

## **Demand-Side and Supply-Side Models**

### **Demand-Side Models**

Theories of repeal have generally focused on interests, ideas, or institutions, as noted in chapter 1. Another way to conceptualize the plethora of competing explanations for repeal is to characterize them as *demand-side* or *supply-side* in their focus. In demand-side theories political representatives translate into policy the new set of preferences that arise from exogenous changes in the interests, partisanship, or ideas of their constituents.<sup>1</sup> The simple assumption is that legislators are motivated by the desire to remain in office. To stay in office, they need to be reelected, and to be reelected, they need to satisfy the preferences of a relevant constituency. In short, legislators are motivated by what Mayhew famously described as the “electoral connection” (Mayhew 1974).

For instance, British MPs may have acted as conduits for free-trade interests that were created from industrialization (Thomas 1939; Brock 1941; Anderson and Tollison 1985; Cox 1987; McKeown 1989; Schonhardt-Bailey 1991a, 1991c, 1994) or have reflected a liberal shift in ideas or ideology (Kindleberger 1975; Rohrlich 1987; Hilton 1988; Howe 1997). There are, however, at least two potentially faulty assumptions of a pure demand-side model. First, it assumes that politicians are no more than passive recipients of constituency or political party pressures. However, representatives often confront conflicting pressures between their constituencies and their party and between their own ideological predisposition and the wishes of their constituents or party. Hence, the reconciliation of these differences requires initiative and activity—not passivity. Second, the model sometimes assumes that the institutional setting in which policy is made (in this case, Parliament)

has no significant bearing on the policy outcome. Yet in many cases, institutional features that give rise to strategic behavior by political leaders<sup>2</sup> may ultimately determine the success or failure of a policy.

In the case of repeal, demand-side explanations have successfully captured many of the necessary causes but have struggled to capture the sufficient ones. In particular, these models offer no clear rationale for *why* the Peelites suddenly reversed their position on repeal. Although chapters 5 and 6 provide evidence that differences in constituency types likely made Peelites less wedded to protectionism than Non-Peelite Conservatives (NPCs), constituency type cannot account for the very *swift* reversal of their policy stance. In other words, it is difficult to point to an abrupt transformation in free-trade interests and lobbying activity that could fully explain why Peelites supported protection up to 1845 and then shifted swiftly to free trade in 1846. We can infer that growing free-trade interests pushed Peelites towards repeal, but this does not tell us what actually pushed them over the edge to support repeal. To know this, we must look to the actual setting in which the conversion occurred—the institutional setting of Parliament.

### Supply-Side Models

Supply-side theories of policy making tend to focus on the institutional setting in which legislators operate (Krehbiel 1991, 1998; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Stewart 2001),<sup>3</sup> but ideas can also form the linchpin of a supply-side theory of policy making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Bawn 1999). Most recently, McLean (2001) has argued that Peel astutely maneuvered his cabinet into a position of accepting what they had previously vehemently opposed—repeal. Part of his story rests on Peel's employing of clever ministerial tactics to engineer his reappointment by the Queen in late 1845 and on a cabinet that was willing to support repeal. The second part of McLean's story is that Peel is said to have altered the choice set of his cabinet and backbench MPs from the single dimension of repeal to a multiple one that linked repeal to the Irish potato famine.

McLean's (2001, 36) argument warrants attention, as he purports to test the relative influences of constituency interests and ideology (the latter defined as "public order and the Queen's government") in the policy shift to repeal. He concludes that "Interests and ideology both played a great part. But for elites as well as for legislators, ideology was probably the greater" (McLean 2001, 53). McLean's argument

hinges on Peel, whom he argues acted “heresthetically”—that is, Peel divided the majority in favor of protection by persuading some of them that repeal was necessary to assuage starvation and the possibility of civil unrest arising from the Irish potato famine. Thus, “Peel seized the Famine heresthetically as an issue on which to change the dimensionality of politics, and hence force repeal through, which he could not otherwise have done” (McLean 2001, 53). McLean tests this argument by examining correspondence between Peel and cabinet members in the critical months leading up to Peel’s formal introduction of the repeal legislation in January 1846. He then applies logistic regression to test whether Peel’s emphasis on the famine can explain the conversion of the Peelites in the Commons to free trade. He obtains rather poor results for this test: his best-performing model for English Conservative MPs fails to account for the votes of 55 (64 percent) Peelites and 27 (14 percent) Non-Peelite Conservatives on the final reading of repeal.

