

Freedom and Determinism: A Framework

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1 The Traditional Problem of Freedom and Determinism

Thoughts about freedom and determinism have engaged philosophers since the days of ancient Greece.¹ On the one hand, we generally regard ourselves as free and autonomous beings who are responsible for the actions that we perform. But this idea of ourselves appears to conflict with a variety of attitudes that we also have about the inevitable workings of the world around us. For instance, some people believe that strict, universal laws of nature govern the world. Others think that there is an omnipotent God who is the ultimate cause of all things. These more global views suggest that each particular event—including each human action—is causally necessitated, and so they suggest a conflict with the claim that we are free. Hence, the problem of freedom and determinism is, at base, a problem about reconciling attitudes we have toward ourselves with our more general thoughts about the world around us. It is a problem about locating our actions within those streams of events that make up the broader universe.

Freedom is usually discussed within the context of theoretical concerns about the nature of moral responsibility. For it is a basic assumption that some kind of freedom—call it “moral freedom”—is a necessary precondition for our being accountable for our actions. Moreover, even those who endorse *moral nihilism*, the claim that no one is ever morally responsible for anything, usually do so because they also believe that we lack moral freedom. Consequently, the assumption of freedom plays a role in our beliefs about the appropriateness of moral praise and blame. We find it absurd to blame a rock that happens to crash through our living room window but acceptable to blame the child who threw the rock. And we would consider such blame more legitimate were the rock knowingly and intentionally

thrown by an adult with normal cognitive capacities. In trying to uncover the basis for these differences in attitude, we encounter other, more fundamental distinctions in moral psychology between action and passion, belief and desire, reason and emotion, and control and compulsion. Not surprisingly persons in the fields of ethics, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of law all share an interest in understanding the nature of moral freedom. This remains true for moral nihilists since some understanding of the nature of moral freedom is implicit in its denial.

There are a variety of kinds of determinism that have been offered as potential threats to our freedom. For instance, there is *logical determinism*, the view that all propositions—including those reporting our future actions—are either true or false. There is also *theological determinism*, according to which an omniscient God knows about the future in complete detail. T. S. Eliot (1943) notes a problem between freedom and *temporal determinism*, which claims that time is another dimension like any of the other three spatial dimensions, so that the difference between what is in your past and what is in your future is a lot like the difference between what is to your left and what is to your right. Lastly, there is *causal determinism*, which claims that the past facts, together with the laws of nature, entail all future facts.² Each of these determinisms is a global thesis, making a claim about all propositions. It is then suggested that this global property carries with it the kind of necessity that is itself a threat to our freedom.

Of course, the term 'freedom' is also ambiguous. There is *political freedom* and *freedom of religion*. These and other freedoms are characterized in a *negative* way, as the absence of certain constraints on one's activities or beliefs. Since there are many kinds of constraints, there are many negative freedoms. But the kind of freedom that metaphysicians are interested in—call it 'metaphysical freedom'—can also be described in a positive way, as an *active power* to do things that are *up to us*. In this sense, metaphysical freedom seems more fundamental than the other, merely negative freedoms.³ Metaphysical freedom may be even more fundamental than moral freedom, for as the problems noted in the previous paragraph indicate, threats to our freedom can be presented without mentioning attributions of moral praise or blame. On the other hand, each of the determinisms noted above is also a potential threat to our moral freedom. By and large, folks in the twentieth century are concerned with moral freedom—the freedom-relevant condition necessary for moral responsibility—and causal determinism.

For this reason, debates about freedom and determinism center on a set of distinct, though related, questions.⁴

1. What is the thesis of causal determinism?
2. What is the nature of moral freedom?
3. Is moral freedom compatible with causal determinism?
4. Is causal determinism true?
5. Are any persons morally free?

The first three questions are *conceptual* and, thus, the primary focus of philosophers is directed towards answering those questions. A provisional answer to (1) was given above, but more precisely, determinism is the conjunction of the following two theses:

- For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant;
- If p and q are any propositions that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of p with the laws of nature entails q . (van Inwagen 1983, 65)

Note that there are no temporal restrictions on p and q . Still if p is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at some time in the past, then when conjoined with the laws of nature it entails each and every future fact.

