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## Index

- Adams, Fred, 6, 10  
Amundson, Ron, 171  
Anomalous monism, 29  
Antecedent physicalism, 32  
Antireduction. *See* Reduction;  
    Autonomy  
Antony, Louise, 64, 161, 191, 195  
Argument from Nuh-uh, 7–10  
Aristotle, 100, 164  
Armstrong, David, 26, 44, 78, 97, 106  
Artificial intelligence, 133  
    Strong AI, 81  
    Weak AI, 105, 108  
Autonomy, 159, 190–198, 201–211. *See also* Explanation  
    argument from, 192–196, 201–209  
    colloquial use, 209  
  
Bealer, George, 6  
Bechtel, William, 5, 16, 21–25, 28,  
    32–33, 51–52, 61  
Behavior, 216–217, 220, 225  
Behaviorism, 74–75  
Berkeley, George, 57  
Bickle, John, 5–6, 16, 32, 195  
Bigelow, John, 169–170  
Binding problem, 244  
Biopsychology. *See* Psychology,  
    biopsychology  
Blindsight, 229, 241, 245  
Block, Ned, xxii, 28, 131, 152, 158, 187,  
    189, 214, 229–232  
Boyd, Richard, 61  
Brain imaging studies, 52, 54–56, 108.  
    *See also* Brain maps  
  
Brain maps, 17–18, 23–25, 53–54  
Brain states. *See* Identity conditions, of  
    brain states  
Brentano's thesis, xxi–xxiii, 87–88, 149,  
    167, 176  
Broad, C. D., 44  
Brodmann, Korbinian, 23–25  
Bundles. *See* Sensations, bundles;  
    Persons and personal identity  
  
Carnap, Rudolf, xvii  
Causal exclusion argument. *See*  
    Exclusion argument  
Causal roles, 64, 94, 98, 116, 120, 150,  
    182, 230. *See also* Function, causal  
    role; Properties, causal theory of  
Causation. *See also* Mental causation;  
    Exclusion argument  
    macrocausation, xx, 161, 163  
    quausation, 128  
    strong efficacy, 128–129, 148, 150, 167,  
        241  
    weak efficacy, 127–128, 168  
Center of narrative gravity, 246  
Chalmers, David, 2, 37–38, 63, 127, 131,  
    214, 218, 239  
Churchland, Patricia, xv, 54, 127,  
    195  
Churchland, Paul, 15, 30, 75, 85  
Clark, Austen, xv  
Computationalism, 67, 80–81, 93, 105,  
    117–118, 120, 127, 140, 148–149, 151,  
    158. *See also* Artificial intelligence  
Conscious inessentialism, 227  
Craver, Carl, 196–204