In contrast to McLean’s findings, chapter 6 finds strong evidence to suggest that Peelites shifted their votes in accordance with the interests of their constituents, *not* in accordance with MPs’ personal ideology. Yet while my analysis of the roll-call votes tells us what the Peelites did (they shifted from voting as trustees to voting as delegates), it does not tell us *why* they did so. Perhaps the famine provided cover for their free-trade votes—or perhaps some other dimension provided similar cover. Only further evidence—such as the written record—can shed light on the motivations of the Peelites. Indeed, if evidence exists to support McLean’s claim for the introduction of a “famine dimension” into the debates over repeal, this should be found in the statements of MPs themselves.

### **The Argument**


Repeal cannot be fully explained by either a demand- or supply-side explanation alone. Rather, both are needed to understand why repeal occurred and particularly why it occurred in 1846.

### **Demand-Side Pressure**

In the several years leading up to repeal, free-trade interests had intensified, partly the result of the geographic concentration of the cotton textile industry. These interests had, moreover, spread more widely, owing to the deconcentration of the broader export sector both

geographically and in terms of industrial structure. (Chapter 3 documents the spread of free-trade interests.) Thus, intensified and more widely spread free-trade interests increasingly became politicized under the leadership of the Anti-Corn Law League. Meanwhile, the policy preference of (some) landowners became less protectionist as their asset portfolios became more diversified (documented in chapter 5). The net increase in free-trade interests served to convert more Liberal MPs to repeal, as seen in their roll-call votes: Liberal support for repeal grew from 71 percent of MPs in 1843 to 81 percent in 1844 and 89 percent in 1845.<sup>4</sup> The demand-side effect on Conservative MPs was not, however, sufficient to *convert* them to free trade. Indeed, no more than four Conservative MPs voted for free trade in the divisions on repeal from 1842 to 1845. Yet as chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, Peelites represented constituencies with some free-trade leanings (relative to those of NPCs), and so, as delegates, they most likely faced more free-trade pressures. In short, *the demand-side shift brought more Liberals into the repeal camp and brought Peelites nearer to the brink of converting to repeal.*

Spatial voting models provide a useful way to conceptualize the effects of demand-side changes on legislative voting behavior. On various occasions before January 1846, MPs were asked to consider a vote to cease protection for British agriculture. The two options—repeal or the status quo (protection)—are depicted along a single horizontal trade-land dimension in figure 2.1.<sup>5</sup> (The designation of *trade* and *land* represents the underlying conflict over the orientation of Britain's national economic interest.) The ideal point of the median Liberal ( $M_L$ ), Peelite ( $M_{Peelite}$ ), and Non-Peelite Conservative ( $M_{NPC}$ ) is mapped spatially along the line. The MP who is indifferent to repeal or protection is situated at the cut point. All MPs to the left of the cut point voted for repeal, and all those to the right voted against (that is, for the status quo—SQ). Figure 2.1 illustrates the spatial positions of MPs on the issue of repeal just before 1846.