Until recently, all parties in the freedom and determinism debate accepted a short answer to (2), regarding the nature of moral freedom. First, it was held that the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility was *free will*. Second, it was accepted that free will requires that persons have *alternatives* to at least some of their actions, where a person S has an alternative to an action iff S can do otherwise, or if S is able to do otherwise, or if it is within S 's power to do otherwise. Call the identification of moral freedom with free will, the 'traditional view' of moral freedom.⁵

The traditional view makes it rather easy to understand the philosophical problems surrounding freedom and determinism, for free will is also a likely candidate for the more basic metaphysical freedom. According to the traditionalist, there are not three distinct kinds of freedom—metaphysical freedom, moral freedom, and free will. There is only one kind of freedom, free will, and it is essential to moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Proponents of the traditional view tend to fall into well-defined groups,

depending on how they answer the remaining questions above. *Compatibilists* believe that determinism is consistent with the *free will thesis*—the view that at least some persons have free will—whereas *incompatibilists* believe that it is not. *Soft determinists* are compatibilists who accept both determinism and the free will thesis, whereas *hard determinists* are incompatibilists who endorse determinism but deny the free will thesis. Finally, *libertarians* are incompatibilists who deny determinism and endorse the free will thesis (van Inwagen 1983). The following chart should help the reader to keep track of the theories noted in this paragraph.

	(3) Compatibility?	(4) Determinism?	(5) Freedom?
Compatibilism	Yes	_____	_____
Incompatibilism	No	_____	_____
Soft Determinism	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hard Determinism	No	Yes	No
Libertarianism	No	No	Yes

During the last century a few of the above theories began to look rather archaic. First of all, certain results in quantum mechanics led many philosophers eventually to reject determinism. According to the standard interpretation of quantum theory, there are facts about the sub-atomic level—facts like *this electron has the property of “spin up”*—that are not a logical consequence of any conjunction of past facts and laws of nature. Subsequently, many philosophers have abandoned the positions of soft and hard determinism since they both entail a positive answer to (4), and the acceptance of determinism.

In addition, philosophers began to question the relevance of the concept of *free will* to moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Motivation for the traditional view of moral freedom stems from an acceptance of something like the following principle:

The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): S is morally responsible for action *a* only if she has, or had, alternatives to *a*.

But in an important and influential paper, Harry Frankfurt provides apparent counterexamples to PAP, cases in which agents perform blameworthy actions even though it appears that they could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt writes:

Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants Jones₄ to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid

showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones₄ is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones₄ is going to decide to do something *other* than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones₄ is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones₄ decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. Whatever Jones₄'s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way. (Frankfurt 1969, 148–149)

Perhaps Black wants Jones₄ to rob a bank, and that Jones₄ robs the bank without the need of Black's counterfactual intervention. It seems, then, that Jones₄ is morally responsible for his action but that he could not have done otherwise. Call such examples 'Frankfurt examples'. To accept that Frankfurt examples are genuine counterexamples to PAP is to accept a split between moral freedom and alternatives, for the Frankfurt examples suggest that one can have the former without having the latter. This means that the traditional view is wrong about the nature of moral freedom.⁶

Lastly, some philosophers have abandoned the traditional view because of the development of a number of persuasive formal arguments in support of incompatibilism, presented primarily by Peter van Inwagen (1975, 1983, 1989) and Carl Ginet (1966, 1990). These are all versions of the *Consequence Argument*.

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983, 16)

Van Inwagen (1983) offers three formal versions of the Consequence Argument. In the third version—aptly called 'the Third Argument'—he constructs a modal operator '*N*' where '*Np*' means '*p* and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether *p*' (1983, 93; 1989, 404). Intuitively, we can think of this as the *unavoidability operator*. Van Inwagen claims that according to the logic of this operator the following two inference rules are valid:

- (α) From $\Box p$ deduce Np
- (β) From Np and $N(p \rightarrow q)$ deduce Nq ,

where ' \Box ' represents broad logical necessity and ' \rightarrow ' represents material implication (1983, 94; 1989, 227). From the above rules and definitions, together with reasonable assumptions about the past and the laws of nature,

one can show that no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether any true proposition is true, given determinism. Thus, the Third Argument apparently establishes incompatibilism.⁷

