., 304
- Robinson, H., 2, 30–31, 223–245, 273, 342
- Robinson, W. S., 2, 24–25, 59, 73–87, 258, 348
- Rommetveit, R., 361
- Rosencrantz, G. S., 361
- Royce, J., 352, 359, 360
- Russell, B., 195, 263
- Ryle, G., 1, 196, 263, 344–345
- Sartre, J.-P., 236
- Sacks, O., 360
- Schier, F., 338
- Schilder, P., 193, 197, 208
- Schiller, F. C. S., 351–352, 355, 358, 360
- Schutz, A., 351, 361
- Schwartz, J. H., 176
- Science, false aura of, 217
- Searle, J., 113, 163, 164, 197, 207–208, 217
- Seibt, J., 180
- Seitz, R. J., 194
- Sejnowski, T. J., 208, 209, 215, 216
- Self, emergence of, 353
- Sellars, R. W., 2, 360  
 notion of “differential correlation,” 342–343  
 emphasis on feedback in perception, 19
- Sellars, W., 2, 36, 209, 277, 356
- Sensation(s)  
 as parts of body, 353  
 collapsing of distinction between sensation and perception, 28, 179–180  
 ethical implications of the distinction from perception, 7, 15  
 its “field-determinate” level, 4–5, 91–92  
 as involuntary and not mental, 347  
 no “normal observer,” 27  
 vs. perception, 4, 9  
 “to sense is not to know,” 348  
 reduced to coordinates of vector spaces, 205
- Sense data  
 and brain-processes, relation to, 70  
 Broad’s definition of sense datum, 7  
 defense of, 59–72  
 “familiar grounds” for dismissing sense data, 277  
 sense data not incorrigibly known, 60  
 location of sense data, 70  
 sense data defined, 59–60
- Sense-data theory, 1  
 qualia theory identified with, 342
- Sense modalities, the “binding problem,” 28, 32–33, 193, 300–307
- Shoemaker, S., 2, 158, 175, 271, 273, 297

- Sibelius, J., 360
- Siewert, C., 310, 316
- Sight. *See also* Phenomena unrelated to direct perception
- binocular rivalry, 167–168, 215
  - blindsight, 152–153
  - blurriness, 158–159, 288–289, 294, 349–350
  - change-blindness, 349
  - color response, differences in right and left eyes, 9
  - double images, 18, 61–65, 67–70, 215
  - “field-determinate” account of visual field, 345–346
  - floaters, 17
  - illusory filling-in (*see* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception)
  - “object-determinate” account of visual field, 346
  - periphery of visual field, 9, 27, 157, 159
  - phi effect, 216
  - saccades, 194
  - stereoscopic vision, 204, 343–344 (*see also* Phenomena not regarded as direct perception)
  - variations across persons in sensitivity to ultraviolet light, 10
  - viewing world upside-down, 18
  - visual system’s neutral state, 144
- Singularity
- as catalyst in communication, 352
  - in relation to Chalmers’s “Edenic perception,” 352
  - Evans’s belief that singular entities await perception, 21
  - idealization of, superstitious, 354–355
  - dependence on mutual trust, 35–36
  - as necessary regulatory idea, 20
- Smart, J. J. C., 209, 213, 237–238, 243–244
- Smith, A. D., 275, 276–277
- Smith, D. W., 359
- Smythies, J., 2, 28, 36, 191–199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 215
- his notion of a “TV-Hood,” 345, 360
- Solipsism, 15, 36
- Spurrett, D., 137
- Stiles, W. S., 145
- Stoljar, D., 243, 247, 255
- Strahovnik, V., 123
- Strawson, G., 95, 104, 183, 243
- Strawson, P., notion of an “auditory universe,” 241
- Structural isomorphism, 278–279, 342–348
- analogy with map, 279
  - colors represented by different length of lines, 333, 338
  - non-epistemic nature of, 345
- Stubenberg, L., 175
- Subjectivity
- situated within length, mass, and time, 207
  - subject and object linked, 179
  - thought of as mark of ontological deficiency, 128
- Superstition, 354–359
- Supervenience, as implied in metaphysical physicalism, 129
- Television analogy, 345–346
- Thing, as conceptual instrument, 19
- Thompson, B., 140
- Thompson, E., 32, 171, 280
- Tienson, J., 92, 93, 96, 98, 99, 103, 104, 110
- Tononi, G., 26, 348
- Transparency thesis, 5, 30–32, 33–35, 178, 286–296
- possible answers to objections to thesis, 334–336
  - and emotion, 292–293
  - failure of, 306–307
  - fixing of content vs. becoming aware of content, 326–327

- Transparency thesis (cont.)  
   impossibility of detaching from  
     content, 276–278, 286–287  
   impossibility of tokening of a word  
     constituting a look, 329, 336  
   as incompatible with qualia, 287  
   as inconsistent with learning process,  
     32  
   danger of narcissism, 357  
   and phenomenal character, 275–278,  
     309–324, 312–316  
   hidden reliance on phenomenal prop-  
     erties, 34–35  
   and representationalism, 229,  
     288–290, 293–296, 297  
   failing for shape perception, 320–321  
   squint as providing empirical disproof  
     of, 349  
   as ignoring subject of experience,  
     321–324  
   as unethical, 35–36, 341–366  
   weakness of pure stipulation over  
     “mental word RED,” 330
- Treisman, A. M., 304
- Tye, M., 1, 2, 5, 31, 80, 81, 91, 158, 233,  
   262, 263, 264, 269, 271, 279–281,  
   282, 286–288, 326, 337, 338, 342,  
   349, 359
- PANIC theory, 297, 336–337
- theory of phenomenal unity, 299–308
- “transparency” proposal (*see*  
   Transparency thesis)
- and “veil of sensation” objection, 357
- Unger, P., 247, 255, 263, 264
- Valberg, J. J., 275
- Varela, F., 170, 361
- Vasabandhu, 8
- Vaughan-Williams, R., 360
- Velleman, D., 297, 349
- Vernon, M. D., 191, 208
- Walter, S., 250, 263
- Walton, K., 338
- Ward, A., 2
- Warnock, G., 6
- Whetsell, Jr., W., 304
- Whitehead, A. N., 28, 177, 180
- Wilcox, S., 361
- William of Ockham, 352
- Williams, B., 361
- Wilson, J., 136
- Wittgenstein, L., 61, 69, 100, 158
- Wollheim, R., 338
- Woodworth, R. S., 5
- Wright, E. L., 1, 2, 26, 27, 35–36, 60,  
   69, 98, 123, 157, 170, 206, 216, 278,  
   297, 307, 337, 341–366
- Bomb-Defusers Analogy, 353
- the joke and motivational rivalry, 16
- notion of real numerical and qualita-  
     tive identity unnecessary, 56, 352
- Wyszecki, G., 145
- Yang, M., 193
- Yolton, J., 9, 10, 12