

## Preface and Acknowledgments

This book is about human rationality, logic, and the connection between them. On my view, this connection is both constitutive and mutual. More precisely, I defend the broadly Kantian thesis that logic is the result of the constructive operations of an innate protological cognitive capacity that is necessarily shared by all rational human animals, and governed by categorically normative principles. Working out and writing up this idea has involved many extended visits to the domains of logical theory and cognitive psychology. But although I am a philosopher who by virtue of a deep interest in human rationality is also deeply interested in logic and cognition, I am neither a professional logician nor a professional cognitive psychologist. So I want to make it very clear in advance that I am drawing and relying even more heavily than is usual for philosophers on the theoretical expertise of others. I hope to make my contribution at the synoptic level of the Big Picture, and then turn this project back over to the specialists as a new and important joint research program.

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One last pair of philosophical acknowledgments—oddly enough, to Francisco Goya and Blaise Pascal. The caption of the most famous of Goya’s drawings in the *Los caprichos* reads: *el sueño de la razon produce monstruos*. The sleep of reason produces monsters. In other words, without rational guidance we inevitably commit atrocities. Goya’s stark and uncompromising pronouncement on human folly and how to prevent it, however, should always be juxtaposed with the quotation on the dedication page, which is taken from Pascal’s *Pensées* (section 4, no. 277). The heart has reasons of its own that reason knows nothing about. In other words, the rational guidance of human conduct is inevitably embedded in and inevitably constrained by our equally fundamental pursuits of happiness, personal integrity, and empathic connectedness with others. These are pursuits that may run, most perversely, contrary to our rationality, yet at the same time they drive rationality itself. Taken separately these two remarks capture, for me, the moral depth and the moral limits of human rationality. And taken together they state far better than I ever could my motivations for writing this book.