The three developments discussed above have led to a number of new theories in the freedom and determinism debate. Among the more attractive of these is *semicompatibilism*, inspired by the rejection of PAP and the success of the Consequence Argument (Fischer 1994). According to the semicompatibilist, moral freedom is not essentially linked to alternatives. The semicompatibilist can agree that free will is incompatible with determinism but also contend that determinism and moral responsibility are compatible. Moral freedom is best understood in terms of concepts like *guidance control* and *reasons-responsiveness* that rely on features about the actual causal history leading up to an action, instead of whether or not there are any alternatives to the action.⁸

Libertarianism is still widely held.⁹ Moreover, many incompatibilists deny the free will thesis altogether. Hard determinism is rarely endorsed, since few philosophers accept determinism, but in its place are *successor views*, like *hard indeterminism*, according to which incompatibilism is true, determinism is false, but the free will thesis is false anyway (Pereboom 2001). Most successor views differ from traditional versions of moral nihilism. Traditionalists begin with the Consequence Argument. Hard determinists then argue that determinism is true, and thus all human actions are unavoidable. Other traditionalists extend the Consequence Argument to cover cases of indeterminism, as well. For instance, after presenting the Third Argument one can go on to show that most propositions are unavoidable even if one assumes the truth of indeterminism (van Inwagen 1983, 1989). Proponents of successor views often believe that unavoidability is unimportant to moral freedom, given the Frankfurt examples. Instead, they claim that moral freedom is essentially linked to *origination*, and claim that origination is impossible under the assumption of determinism and unlikely at best even if indeterminism is true.¹⁰

In summary, the majority of contemporary philosophers agree that some kind of freedom—*moral freedom*—is required for moral responsibility. But they differ as to the nature of this freedom as well as some of the other necessary conditions for moral responsibility. Proponents of the traditional view continue to maintain that moral freedom is just free will, but a variety of philosophers have rejected the latter notion altogether. This is primarily

due to the impact of the Frankfurt examples and formal arguments for incompatibilism. Moreover, while debate about the compatibility of moral freedom and determinism is still alive and well, most philosophers have rejected determinism given quantum mechanics. Gone are the labels of soft determinism and hard determinism, but the lion's share of opinions on the nature of freedom and determinism still fall into three main groups: libertarians, moral nihilists, and compatibilists, including semicompatibilists. We now introduce the essays in this current volume.

2 New Work on Freedom and Determinism

As we have seen, there are essentially two projects that are important to contemporary philosophers working in the area of freedom and determinism: (a) understanding the nature of moral freedom and its relationship with moral responsibility, and (b) determining whether or not moral freedom is compatible with determinism. That is, contemporary philosophers are primarily concerned with questions (2) and (3) from our earlier list. However, one cannot address these questions without a provisional understanding of the general concepts involved—*determinism* and *moral freedom*—as well as a clearer sense of the type of events relevant to our concerns here, namely, actions. These presuppositional topics are the subject of the essays in our first section, “Determinism, Freedom, and Agency.” We then turn to the nature of moral freedom and responsibility in “The Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility,” and finally, to questions about the compatibility of freedom and determinism in “The Compatibility Problem.”¹¹

Determinism, Freedom, and Agency

Many standard ways of treating the problem of freedom and determinism presume answers to questions (1) and (4) above. As it turns out, it is not easy to say what it would be for the world to be deterministic, and even less easy to see whether, on any plausible account of what determinism amounts to, the world is in fact deterministic. In “Determinism: What We Have Learned and What We Still Don't Know,” John Earman briefly reviews relevant parts of current physics with respect to their compatibility with determinism. He begins by distinguishing between determinism and prediction. While the latter may entail the former, the converse is false. Hence, one cannot infer from an inability to predict future states of a system that

the time evolution of the system is indeterministic. Earman's review covers determinism and predictability not only of quantum systems, but also classical and relativistic systems. One of the interesting results he reaches is that, contrary to naive intuition, classical Newtonian physics is more hostile to determinism than either quantum mechanics or special relativity. Another is that the prospects for a deterministic theory unifying general relativity and quantum theory are rather grim. After noting various points of tension between determinism and each of these parts of current theory, Earman identifies ways in which extensions of the theories might save determinism, but argues that, as things now stand, questions about the truth or falsity of determinism remain open.¹²

