

# 1 | Discourses of *Keitai* in Japan

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The mobile phone, or more appropriately *keitai*, is indispensable in Japanese society today. Take a quick stroll and you will see a youth in front of a convenience store, a mother watching her child play in the park, even somebody riding a bike—all are staring intently at a small terminal in the palm of the hand. Although these are completely commonplace scenes now, just a decade ago they did not exist.

Today, cellular phone subscription numbers in Japan are at over 82 million. In addition, Japan had over 5 million PHS (personal handyphone system) subscriptions as of the end of May 2004. If we assume that each subscription is held by one individual, then adoption rates are at over 70 percent of the entire population. By comparison, in 1994 cellular phone subscriptions were at 2.13 million. Although other countries have similar adoption rates, *keitai* and Japanese society have unique characteristics that deserve study, such as the permeation to a wide age demographic and the high rates of mobile Internet use.

The chapters in this book analyze and theorize on popular discourse about *keitai* as well as the concrete details of how people relate to *keitai*. This informs not only understandings of Japanese society but also the relationship between technology and society more generally. This opening chapter provides some background context for the chapters that follow. I describe evolving discourses surrounding *keitai* in Japanese society and trends in related sociological research. Since the 1990s, phenomena related to *keitai* came to be described as “youth problems.” Of course, the first users of the cellular phone were executives and then businessmen (not women), who were required to carry them. These groups did not stop using *keitai*; however, *keitai* use became explosively popular among young people, drawing the attention of the general public as well as the interest of researchers. In the following sections, I trace how popular and research discourse has shifted from a focus on business uses to youth relationships to a technonationalistic celebration of Japan’s leadership in the *keitai* arena.

### *Keitai*, Not Mobile Phone

First, I would like to explain briefly why we use the term *keitai* in our work rather than “cellular phone” (*keitai denwa*) or “mobile phone” (*idou denwa*).

Four contributors to this volume, Hidenori Tomita, Kenichi Fujimoto, Tomoyuki Okada, and I began research in *keitai* studies in 1995. We published the results of our research in two edited volumes, *Poke-beru Keitai Shugi!* (*Pager and Keitai Manifesto!*) (Tomita et al. 1997), and *Keitai-Gaku Nyumon* (*Understanding Mobile Media*) (Okada and Matsuda 2002). In the introduction to the latter, Okada cites Ivan Illich’s (1981) concept of the vernacular in explaining our use of the term *keitai*.

From the start, we referred to the objects of our research—cellular phones and personal handyphones (PHS)—by the shared moniker of *keitai*. By then, *keitai denwa* (cellular phone) had been abbreviated to *keitai* in everyday speech. We chose to use this colloquial term to make clear our position on cellular phones and PHS: they are not “new technologies/media introduced from the outside” but rather “technologies/media that come to be embedded in society.”

To study *keitai* rather than the cellular phone, mobile phone, or mobile communications media means examining these devices as they are embedded within a particular society we call Japan, and by extension to examine Japan as a society with *keitai*. Our position, however, is not that the phenomena surrounding *keitai* are exclusive to Japanese culture. As Ito writes in her introduction, we argue against theorizing technology and society, or technology and culture, as separate entities; instead we stress their indivisibility. By examining the wide range of phenomena surrounding *keitai*, we gain insight into modern global society in which mobile phones are unevenly distributed.

Considering how the word *keitai* is constituted raises some interesting issues. In Japanese, *keitai denwa* (portable phone) is a combination of two different two-character *jukugo* (compounds of Chinese characters): *denwa* (telephone) and *keitai* (portable), creating a new four-character *jukugo*. Masao Aizawa (2000) points out that, in Japanese, when abbreviating composite *jukugo*, generally the first character of each word is used. In the case of *keitai* and *denwa*, following this norm would result in *kei-den*. The term *kei-den* would retain both the meaning of “portable” and “telephone.” However, *kei-den* was never taken up, and *keitai* became the established term. “Telephone” was eliminated.

It almost seems as though the popularization of the name *keitai* foretold the subsequent development of the mobile phone. As many have noted, today’s mobile phone, with functions such as e-mail, Internet, and digital camera, is still a phone but is not merely a phone because phones solely support one-on-one voice communication. Particularly among young people, the *keitai* is not so much a phone as an e-mail machine. Further, in practice, cellular phones and PHS are not distinguished from one another and are most commonly both called *keitai*. Only at times when it is necessary

to distinguish the two is the PHS noted as “PHS” or *picchi* (in the case of the younger set).<sup>1</sup>

We feel that *keitai* is the most appropriate term to use in our inquiry into mobile phones in contemporary Japan. In this book we use the term *keitai* or “mobile phone” to refer to both cellular phones and PHS. When there is a need to distinguish them, we use the terms “cellular phone” and “PHS” (see chapter 3).

### The *Keitai* Research Network

Here I briefly introduce the research background of our contributors to situate this book within the broader discourses of *keitai*. I have already described how Tomita, Fujimoto, Okada, and I have been conducting *keitai*-related collaborative research since 1995. Tomita’s interests focus on intimacy and youth cultures, and he has written a book on the 900 number service Dial Q<sup>2</sup> (Tomita 1994). Okada has a background in media studies, and he has conducted participant observation research on the voice mail service, *dengon dial* (Okada 1993). Fujimoto studies popular culture, broadly conceived, and at the time that we began our research together, he was researching watches and pagers as gadgets. With the addition of my own background in communication studies, we began collaborative research based on a shared background in sociology but with different sets of interests. Ichiyo Habuchi, with her interests in intimacy, later joined this group.

In contrast to the explosive spread of *keitai* and the high degree of public interest, in the latter half of the 1990s *keitai* research was not exactly flourishing. Most scholars of media and communications had turned their attention to the Internet, which was also expanding in Japan during the same period. But the irrepressible spread of the mobile Internet finally drew researchers to study *keitai*.

In the spring of 2002, Mizuko Ito and I discussed putting together an edited collection as an English language publication. As a first step, we organized a workshop and invited contributions from my existing research team as well as Yukiko Miyaki, a researcher at a private think tank who had been conducting surveys related to *keitai*; Haruhiro Kato, who had researched computer-mediated communications since the early days of Japanese computer networking; and Shingo Dobashi, with a background in media and technology studies specializing in computer-mediated communications. We also received contributions from Daisuke Okabe, who had been collaborating with Ito based on a shared interest in situated learning theory; Eriko Tamaru and Naoki Ueno, who had been conducting workplace research from an ethnomethodological perspective; Kenji Kohiyama, an engineer who had been engaged in the research and development of various radio communication systems, including the development of the PHS at NTT; Fumitoshi Kato, with an interest in communication theory and the sociocultural context of digital media technologies; and Kakuko Miyata, Jeffrey Boase,

Barry Wellman, and Ken'ichi Ikeda, researchers who had been collaborating on a study of Internet adoption in Japan from a social networks perspective.

