## Index

Akins, Kathleen, 159–162	Descartes, 26, 27
Analytic-synthetic distinction, 223	Dretske, Fred, 83, 150–152
Anti-individualism, 205, 207, 211, 215,	
220, 224. See also Externalism	Essence, 173-177, 182, 186, 190,
Awareness, 13-35, 40-43, 46-50, 61,	198–201, 270–272
64, 65, 77, 78, 81, 84, 123, 125, 157,	Explaining appearances, 2, 4, 28–30,
242, 243, 250, 265, 270	48, 49, 58, 59, 105, 138, 142,
	171
Berkeley, 28, 29, 201, 202	Explanatory gap, 91-97, 100-113, 161,
Burge, Tyler, 19-21, 56, 63, 236, 243;	191–196
chapter 7, passim	Extension, 52–54, 215–217, 223–225,
	235–239, 242, 243, 269, 279
Chalmers, David, 100–102	Externalism, 31–40, 47, 49. See also
Chaos Theory, 105–114, 154	Anti-individualism
Churchland, Patricia and Paul,	
138–142, 164, 165	Freeman, Walter, 108–111, 158,
Community notion, 218–225, 230, 231,	161
236–239, 243	Frege, 25, 26
Comprehensible to us, 96, 97, 100–105,	Functional equivalence, 45, 46
108, 111, 112	Functionalism, 1, 24, 40–49, 62
Consciousness	Fundamental intentional state, 2, 22,
non-phenomenal, 61, 76–78, 165	23, 31, 117, 126, 203
phenomenal, 61–80	
Content	Galileo, 102–105, 168, 169, 172, 173
constituting, 5–8, 12, 22–26, 57, 90,	Genuine representer (representation),
93, 124–126, 143, 236, 253, 261, 265	113, 120, 121, 130–132, 135, 142,
individuation of, 11, 13, 19–23, 44,	146, 160–162
49, 50, 56, 57, 70, 80, 81, 124, 136,	Grasping, 18, 25, 26, 29, 30, 126
140–142, 220–223	
intentional (representative), 8–10, 22,	Hard problem. See Explanatory gap
32–34, 38–40, 64, 85, 202	Higher-order theories, 31–40
narrow, 1, 25, 43, 44, 52, 58, 76	"How question" ("How possibly"),

92, 97, 105–108, 156, 171, 172, 191,

197

narrow, 1, 25, 43, 44, 52, 58, 76 phenomenal minimal, 76, 167, 175,

176, 198, 203

352 Index

Identities, 168, 177–192
Indeterminacy of Translation, 233, 251–255, 258–260, 265, 267
first-person, 249, 259, 267, 268, 271, 272
third-person, 258, 267
Individual notion, 218–225, 230, 231, 236–238, 243
Information bearer (state), 116, 130–138, 141–152, 162–166
Intentionality, phenomenal, 67–76
Intentional object, 8–10, 39, 40

Language, privacy of, 259–266 Lycan, William, 85–91

Meaning, 21, 39, 40, 203, 269, 286; chapters 7 and 8, passim

Methodological chauvinism, 117–121, 127, 128, 131, 135–138, 145, 146, 152, 157, 163, 166

Millikan, Ruth, 144–150

Nagel, Thomas, 3, 62, 68, 69, 77, 93 New fact (Mary argument), 84–91

Ontology, 3, 4, 14–18, 29, 168, 171, 179, 233, 237–239, 250, 254, 267–274, 277, 280–285, 290, 291 Ostension, 122–124, 241–244, 278

Particularity, 116, 121–124, 151, 233, 235, 244, 247–252, 260
Phenomenological fallacy, 192–195
Phenomenology, 73, 77, 78
Physicalism, 95–100
Place, U. T., 62, 183–185, 191–197
Privileged access, 4–8, 11, 13, 26–43, 48–54, 59, 121, 124, 163, 164, 257

Qualia absent, 23–25 inverted, 23–25, 70 Quine, W. V., 122, 223; chapters 8 and 9, passim

Realism, 272, 273, 280–285, 288 Reduction, 177–183, 190 Reference intended, 233–245, 260–264, 269–272 objective, 233, 237, 238, 269, 270 ontic, 233, 238, 242–244, 268, 269–272 Representation

fundamental fact of, 116, 126–129, 144, 146, 148, 150, 166 teleological accounts of, 134, 144–152 Representations, unconscious, 112, 113, 152–163

Sally, 80–82, 102 Searle, John, 8–10, 27, 28, 39, 40, 65–67, 73, 148, 149, 155, 156, 179–181

Sensory terms, ambiguity of, 167, 168, 173–176, 181, 182, 188–191, 197, 200–203

Smart, J. J. C., 185–190 Subjectivity, 61, 64, 77–82, 90–94, 102, 163–165, 169–173, 181, 182 objective study of, 80–84, 163–165, 262–264

Supervenience, 96, 97, 102, 202 System, state of, 82, 83, 88–90

Topic-neutral sentences, 196, 197
Total information, fallacy of, 174, 175, 201
"To whom," 126–128, 139, 144–150
Transcendental metaphysics, 267–273, 281
Twin Earth, 49–57

Understanding, 12–22, 25–28, 41–43, 65–67, 215–223

What it is like (WIL), 62, 63, 68–78, 172