- Cummins, Robert, 92–93, 101, 104–107, 113, 146–51, 162, 183–186, 196, 199–200, 224
- Darden, Lindley, 196–204
- David, Marian, 28
- Davidson, Donald, 29, 170
- Davies, Paul, 168, 171
- Deductive-nomological (D-N)  
 explanation, 63, 165, 205, 211–240, 244, 246
- Dennett, Daniel, xv, xxii, 35  
 intentional stance, 88, 108  
 Multiple Drafts model, xxii, 234  
 physical stance, 231  
 on zombies (*see* *Zombies*)
- Descartes, René, xv
- Disjunctive view. *See* Identity, species-specific or local
- Dretske, Fred, xxii, 90–93, 128–129, 140, 165–172, 176
- Dualism, 178  
 Cartesian, xviii, 79, 239  
 property, 37
- Eliminativism, 126–127, 192, 196
- Enç, Berent, 15, 30, 44
- Epiphenomenalism, 126, 129, 160–161, 175, 192, 205, 222–230, 233–234  
 causal-role, 127, 225–230, 234, 237  
 etiological, 224–227, 230–236  
 spandrels, 224  
 strict-metaphysical, 127, 224, 235–237
- Essence and essentialism, 39, 42–43, 60–63, 82, 96, 98, 119–120, 167, 189, 191, 195, 201  
 nominal essence, 82, 96, 99, 157  
 real essence, 33, 82, 96, 157, 179
- Evolution, 100–102, 107, 164–168, 172
- Evolutionary psychology. *See* Psychology, evolutionary psychology
- Examples  
 aliens and Martians, xiii, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 26–27, 131, 155, 170  
 Amos the mouse, 169–170  
 ashtray, 48  
 automobile, 52, 153, 198, 243 (*see also* Examples, carburetors and fuel injectors)  
 bricks and windows, xx, 161–162  
 caffeine, xv  
 Cal Ripken, Jr. and Lou Gehrig, 83  
 carburetors and fuel injectors, 19–20, 198, 200, 210, 227–229, 233, 236, 240, 243  
 corkscrew, 208  
 cricket, 48, 56–57, 67  
 friendly physicist, 202–203, 207–208  
 Hinkfuss's pail, 131, 153, 231–232, 242  
 instant hibernation, 167  
 liquid enjoyed by George Washington, 45–46  
 lumps of clay, xx, 47–48, 66  
 mousetrap, 197  
 octopus, 8, 22, 26–27, 155  
 pain and c-fibers, 7, 42, 51, 57–58, 61–63, 75, 79, 82, 96, 154, 157, 220, 245  
 petri dish, xxvi, 242–243  
 platypus, 227–229, 233  
 plumbing and pipes, 229–231  
 being president, 84  
 schoolchild's art project, 47–48  
 square peg and round hole, 203–204, 207–208  
 thermostat, 15, 131, 231–232, 242  
 urn, 47, 66  
 water and H<sub>2</sub>O, 40–48, 59–60, 64, 67, 132, 231–232  
 widgets and thingamajigs, 48, 61
- Exclusion argument, 160–164, 184, 207–208
- Explanation, 104, 108, 196, 203–205, 209  
 mechanical, 209–211  
 pluralism, 200–211  
 vs. prediction, 36  
 psychological, 150, 154–156, 191, 203, 231 (*see also* Psychology)  
 unification, 203–208
- Explanatory gap, xxv, 63–70
- Explanatory hooks, 65
- Feigl, Herbert, 78
- Field, Hartry, 81, 143–144
- Flanagan, Owen, xv–xvi, xx, xxii, 1, 28, 58, 64–65, 165, 168, 172, 174, 207, 220, 224, 246
- fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), 52–56, 108
- Fodor, Jerry, 28, 71, 80–81, 86–87, 90–93, 107, 115, 133, 144, 150, 182, 191, 194–195
- Folk psychology. *See* Psychology, folk or common sense
- Function  
 abstract, 73–74, 140–149, 215, 234

- biological or natural, 73–74, 113, 165, 190 (*see also* Function, teleological)  
 causal role, 73–74, 95, 101, 104–105, 107, 113, 122, 145–164, 168, 171–176, 182–186, 190, 196, 200, 206, 210, 215, 224  
 computational, 140–152 (*see also* Function, abstract)  
 etiological, 101, 113, 165–175, 206, 210, 215 (*see also* Function, teleological)  
 hybrid, 168, 172–177, 190  
 indicator, 165, 176  
 propensity, 169–171  
 proper function (*see* Function, etiological)  
 teleological, 74, 164–176, 187, 206, 210 (*see also* Function, etiological; Function, propensity; Function, hybrid; Function, biological or natural)  
 Functional analysis, 104–107, 150, 196, 199  
 Functional duplicates, 170, 213–217, 225–229, 233  
 Functional equivalence, 143–145, 148–149, 182  
 Functionalism. *See also* Generic Functionalism  
   anatomy of, 72–74, 109, 137  
   computational, 72–73, 140–152  
   CTP-functionalism, 183–185  
   direct-teleological, 165–167, 170–175, 178, 210  
   explanatory, xxv, 73–75, 85, 99–106, 109, 159, 182, 193, 200–202, 208, 211–213, 230  
   hybrid, 172–177, 210  
   intentional, xxv, 73–75, 85–89, 91–92, 105, 149  
   machine (*see* Machine functionalism; Functionalism, computational)  
   and mechanism (*see* Mechanism, confused with functionalism)  
   metaphysical, xxv–xxvi, 72–85, 92, 97–100, 105, 108–110, 124–127, 133, 139–142, 144, 150, 157, 159, 167, 171, 176–177, 181–182, 191, 211, 234  
   methodological, xxv, 73–75, 85, 106–108, 158–159  
   minimal (*see* CTP-functionalism)  
   psychofunctionalism, 108, 156, 157, 158, 186  
   semantic, xxv, 73–75, 86–95, 140, 149  
   standard formulation, 81–85  
   strong sense, 79, 85, 93, 114, 144, 152, 155, 157, 159, 171, 183  
   teleofunctionalism, 164–172, 182, 242  
   teleological, 165–166, 172 (*see also* Functionalism, teleofunctionalism; Functionalism, direct-teleological; Functionalism, hybrid)  
   theoretical, xxv, 73–75, 85–86, 92–100, 154–155, 158–159  
   varieties of, 71–78, 109, 137, 181  
   weak sense, 79, 85, 93, 144, 152, 161  
 Functional specification, 199  
 de dicto, 82–85, 98, 108  
 de re, 82–85, 98  
 meaning fixing, 82–84, 98, 154–157  
 nonconventional, 130, 151, 154, 177  
 reference fixing, 82–84, 98, 157–159  
 Functions all the way down, xxvi, 182–191, 206  
  