The varying backgrounds of the authors are reflected in their contributions. This diversity was not only effective in advancing the discussions held during the workshop but also indispensable in considering the multiple dimensions of *keitai* as a media form embedded in everyday life.

Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the details of the *keitai* diffusion process in the 1990s, with Okada discussing the relation with youth culture and Kohiyama approaching the issue as a telecommunications industry insider (see also Matsuda 2003). Here I describe the evolution of the more popular discourses surrounding *keitai* and review related theories of media, communication, and sociology that emerged in parallel to these developments.

The first section examines the process by which *keitai* was transformed from its initial form as a businessmen's tool to a youth media technology. It describes the initial image of *keitai* as "uncool" as well as issues about the use of *keitai* in public spaces. In the second section, I discuss the moral panic that accompanied the construction of *keitai* as a "youth problem," introducing the main actors: *kogyaru* (street-savvy high school girls) and *jibetarian* (young people who sit and congregate on the street). Next, I summarize how researchers began to study the effects of *keitai* on the interpersonal relationships of young people, once *keitai* became their medium. Finally, I outline the complete transformation of the image of *keitai* after the diffusion of the *keitai* Internet, touching on technonationalism and the growth in *keitai* research.

### **From a Business Tool to a Youth Medium**

The car phone was introduced in Japan in 1979, followed in 1985 by the shoulder phone, which could be taken out of the car, and in 1987 by handheld cellular phone service. However, the user population did not grow steadily, and serious growth did not happen until 1993 (see chapter 2). Although there are numerous reasons why adoption was slow, I believe the most salient was cost. For example, in 1991 new subscriptions cost just under ¥50,000 (approximately US\$450), reduced to ¥36,000 in 1994. On top of this, subscribers were charged a ¥100,000 deposit (done away with at the end of September 1993). At the time, subscribers were primarily men who needed cellular phones for their work (see Nakamura 1996a; Matsuda 1996a).

#### **"Uncool" *Keitai***

What was the image of *keitai* and its users during this period? Yasuyuki Kawaura (1992) conducted one of the first sociological inquiries focused on *keitai*. Drawing from newspaper articles and letters from readers regarding *keitai*-related problems, he discusses *keitai* as a media technology that enables people to become free from place. The cases

presented describe the dangers of using *keitai* while driving and the issue of manners in public places. Among the articles he cites, a number are interesting when viewed from the vantage point of the present:

In a feature article titled, "These are the kinds of men we hate!" a women's magazine puts "men with *keitai*" on the opening page.

"Since he is not really busy at all, the phone never seems to ring. The only calls are ones that he makes himself, and even then, it is not very important communication, something like, 'Oh, thanks for dealing with that.'" The next illustration goes even further: "When he has a free minute he makes a call on his *keitai* asking, 'Were there any calls for me?'" (Kawaura 1992, 307)<sup>2</sup>

A few years later, in an essay entitled "*Keitai-girai no Dokuhaku*" ("Monologue of a *Keitai* Hater"), Junko Sakai (1995) describes how "*keitai* are tasteless." She writes, not only do *keitai* "seem to be used mostly by garishly dressed young women, people who had happened on some quick cash, and people who work in fields that society tends to view as frivolous," just having a *keitai* is a display to others of "a kind of over-eager mentality of 'I want to be reached and be able to reach people at all times and places.'"

In light of the subsequent explosive growth of *keitai* use, we might view this negative image of *keitai* users, as Kawaura (1992) does, as simply "envy on the part of those who don't have one." In the early 1990s, the period of early adoption, *keitai* were still expensive and functioned as a status symbol subject to being cast as "uncool" and "tasteless." In 1991, after the economic bubble burst, "people who happened on some quick cash" may have stood out from the crowd a bit more than usual. *Keitai* were disliked as a device that conspicuously broadcasted "I am wealthy," "I am busy," "I am needed by others."

During this period, even *keitai* users did not have a very positive image of *keitai*. Most use centered on work, and users experienced *keitai* as a new "shackling medium" that succeeded the pager. Ritomo Tsunashima (1992), in his column for a weekly magazine, describes seeing somebody using a *keitai* in a public toilet stall. He writes, "Do you really have to take a call on the toilet?!" "In this busy Japan, there will always be some people who have to take the stance that they will take a call at any time or place," he writes with some sympathy.

This negative image quickly changes after the sudden growth in popularity among young people in the last half of the 1990s. The image continues to be negative, but the nature of the characterization shifts. I discuss this evolution in subsequent sections that deal with young people and *keitai*, but first I discuss the public debate surrounding *keitai* in public spaces from the early adoption years to the present.

### ***Keitai* in Public Spaces**

It is often said that mobile phones blur the boundaries between public and private. From the early 1990s in Japan, use of *keitai* in public spaces was considered a social problem, specifically "inconsiderate *keitai* use on trains" and "poor manners in

speaking loudly on a *keitai*.” In March 1990, Central Japan Railway started playing an announcement on their bullet trains asking passengers to refrain from using *keitai* while at their seats. Other public transportation facilities soon followed suit and began playing similar announcements despite complaints that the announcements themselves were a nuisance.

In his review of letters sent by readers to newspapers, Kawaura (1992) identifies four sources of discord surrounding *keitai* use in public spaces: (1) physical noise (voice, ringing phones), (2) violations of privacy in having to listen in on conversations one doesn’t want to hear, (3) the general creepiness of conversations with people who are not sharing the same space, and (4) the formation of a new kind of hybrid space—the privatization of public space and the impression that personal conversations are out of place there. Drawing from Stanley Milgram’s (1970) concept of “norms of noninvolvement,” Tomita (1997, 69) makes the following analysis:

Although others in the vicinity are “pretending not to hear,” the person talking on the *keitai* seems totally oblivious to the consideration of others around them. Because others are “pretending not to hear,” the speaker should also be “pretending they are not being heard.” . . . But *keitai* users ignore this rule and appear to those around them as if they really do not care. In this way, the norms of noninvolvement in trains have been thrown into disarray.

