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The Soviet-East European Concept of People's Democracy

The Political Situation

At the end of World War II the leaders of the Communist Parties of Poland, Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria returned to their countries in the baggage train of the Red Army and assumed control of the "commanding heights" of society in dependence on the Soviet occupation forces.[1] These Communist Parties were burdened with a dual weakness that limited their radicalism in the initial postwar period. All faced significant, organized opposition to the consolidation of their rule, resistance being strongest in Poland and weakest in Bulgaria. This internal situation dictated a policy of gradualism, generalized by Hugh Seton-Watson[2] as encompassing three stages: (1) a genuine coalition with the surviving socialist and peasant parties resting on a short-term program of mutually accepted "antifascist" and "democratic" reforms (lasting until early 1945 in Bulgaria and Rumania and until early 1947 in Hungary); (2) a bogus coalition with the same parties, themselves increasingly dominated by Communists, implementing more radical social reforms and more openly suppressing the non-Communist opposition (lasting until late 1947 or early 1948); at this stage, socialism was spoken of only as a distant goal; economic planning was introduced but remained limited in scope; collectivization of agriculture was not mentioned; (3) a monolithic regime that, having liquidated its opposition, set out to emulate the Soviet Union in "building socialism" through forced industrialization and collectivization.

Another aspect of the weakness of the East European Communist Parties was their great dependence on the Soviet Union and thus their subordination to the broader goals of Soviet foreign policy. During the immediate postwar period, until 1947, Soviet foreign policy sought, by playing down its maximalist goals in Eastern Europe, gradually to increase Soviet influence in the rest of the world—particularly in France and Italy—at the expense of the Western powers and without provoking their reaction.[3] Thus the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, no less than the domestic political situation, necessitated a policy of gradualism on the part of the East European Communists.

The Doctrine of People's Democracy

The dual weakness of the East European Communist Parties was reflected in a new theoretical concept markedly at odds with the Marxist-Leninist classics—the concept of "people's democracy."

Marx, Lenin, and Stalin were relatively clear and in agreement on the social order that was to follow the breakup of capitalist society. As Marx stated in the *Critique of the Gotha Program:* "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There is a corresponding political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.*"[4] Lenin devoted most of *State and Revolution* to defending this view, concluding Chapter 2 with these words: "The forms of the bourgeois state are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same; in one way or another, in the last analysis, all these states are inevitably the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence there will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat."[5] Whatever Marx's view, the dictatorship of the proletariat was given a specific interpretation in conditions of economic underdevelopment by Lenin and Stalin. It was defined as the transitional stage between capitalism and communism in which the proletariat—led by its vanguard, the Communist Party—having overthrown the bourgeois or even pre-bourgeois order by force of arms, set out to "build socialism": to create the economic preconditions for communism which capitalism had failed to realize, while simultaneously eliminating exploitation from society.

This scheme could not be reconciled with the reality of postwar Eastern Europe. Coalition governments existed, while land reform and partial nationalization of large-scale industry were only gradually changing the prewar socioeconomic order. Moreover, the Communist Parties owed their control of the key positions of political power, not to revolution, but, with the exceptions of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Czechoslovakia, to the advance of the Red Army. Thus the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was theoretically inapplicable.[6] Moreover, it would have been a political liability for the East European Communists—who lacked mass support in the interwar period (except in Czechoslovakia) and were condemned as "Bolsheviks" fomenting violent revolution by the majority of their countrymen—as they sought to consolidate their power.

In this situation, Communist leaders and theoreticians set out to develop a satisfactory theoretical alternative to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The result was the concept of "people's democracy"—albeit never systematically formulated prior to its reinterpretation

beginning in 1948—which emerged first in scattered statements of East European Communist leaders in 1945 and 1946 and then in limited theoretical generalizations made by a group of Soviet academicians in 1947.