 Generality (of psychology) argument, 161–164. *See also* Multiple realizability  
 Generic Functionalism, 110, 125–139, 146, 152–155, 158, 160, 163, 165, 168, 171, 178–179, 183–186, 240  
 biological abstractness, 126, 133–134, 155–159, 163–169, 177–178, 184–186, 190–193  
 causal efficacy, 126–129, 148, 169, 177–178  
 objectivity, 126–131, 148, 151, 154–156, 164–165, 169–172, 178, 184–185  
 synchrony, 126–133, 168–171, 178  
 Gillett, Carl, 116–118, 121–124  
 Godfrey-Smith, Peter, 104, 108, 151, 153, 164, 166, 173–174  
 Gould, Stephen J., 224  
 Graham, George, 22–23, 66  
 Grain and granularity, 20–23, 26, 61, 69, 188, 219  
   grain project, 22–23, 66  
 Grantham, Todd, 102–103  
 Griffiths, Paul, 168  
 Güzeldere, Güven, 214–215, 218  
  
 Hardin, C. L., 65  
 Heil, John, 5–6, 116, 118, 121, 124  
 Hempel, Carl, 63, 195

- Heuristic identity theory, 32  
 Hill, Christopher, 14–15  
 Homology, 23–24, 240  
 Homunctional organization, 173, 187, 198, 201  
 Horgan, Terence, xxii, 16, 22–23, 66, 116–120, 128, 147, 161, 216  
 Hume, David, 174, 244, 245  
 Identity  
   a posteriori or scientific, 37–38, 40, 43, 45, 51, 67  
   apparently contingent, xxiv, 40–44, 48, 51, 59, 66, 157, 241  
   brute, 36–37, 65  
   illusion of contingency (*see* Illusion of contingency; Identity, apparently contingent)  
   necessary, xxiii, 36, 40–43, 45, 51, 67, 70  
   species-specific or local, 14–15, 19–20, 26–29, 30–31, 33, 69, 155–157, 241  
 Identity conditions, 45–51, 60, 79, 82, 171  
   of brain states, 50–59, 68–69  
   candidacy, 45–48  
   compatibility, 48–50, 60  
   of sensations, 50–51, 68–69  
 Identity Theorists' Hall of Fame, 44  
 Illusion of contingency, 39–70. *See also*  
   Identity, apparently contingent  
   candidacy model, 49–51, 58–63, 66–68  
   epistemic model, 41–44, 59, 62, 68  
 Implementation, 111, 113, 117. *See also* Realization  
 Individual differences. *See* Multiple realizability, individual and intraindividual differences  
 Instantiation. *See* Realization  
 Intentionality, xxii, 73, 87, 89, 91, 121, 149, 167  
 Intraindividual differences. *See* Multiple realizability, individual and intraindividual differences  
 Introspection, 86, 133  
 Jackson, Frank, 37–38, 63, 128, 129, 132, 226  
 James, William, xiv  
 Kim, Jaegwon, 2, 5–6, 10, 15, 28, 30, 33, 78, 95–96, 107, 110, 114, 116, 121–124, 142–143, 150–151, 160–162, 188, 208  
 Kim–Adams reply. *See* Multiple realizability, Kim–Adams reply  
 Kirk, Robert, 217  
 Kripke, Saul, xxiv–xxv, 38–70, 156, 181, 216, 239  
 Language of thought, 85, 89–90  
 Lauder, George, 171  
 Laws of nature, 37, 102, 104, 158, 182, 194, 203, 207, 216  
 Leibniz's Mill, 243  
 Levels and orders, 161–164, 187–188, 196–198, 200–201, 205, 208, 241  
 Levine, Joseph, xxv, 63–66, 161, 191, 195, 239  
 Lewis, David, 15–16, 26–28, 32, 71, 93–95, 98–99, 106, 154–156, 217  
 Lewontin, Richard, 224  
 Loar, Brian, xxii  
 Locke, John, 47  
 Lycan, William, xxii, 23, 42–44, 72, 80, 84, 89–90, 96, 140, 162, 165–169, 172–174, 179, 182, 186–190, 201, 206–207  
 Machamer, Peter, 196–204  
 Machine functionalism, 72–73, 80, 94, 120, 131, 140–141, 149, 152. *See also* Functionalism, computational  
 Machine program, 141–142, 151  
 Machine table, 94, 141–145. *See also* Machine program  
 Marr, David, 117, 158  
 Materialism. *See* Naturalism  
 McCauley, Robert, 5, 21, 32  
 McGinn, Colin, 33, 239  
 Mechanism and mechanistic  
   explanation, xxvi, 52, 64, 102, 159, 181–182, 196–213, 222, 226–233, 241–245  
   confused with functionalism, xxvi, 211–214, 222, 235–240  
   schema, 198–199  
   sketches, 198–200, 228  
 Mental causation, xxiii, 3, 35, 70, 87, 127, 158, 161, 163, 173, 241. *See also* Causation  
 Mereology, 121–122, 161–162, 197–198, 205–206, 241  
 Millikan, Ruth, 87, 90–93, 101–107, 113, 165–169  
 Moral value, 231–232, 237–238  
 Multiple realizability, xxiv, 1–39, 64, 69, 110, 117, 126, 133–136, 146, 157,