The physical noise is not the problem. Rather, *keitai* conversations disrupt the order of urban space. *Keitai* lay waste the unspoken agreements determining behavior in public spaces.

At first, those transgressing these norms were businessmen making work-related calls; they constituted the majority of early adopters. Hence the settings for social discord were indicative of this initial user base: mostly the first-class cars in bullet trains, hotels, golf courses, and the like. In the last half of the 1990s, however, as young people begin to adopt *keitai*, bad *keitai* manners become reframed as a problem specific to youth. In this transitional period, an article discussed the PHS the month before it was introduced: “Because PHS are relatively inexpensive, it is likely that young people with bad manners will be using them. I think people will come forward to insist on listeners’ right not to have to listen to conversations” (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, evening edition, June 17, 1995, 7).

As youth emerged as the predominant *keitai* user base, “young people’s inconsiderate use of *keitai* in public spaces” probably did increase. However, even before it became a reality, public discourse was already constructed around the “youth problem” of bad *keitai* manners. I discuss some of the reasons behind this in the following sections, but here I would like to trace the course of the issue of youth and *keitai* manners as it was taken up in the last half of the 1990s.

At the same time, the issue of electromagnetic waves from *keitai* rose to public consciousness,<sup>3</sup> and there was a growing concern that *keitai* use in crowded trains could

affect the functioning of pacemakers (see chapter 10; Mori and Ishida 2001). As a result, public transit facilities have been moving from the stance of self-regulation (“please do not use your *keitai*”) to prohibition (“please turn off your *keitai*”) during rush hour and in train cars flagged as no-*keitai* zones. This quarantining approach is the latest iteration of trial-and-error efforts to regulate *keitai* on public transit.

One result of these ongoing efforts is the perception in recent years that “Japanese mobile phone manners are good.” Ikuo Nishioka, the president of Mobile Internet Capital Inc. and a world business traveler, writes in his Web column, “Around the world, people are very tolerant. Only in Japan are people exceptionally strict in regulating use. If you imagine what it would be like if everyone in a packed train car in overpopulated Japan used their *keitai*, it is understandable that it would be considered poor manners. That is the reality in Japan” (Nishioka 2003). Others have commented on the oppressiveness of the social regulation against *keitai* on public transit, where the issue of pacemakers gets trotted out more as a rationalization for regulating youth behavior on trains (Hoshino 2001; Takeda 2002).

This concern with manners has been affirmed by a number of empirical studies. For example, based on research with college students, Masato Ishikawa (2000) found that the sense of discord that comes with *keitai* use is a result not so much of violating the communal accord of the train but more a matter of sheer noise level. Toru Suematsu and Hitoshi Joh (2000), writing about personal space issues, suggest that one source of the displeasure is related to the fact that *keitai* users have a lowered awareness of the physical space they are occupying. Based on a questionnaire study, Shunji Mikami (2001) found a relation between perceptions about *keitai* manners and public manners in general; according to Mikami, men and younger people tended to have a more tolerant attitude toward public manners than women and older people. Okabe and Ito’s observations of *keitai* use in trains are also discussed in relation to public manners (see chapter 10).

### **Moral Panic**

Okada describes in detail how first the pager and then the PHS and *keitai* became widely adopted by youth in the 1990s as entry-level prices for the devices dropped (see chapter 2). A kind of moral panic (Cohen 1972) emerged as a reaction to the spread of these technologies among young people. This reaction was based on the perception that young people transgressed social norms through *keitai* use. In particular, their *keitai* use did not conform to an earlier norm that “phone calls should be made when there are specific tasks to be dealt with.” From this perspective, youth use of *keitai* represented trivial and useless chatter, and it was wrong to be using expensive voice calls for such conversations. A number of broader social issues emerged from this initial reaction, particularly in relation to how young people relate to others. Here I organize

issues surrounding the interpersonal relationships of young people into two types of “social problems.” One is concern about youth’s tendency to avoid relationships with others. The other is the discomfort with young people’s forming “relationships with anonymous others.” At the root of both of these concerns is the anxiety that traditional human relationships are being lost as a result of new media.

### **Kogyaru and Jibetarian**

At the peak of the pager years, around 1996, *kogyaru* appeared widely in the mass media. A few years later, as *keitai* became widely adopted in 1997 and 1998, it was *jibetarian* who became the focus. Both refer to young people who gather in city centers, but with one major difference. *Kogyaru* refers only to young women, but *jibetarian* is used for both genders. The distinguishing features of *kogyaru* are their bleached brown or blond hair, heavy makeup, very short miniskirt high school uniforms worn with loose socks, and their practices of taking lots of pictures with *puri-kura* (sticker photos from a photo booth) and disposable cameras, and keeping in ongoing touch with their friends with their pagers and *keitai* (see chapter 4). These girls were behind the relabeling of the act of dating men for money from *shoujo baishun* (young girl prostitution) to *enjo kousai* (literally, compensation for companionship). *Jibetarian*—a contraction of *jibeta* (the ground) and the English suffix “-arian”—refers to these people’s signature practice of squatting or sitting on curbs or in a corner of a shopping street.<sup>4</sup> The term was adapted to cover both *kogyaru* and young men of a similar age who were inhabiting the city, seemingly without a particular task, actively maintaining their social life with communications media.

For both these groups, “bad manners” became the target of criticism. “*Kogyaru* who put on makeup and change clothes in the train” and “*jibetarian* who not only sit on the street but eat and drink there”—young people nonchalantly doing things that one should be too embarrassed to do based on traditional sensibilities. In order to “understand” these *kogyaru* and *jibetarian*, characterizations were put forth such as “young people who can’t distinguish public and private,” “young people who are only concerned with their friends,” or “young people who transform public places into private space.”

Their *keitai* use was described in similar terms. The reason they “engage in idle chatter on the train” is because they don’t have any interest in “others” who are not their friends. At the same time, they are criticized for “denying the importance of others who are right in front of them by connecting with a partner in a remote location.” Does the *keitai* detract from the relationship with the “others who are right in front of them,” or do they use *keitai* because they have no interest in these strangers? Without really querying the causal links, public discourse stresses the affinity between *kogyaru*, *jibetarian*, and *keitai* and extends these characterizations to young people as a whole.