It is possible to distinguish several instrumental motivations that guided the East European Communists in developing the doctrine of people's democracy. It would seem to have reflected rather well the mood of the population, including the mass of post-1945 new Party members, which was ready for far-reaching social change in the wake of prewar dictatorship (in every country except Czechoslovakia) and wartime destruction, but which had no desire to see a Stalinist revolution repeated at home. The theory clearly also took shape in part as a result of the efforts of East European Communist leaders to convince revolutionary Communists in their own Parties—many of whom were "natives" who had remained in their countries during World War II and had, in various degrees, engaged in resistance activities—that the gradualist coalition policy was not a betrayal of socialist goals.[7]

However, it may be suggested, the East European Communist leaders were not guided solely by tactical or instrumental considerations in formulating the concept of people's democracy; such an explanation would postulate a sharp separation of ideology from action, which, as noted in the Introduction, has not been characteristic of Communist politics. It must not be forgotten that the East European Communist leaders not only had to justify their power, which was of course still limited in differing degrees in the various countries; they also had to explain their positions of power when the expected precondition and consequence of that power, proletarian revolution and the development of socialism, were lacking.

The theoretical generalization of people's democracy formulated by Soviet academicians in 1947 apparently had a somewhat different motivation. This was, in part, a natural analytical response to a new theoretical phenomenon in the international Communist movement. But in their effort to generalize, the Soviet professors sought to minimize or refute some of the very gradualist formulations of the initial postwar period—for example, the claim that a people's democracy was only a progressive form of bourgeois state. This fact suggests a more directly political motivation for their scholarship: together with possible inter-Party communications, it indirectly conveyed to East European Communists (and to proponents of a gradualist line in the

USSR itself) the position of the Soviet leadership that the "genuine coalition" phase belonged to the past and that the consolidation of Communist power in Eastern Europe must proceed apace.

In theorizing about post-1945 Eastern Europe, the Soviet and East European Communists did not break with the Marxist-Leninist "classics" on the proletarian revolution and socialist transformation as sharply and uniquely as they themselves sometimes suggested. Aside from a number of minor precedents[8] they could have returned to the "popular front" line of the Seventh Comintern Congress,[9] particularly as put into practice in the Spanish Civil War. In Spain, too, Communist domestic policy had been dictated by the foreign policy interests ("antifascism") of the Soviet state, as well as by the preponderant strength of the non-Communist Spanish Republicans. Following the line of the Seventh Comintern Congress, the Spanish Communists and International Brigades had fought for a "new type of democratic republic" (Togliatti) and a "new type of democracy" (José Díaz Ramos), as opposed to the more orthodox, revolutionary slogans of the Spanish Anarchists, Trotskyites, and Left Socialists.[10] When in 1944 Communist Parties throughout the world, including those in Eastern Europe, adopted the coalition tactics dictated by Stalin, this precedent clearly was not forgotten.

The doctrine of people's democracy was also probably influenced by Mao Tse-tung's *On New Democracy* (1940). In that work, Mao wrote that the aim of the Chinese revolution was "a state under the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes" including, he implied, the "national bourgeoisie," forced to back the revolution for a long period because of its opposition to foreign imperialism. The "form" of the postrevolutionary state, according to Mao, could not be "the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship" or "socialist republics of the type of the USSR, republics of the dictatorship of the proletariat," but "only a third [state form], namely the new democracy republic."[11] In *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* (1939), Mao described the "new democracy" revolution as meaning "nationalization of all big capital and big enterprises . . . distribution of the land of landlords among the peasants, and at the same time the general preservation of private capitalist enterprises."[12] Pointing out the similarities between these ideas and the later concept of people's democracy, Benjamin Schwartz convincingly argued that East European and Soviet theoreticians—in particular, Eugene Varga, who (as described later) used the very phrase "new democracy"—drew on Mao's writings.[13]

In the following pages, the concept of people's democracy as it was understood in Eastern Europe prior to 1948 will be summarized under six points.[14]