In keeping with the introductory nature of the first section, the next two essays in the volume offer two distinct theories of moral freedom: a compatibilist account and a libertarian one. Both essays are exceptionally broad in their scope, covering over a half-century of scholarly research combined. Keith Lehrer's "Freedom and the Power of Preference" is a break from his earlier views. In Lehrer (1980), the author argues that *total integration* of preferences is sufficient for moral freedom. Since total integration is compatible with determinism, it follows that moral freedom is compatible with determinism, too. Lehrer now believes that total integration is not sufficient for moral freedom because the integrated structure might be produced by another person and, thus, it would not be a preference structure of which the agent is the author. According to Lehrer's new view, in order for our actions to be free they must be the result of a preference structure that the agent prefers to have, and one that the agent has because he prefers to have it. This is sufficient, according to Lehrer, for the agent to be the author of his own actions yet is still consistent with determinism.

In "Agency, Responsibility, and Indeterminism: Reflections on Libertarian Theories of Free Will," Robert Kane embraces an incompatibilist theory of moral freedom. Kane is careful to distinguish between two requirements that are central to libertarianism. First, there is the condition of alternative possibilities (AP), which claims that alternatives are necessary for free will. Second, there is the ultimacy condition, which requires that the agent be the ultimate source of her morally free actions. Kane notes that although AP may be necessary for free will it is not sufficient. Thus, an account of libertarian free will must add something else to the mere existence of alternatives. Kane adds the condition of ultimate responsibility,

which includes the ultimacy condition. But Kane distances himself from other, more classic libertarian theories, like the *libertarian agency theory*, which holds that agent causation is *sui generis* and not reducible to event causation.¹³ Instead, Kane adopts a teleological theory that attempts to explicate moral freedom in terms of the reasons or purposes of the agent. Kane closes his essay with a lengthy response to allegations that the notion of indeterministic action is incoherent.

The kinds of things that we are normally held responsible for are actions, or their consequences, so the problem of freedom and determinism is essentially a problem about reconciling free actions with determinism. Thus, in addition to delving into the intricacies of the latter view, theorists often engage in important work on the nature of human action. In “Trying to Act,” Carl Ginet offers four conditions, each of which he claims is sufficient for the truth of sentences of the form, ‘*S* tried to *a*’. Ginet falls short of offering an analysis since he does not claim that any, or all, of the conditions are necessary for the truth of such sentences. Still, Ginet notes some important features that all four conditions share. For instance, in each condition *S* tries to *a* by doing something else which *S* believes is connected in a certain way with the possibility of doing *a*. To try to do *a* is to do *something*, even if one fails to do *a*, so these are also conditions for the truth of sentences reporting the performance of a certain class of actions.

The Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility

The papers in this section discuss question (2) in detail: What is the nature of moral freedom, the freedom-relevant condition for moral responsibility? Dana Nelkin’s “The Sense of Freedom” is a sustained discussion of the following principle:

(R): Rational deliberators, in virtue of their nature as rational deliberators, necessarily have a sense that they are free.

Establishing (R) is important for at least two reasons. First, it is one of the most central and universally agreed upon beliefs that we have about moral freedom. Second, philosophers like Immanuel Kant use (R) as an important premise in arguments against moral nihilism. After considering and dismissing another version of (R), Nelkin concludes that the ‘belief-concept’ reading of it should be accepted. Thus, according to Nelkin, all rational deliberators essentially believe that their actions are up to them in the sense that they are accountable for those actions.

In "Libertarian Openness, Blameworthiness, and Time," Ishtiyaque Haji argues against a traditional belief in moral theory that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are essentially retrospective, that is, that we cannot hold a person responsible for an action until *after* the action has been performed. Against this, Haji argues in support of *blame future*, the view that it is possible for *S* to be morally blameworthy for doing *a* at *t* at some time *prior* to *t*. Haji's intuitions run counter to those who believe in *libertarian openness* (L-openness), the view that if *S* has free will then it was always possible for *S* to do otherwise at any time prior to performing an action. Proponents of L-openness argue that we cannot be responsible for our future free actions since it is undetermined as to whether or not they will occur until the action is actually performed. But Haji rejects this argument by noting that one can construct Frankfurt examples in which *S* is morally responsible for performing some action even though the action is not L-open to *S*. Haji goes on to discuss a variety of conceptions of moral responsibility that might lie behind the rejection of blame future. Haji critiques all of these views and, instead, advocates the *self-disclosure* conception of moral responsibility that is consistent with blame future.