**Figure 2.1**

The prevailing trade-land dimension in Parliament, pre-1846

Demand-side pressures, driven (in the short-term) by the lobbying efforts of the Anti-Corn Law League (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991a), pushed the median Liberal MP further from indifference and toward repeal. Feeling these same pressures, the ideal point of the median Peelite moved gradually away from that of the median Non-Peelite Conservative.<sup>6</sup> As noted in chapter 1, Cobden famously remarked that the Corn Laws had been repealed too soon, meaning that the demand-side pressures that pushed for repeal were gaining momentum in transforming the landed basis of Parliament. Once Cobden realized that Peel would likely introduce repeal before the next election, he noted: "We should have liked to have had another year of qualification for counties [from the League registration campaign]. If we had had another year or two, we could have shown the monopolist landowners that we can transfer power in this country from the hands of a class totally into the hands of the middle and industrial classes of this country" (Searle 1993, 43). Cobden was referring to the League's longer-term strategy for repealing the Corn Laws by creating an elected free-trade majority in Parliament. To this end, the League campaigned to create new free-trade electors by purchasing 40 shilling freeholds (a feature of the 1832 Reform Act), while it also sought to reduce the number of protectionist electors by challenging their qualifications on the electoral registers (Schonhardt-Bailey 2001; McCord 1958; Prentice 1968). Table 2.1, derived from the testimony of Leaguers before a parliamentary committee in 1845, illustrates the success of the League for 1845 alone as it sought to transform the English electorate into a free-trade majority. In that year, the League challenged, on average, 11 percent of the eligible voters in constituencies that contained just over a quarter of the total English county electorate, with an end success rate of 50 percent. The dual strategy of the League is most striking in Lancashire South and Lancashire North. In the former, the League struck off almost 8 percent of the electorate, but between 1841 and 1845 the electorate increased almost 21 percent, much of this owing to the 40 shilling freehold registrations. In Lancashire North, the League struck off 5.5 percent of the electors, while their 40 shilling campaign contributed to an overall increase of almost 5 percent of the electorate. Indeed, if one adds the change in the electorate in 1844 and 1845, claimed by the League to be the result of their activity, it equals 19 percent of the electorate in Lancashire South and 16 percent in Middlesex in 1841. Moreover, at a by-election in Lancashire South in 1844, the Conservative candidate beat the Liberal candidate by just 598 votes. So the success of the League in

**Table 2.1**  
League and protectionist activity in challenging electors

Constituency	Registered Electors			League Activity in the Year 1845					
	1841	1845	Change (percentage)	Change (percentage)	Electors Challenged	Electorate in 1845 (percentage)	Electors Struck Off	Electorate in 1845 (percentage)	Success Rate (percentage)
Warwickshire North	6,786	6,291	-495	-7.29%	650	10.33%	106	1.68%	16.31%
Staffordshire North	10,020	10,050	30	0.30	2,013	20.03	1,000	9.95	49.68
Gloucestershire East	7,971	8,069	98	1.23	919	11.39	413	5.12	44.94
Buckinghamshire	6,107	5,884	-223	-3.65	1,000	17.00	51	0.87	5.10
Lancashire South	18,148	21,940	3,792	20.89	2,896	13.20	1,722	7.85	59.46
Cheshire North	5,832	6,380	548	9.40	1,167	18.29	509	7.98	43.62
Cheshire South	6,972	7,940	968	13.88	415	5.23	246	3.10	59.28
Westmoreland	4,480	4,480	0	0.00	306	6.83	51	1.14	16.67
Hampshire South	5,591	5,791	200	3.58	80	1.38	36	0.62	45.00
Somerset East	9,759	9,655	-104	-1.07	537	5.56	373	3.86	69.46
Middlesex	13,919	13,679	-240	-1.72	1,944	14.21	1,119	8.18	57.56
Staffordshire South	8,469	8,560	91	1.07	837	9.78	484	5.65	57.83
Lancashire North	10,032	10,507	475	4.73	643	6.12	582	5.54	90.51
Surrey East	6,222	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	367	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Yorkshire West Riding	30,998	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Leicestershire South	4,854	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,370	n.a.	30	n.a.	2.19
Cambridgeshire	n.a.	3,888	n.a.	n.a.	95	2.44	31	0.80	32.63
<b>Total<sup>a</sup></b>		<b>124,114</b>			<b>13,502</b>	<b>10.97%</b>	<b>6,723</b>	<b>5.46%</b>	<b>49.79%</b>

Protectionist activity in challenging electors					
Protectionist Activity in 1845					
Constituency	Electors Challenged	Electorate in 1845 (percentage)	Electors Struck Off	Electorate in 1845 (percentage)	Electors Struck Off
Warwickshire North	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Staffordshire North	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Gloucestershire East	301	3.73%	103	1.28%	103
Buckinghamshire	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lancashire South	2,128	9.70	734	3.35	734
Cheshire North	950	14.89	106	1.66	106
Cheshire South	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Westmoreland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hampshire South	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Somerset East	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Middlesex	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Staffordshire South	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lancashire North	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Surrey East	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Yorkshire West Riding	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Leicestershire South	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Cambridgeshire	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,379</b>	<b>9.29%</b>	<b>943</b>	<b>2.59%</b>	<b>943</b>

**Table 2.1**  
(continued)

*Source:* Report from the Select Committee on Votes of Electors, *Parliamentary Papers VIII 1846*, pps. 190–194, 208, 220, 256, 299, 309–312 and 327–328. Evidence of W. W. Burrell, Richard Helps, Henry Lucas, Colin Campbell Macauley, Charles Bradford Passman, George Whateley, and George Wilson.