1. *Uniqueness*

The people's democracies were held to be unique historical phenomena, the consequence of the special position of the East European states at the close of World War II, and as such something previously unknown to Marxism-Leninism. In the words of the Soviet Professor A. Leont'ev, "Such a form [people's democracy] was not foreseen and could not be foreseen by Marx and Lenin, because it was created by completely specific historical circumstances, by specific conditions which could not be foreseen."[15]

It was no wonder, then, that the essential characteristics of a people's democracy were open to debate. Prior to 1948 one group of Communists regarded the postwar East European states as simply "progressive" bourgeois states. This view was expressed by the Hungarian Central Committee member Márton Horváth: "In view of the fact that a people's democracy does not destroy private ownership of the means of production, it can simply be regarded as the most progressive form of bourgeois democracy (or, more correctly, its only progressive form)."[16] Varga, too, in 1946 treated the people's democracies as part of the capitalist world, describing their economies as state capitalism.[17]

A second group of theoreticians held that a people's democracy was neither a capitalist nor a socialist state but a unique, intermediate transitional form. This was the most commonly accepted view all along; in 1947 it became obligatory when Varga was criticized in Moscow for his original position. As K. V. Ostrovitianov put it: "In the states of the new democracy we have a new phenomenon in principle."[18] Varga himself now wrote: "The social structure of these states differs from all those hitherto known to us; it is something totally new in the history of mankind. It is neither a bourgeois dictatorship nor a proletarian dictatorship."[19]

One sign of the ambiguity of the notion of an "intermediate" state order was the terminological confusion that resulted. The East European leaders themselves generally used "people's democracy." Varga favored "democracy of a new type" or simply "new democracy." Professor I. P. Trainin disagreed with this usage, suggesting instead the alternative "democracy of a special type."[20]

2. *Origins*

A people's democracy was held to be a new state order resulting from a "national democratic revolution" in the individual East European countries during 1944–1945. These revolutions, it was maintained, were led by the working class and were directed not only against the foreign invader but at the leaders of the prewar societies.[21]

The national democratic revolutions were thus not considered to be classic bourgeois democratic revolutions.[22] Nor were they considered socialist revolutions.[23] They were usually treated, like the people's democracies themselves, as unique historical phenomena, as something in between bourgeois and socialist revolutions. Only occasionally were they said to be the first phase of an incipiently socialist, permanent revolution, as when Leont'ev quoted Lenin on the absence of a "Chinese wall" between the bourgeois and socialist revolutions.[24]

The concept of the national democratic revolution was developed in an effort to provide some trace of revolutionary legitimacy for the new East European regimes while attempting to explain the far-reaching social changes that in fact resulted from the presence of the Red Army. There was no attempt to deny that presence. On the contrary, the Red Army—in its role both as "liberator" from the Axis invader and as an army of occupation—was seen as the motive force of the "revolution" and was explicitly described as *the* fundamental factor giving rise to the new "popular democratic" regimes. The Polish Communist leader Władysław Gomułka, for example, noted that transformation of Polish society could begin without an internal revolution because of the presence of the Red Army.[25] The national democratic revolution was, in short, indeed unique; it was a revolution from without.

3. *State Order*

As conceived by Marx and developed by Lenin, the proletarian revolution signified the total destruction, the "smashing" of the bourgeois state machine. Both had attacked the belief that the proletariat could take over and utilize the old state machinery. In the case of the people's democracies, it was patently obvious, however, that the old state apparatus had not been destroyed. Many parliamentary institutions and much of the prewar bureaucracy survived. Hungary and Rumania even remained formally monarchies until 1947. Faced with this dilemma, the theoreticians usually responded by denying the necessity of destroying the old state. Varga formulated this point quite clearly: "The old state apparatus has not been smashed, as in the Soviet

Union, but reorganized by means of a continuous inclusion in it of the supporters of the new regime."[26]

