could be refined enough to make the ties on the criterion disappear; the objects will therefore always be ranked in different ranks according to each criterion.

Another distinction we find irrelevant is counting on an odd or an even number of individual votes, since adding or deleting a criterion is always possible in a real multicriterion decision.

Although we are actually considering a majority method with weighted criteria, we can always suppose that the weights are integers and that their determination is exterior to the real problematic procedure of deciding. Doing this turns all of the "weighted majority" problems described into "simple majority" problems with equal weights for all criteria.

Part II is itself divided into four chapters. Chapter 3 deals with the restricted domains having a known socioeconomic interpretation. Chapter 4 builds the algebraic framework underlying these conditions, and Chapter 5 repairs a classical error on another set of celebrated conditons. Chapter 6 indicates how drastically restrictive are even the loosest of these conditions in terms of structural requirements on the criteria and draws from this operational concluding remarks on the use of the majority method for real noncommittee multicriteria decision-making.