The Frankfurt examples also play an important role in Todd Long's "Moderate Reasons-responsiveness, Moral Responsibility, and Manipulation." Long's paper is a critique of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's view of moral freedom (1998). According to Fischer and Ravizza, agents in the Frankfurt examples lack *regulative control* over their actions since they cannot do otherwise. But such agents have *guidance control* over their actions as long as their actions are a result of mechanisms that are *moderately reasons-responsive* (MRR). Moreover, it is guidance control, and not regulative control, that is the freedom-relevant condition for moral responsibility, according to Fischer and Ravizza. Long offers some Frankfurt examples that he thinks pose problems for Fischer and Ravizza's theory. More specifically, the examples are such that the counterfactual intervention involves cases of direct manipulation of the inputs to the agent's deliberative processes by either adding or replacing different reasons for action. Intuitively, in such cases the potential actions in the alternative sequence scenario—the actions that would result were the counterfactual intervention to be operative—arise from the same mechanism as those performed in the actual sequence scenario—the actions that do result, without the aid of intervention. But an important assumption of Fischer and Ravizza is that

agents are morally responsible for their actions in the actual sequence scenario yet these same agents would not have been morally responsible for their actions were the counterfactual intervention to be enacted. Fischer and Ravizza are then faced with a dilemma. Either they must concede that there is more to moral responsibility than an action's being the result of a mechanism that is MRR or they must give up their belief that their theory explains why agents in the Frankfurt examples would not have been morally responsible for their actions had the counterfactual intervention taken place. Long also suggests that agents may be morally responsible for actions even if they undergo external manipulations that are quite severe.

Nomy Arpaly's paper, "Which Autonomy?" is a general critique of the concept of *autonomy*, one of the more popular candidates for moral freedom. First, Arpaly discusses a variety of divergent accounts of autonomy that philosophers have offered. This alone poses a problem for such theorists since the diversity of such accounts has rendered the concept of *autonomy* practically meaningless. Arpaly goes on to offer substantive criticisms of each of these accounts and ends by advising that we might be better off dealing more directly with moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and abandoning the notion of autonomy altogether.

We close the second section with an essay by John Martin Fischer entitled "The Transfer of Nonresponsibility." Fischer's contribution is part of a long-standing debate—one in which he has exerted substantial influence—on the Principle of the Transfer of Nonresponsibility (Transfer NR), a version of which was put forth by van Inwagen. Van Inwagen's principle is formally identical to his rule (β), noted above, only here ' Np ' means " p and no human being, or group of human beings, is even partly responsible for the fact that p " (van Inwagen 1980). Both rule (β) and Transfer NR can be seen as *closure principles* of unavailability and nonresponsibility, respectively. Fischer formulates the principle as follows:

Transfer NR: If p obtains and no one is even partly morally responsible for p and if p obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for the fact that if p obtains, then q obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for q . (Fischer, chapter 9)

Transfer NR has recently come under attack by semicompatibilists, like Fischer, who argue that the Frankfurt examples are counterexamples to this principle too. To use an example from Fischer's essay, suppose that q is the

fact that an avalanche occurs and that the avalanche was started by an agent, Betty, but that the avalanche would have occurred even if Betty had not started it due to the fact that a glacier was eroding, p . No one is responsible for the fact that p , and no one is responsible for the fact that if p , then q , but it seems that Betty is responsible for the fact that q .¹⁴ Proponents of Transfer NR have tried to alter the principle to meet this counterexample. Fischer considers and responds to a variety of these reformulations. He concludes that the newer versions of Transfer NR cannot be used to support the incompatibilism of determinism and moral responsibility. At most, he says, they lead only to a *dialectical stalemate*.