A further problem was the form of state organization. It was easy to define it negatively: "Bulgaria will not be a soviet republic," maintained Georgi Dimitrov, "it will be a people's republic."[27] The people's democracy did not incorporate the form of state organization based on the citizens' committee, such as the Paris commune and the soviets. Positive definitions of the new state organization were much vaguer; they usually affirmed the existence of a parliamentary republic in some form. In the speech just cited, Dimitrov maintained: "Our people are for a parliamentary republic which will not be a plutocratic republic." Varga generalized Dimitrov's assertion: "The rise of the states of new democracy shows clearly that it is possible to have political rule by the working people even while the outward forms of parliamentary democracy are still maintained."[28] While the state was said to exercise functions of class repression, economic organization, and education, none of these tasks was defined as clearly, nor was the state's role in their fulfillment made as exclusive, as in Stalin's formulations of the three functions of the Soviet state.[29]

4. *Economic Structure*

Just as the people's democracies were viewed in toto as hybrid states, so their economies were viewed as neither capitalist nor socialist but as mixed economies combining elements of both.[30] The elimination of "feudal survivals," the redistribution of land, partial nationalization, and the introduction of reconstruction planning were seen as modifying the capitalist economic order without replacing it entirely. In each East European country, the coexistence of three economic sectors—the state, the peasant and handicraft, and the capitalist—was asserted. The right of private property was guaranteed, though restricted by the state in its effort to limit (not abolish) "capitalist exploitation." While the capitalist sector had lost its predominant role in the economy, its importance was not to be denied. Polish Communist leader Bolesław Bierut explained the relationship between the state and capitalist sectors in the following words: "The essence of the new social and economic order consists in the specific harmony of two factors—on one hand, the leading role of the state, which controls the large-scale means of production and which is guided in its activity by the interests of the whole people, and on the other hand, the entrepreneurship, energy, and free initiative of the mass of individuals in agriculture and the

handicrafts, just as in medium and small-scale private shops and enterprises which are based on wage labor."[31] This rationale was reflected in the East European reconstruction plans. The Polish Three-Year Plan of 1947, for example, explicitly affirmed the coexistence of the three sectors.[32]

This mixed economy was said to be developing "in the direction of socialism"—since the state sector was decisive—but not yet "building socialism"; when the latter stage was reached, it was often suggested, it would be a gradual process quite unlike the Soviet experience. In Varga's words: "[The people's democracies] may, maintaining the present state apparatus, gradually pass over to socialism, developing to an ever-increasing extent the socialist sector which already exists side by side with the simple commodity sector (peasant and artisan) and the capitalist sector, which has lost its dominant position."[33] The ultimate fate of peasant agriculture in this process was usually passed over in silence.

5. *Class Structure*

In classic Marxist-Leninist doctrine, it was the task of the proletarian revolution to overthrow the ruling bourgeoisie. The victorious proletarian state had only to suppress the "remnants" of the deposed ruling class.

In the people's democracies, in contrast, the "progressive" bourgeoisie was—in the Communist view—still both strong and politically active, and this fact was reflected in the theoretical conception of the new state. It could hardly be otherwise with a doctrine that still admitted an important role for capitalists in a mixed economic system. Thus people's democracy encompassed the existence of "progressive" bourgeois parties and their participation in the parliamentary state organs. As Soviet Professor N. P. Farberov was to say of the former "exploiters": ". . . . the structure of society consists not only of the toiling classes who are in power; there are still preserved exploiting *classes*, too. . . ."[34]

But while "progressive" bourgeois parties existed, as time passed less pretense was made that they really shared power. The former ruling classes, including the bourgeoisie, had been deposed, and power was said to be in the hands of the "people"—sometimes defined as including the "progressive" or "patriotic" bourgeoisie but increasingly restricted to workers, peasants, and "people's intelligentsia." In Dimitrov's words, the leading role in the people's democracy was played by "the great