*Notes:* Total county electorate of England was said by the Anti-Corn Law League to be 445,630, so these counties equal 28 percent of the total. In addition, in Lancashire North the League is said to have gained (by claims and objections) 957 votes in 1843 and 553 votes in 1844. In Lancashire South the League is said to have gained 1,741 votes (by strike off and new votes) in 1844. In Middlesex the League is said by George Wilson to have gained 466 votes in 1843 and 1844 and 651 votes by new claims in 1845. In some counties, the total votes “struck off” figure for the League may include votes gained by new entries to the register by League supporters.

a. Totals do not include Surrey East, Yorkshire West Riding, and Leicestershire South.



the following year in striking off 1,722 electors in that constituency was presumably not irrelevant to the prospects of the sitting MPs.

Whether the League could have gained a numerical majority for free trade in Parliament is open to speculation. Given a restricted franchise and the property qualifications of 1832, its successes under these circumstances were remarkable. To put into perspective the threat from the League's electoral strategy, in the 1841 general election the Conservatives had gained fifty-three seats from their "opponents" (Blake 1974, 281) and were thus able to form the government. In the constituencies listed in table 2.1, the League's strategy posed a direct challenge to twenty-six Conservative MPs (half the swing in 1841).

MPs (particularly in marginal constituencies) quite rightly had reason to fear the League. As Cobden wrote to T. Hunter<sup>7</sup> on 12 March 1846: "In fact there are not a hundred men in the Commons, or twenty in the Lords, who at heart are anxious for total repeal. They are coerced by the out-of-doors [public] opinion, and nothing but the dread of the League organisation enables Peel to persevere. But for our forty-shilling freehold bludgeons, the aristocracy would have resisted the Government measure almost to a man" (Morley 1881, 370). In carrying repeal, Peel preempted the League's efforts. Subsequently, the Anti-Corn Law League was disbanded, and so the registration campaign and all the fervor of the League's efforts died. It was precisely this demand-side pressure that Peel sought to stave off by conceding to repeal. As Prest (1977, 133) notes,

The entire period between 1832 and 1847 can be interpreted as one continuous registration battle, which Peel joined in when he appreciated its importance, and then lost. Peel surrendered in 1845–6, as soon as he saw the battle turning against him, without giving the constituency agents on his own side the chance to fight back against the League and with the League's own weapons. . . . The consequence was that for nearly twenty years successive Whig governments came under so little external pressure that they were able, in effect, to extend a truce to the Conservatives.

More vividly, Peel's response to the overthrow of the government of Louis Philippe in 1848—in which he is said to have retorted that "this comes of trying to govern the country through a narrow representation in Parliament, without regarding the wishes of those outside. It is what this party behind me wanted me to do in the matter of the Corn Laws, and I would not do it" (Morley 1881, 1: 407) (see chapter 1)—reveals the determination of Peel not to allow repeal to give rise to pressures for parliamentary reform.

### Supply-Side Shift

Peelites in 1846 thus became torn between, on the one hand, representing the increasing free-trade-oriented interests of their constituents and, on the other hand, remaining loyal to a Conservative ideology that sought to defend traditional British institutions, including protection. As Lord Ashburton commented in 1841, "I am aware to what extent our Conservative party is a party pledged to the support of the land and that, that principle abandoned, the party is dissolved" (quoted in Gash 1965, 137–138).

The relationship between constitutional conservatism and agricultural protection was a simple one: "protecting agriculture preserved the landed basis of the British constitution" (Gambles 1999, 58). Conservatives were particularly concerned that the 1832 Reform Act "had transformed both the nature of representation and the electoral pressures on the tariff through the primacy of the sectional interests of urban manufacturers and creditor interests in the reformed political nation" (Gambles 1999, 57). Hence, free trade was seen as divisive and therefore contrary to the responsibilities of government, which included balancing the various interests in society. Protection, on the other hand, allowed government to use the tariff as a tool to balance economic interests, particularly between landowners and manufacturers.