I am not suggesting that “young people’s manners really aren’t so bad,” or that “*keitai* use does not have an impact on young people’s interpersonal relationships.” I am not working to call attention to the reality of the matter. Rather, I wish to examine the *perception* that young people have bad manners, how their interpersonal relationships and *keitai* use were intuitively linked and taken up as “social problems.” Based on 2001 data from the Mobile Communication Research Group, Habuchi (2002b) found that there are no particularly distinguishing features of *keitai* users who make voice calls in public places. In other words, young people do not have a stronger tendency to make these calls, and we could draw the conclusion that the “problem with young people’s *keitai* manners” is more a reflection of the older generation’s “wanting to characterize youth as having no shame” (Habuchi 2002b, 50).

In every era, young people’s attitudes, actions, and values are viewed as inappropriate or incomprehensible by older people. In Japan, particularly since the 1980s, new media have played a role in this framing. For example, when devices such as Walkmans, Famicom game machines, and videocassette recorders appeared in rapid succession, young people in Japan were labeled and discussed as *shinjinrui* (the new breed), and one of their distinguishing features was their mastery of these new media devices. Then, near the end of the 1980s, *otaku* (media geeks) make their appearance. Although the meaning of the label diversified in later years, at the time it was a negative term that referred to youth who “grew up immersed in media and so are unskilled at human communication.” Saeko Ishita (1998) describes how both youth and media represent something new to society and get discussed in the same context, where each becomes a basis for explaining the other. She calls this relationship “the unhappy marriage of youth and media theory.” This unhappy marriage, of course, was applied to pagers and *keitai* through the 1990s.<sup>5</sup> In contrast to this view of the older generation, Fujimoto (chapter 4) and Kato (chapter 5) analyze how young people themselves understand pagers and *keitai* in their lives.

### **Anonymous Relationships and Media: From *Beru-Tomo* to *Deai-Kei***

With the popularity of pagers in the mid-1990s, mass media attention focused on *bell-tomo*, or *beru-tomo*, friendships built through the exchange of pager (*poke-beru*) messages. After meeting once face-to-face, friends, strictly speaking, cease to be *beru-tomo*. Some young people would exchange several tens of messages a day. Among these youth, some felt they could share troubles that, with *beru-tomo*, they would not share with their friends, and this was reported with astonishment by the mass media.

Tomita (chapter 9) describes how relationships with anonymous others preexisted the *beru-tomo*, enduring in the social lives of youth as they transitioned from call-in and voice mail services accessed by home telephones to pay phones and pagers, and now to the Internet and *keitai* and the *deai-kei* (encounter/dating) sites that are the current subject of public concern. I would like to point out here that anonymous

relationships supported by these different media forms have always been discussed in negative terms.

In a value system that sees face-to-face relationships as most vital, baring one's soul to a *beru-tomo* whom one has never met in person is characterized as strange. Often these young people are described as getting into mediated communication because "they are not skilled at face-to-face communication." Alternatively, they might be characterized as choosing anonymous relationships because they don't want to get hurt by real ones. Kato (chapter 5) analyzes how this "mythology of the face-to-face" has deep roots not only for the older generation but for young people as well. So what distinguishes the youth who get into *deai-kei* and those who avoid them? Habuchi (chapter 8) takes up this question.

Crimes associated with call-in services and *deai-kei* were eagerly reported in the media, stressing danger and risk and reinforcing the negative images associated with these anonymous relationships. These services have also had a strong association with the sex industry. Trade magazines for educators and police have recently taken up the theme of how to deal with *deai-kei* sites as problematic and deviant behavior.

### ***Keitai* and the Transformation of Interpersonal Relations**

What research has taken up the issues surrounding youth, pagers, and *keitai*?<sup>6</sup> As public interest in the topic grew, researchers also became interested in the unique uses of *keitai* developed by young people. For example, young people transformed the pager from a technology designed to get somebody to initiate a call to a medium for one-on-one communication (see chapter 2). Youth use changed the technology. Technology does not unilaterally change society, nor does society simply take up a technology unchanged as a useful tool. Researchers' interests were drawn to the case of the pager first and then to *keitai* as a visible and concrete example of the interaction between technology and society. In addition, a number of practices such as *wan-giri* or *wan-ko* (making a call and hanging up after the first ring)<sup>7</sup> or *ban-tsuu sentaku* (call-screening using caller ID) (see chapter 6) are examples of *keitai* use unique to or primarily utilized by young people.

Most of the chapters in this book follow the trend set in the mid-1990s of focusing on youth use. These studies analyze *keitai* use by young people because they foreshadow subsequent developments and highlight what is distinctive about *keitai*. A smaller number of the contributions represent emergent research attention toward other groups of *keitai* users (chapters 7, 11, and 12).

### **Pagers and a New *Yasashisa* among Youth**

Let me begin by introducing the psychiatrist Ken Ohira's (1995) theory of *yasashisa* (kindness, sweetness, gentleness). Ohira posits that prior meanings of *yasashisa*

changed in the nineties. In contrast to the earlier meaning of *yasashisa* based on sensing and responding to another's feelings and creating a congenial relationship, for 1990s young people, *yasashisa* means not interfering with another's feelings by "carelessly doing something that might seem considerate." And Ohira relates this "new *yasashisa*" to pagers. Pagers are "a tool for taking a passive role, placing the first step of mutual communication in another's hands" (88). Unlike the phone, which burdens the receiver with the demand of an immediate and direct response, the pager conforms to a "new *yasashisa*" in allowing the receiver to read the message when it is convenient. Ohira argues that receivers also have the option of cutting the power or making an excuse that they did not see the message, alleviating stress for the pager owner.

A popular theory goes, "Young people today have many friends that they always spend time with, but because they don't argue or share their problems, because they associate without getting too intimate, young people today are isolated." As did Ohira, the mass media made similar points about young people's relationships, tracing continuities between pagers, PHS, and cellular phones: "The switch can be turned off for a pager or *keitai* at any time; this fits with young people who want to avoid conflicts in interpersonal relationships." "Young people's relationships are maintained completely by media communication and are superficial." "Because they feel isolated, young people look for constant connection with the *keitai*."

In the pager heyday of 1995 and 1996, the media "discovered" a youth with several hundred *beru-tomo* who was taken up as a "real case" of shallowness in interpersonal relationships, combined with a sense of isolation. On top of this, the exchanges were not based on any necessity, being merely exchanges of simple feelings or to confirm a sense of connection, like "good morning," "how are you?" "good luck." This case was mobilized as "evidence" of young people's social disconnection.