majority of the people—the workers, peasants, artisans, and the people's intelligentsia."[35] It was usually pointed out, with varying degrees of emphasis, that the leading force of the people, so defined, was in fact the working class.[36] While such a formulation approached the orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the leading role of the proletariat, in alliance with the peasantry, in a socialist state, there was a significant difference between the two concepts. Stalin had formulated the relationship between the proletariat and its class ally in terms of the "*hegemony* of the proletariat within this alliance."[37] In the theory of people's democracy as propounded until 1948, in contrast, the emphasis was placed on the worker-peasant alliance itself rather than on the dominance of the working class. József Révai, a leading Hungarian Communist, expressed the idea in the following words: "The essence of state power of the people's democracy is the division of power between the working class and the working peasantry. . . . State power at present is not unified, homogenous state power in the sense that state power as a whole is not in the hands of one class."[38]

This treatment of the working class as the most important but not a hegemonic element in the people's democracy was reflected in the formulation of the Communist Party's role. In contrast to Stalin's dictum on the exclusive leading role of the Communist Party,[39] it was held that the Communist Party was the most important but not a hegemonic political party in a people's democracy.

The inapplicability of the classic Marxist-Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the people's democracies was pointed out earlier. And, in fact, referring to this class structure of the new states, the East European Communist leaders and Soviet academicians were unanimous in explicitly denying that the people's democracies were dictatorships of the proletariat.[40] In Trainin's words: ". . . what is the social essence of the democracy of a special type? Of course it is not proletarian (socialist) democracy. Proletarian democracy is identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which does not share power with other classes. . . ."[41]

6. Specific National Road to Socialism

People's democracy, as defined by the preceding five characteristics, signified the affirmation of a specific road to socialism, quite different from that described in the classics of Marxism-Leninism. It must be repeated, however, that the people's democracies were not considered to be actively "building socialism." While socialism was "on the

agenda," as the Communists often put it, at the present stage the people's democracies were said to be engaged in creating the preconditions for the development of socialism. In Soviet leader Andrei Zhdanov's mild words, taken from his otherwise militant report at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, the people's democracies were "paving the way for entry onto the path of socialist development."[42] The Communist regimes, backed by the Soviet military presence and proceeding from the "popular democratic" social transformation of the initial postwar period, would develop their countries in the direction of socialism. The emphasis in this process, as already pointed out with reference to the economy, was on gradual change: "An evolutionary way of social change and an evolutionary transition to a socialist order is entirely possible."[43] It was never made very clear whether socialism—that is, the "full socialism" of 1936 in the Soviet scheme of development—would be reached in this way, but the usual implication was that gradual change would characterize the whole course of socialist development; a dictatorship of the proletariat would be avoided in a people's democracy.[44]

This concept of a specific road to socialism was given a further dimension of being in harmony with the unique *national* characteristics of the respective country—an emphasis reflecting the need of the East European Communists, burdened with their pasts as Soviet agents, to present themselves to their countrymen as the "best defenders" of national sovereignty. The Hungarian Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi expressed this idea very clearly:

> During the last 25 years the Communist Parties of the world learned that there are several roads which lead to socialism and, . . . although socialism utilizes a wealth of international experiences, our socialism can be created only as a result of the development of Hungarian history and Hungarian economic, political, and social forces. That will be socialism born on Hungarian soil and adapted to Hungarian conditions.[45]

Somewhat later, nearly the same thing was said about Rumania; such statements could be cited for each of the East European states. However, no Hungarian spokesman, for example, ever suggested precisely how the Hungarian road to socialism might differ from the Rumanian or the Polish road; Polish Communist leader Edward Ochab indicated in December 1945 that Polish Communists "still cannot quite define" the "Polish road."[46] The people's democracies as a group were said to be following national roads to socialism, yet there was never any

attempt to differentiate the substance of this development in the individual East European countries. This was so because the "national" roads to socialism were not primarily national at all but rather non-Soviet.