- 166, 168–169, 177, 184, 186, 189–195, 222, 230, 236, 241  
 empathetic, 12–17, 69, 155  
 and identity theory, 30–33  
 individual and intraindividual differences, 16–17  
 Kim–Adams reply, 10–12, 16–17, 20–21, 23, 26–29, 33  
 radical MR, 6–11, 15, 17, 29–31, 134, 136, 151  
 SETI MR, 6, 11–12, 18–19, 21, 30–31  
 standard MR, 6–11, 15, 17, 21, 24, 29–31, 134–136, 151, 230  
 weak MR, 6, 11, 19, 21  
 Mundale, Jennifer, 5, 16, 21–22, 24–25, 51–52, 61
- Nagel, Ernst, 195  
 Nagel, Thomas, xix–xx, 14, 239  
 Natural method, xv–xx. *See also* Naturalism  
 Naturalism, i–xix, 36, 95, 124, 183, 185, 192  
 Naturalized metaphysics. *See* Naturalism  
 Neander, Karen, 101, 107, 166  
 Nichols, Shaun, 102–103  
 No Ghosts Rule, xviii–xix  
 Normativity, 90–91, 102–103, 152, 165, 167, 173–174, 210  
 biological, 165, 169, 172
- Oppenheim, Paul, 63, 195  
 Orders. *See* Levels and orders  
 Other minds. *See* Problem of other minds
- Pargetter, Robert, 169–170  
 Perry, John, 32  
 Persons and personal identity, xxvii, 48, 231–232, 241–246  
 Pettit, Philip, 128–129, 132  
 Physicalism. *See* Naturalism  
 Pitt, David, xxii  
 Place, Ullin T., 44  
 Plasticity, 17–18. *See also* Multiple realizability, individual and intraindividual differences  
 Platitudes, 97–98, 154–155, 157, 245. *See also* Psychology, folk or common sense; Ramsey–Lewis method  
 Poland, Jeffrey, 116–120, 124–125  
 Polger’s brain, 55–56  
 Pragmatism, xvii, 174, 201
- Problem of inputs and outputs, 152, 187  
 chauvinism, 152, 186, 187, 189  
 liberalism, 152, 186, 187  
 Problem of other minds, 33–35, 235–239  
 Properties, causal theory of (CTP), 182–186, 206. *See also* Mechanism, confused with functionalism  
 Propositional attitudes, 86, 96  
 Psychofunctionalism. *See* Functionalism, psychofunctionalism  
 Psychology. *See also* Explanation, psychological; Generality (of psychology) argument  
 analytic, 96, 99, 106, 154, 157, 186  
 autonomy of, xxvi, 190–196 (*see also* Autonomy)  
 biopsychology, 101–104  
 evolutionary psychology, 101–104  
 folk or common sense, 96–99, 106, 154, 157, 186  
 scientific, 86, 96–99, 103–107, 154, 157, 186, 191  
 Psychophysiology, xv  
 Psychosemantics, 86, 90  
 Putnam, Hilary, xxiii–xxiv, 3, 15, 22, 24, 28, 40, 61, 69, 72, 79–80, 88–89, 96, 106, 131, 140, 145, 156, 158, 177–182, 185–86, 191, 195, 203–208, 241–245  
 Putnam’s intuition, 3–4. *See also* Multiple realizability
- Qualia  
 absent, 189, 214, 218, 232  
 alien, 214, 217, 218  
 dancing, 214, 217, 218  
 inverted, 189, 214, 217, 218
- Ramsey–Lewis method, 94–100, 106–107, 151, 182–183  
 Ramsification. *See* Ramsey–Lewis method  
 Realization, xxiv–xxv, 310–113, 116, 139–179  
 and describability, 143, 147–148, 228  
 dimensioned view, 124  
 flat view, 122–124, 144  
 functional, 36, 113, 178–179, 230  
 general metaphysical notion, 116–125  
 as the hardware/software relation, 112, 117  
 as having a function, 113–114