At the heart of conservatism was the concept of the "territorial constitution" or "territorial aristocracy," which was grounded in works of prominent seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers. For instance, Daniel Defoe maintained that freeholders were "the proper owners of the country" while others were merely "sojourners, like lodgers in a house," and again, "I make no question but property of land is the best title to government in the world" (Defoe 1702, 16, quoted in Namier 1930, 21). The rationale for the territorial constitution was that those individuals most affected by the policies of government should be the ones to dictate those policies. In other words, as land was argued to be fixed and capital mobile,<sup>8</sup> the interests of landowners were deemed to have a permanent role in the British constitution.<sup>9</sup> The territorial constitution did not mean, however, that the landowning aristocracy had *carte blanche* to disregard the interests of all other sections of society. Rather, other sections of society, along with the colonies, were said to be represented "virtually" in Parliament. MPs were intended to represent all their constituents, voters and nonvoters alike. Yet as the landowning aristocracy endorsed Edmund Burke's advocacy of the *trustee*

mode of representation<sup>10</sup>—which maintained that landowners, who held “real” property, had a greater claim to governing than manufacturers (Gambles 1999, 58–59)—there is an unresolved tension in how MPs might faithfully represent (“virtually”) the interests of all sections of society while at the same time ensuring that landowners themselves would not suffer undue losses.

With the move toward “individual” as opposed to “virtual” representation in 1832, Conservatives feared a constant clash between and among land, capital, and labor for “the governing dynamic of a landed nobility and gentry . . . was, as Goulburn reminded [Peel] in 1845, the only barrier . . . against the revolutionary effects of the Reform Bill” (Macintyre 1989, 143). Free trade, in their view, would serve to deepen this clash further: “Political protest was explained as a direct consequence of a social and economic crisis of distribution which free-trade political economy seemed to compound” (Gambles 1999, 57). Hence, protection served to stabilize the inevitable social unrest that resulted from encroachments on the territorial basis of Parliament, while free trade would only exacerbate these tensions. Moreover, protection provided a means to reequilibrate divergent economic interests.

As Peelites observed the growth of interests linked to manufacturing and trade—partly in their own districts but also throughout the country—the pressure for repeal mounted. For Peelites to justify their support for repeal in terms of the interests of their constituents would, however, wholly cut against the grain of Conservatism. Indeed, it is likely that most Peelites would have rejected the Liberal notion of legislators as delegates, and thus we should not expect them to refer to constituency interests as justification for their repeal votes. Rather, they would likely have sought other compelling reasons to justify their abrupt reversal. Perhaps most important, they would have sought to square these reasons with their Conservative ideology.


Before 1846, Peelites voted according to their Conservative (protectionist) ideology, but in January 1846, Peel offered them a way to embrace their constituents’ interests *and* appear to remain faithful to Conservatism. If protectionism could be legitimately excluded from the umbrella of traditional institutions, then Conservatives who voted for repeal (Peelites) could profess to be adhering to the respected trustee mode of representation rather than caving in to popular demand, as a delegate might do.<sup>11</sup> Peel characterized repeal as a means to preserve the traditional institutions of the British government—and, in particular, the aristocracy. It would ensure peace between the

commercial and aristocratic classes, thereby ensuring the nation's welfare and stability. While all Conservatives agreed on the preservation of the territorial constitution, Peelites came to believe that repeal offered a new means to that end. In a broader perspective, Peel's willingness to concede on repeal can be traced to lessons learned from the 1832 Reform Act. In his 1834 Tamworth Manifesto, Peel argued for the widening of the social foundations of the Conservative party and urged Conservatives to control rather than to halt democratic reform. As Gash (1965, 140) notes, "Peel's approach to the mercantile and industrial interests . . . was essentially conciliatory and comprehensive."