These six primary characteristics of a people's democracy indicate that the very concept, as developed between 1945 and 1948, was extremely ambiguous from a Marxist point of view. Some discrepancies between the theory of people's democracy and the Marxist-Leninist "classics" have been indicated. Yet, as an aid to understanding how the theory could be accepted by theoretically inclined Communists during these years, it should be repeated that "a clear-cut, theoretical, and well-reasoned analysis of the people's democracies, made within the context of Marxian ideology, was not elucidated systematically by the East European Communist leaders,"[47] or, really, by the Soviet professors. The very vagueness of the theory, then, was one of its strengths, allowing it to serve the instrumental and analytical purposes mentioned previously.

From another point of view, however, the basic rationale of the doctrine was not entirely new or entirely at odds with Stalinism. Stalin had, after all, transformed Soviet society from above, and this fact had found suitable expression in his glorification of the Soviet state and his subsequent attribution of primacy to the superstructure instead of the economic base of society.[48] It was only one (albeit self-contradictory)[49] step further to formulating a doctrine of *initiating* such a revolutionary transformation from above, though that transformation was envisaged in this stage as gradualist and unlike the Soviet path.

More important, uncodified as it was, the doctrine of people's democracy did closely reflect the reality of the imposition of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe with the aid and under the protection of the Red Army. The people's democracies explicitly traced their origins to the westward advance of Soviet troops at the end of World War II. The doctrine thus embodied the factual dependence of the East European Communists on the Soviet Union. It also embodied an "historical" aspect of subordination to the USSR. As much as the roads to socialism were said to vary, the final goal was still socialism, and the Soviet Union, being the only country where, it was claimed, socialism had been realized, was still a historically more progressive society, whose experience, if not copied, certainly could not be ignored.[50]

Notes

[1] The best summaries of the Communist seizure of power in Eastern Europe are Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1951); Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* chap. 1; Richard V. Burks, "Eastern Europe," in C. E. Black and T. P. Thornton, eds., *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[2] Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution,* pp. 167–171.

[3] See Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 13–20.

[4] Marx/Engels, *Ausgewählte Schriften* ([East] Berlin, 1954) 2:25.

[5] V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), p. 31.

[6] This point is made in Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* p. 26.

[7] Shortly after returning to Hungary from Moscow in late 1944, Mátyás Rákosi, invoking Stalin's authority, defended the coalition policy against the "1919-ers" or "native" revolutionary Communists in the Hungarian Party. (Speech of February 11, 1945, quoted in McCagg, "Communism and Hungary," pp. 245–246.) McCagg analyzes at length the differences between Rákosi and the "leftists" in the Hungarian Party. For a survey of similar revolutionary sentiment in the Rumanian and Czechoslovak Parties, see Burks in Black and Thornton, eds., *Communism and Revolution,* pp. 83–86. Władysław Gomułka attacked at length the "sectarian position of some comrades" in his May 27, 1945, speech to Polish Party functionaries. (Władysław Gomułka, *Artykuły i Przemówienia* [Warsaw, 1962–] 1:256–287.)

[8] The Bukharan, Khorezmian, and Far Eastern republics of the early 1920s were called "people's republics." (Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954], pp. 254–255.) Mongolia had remained an anomaly for Soviet theoreticians; it was described in the *Politicheski Slovar'* (1940) as "a bourgeois-democratic republic of a new type, laying the foundations for a gradual transition to the path of non-capitalist development." (Quoted in H. G. Skilling, "People's Democracy in Soviet Theory," *Soviet Studies* 3, nos. 1 and 2 [July, October 1951]: 16–33, 131–149, at 22.)

[9] The Resolution of the Seventh Comintern Congress of August 28, 1935, called for the formation of "a proletarian united-front government, or an anti-fascist popular-front government, which is not yet a government of the proletarian dictatorship. . . ." (Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International 1919–1943, Documents* [London: Oxford University Press, 1956–1965] 3:365.) This was a partial revival of the concept of "workers' government" contained in the "Theses on Tactics" adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress on December 5, 1922. In certain circumstances, the Fourth Congress sanctioned the formation of workers' governments with non-Communists; two of three possible types were said not to be dictatorships of the proletariat, since "workers' government that is not Communist" could not be considered a dictatorship of the proletariat. (Degras, ed., *The Communist International* 1:427; see also Kermit E. McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928–1943* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1964], pp. 154–156; Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964], pp. 84–86, 94–95.)