In response to this situation, Isao Nakamura (1996b) draws from a questionnaire survey of college students to challenge the view that young people have superficial relationships and that pagers foster this tendency. Nakamura (1997, 27) explores the influence of pagers and PHS on young people's relationships through a panel survey and refutes the view that pagers lead to superficial relationships: "[T]he users of pager and the users of PHS have tendency [sic] to have active face to face interaction. . . . The using of mobile telecommunication media doesn't encourage the mobility in daily life. On the other hand, there is a tendency for the mobile telecommunication media to enhance the face to face interactions."

From a media theory perspective, Okada (1997) argues that depending on the nature of the relationship, the pager can be a "violent medium," such as when a company demands pager use for an employee. He argues against Ohira's stance that the pager is inherently a medium of "new *yasashisa*" and that research needs to attend to the settings in which media are used. Further discussion of this issue can be found in Okada's contribution in chapter 2, particularly his review of Takahiro's work (1997a; 1997b).<sup>8</sup>

### Selective Sociality and Full-Time Intimate Community

By 1996 subscriptions to pagers had started to fall off, and young people were transitioning to *keitai*. In 1995 I began working with Tomita, Fujimoto, Okada, and Habuchi, conducting fieldwork and interview studies on mobile communications using pagers and *keitai*. Based on our research from 1996 to 1998 in urban centers in Tokyo and Osaka (Matsuda et al. 1998), we found that young people's use of caller ID services reflected a highly selective and discriminating approach to interpersonal relationships. Hashimoto's (1998) analysis of public statistics from 1970 on also refutes the popularly held notion that young people's relationships are becoming superficial; he finds indications that heavier *keitai* and pager use correlates with a preference for deeper and broader friendships (see also Hashimoto et al. 2000; Hashimoto et al. 2001).

Building on this prior research, I have argued that young people's relationships are tending not toward superficiality but toward *selectivity*, where friends are chosen based on context rather than on some other broad or shallow footing (Matsuda 1999b; 2000a; also see chapter 6). In a similar vein, Daisuke Tsuji (1999) has described a "flipper orientation," where youths favor flexible switching of communication to engage and disengage from relationships. He argues that young people's contemporary conception of self can only be understood using a multifaceted model of self with multiple centers rather than a more conventional model of a single self embedded in a set of concentric relational circles. Debate continues on the issue of superficiality and selectivity of young people's relationships, as other researchers have stepped in to challenge and expand on both views (e.g., Iwata 2001; I. Tsuji 2003; Mikami et al. 2001; Miyata 2001; Kotera 2002).

Habuchi's (2002a) work on *keitai* and self also represents an important dimension to this debate (see chapter 8). She describes how the continuous connectivity of *keitai* feeds into the reflexive construction of self that is dependent on feedback from peers. Akihiro Kitada (2002) describes how *keitai* actualizes social connections through text messages that are not oriented so much toward actual communicative content but toward the metamessage "I am trying to communicate with you." The exchange of these messages, in turn, transforms urban environments into a superfluous ritual space where young people need to constantly ward off the risk of "I who may not be connected."

I would like to introduce one final concept on the topic of *keitai* and young people's interpersonal relationships. Based on four surveys of young *keitai* users, Ichiro Nakajima, Keiichi Himeno, and Hiroaki Yoshii (1999) developed the concept of "full-time intimate community," which describes how young people use *keitai* to maintain communication with a select group of no more than ten close friends. These close friends are also people that they see on an everyday basis. The addition of *keitai* communication means that the select peer group has a sense of being in psychological contact twenty-four hours a day, thus forming a full-time intimate community. Research and

debate is ongoing on this issue (Hashimoto et al. 2000; Mikami et al. 2001; H. Ishii 2003).

### **Effects of *Keitai* and Characteristics of Users**

*Keitai* influences more than communication. Yoshii (2001) writes that nearly 50 percent of college students who take up a *keitai* report having less money to use freely, 20 percent report that their purchases of clothing and accessories, comics, and CDs have gone down, and 33 percent report that their time doing part-time work has increased. *Keitai* has become a social necessity, and this is having repercussions on youth consumption patterns and time rhythms.<sup>9</sup> Although the popular media have widely linked the recent decline in restaurant business, karaoke parlors, and CD sales to *keitai* costs (e.g., Oda 2000), the picture is actually more complex.

A study of female college and junior college students finds that heavy *keitai* users tend to do more part-time work, have more disposable income, and consume more fashion items such as clothing and cosmetics (Watanabe 2000). Although these results appear contradictory, they can be read as indicating that people who are more proactive and outgoing tend toward heavy *keitai* use. Other studies find that *keitai* users are more sociable than nonusers (Nakajima, Himeno, and Yoshii 1999; Okada, Matsuda, and Habuchi 2000; Hashimoto et al. 2000) and that heavy users are even more sociable (Miyaki 1999; Okada, Matsuda, and Habuchi 2000; Matsuda 2001b). *Keitai* is used by sociable people and augments their sociability. In Yoshii's (2001) survey of young people, 63 percent reported meeting with friends more often after starting to use *keitai*; only 1 percent reported doing so less.<sup>10</sup>

### ***Keitai*, Family, and Gender**

The public's interest in the effects of *keitai* on the family has grown as the age of *keitai* users has dropped from those in their twenties to teens, from high school to middle school students. The central question has been whether *keitai* pushes family members apart or draws them together.

Those arguing for the fragmenting effects of *keitai* point out that family members are each making connections to external relations through the personal medium of *keitai*. In particular, it becomes difficult for parents to monitor their children's relationships, so there may be cases where children become involved in crimes or delinquency through their mobile phones.<sup>11</sup> The opposing view recognizes that *keitai* can push family members apart but also suggests that it can strengthen their existing connections. In families with an existing tendency to communicate, *keitai* promotes more communication, but it does not promote communication for families that tend not to communicate to begin with (see chapter 6). Daisuke Tsuji's (2003a; 2003b) research with 16–17-year-olds suggests that the children's peer communications, strengthened by *keitai*, are increasingly happening outside of parental oversight but that this has not

had a significant impact on at least the qualities of trust and satisfaction in family relationships. In chapter 14, Miyaki describes a trend toward purchasing *keitai* for children for safety and other reasons, despite reservations about its effects on the family (see also Cabinet Office 2002b).

