
Preface

Social Empiricism took shape over a long period of time, and with the influence and support of a number of people and institutions. My former colleagues at the University of Cincinnati supported my return to philosophy of science, after a useful graduate school detour in the history of analytic philosophy. A Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania in 1990–91 gave me the time and the environment to learn about new developments in the cognitive sciences and in science studies. As a participant in the NEH Summer Institute, “Science as a Cultural Process” in summer 1991, I read widely in science studies and feminist science criticism, and had the opportunity to argue with authors. It was then that I saw the emptiness of the polarized debates between social constructivism and traditional empiricism, and looked for the emergence of some new, more complex ideas.

During the early 1990s, it became clear that full development of social empiricism would require several careful historical case studies. The first case study that I did—the history of continental drift and plate tectonics—was suggestive, but not enough. I chose to spend a year on an NEH Fellowship for University Teachers (1994–5) at the Dibner Institute (MIT), which made up the difference in my salary and gave me the opportunity to learn from other Fellows working in the history of science. During that year, in my office overlooking the Charles River and the Boston skyline, I began writing this book.

Temple University, my academic home since 1991, has supported my work with several summer grants and a semester of research and study leave (Fall 1996). *Social Empiricism* was both delayed and improved by

several sideline projects in cognitive science, feminist philosophy of science and bioethics. The impending arrival of my daughter, Amira (born on April 6, 2000), gave me the incentive to finish the manuscript and submit it for publication.

I could not have written this book without the help of a number of colleagues, friends and graduate students, who read portions of the manuscript, answered factual questions, debated broad issues and fine points, and provided continuous moral support. In particular, I thank (in alphabetical order) Liz Anderson, Sid Axinn, Dick Burian, Stephen Downes, Chuck Dyke, Gary Ebbs, Moti Feingold, Samuel Freeman, Ronald Giere, Alvin Goldman, Gary Hardcastle, Jonathan Harwood, Gary Hatfield, Cliff Hooker, Mark Kaplan, Donna Keren, Philip Kitcher, Hilary Kornblith, Hugh Lacey, James Maffie, Mimi Marinucci, Nancy McHugh, Linda Weiner Morris, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Ellen Peel, Joan Richards, Alan Richardson, Bob Richardson, Marya Schechtman, Fred Schmitt, Paul Thagard, Jerry Vision, Joan Weiner and Alison Wylie. I have benefited from the generous comments of my audiences at talks at various universities and conferences. Referees of this book made useful criticisms, corrections and comments. My husband, John Clarke, cared about this project as if it was his own, and gave me both love and time.

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Solomon, M. (1994). “Social Empiricism.” *Noûs* 28, no. 3: 325–343.

Solomon, M. (1994). “A More Social Epistemology.” In Fred Schmitt (ed.), *Socializing Epistemology*, pp. 217–233. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Solomon, M. (1994). “Multivariate Models of Scientific Change.” *PSA* 1994, vol. 2, pp. 287–297.

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Solomon, M. (1998). “Happily Ever After with Consensus?” *Fenomenologia e societa* 21, no. 1: 58–65.

Solomon, M. (2001). "It *Isn't* the Thought That Counts." *Argumentation* 15, no. 1, pp. 67–75.

Solomon, M. (2001). "Consensus in Science." In Tian Yu Cao (ed.), *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 10 of *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*. Bowling Green, Ky.: Philosophy Documentation Center, pp. 193–204.