[10] David T. Cattell, *Communism and the Spanish Civil War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955), pp. 90–93. Nevertheless, the "new type of democracy" was admitted to be only a transitional stage to a dictatorship of the proletariat.

[11] Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1954) 3: esp. 118–119. See also Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung,* pp. 74–104.

[12] Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Selected Works* 3: esp. 96–97.
[13] Benjamin Schwartz, "China and the Soviet Theory of People's Democracy," *Problems of Communism* 3, no. 5 (September–October 1954): 8–15.
[14] This section is based largely on the following studies: Skilling, "People's Democracy in Soviet Theory"; Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* chap. 2; Edvard Kardelj, "O narodnoj demokratiji u Jugoslaviji," *Komunist* 3, no. 4 (July 1949): 1–83. See also Francis J. Kase, *People's Democracy* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968).
[15] A. Leont'ev, "Ekonomicheskie osnovy novoi demokratii," *Planovoe khoziaistvo* no. 4 (1947): 63–79, at 69. Gomułka declared in November 1946: "Our democracy and the social order we are constructing and strengthening have no historical precedent. . . ." (*Nowe Drogi,* January 1947, pp. 4–14, at 12.)
[16] *Társadalmi Szemle* 1, no. 10 (October 1946): 693–701, at 694.
[17] E. Varga, *Izmeneniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirivoi voiny* (Moskow, 1946). Even after Varga modified his view, some Soviet writers still classified the people's democracies as exploitative states.
[18] *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* no. 11 (1947): supplement, p. 58.
[19] E. Varga, "Demokratiia novogo tipa," *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* no. 3 (1947): 3–14, at 3.
[20] I. P. Trainin, "Demokratiia osobogo tipa," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* no. 1 (1947): 1–15, and no. 3 (1947): 1–14, at no. 1:4. Trainin maintained that the first such "democracy of a special type" had been the Spanish Republic of 1936–1938 (no. 1:2–4). For a discussion of the terms applied to the world-wide Communist coalition strategy, see McCagg, "Communism and Hungary," chap. 4, who correctly notes that the Yugoslav Communists advocated the term "people's democracy" as a radical concept after mid-1945 but misinterprets the Soviet reaction to their initiative and ignores the continued use of other terms, such as "new democracy," after that date. Finnish and Hungarian Communists used the term "people's democracy" in late 1944. Its exact origin is uncertain; the earliest reference known to the author is the June 1943 proclamation of the Greek Communist Party on the dissolution of the Comintern (cited in *Komunist* 3, no. 6 [November 1949]: 31). The Czech Communist historian Kopecký claimed that when Eduard Beneš visited Moscow in December 1943, "he dropped his earlier objections to the term 'people's democracy.' " (V. Kopecký, *KSČ & ČSR* [Prague, 1957], p. 329.)
[21] Skilling, *Soviet Studies* 3, no. 1: 29.
[22] In Marxist historiography most of the area had passed through this stage in the nineteenth century.
[23] Klement Gottwald stated in a confidential speech in 1945: "We must continually remind ourselves that in the present phase we are following the line of the national and democratic, and not the line of the socialist revolution." (K. Gottwald, *Deset let* [Prague, 1948], p. 284.)
[24] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* no. 4 (1947): 79.
[25] Speech of December 7, 1945, *Artykuły i Przemówienia,* 1:512. In January 1946, attacking the "leftists" in the Hungarian Party, Rákosi denied that Hungary had experienced a revolution in any sense: "All the time people are telling me that what happened in Hungary [in 1944–1945] was really a revolution; and they are accordingly praising and criticizing everything that happened as if it were a revolution. Their error could not be greater. What happened last year was a great change. Still, the shackles which bound the Hungarian people hand and foot were not shattered by our own liberating forces, but by the Red Army. Let us never forget this. It makes a great difference, Comrades. Had we freed ourselves, as say our Yugoslav neighbors did, with a revolution, there would have been a tremendous inner strength to the Hungarian democracy. . . . He who regards the

liberation as a revolution will necessarily make rather serious mistakes." (Speech of January 19, 1946, cited in McCagg, "Communism and Hungary," p. 276.) Bolesław Bierut was later to declare that the presence of the Red Army was an integral characteristic of the Polish "people's democracy."