The Compatibility Problem

The final section of the volume contains essays on question (3) above, the issue of whether or not some substantive notion of freedom is compatible with the thesis of causal determinism. Like some of the other contributions in this volume, "Van Inwagen on Free Will" offers an important retrospective on an influential body of work given from the author's own point of view. By now, many of van Inwagen's views should be well known to the reader since they have had some bearing on almost all of the issues discussed above. Van Inwagen adopts the traditional view of moral freedom as free will and has offered compelling arguments in support of incompatibilism as well as the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. In this essay, van Inwagen also discusses his thoughts on the Frankfurt examples, which he still finds unconvincing, and his argument for *restrictivism*, the view that we are rarely, if ever, free. He closes with some criticisms of the concept of *agent causation*.

John Perry's "Compatibilist Options" is both a defense of compatibilism and a direct response to one of van Inwagen's arguments for incompatibilism, the 'First Formal Argument' (1975; 1983, 69–78). According to Perry, there are two distinct ways in which compatibilists can avoid a conflict between metaphysical freedom and determinism. They can adopt a soft view of laws of nature, and accept that laws are little more than true universal generalizations, or they can adopt a soft view of 'can'.¹⁵ Perry advocates the second strategy. He endorses a hard view of laws of nature and then argues that metaphysical freedom and determinism are nonetheless compatible. In his discussion of van Inwagen's argument, he notes that it involves a subtle ambiguity in the phrase 'renders a proposition false'. He then rejects

the argument by providing a counterexample to one of its key premises, the premise most similar to rule (β).

Many contemporary philosophers have noted structural similarities between rule (β), Transfer NR, and the following:

The principle of epistemic closure: From S knows that p and S knows that p entails q , deduce S knows that q .

This latter principle plays an important role in arguments in support of *skepticism*, the view that we have no knowledge. Given the formal similarities of these various closure principles, it is fashionable of late to try to bring the technical apparatus from the epistemology debate to bear on the problem of freedom and determinism. For instance, John Hawthorne (2001) has recently put forth a view of *contextualism* according to which sentences about freedom are context sensitive. Thus, in ordinary contexts when an English speaker utters sentences of the form ' S does a freely', the sentence comes out true even if determinism is true. In "Freedom and Contextualism," Richard Feldman argues against Hawthorne's theory. Among his many reasons for rejecting contextualism, Feldman notes that the contextualist concedes too much to the incompatibilist for he admits that in philosophical contexts it is usually false to say that ' S does a freely' given determinism. In addition, Feldman claims that the contextualist fails to take our incompatibilist worries about moral freedom seriously.

In "Buddhism and the Freedom of the Will: Pali and Mahayanist Responses," Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg provide a comparative discussion of freedom and determinism from an Asian perspective. With few exceptions, thinkers across the ancient world embraced determinism with no recognition that it might undermine moral responsibility. According to Gier and Kjellberg, this suggests that the issue of free will is a distinctively modern one, initiated by Augustine and carried over into European philosophy. Buddhist philosophers writing in the Pali language generally support a form of compatibilism that compares favorably with Lehrer's idea that moral freedom lies in developing preferences that lead to the good life. Mahayanist Buddhist philosophers writing in Sanskrit embraced forms of idealism or skepticism that appear to dissolve personal agency altogether. Anticipating French deconstruction, Nagarjuna, one of the most sophisticated Buddhist philosophers, deconstructs the self and implies that the talk of freedom versus determinism is simply competing rhetorics that have no foundation in reality itself.

The volume ends with an original and controversial contribution by Ted Honderich. In "After Compatibilism and Incompatibilism," Honderich endorses a theory of determinism, and then argues strongly for the startling thesis that both compatibilism and incompatibilism are wrong. Each claims that we have one settled conception of moral freedom, or one important conception, and this, he argues, is demonstrably false. The real problem of determinism has seemed to him until recently to be the practical one of dealing with the fact that we not only have attitudes consistent with determinism, but also attitudes inconsistent with it. But now he thinks there is a further problem. Reflection on your past life can issue in confidence in determinism but also in feelings of moral responsibility akin to those that depend on indeterminism. On what fact can they rest? Honderich does not solve this problem directly but he does suggest two avenues of pursuit: embrace a radical theory about the nature of consciousness, or question longstanding assumptions about causation and explanation. His paper is a useful stopping place for this anthology since it suggests that no matter how much has been said about the issues of freedom and determinism there is always something new to add to the debate.