Other research examines how social structural positions tied to institutions of family and gender relate to differences in *keitai* use. Chapter 6 analyzes gender differences in patterns of use, and chapter 11 describes how *keitai* has been incorporated into the sociotechnical entity “housewife.” Rakow and Navarro (1993) argue that just like other media, *keitai* have “the potential to disrupt old social and political conventions, to rearrange hierarchies, and to reconfigure the boundaries of the public and the private” (144), but “It is gender ideology, operating within a particular political and economic context, that leads to women and men living different lives and using technology differently” (155).

### The Success of i-mode and Technonationalism

Around the year 2000 the negative image of *keitai* as a medium uniquely tied to youth began to shift. Starting with i-mode in February 1999, *keitai*-based Internet services started to spread across the broader population: “*Keitai* are saviors of the Japanese economy.” “*Keitai* represent a Japanese-style IT revolution.” Suddenly, Japan began to pin high hopes on *keitai*.

By the end of 2001, 72.3 percent of *keitai* users were subscribed to the *keitai* Internet, and by the end of 2002, this percentage was 79.2. Comparable percentages in other countries are much lower: South Korea 59.1, (74.9 in 2002), Finland 16.5 (29.1 in 2002), Canada 13.8 (20.0 in 2002), and the United States 9.4 (8.9 in 2002). The White Paper on Information and Communications in Japan (2002) which reported these statistics, labeled this topic the “World-Leading *Keitai* Internet.”

Moreover, NTT DoCoMo reported that the average monthly revenue per unit (ARPU) for i-mode alone was ¥1,970 (voice ARPU, ¥5,640) in January through March 2004, and Web access was the driving force for packet traffic, at 88 percent in comparison to 12 percent for e-mail.<sup>12</sup> The *keitai* Internet attracted attention not only because it boosted revenue for DoCoMo but also because it represented a new model for e-business, which had stagnated in Japan because of security concerns.

### The IT Revolution and the Digital Divide

The *keitai* Internet has been a vessel for hope that goes beyond its potential as a new business model. Japan had been suffering with a prolonged recession after the economic bubble of the 1980s burst. In contrast, the U.S. economy flourished in the 1990s after emerging from its recession in the previous decade, and information technology (IT) was identified as one key element in this recovery. Although the U.S. “new econ-

omy” is now subject to suspicion after the dot-com bust, in the late 1990s Japan looked toward IT as a key component of economic recovery.

But the primary IT industry driver, the desktop PC Internet, did not spread as rapidly as hoped in Japan. This stood in marked contrast to the unexpected popularity of *keitai*. Some factors for the low rates of growth were slow connections, high costs, and low penetration of PCs. Improving Internet infrastructure continued to be a political goal. For example, the November 2000 IT Law stipulates the “formation of a superior information communications network with the highest global standard that can be widely used at low cost.”

This was the backdrop to the introduction and spread of the *keitai* Internet. Mari Matsunaga (2001), a developer of DoCoMo’s i-mode service, describes how the service was based on a concept of a “regular telephone,” targeting general users instead of business users. The *keitai* Internet became an extremely popular service and gave a substantial boost to Japan’s Internet participation; at the end of 1999, Internet penetration stood at only 21.4 percent; by the end of 2001, the rate had doubled to 44.0 percent.

The *keitai* Internet has also been characterized as an antidote to the central social concern of the IT era: the digital divide between people who can and cannot use IT. Compared to the costly and difficult process of gaining PC Internet access, the *keitai* Internet is accessed through inexpensive terminals; it is simple to subscribe to and navigate. The barriers of technical knowledge and pricing that inhibited PC Internet adoption do not apply to the *keitai* Internet, and many Japanese first connected to the Internet through *keitai*. For example, Dentsu Soken (2000) has categorized survey respondents into those with high technical literacy and affinities to the PC Internet, and those with low technical literacy and affinities to *keitai*. This latter group is nonetheless characterized by high rates of access to the *keitai* Internet, and the report concludes that this group will “lead the evolution of the Web phone world.”<sup>13</sup>

### Technonationalism

The slogan “*keitai* IT revolution” emerges from this context. The White Paper on Information and Communications in Japan (2000) reports, “The NTT DoCoMo group has more subscribers than the other major ISPs in Japan.” This celebration could be characterized as an effort to gain leadership in the IT revolution through *keitai* after lagging behind the United States in PC Internet use. Dentsu Soken (2000, 18) describes this sentiment:

In the world of the “PC + Internet,” the US, the birthplace of the Internet, has always taken the lead over other countries. Today’s economic prosperity in the US is also tied to this ongoing IT leadership. With the Web phone, however, Japan has taken the initiative, and if a new IT social model takes hold, Japan could claim a substantial international contribution, and most importantly, could contribute to a reactivation of the Japanese economy.

In his book *Keitai ga Nihon wo Sukuu* (*Keitai Will Save Japan*), Kiyoshi Tsukamoto (2000, 47) relates Japanese *keitai* achievements to a kind of national character reminiscent of earlier *Nihonjinron* (Japanese theory) texts, which claimed the uniqueness of Japanese culture and people:

Americans are strong in the world of large memory and fast connections, as for the PC, but the Japanese are adept in the world of small capacity and miniature displays, as for the *keitai*. This may be a reflection of the difference between a country with rich resources and one with few, but somehow, along the way, *keitai* have become a master craft of the Japanese.

This book does not mention Motorola's 1989 MicroTAC despite the dramatic breakthrough it represented in defining the trend toward miniaturization of terminals. Even before *keitai*, Japanese transistor radios and cars were characterized as beating international competition with "compact high performance" grounded in Japanese "top-grade technology." The current celebration of *keitai* arises from a technonationalist sentiment typical of the self-characterization of postwar Japan.

Of course, Japan was not always a high-tech nation. Akio Morita, the founder of Sony, writes in *Made in Japan* that Japanese products were of poor quality until the 1950s and that it was not until the late 1970s that Japanese companies started to dominate high-tech markets (Morita, Reingold, and Shimomura 1986). Further, Shunya Yoshimi (1998) describes how U.S.-driven global standards in the 1970s started to stress light and compact technologies and precision instruments rather than heavy and massive technology. This shift was as much a factor in Japanese success as any high standard that Japanese technology came to represent in the international arena.