- Realization (cont.)  
 as mapping, 148–149 (*see also* Functional equivalence)  
 multiple (*see* Multiple realizability)  
 not a single relation, 112–114, 178  
 orthodox view, 112–113, 140  
 realization theories, 119, 124  
 subset model, 122–124  
 transitivity of, 117, 147  
 Reduction, xxi, xxvi, 37–38, 126, 193–196, 201–205, 208, 209–210. *See also* Autonomy  
 and identity, 193–194  
 and multiple realizability, 5, 30–32  
 new wave, 32, 195–96  
 Reflective equilibrium. *See* Natural method  
 Representation, xxii, 93, 147, 167, 176  
 Rey, Georges, 75, 85, 96, 99–100  
 Rigid designators, 39–43, 61  
 Rorty, Richard, xvii  
 Ryle, Gilbert, 78, 99  
  
 Salmon, Wesley, 202–207  
 Searle, John, xiii–xiv, 81, 105, 108, 131  
 Sejnowski, Terence, 54  
 Self. *See* Persons  
 Semantics, functional role, 90, 93. *See also* Functionalism, semantic  
 Sensations. *See also* Identity conditions, of sensations  
 bundles, 243–246  
 eccentric, 33–35, 69  
 Shapiro, Lawrence, 5, 11, 208  
 Shoemaker, Sydney, xxii, 6, 79, 85, 91–99, 106, 114–116, 121–124, 144, 152–159, 182–186, 189, 205–206, 214, 217, 232  
 Sidelle, Alan, 45–48  
 Siewert, Charles, xxii  
 Skepticism, xv, 36, 238–239  
 Skinner, B. F., 75  
 Smart, J. J. C., 2, 44, 78–79, 94, 97, 157  
 Sober, Elliot, 5, 81, 205  
 Sociobiology, 103  
 Species-specificity. *See* Identity, species-specific or local  
 Structure of experience reply, 65, 67  
 Supervenience, 78, 114, 116, 121–122  
 Swampman, 170  
  
 teleological; Functionalism, direct-teleological; Functionalism, hybrid  
 Teleology, 100, 102, 164, 173  
 Thales, 40  
 Tienson, John, xxii, 116–120, 147  
 Topic neutral, 94–95  
 Turing machine, 141–143, 145, 149, 151–152, 206. *See also* Machine table  
 Turing test, 131, 220, 235  
 Two-Levelism, 187–189  
 Tye, Michael, xxii, 82, 89, 132, 140  
  
 Van Gulick, Robert, 65, 75, 79, 85, 91–92, 108, 134, 144, 148, 152, 155, 159, 168, 172–173, 185, 189  
  
 Watson, John, 75  
 What-it-is-like, xix–xx  
 Wilson, E. O., 103  
 Wilson, Robert, 116, 118, 121, 124  
 Wright, Larry, 101, 107  
  
 Zimboes. *See* Zombies, zimboes  
 Zombies, xxvi, 35, 170, 213–24  
 and conceivability, 239  
 Dennett's challenge, xxvi, 213–214, 218–219, 223, 233  
 Dennett's challenge as a dilemma, 223, 227, 234–235  
 varieties of, 214–217, 225  
 zimboes, 219–223, 225  
 Zombie Scorecard, 215–217