Defense of the "territorial constitution" was only one of several justifications that Peel employed to argue for repeal, however. Indeed, one could say that he adopted a "shot-gun"<sup>12</sup> approach to his advocacy of repeal (see chapter 1)—but it was this theme that resonated with the Peelites since it appealed to their Conservative ideology. This form of argumentation provided Peelites with the nudge to push them into the repeal camp. Peelites did not follow Peel in a herdlike mentality: they followed Peel because his rationale for repeal offered a Conservative cover to enable them to align with their increasingly free-trade-oriented constituencies.

In short, a shift in constituency demands was necessary but not sufficient to convert a majority of MPs to repeal. Even if all Liberal MPs voted for repeal (which, in the end, all but six did)<sup>13</sup> (Aydelotte n.d.), repeal could not have passed in the 1841 to 1847 Parliament without the support of some Conservative MPs. To push the wavering Conservatives to free trade, the definition of repeal required reinterpretation so that it could be seen to be compatible with Conservative ideology. Peel provided this reinterpretation when he introduced the repeal legislation, and Peelites latched onto this reinterpretation as political and ideological cover for their free-trade votes. By trumpeting themselves as loyal to the longer-term preservation of the territorial constitution and judging that repeal was a necessary concession to ensure this outcome, Peelites could vote as delegates without having to justify themselves as such.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the demand-side pressures placed on MPs, and figure 2.2 illustrates the final supply-side shift to repeal. The horizontal line in figure 2.2 represents the initial single trade-land dimension, while the line at 45 degrees represents the new dimension of the "territorial constitution." The key feature is the movement of the median



**Figure 2.2**  
Shift of the Peelites: Introducing a new dimension

Peelite from an ideal point to the right of the cutting line, or cut point (that is, against repeal) in one dimension to an ideal point to the left of the new cutting line (for repeal) in two dimensions.<sup>14</sup> In one dimension, the median Peelite was nearer to repeal than the median Non-Peelite Conservative but was nonetheless well to the right of the cutting line. By raising the profile of the territorial constitution, the second dimension served to divide the Conservatives. Toward the left side (and to the *left* of the new cutting line, though the exact position is unimportant), Peelites argued for repeal as a means to defend the landed basis of Parliament, while at the extreme right (and still to the right of the cutting line), NPCs firmly defended protectionism as core to the preservation of that same end. This new dimension was, in effect, a dimension of means rather than ends. A “dimension of means” raises the question of whether the territorial constitution was mere rhetoric or whether this justification for repeal offered an actual alternative to the “old” interpretation of repeal. The answer is that this new dimension contained *both* rhetoric and reality. The territorial constitution provided Peelites with a persuasive argument for their conversion

to repeal, and to the extent that this rhetoric gave Peelites greater freedom to vote more as delegates, the reality of repeal may well have lengthened the tenure of aristocratic control of Parliament. Repeal offered a concessionary means to moderate—but not halt—the impetus for democratic reform. For NPCs, repeal represented the end of the landed aristocracy's economic *and* political monopolies, while for Peelites it meant the end of the economic monopoly and a reprieve on the political monopoly. Stated differently, in the short term, the territorial constitution offered Peelites a convenient rhetorical device, but in the long term, repeal may have provided some breathing space for the landed aristocracy to adapt to democratic change.

Note from figure 2.2 that the only group of MPs affected by the second dimension were the Peelites. NPCs and Liberals remained unaffected by the new dimension. The median Liberal MP supported repeal because it benefited the interests of British manufacturing and trade, while the median NPC opposed repeal because it harmed the interests of landowners. Non-Peelite Conservatives also opposed repeal because they believed that free trade would undermine their notion of the territorial constitution. Thus, the second dimension intersects their ideal point on the first dimension.

Three points should be highlighted. First, Peel did not rest his argument for repeal solely—or even predominantly—on the defense of the territorial constitution. Peel's arguments and justifications for repeal were multifaceted, as described in chapter 1. Hence, it is difficult to spot any "heresthetics"<sup>15</sup> in Peel's mention of the territorial constitution. Contrary to McLean's view, this book finds that Peel did not singlehandedly redefine repeal to gain support. Rather, the Peelites magnified the theme of the territorial constitution.<sup>16</sup> Second, it is impossible to know with certainty the extent to which Peelites latched on to the territorial constitution idea as a matter of convenience or as one of conviction. The argument is that the idea served as a convenient cover for voting behavior that veered toward the representation of constituents' interests. It is entirely plausible that Peelites truly believed that repeal would ensure the preservation of the territorial constitution and that the increasingly free-trade-oriented nature of their constituencies was a sheer coincidence. This is plausible but unlikely. Third, the defense of the territorial constitution may be seen as a new dimension (or more simply, a new idea) that offered a reinterpretation of repeal.