As soon as Japan became associated with high-tech in the international arena, some Japanese began interpreting characteristics intrinsic to Japan as a source of these technologies. For example, in *Made in Japan*, Morita describes technology as a survival mechanism and locates Japan's technological aptitude in the characteristics of an island country with harsh weather and few natural resources, inhabited by deeply spiritual people "who tend to believe that God resided [sic] in everything" (226). He suggests that the Japanese believe that frugality is a virtue and that they "also seem naturally more concerned with precision. It may have something to do with the meticulousness with which we must learn to write the complicated characters of our language" (223). In short, the popular characterization of the *keitai* Internet as the product of superior technology crafted by Japan's "intrinsic cultural qualities" expressed much more than an economic hope for overcoming the recession; it represented an effort to salvage a national pride damaged by the economic downturn in the early 1990s.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Keitai* E-mail and Internet Use**

In contrast to business success stories, from the user perspective *keitai* Internet use has been neither frequent nor diverse (see chapter 6; Mikami et al. 2001; Hashimoto et al.

2001). Use centers primarily on *keitai* e-mail, while the Web is used primarily for wall-paper and ring-tone downloads.

*Keitai* text messaging first became possible in Japan in April 1996 through a service launched by the DDI Cellular Group (now called au). The other carriers soon followed suit in launching this type of service, which has come to be called, collectively, short message. At the time, it was not possible to send messages between *keitai* subscribed to different service providers, and each provider had a unique service name, such as DDI Cellular's Cellular Moji Service, DoCoMo's Short Mail, and J-Phone's SkyWalker. In other words, these services were not the same as short message services (SMS) because they did not rely on a shared Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard.

J-Phone (now Vodafone) introduced Internet e-mail for *keitai* in November 1997; Japanese users gradually chose this type of e-mail over short messages because it is cross-platform and allows for longer messages. From a user perspective, however, there is little difference between text messages sent as short messages and those sent as Internet e-mail. Users refer to both as *meiru* (mail), and in this book we call both *keitai* e-mail.

Just as with pagers, *keitai* e-mail has been adopted by more women than men, and use is heaviest among those in their teens and twenties. How is *keitai* e-mail being used by young people and with what kinds of social effects? Survey data show that students who are heavy users of *keitai* e-mail tend to have more friends and to be more sociable (Matsuda 2001b).<sup>15</sup> Further, they tend toward self-disclosure, are not insecure about relating to others, and are not lonely (Tsuji and Mikami 2001). While reporting similar survey results, Nakamura (2003) also states that heavy *keitai* users exhibit a fear of loneliness and a lack of strength in enduring loneliness. As a result, he fears that acclimation to "convenient" human relationships through *keitai* e-mail—where one can contact people 24 hours a day without worrying about their availability—can lead to an inability to tolerate being alone.

Nakamura (2001a) considered the messages sent over *keitai* e-mail and concluded that they are characterized by "casual and colloquial expression," including onomatopoeic words, childlike expressions, and regional dialect. As well, young people often use *emoji* (emoticons) that are programmed into the handsets, and send long messages (enabled by the 250–3,000 character length of *keitai* e-mail) despite the difficulties of one-thumb input. They also mix graphics, video, sound, and Web links into their messages (Miyake 2000; *Nihongo-Gaku* 2001).

In chapter 13, Ito and Okabe look in detail at what kind of messages are exchanged and with what frequency. In general, users see *keitai* e-mail as a medium that allows for "an appropriate sense of distance" based on the immediacy of transmission coupled with a format that is less intrusive than voice (Kurihara 2003). But young people still feel that "it is inconsiderate not to respond immediately." One outcome of this is the

mobile text chat that Ito and Okabe describe, where users may send a great number of messages back and forth over a short span of time. The use of *emoji* (pictorial icons provided by operators) in these messages reflects not only “wanting to effectively convey feelings that can’t be conveyed by text only” and “wanting to make messages cute with *emoji*” but also a sense of consideration toward others, because “they might mistakenly think I am angry if I don’t include *emoji*” (Tsururahara 2004). Just as with pagers, the *keitai* is not always a medium of *yasashisa*.

Turning to the *keitai* Internet, Kenichi Ishii (2004, 57) offers the following summary of his analysis of the World Internet Project Japan survey (2002):

The mobile Internet has positive effects on sociability with friends, while the PC Internet does not have such effects. Email via a mobile phone is exchanged mainly with close friends or family, whereas email via a PC is exchanged with business colleagues. These results suggest that PC diverge in terms of social functions; in other words, mobile Internet use has more in common with time-enhancing home appliances such as the telephone, while PC Internet use has more in common with the time-displacing technology of TV....

The experiences in Japan show that neither technological advantages nor telecommunication policy promote a new type of telecommunication service. Japanese experience after 1995 demonstrates that user needs have brought about the high penetration rate and unique usage patterns (e.g., *beru-tomo* and picture mail) of the mobile Internet in Japan. The Japanese government has placed political importance more on broadband than on mobile phones.

See chapter 7 for a comparison of *keitai* Internet and PC Internet use.

### **From Rejection to Utilization of *Keitai***

I have described how, in the late 1990s, *keitai* were criticized by the general public as devices used by young people for trivial personal communication, closely linked to poor manners and superficial relationships.<sup>16</sup> High schools generally prohibited *keitai* because of its association with problematic and deviant social behavior. As *keitai* continued to spread among young people, however, it has come to be tacitly tolerated, and schools are now taking the stance that “as long as it doesn’t ring during class, it is okay.” In recent years, there have even been efforts to educate students on how to relate to *keitai* from a media literacy perspective. Since practically all college students have *keitai* now, there is a project under way to use *keitai* for real-time teaching evaluation as part of a faculty development effort (Takeyama and Inomata 2002; Hara and Takahashi 2003).

Surveys indicate that *keitai* use has not been and is not currently exclusive to young people or to private uses. Although those in their twenties have the highest ownership rates, those in their thirties rank next. In the Mobile Communication Research Group (2002) survey, 10.2 percent of respondents indicated they had multiple *keitai* handsets; these respondents were primarily male managers and officers of corporations and other organizations in their thirties and forties. These users generally have separate *keitai*

handsets for personal and business use. Heavy users of voice calls tend to be men and those working full time; 26.0 percent responded that 100 percent of their voice calls were personal, and 15.5 percent responded that 90 percent of their voice calls were, but 12.8 percent responded that 10 percent of their calls were personal, and 12.0 percent responded that only half of their calls were. As it was in the early adoption years, *keitai* continue to be used as media for work.