[26] *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* no. 3 (1947): 3. Trainin reacted differently, pointing to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as proof of the necessity of destroying the old state machine. (Trainin, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* no. 1 (1947): 7, and no. 3 (1947): 6–10.)

[27] Radio address of September 7, 1946, *Sachineniia* 12 (Sofia, 1954): 292.

[28] *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* no. 3 (1947): 13.

[29] J. V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 196–197.

[30] In his 1946 book, Varga depicted the economy of a people's democracy as state capitalism, but he modified this view in his 1947 article.

[31] Kraków speech of July 1946, quoted in Kardelj, *Komunist* 3, no. 4: 12.

[32] Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., and New York: Technology Press and Wiley, 1957), p. 64.

[33] *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* no. 3 (1947): 3.

[34] N. P. Farberov, *Gosudarstvennoe pravo stran narodnoi demokratii* (Moscow, 1949), p. 43 (emphasis added).

[35] Georgi Dimitrov, *Govori, članci i izjave* (Belgrade, 1947), p. 318.

[36] While Varga spoke only of the "political domination of the working people," Trainin, apparently the most extreme, affirmed that the political hegemony of the working class had in fact been achieved, although with different consequences than in the USSR. See Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* p. 30.

[37] Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* p. 161.

[38] *Informatsionnyi biulleten'* TSK MPT, no. 8 (1948): 14, cited in Kardelj, *Komunist* 3, no. 4: 9.

[39] ". . . the leader in the state, the leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is one party, the party of the proletariat, the party of the Communists, which *does not and cannot share* leadership with other parties." (Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* p. 160).

[40] E.g., Varga, *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* no. 3 (1947): 3; Gomułka, Speech of November 30, 1946, *Nowe Drogi,* January 1947, p. 12; Leont'ev, *Planovoe khoziaistvo* no. 4 (1947): 68–69.

[41] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* no. 1 (1947): 12.

[42] A. Zhdanov, *O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii* ([Moscow], 1947), p. 8.

[43] Gomułka, Speech of December 7, 1945, *Artykuły i Przemówienia,* 1: 515. Or as Révai put it: "This development toward socialism is undoubtedly slower than the tempo which we followed in 1919, but, comrades, for the good of the intelligentsia, the peasantry, the little man, for the good of the entire working people, we gladly proceed more slowly but less painfully toward socialism, instead of going faster at the price of a bloody civil war." (Speech to the Third Hungarian Party Congress, cited in Kardelj, *Komunist* 3, no. 4: 8.)

[44] Dimitrov explicitly claimed this in September 1946. (*Rabotnichesko Delo,* September 13, 1946.) Gottwald made the same claim, addressing the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party the same month. (Gottwald, *Deset let,* p. 349.)

[45] Speech to the Third Hungarian Party Congress, cited in Kardelj, *Komunist* 3, no. 4: 7.

[46] E. Ochab, *Wieś polska na nowych drogach* (Warsaw, 1946), p. 46.

[47] Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* p. 29. Wolfgang Leonhard commented: "Until early 1948, the definition of the content and essence of the concept 'people's democracy' was one of the few unsolved problems for which there was not yet an official correct line." (Wolfgang Leonhard, *Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder* [Berlin: Kippenheuer & Witsch, 1955], p. 482.)

[48] See, inter alia, his *Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU* (1939), *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics* (1950), and *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952).
[49] See Kase, *People's Democracy*, pp. 40–41.
[50] For this point, see Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, p. 36.