## Findings We Should Expect (and a Recap)

The remaining chapters in this book endeavor to test aspects of this demand- and supply-side approach by drawing on a variety of methodologies (including statistical and textual) and both quantitative and qualitative data. In part 1 (chapters 3 through 6), I examine the demand-side pressures for free trade. As noted earlier, chapter 3 finds that the demand for protection had declined by the early 1840s, owing to the portfolio diversification of (some) landowners into nonagricultural ventures, and chapter 4 finds that changes in the structure of the British economy (particularly its export sector) helped to intensify and spread more widely its free-trade interests. In short, landowners were becoming less wedded to protectionism at about the same time as manufacturers were clamoring more loudly and effectively for free trade. Chapter 5 examines how this clamoring transformed into a unique form of lobbying as the Anti-Corn Law League engaged in a strategy of “nationalizing the interest”—that is, appealing to the general British public to support repealing the Corn Laws by linking repeal to unifying themes, such as democratic reform and antiaristocracy. Finally, chapter 6 provides an empirical test of the effect of demand-side pressures on the votes of MPs in the lead-up to repeal and on repeal itself. This chapter finds evidence to suggest that in 1846, the pivotal MPs—the Peelites—abruptly shifted from voting as trustees to voting as delegates. In other words, they (like their Liberal counterparts) shifted their voting behavior to reflect the net increase in constituency demand for free trade. The role of economic interests is prominent in these chapters, although ideas are found to be critical to the lobbying of the League and Conservative ideology severely constrained the voting behavior of Peelites before 1846. The key defining institution in the demand-side story is the 1832 Reform Act, which gave rise to the politicization of middle-class interests and shaped the lobbying strategies of the League.

In part 2 (chapters 7 through 9), I focus more on the parliamentary setting to explore the supply-side aspect of repeal. Chapter 6 details how MPs actually voted on repeal but does not tell us *why* the Peelites abruptly shifted from voting as trustees to voting as delegates. Chapter 7 is the first of three chapters that use computer-assisted content analysis to analyze the speeches of MPs and peers in their entirety. The analysis reveals that a reinterpretation of repeal allowed Peelites to vote as

delegates but to justify their betrayal of a protectionist Conservative ideology in the language of disinterested and moral trustees whose motive was only to promote the nation's well-being. Chapter 8 tests the robustness of the findings in chapter 7 by asking whether Peel's re-interpretation of repeal as a policy that would preserve the territorial constitution was indeed unique to 1846. I find that this rationale was not articulated as a theme in any of the debates on trade policy in the thirty years prior to 1846, which lends significant weight to my argument that while demand-side pressures were necessary for repeal, the final explanation for repeal must hinge on the introduction of a second dimension of argumentation, thereby splitting the Non-Peelite Conservatives from the Peelites. Chapter 9 explores the institutional conflict between one legislative chamber (the Commons) perceived as caving in to popular demand and one (the Lords) that perceived itself as immune to pressure from "out-of-doors." The latter, whose members were prominent landowning aristocrats, vehemently opposed repeal and had within its powers to veto the legislation. Why did the Lords then fail to veto repeal? This chapter examines how demand-side pressures for parliamentary reform ultimately persuaded peers to accept the lesser of two evils—repeal over democratic reform. The contribution of this chapter is that it allows us to trace how institutions such as Parliament can be constrained and ultimately shaped by economic interests. Finally, chapter 10 plays devil's advocate. It asks whether it might have been the ideas and arguments of the League and not changes in the economic make-up of their constituencies that persuaded Peelites to change their position. While the results of this analysis of newspaper coverage in local constituencies clearly illustrate the increased intensity in lobbying by the League from 1841 to 1846 (thereby increasing the demand for repeal), they also find that the effect of free-trade ideas on the voting behavior of Peelites was almost nonexistent.