In the late 1990s, public discourse surrounding *keitai* deviated from the realities of use reflected in survey data: it viewed *keitai* as “a youth problem” and “emblematic of the private.” This discourse changed after the peak of rapid *keitai* adoption in the 2000s; *keitai* are now firmly established and the *keitai* Internet widely adopted. Now that *keitai* have become unremarkable, its use by those other than youth and for business purposes is being “rediscovered.” For example, a year and a half after the introduction of i-mode, the *Asahi Shinbun* (2000) newspaper carried an article titled “i-mode has made its appearance in the workplace—easy to use and carry around”:

Just as I thought that there are fewer young people talking loudly on their *keitai* in the train, now I can't help but notice people intently moving their thumbs [over their keypads]. Services such as “i-mode” have appeared and greatly expanded the pleasures of e-mail and information access. But, if you think about it, these “any time, any place” features that can be accessed with just one thumb have got to appeal to business uses as well. After initial tentative usage, the technology has demonstrated a surprising power for managers who are in demand for speedy decision-making and for the intensely competitive front lines of sales and marketing. As the youth culture origin technology of “i-mode” starts to spread among the older population as a business tool, there are hints that business styles are changing.

The article goes on to describe e-mail exchanges between the president of a company and the head of personnel as the president is in transit on a train. In this way, *keitai* e-mail has been spreading from the base of business e-mail use that started with the PC Internet. Currently, there is virtually no research on such business uses of the *keitai* Internet; Tamaru and Ueno's contribution in chapter 12 is a rare inquiry into this space.

## Conclusion

I have explored various developments in the public discourse concerning *keitai* from the 1990s. To borrow from Ito's introductory framing, I have described the state of domestic Japanese mobile communications not as “the cellular phone,” defined by technical infrastructure, nor as “the mobile phone,” defined as an untethering from fixed location, but rather as *keitai*, an artifact located in a specific national context. Through this process, I have contextualized the contributions to this book as well as reviewed additional pertinent popular and research literature from Japan.

Our collective effort is to describe *keitai* not as something exclusive to Japanese society but as something deeply embedded in the contexts of Japan. In contemporary societies characterized by the presence of mobile media, the studies in this book will speak to the specific contexts that readers bring to bear, and will no doubt provide insight into contemporary human relations and social systems.

## Notes

1. In the early years, PHS users were mostly youth, and PHS were used in ways similar to the cellular phone. As young users transitioned to the cellular phone, however, the low-cost PHS came to be used differently from the cellular. Research shows that 44.6 percent of PHS users have more than one *keitai* (cellular and/or PHS) (Mobile Communication Research Group 2002).
2. In this article, from the magazine *Kuriiku*, May 20, 1991, as well as the others cited by Kawaura, the word *keitai* is not yet being used.
3. In other work (Matsuda 1996b; 1997), I analyze statements that *keitai* have personal health effects from the perspective of rumor and urban legend, describing the process through which *keitai* is received by society.
4. *Jibetarian* have a deep relationship with *keitai*. In an article about *jibetarian*, a reporter describes reasons why they sit on the street: “(1) They have no endurance and get tired. (2) The sidewalks have gotten clean. (3) They want to make voice calls in peace. (4) They want to save money for their *keitai* communication costs” (*Asahi Shinbun*, evening edition, October 24, 1997).
5. Sociological inquiry into Japanese youth in the 1990s include Shinji Miyadai (1994; 1997) and Tomita and Fujimura (1999). In addition, Satoshi Kotani (1993) provides an outline of the evolution of youth studies since the 1970s.
6. Hashimoto (2002) has produced an English-language paper on the influence of *keitai* on youth.
7. By cutting the call after one ring, the caller does not incur a toll but is able to leave a record that they called through caller ID, thus sending a free message that “I am thinking about you.”
8. Other works on pagers and youth include those by Fujimoto (1997) and Tomita et al. (1997). Matsui (1998; 1999a; 1999b) has analyzed the changing image of pagers.
9. The NHK Broadcasting Culture Institute has conducted a series of surveys on the influence of *keitai* on life rhythms. For example, *keitai* do not reduce sleep or television viewing time as much as the PC Internet does (Kamimura and Ida 2002). Further, young people generally use *keitai* at the same time as they are engaged in other activities, such as watching TV, eating, or conversing with friends (Nakano 2002).
10. More information on user demographics, adoption, and use patterns can be found in studies by Nakamura (2001b), Mikami et al. (2001), Mobile Communication Research Group’s (2002) national survey, and Hashimoto et al. (2000), Hashimoto et al. (2001). The World Internet Project, <<http://media.asaka.toyo.ac.jp/wip/>>, has survey results available in English.

11. In the past few years, the term *puchi iede* (*petite* running away from home) has become popular. This refers to teens who stay at places like their friends' homes and don't return to their own homes for several days or weeks. Family members can "reach their child through *keitai*," so they don't file a missing person report, and after a while the child generally returns home without incident, so this phenomenon differs from the prior practices of running away from home.

12. NTT DoCoMo Web site, <<http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/info/new/release.html>>.

13. This "low literacy stratum" is composed mainly of young people, however, so it is unlikely that it will become a window for Internet access for the older age groups that use PCs and the Internet even less. Further, Kimura (2001a) writes that (1) the *keitai* Internet business model is the same as Dial Q<sup>2</sup> and is not particularly innovative; (2) there is a large gap between "possession" and "use" of devices; (3) the *keitai* Internet is typical "conspicuous consumption" that started with the pager and moved onto the PHS and *keitai*. Thus he concludes, "i-mode is not the savior." See also Kimura 2001b; Matsuda 2002.

14. "Compact high-performance" design is also prevalent in other countries besides Japan. Several years ago, U.S. and European manufacturers and mobile entrepreneurs were concerned that "super-compact terminals are too 'Japanese' and might not be well accepted by domestic consumers." (I have also heard similar statements in personal communication.) However, considering that such products actually did penetrate the respective markets, these statements could also be considered a version of "techno-orientalism" (Morley and Robins 1995).

15. See note 10. Studies of college students, who are heavy *keitai* e-mail users, include Okada, Matsuda, and Habuchi (2000); Matsuda (2001b); and Tsuji and Mikami (2001).

16. At the same time, many continue to describe *keitai* in relation to "youth insecurity in communication" (e.g., Okonogi 2000; Masataka 2003). Masataka cleverly titled his book *Keitai wo Motta Saru: "Ningenrashira" no Houkai* (*Monkeys with Keitai: The Destruction of "Humanity"*); this drew attention from a wide range of newspapers and magazines, which resulted in a bestseller.