Notes

1. See Aristotle (1963) along with writings by the Stoics and Epicureans in Long and Sedley (1987). This is disputed by Gier and Kjellberg, chapter 13, who argue that the problem is a modernist one.
2. For discussions of the problems of freedom and logical/theological determinism in ancient times, see Aristotle (1963) along with writings by the Stoics in Long and Sedley (1987). For more contemporary essays, see Fischer (1989) and Kane (2002, part 1). A more precise definition of 'determinism' is provided below.
3. See van Inwagen (1998, 365–366). The term 'metaphysical freedom' is van Inwagen's. The term 'active power' comes from Reid (1983).
4. For a related, though somewhat different set of questions and problems, see van Inwagen (1983, 1–2) and Kane, chapter 3.
5. Following van Inwagen (1983, 8), we use the term 'free will' out of respect for tradition. By use of the term we do not suggest that there is some faculty, e.g., *the will*, that has the property of being free. To say that *S* has free will is just to say that *S* has alternatives, in the sense noted in this paragraph. This connection between the concepts of *free will* and *alternatives* has been accepted by virtually everyone throughout the history of philosophy. Frankfurt (1969, 1971) remains an exception.

6. Not all philosophers agree that the Frankfurt examples undermine PAP. See the articles in Fischer (1986, part 2), Fischer and Ravizza (1993, part 3), and Kane (2002, part 5). For discussions of the Frankfurt examples in this volume, see Haji, chapter 6, Long, chapter 7, Fischer, chapter 9, and van Inwagen, chapter 10.

7. Let ' P_0 ' represent a proposition that expresses the state of the world at some time t_0 before any human beings existed, let ' L ' represent the conjunction of the laws of nature, and let ' P ' represent any true proposition. Here is van Inwagen's Third Argument (1983, 93–104; 1989, 404–405).

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| (1) $\Box((P_0 \ \& \ L) \rightarrow P)$ | assumption of determinism |
| (2) $\Box(P_0 \rightarrow (L \rightarrow P))$ | from (1) by exportation |
| (3) $N(P_0 \rightarrow (L \rightarrow P))$ | from (2) by (α) |
| (4) NP_0 | premise |
| (5) $N(L \rightarrow P)$ | from (3), (4) by (β) |
| (6) NL | premise |
| (7) NP | from (5), (6) by (β) |

8. Fischer (1982, 1987, 1994) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998). For other theories of moral freedom along the lines of semicompatibilism, see Lehrer (1980) and the articles in Fischer (1986, part 1), Fischer and Ravizza (1993, part 2), and Kane (2002, part 4). This latter section includes discussions of the *new compatibilists*, who provide naturalistic conceptions of moral responsibility inspired by P. Strawson (1962).

9. For contemporary discussions of libertarianism, see O'Connor (1995) and Kane (2002, part 6). See also Kane, chapter 2, and van Inwagen, chapter 10.

10. For versions of the successor view, see Kane (2002, part 7), G. Strawson (1986), Pereboom (2001), and Honderich, chapter 16. The term 'successor view' is Kane's. See also Kane, chapter 3, for a discussion of origination. Van Inwagen is not a moral nihilist though he does embrace a related view, called 'restrictivism', defined below.

11. The expression 'compatibility problem' is from van Inwagen (1983, 2).

12. We thank Bruce Glymour for providing the basis of this paragraph.

13. See Reid (1983), Campbell (1957), Taylor (1963), and Chisholm (1964). For more recent versions of the theory, as well as criticisms of it, see articles in O'Connor (1995) and Kane (2002, part 6). Kane, chapter 2, and van Inwagen, chapter 10, contain interesting criticisms of the concept of *agent causation* from the libertarian perspective.

14. This is based on an example from Ravizza (1994, 78).

15. For compatibilists representing the former approach, see Lewis (1981) and Lehrer, chapter 2. For compatibilists representing the latter approach, see Moore (1912) and Lehrer (1976, 1980). Kane (2002, part 4) also contains some recent essays of interest on compatibilism.

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