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## Preface

Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. This is not to say that if I am undergoing an experience or feeling, I must be attending to it; my attention is often focused elsewhere. Still, if I have an experience or feeling, consciousness must surely be present. Consciousness of this sort goes with talk of “raw feels,” of “sensational qualities,” of “what it is like.” For a person who feels pain, there is something it is *like* for him to be in pain. *Phenomenal* consciousness is present.

Phenomenal consciousness is *essential* or *integral* to experiences and feelings in a way in which it is not to other mental states. The state of thinking that water is wet, to take a specific case, has no characteristic phenomenal “feel,” in my view, although it may certainly be accompanied by a linguistic, auditory image with phenomenal features. The subject of the thought may “hear” an inner voice. It may seem to the subject as if she is uttering a sentence in her native language, complete with a certain pattern of stress and intonation. Remove the phenomenology of the auditory experience, however, and no phenomenology remains.<sup>1</sup>

I currently have a rich and varied phenomenal consciousness. My visual field is full of the colors of my garden. I have auditory sensations of a bird singing from a nearby tree. I feel my watch strap on my wrist and my shirt sleeves on my arms. I have a dryness in my mouth, a soreness in my right knee. I feel my feet touching the floor, my hands resting upon my legs, my brow furrow as I think about what to write. Sensory experiences such as these can (and do) exist whether or not their subjects are attending to them.<sup>2</sup>

Phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive, largely automatic matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order

consciousness, for example. But it is also deeply puzzling. In Tye 1995, I elaborated and defended a theory of phenomenal consciousness that has come to be known as representationalism. In reflecting further upon the view, and in responding to questions at talks and in discussions, I have come to realize that there are aspects to representationalism that need further clarification (and indeed aspects that need certain minor revisions). For example, it seems to me that the so-called “transparency intuition,” which undeniably plays a very important role in motivating the representationalist view, has not been well understood; nor has the notion of content, in terms of which phenomenal character or “feel” is best elucidated. I have also come to think that it would be worthwhile not only to offer detailed replies to certain recalcitrant objections to representationalism but also to connect the view with other issues of philosophical interest (most notably, the question of the nature of color).

My focus in the essays that comprise this book is broader than representationalism and associated topics, however. Two prominent challenges for *any* reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. Much has been written on these challenges (I myself have not been reticent [Tye 1984, 1995]), but more remains to be said. In particular, it now seems to me that the two challenges are intimately related and that the best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap is to argue that it is a kind of cognitive illusion. Part I of the book is concerned with these more general matters.

Part II is devoted to representationalism itself. This part opens with a summary of representationalism and its motivations. I have tried to make the development of the view here especially clear, and I think that this chapter contains enough new material (as well as some minor revisions) to make it worthwhile to peruse even for those who are fully familiar with the theory presented in Tye 1995. The three chapters that follow deal with objections to representationalism that take the form of putative counterexamples.

The first class of these consists of actual, real-world cases in which, it is claimed, perceptual experiences are the same representationally but different phenomenally. These are the focus of chapter 4. Another class of objections consists of imaginary cases in which experiences suppos-

edly are identical representationally but inverted phenomenally. These cases, along with a modified representational theory proposed by Sydney Shoemaker, are the focus of chapter 5. A third class of putative counterexamples consists of problem cases in which experiences allegedly have different representational contents (of the relevant sort) but the same phenomenal character. Ned Block's Inverted Earth example (1990) is of this type. Counterexamples are also sometimes given in which supposedly experience of one sort or another is present but in which there is no state with representational content. Swampman—the molecule-by-molecule replica of a notable philosopher (Donald Davidson), formed accidentally by the chemical reaction that occurs in a swamp when a partially submerged log is hit by lightning—is one such counterexample, according to some philosophers. Chapter 6 presents replies both to the Inverted Earth example and to Swampman.

Part III of the book deals with two more general issues, one of which is potentially threatening to representationalism and the other of which representationalism enables us to make progress upon. The potential threat is posed by color (and other so-called “secondary qualities”). For reasons that will become clear in chapters 3–6, representationalism of the sort I endorse requires an objectivist account of color. It does not require that colors be *external*, objective entities, but this is certainly the view of color that goes most naturally with representationalism. This is also, I believe, the commonsense view of color. Unfortunately, according to many color scientists and some philosophers, colors cannot be objective entities of the sort common sense supposes. Common sense supposedly conflicts with modern science on color, and common sense supposedly has no way of accommodating the distinction between unitary and binary colors. I argue that this is quite wrong. Chapter 7 may thus be seen as a vindication of common sense and thereby indirectly a defense of representationalism with respect to color.

The final chapter considers an important question about consciousness on which philosophers have been largely silent, namely: Where, on the phylogenetic scale, does phenomenal consciousness cease? I address this question from the perspective of representationalism, and I argue that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such simple creatures as honey bees.

I have given talks at many places on the essays that comprise this book, and I am indebted to many people for helpful comments, discussion, and/or correspondence. In particular, I would like to thank the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bielefeld for hosting a week-long seminar on Tye 1995 (during which I was asked a large number of useful and probing questions) as well as the following individuals: Kent Bach, Ansgar Beckermann, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Earl Conee, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, John Dilworth, Jim Edwards, Frank Hofmann, Terry Horgan, Keith Hossack, Frank Jackson, Joe Levine, David Lewis, Peter Ludlow, Colin McGinn, Brian McLaughlin, Christian Nimtz, John O’Leary Hawthorne, Andrew Melnyk, Tom Nagel, Chris Peacocke, David Papineau, Jesse Prinz, Diana Rafmann, Alex Rosenberg, Mark Sainsbury, David Sanford, Krista Saporiti, Giofranco Soldati, Wade Savage, Sydney Shoemaker, Eilrt Sundt-Ohlsen, Bernhard Thole, and Bob Van Gulick.

Some of the essays are entirely new; others involve a significant reworking of previously published articles. Chapter 1 differs only very minimally from an essay with the same title that appeared in German in an issue of *Protosociologie* (1998), edited by K. Preier. Chapter 2 appeared in *Mind* (October 1999) as “Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion.” An ancestor of chapter 6 was published as “Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism” in *Philosophical Perspectives* (1998), but the latter part of the chapter that appears here is notably different from the earlier essay. Chapter 8 is taken from the last two-thirds of an article with the same title that appeared in *Philosophical Studies* (1997).

## Notes

1. It is sometimes held that the content of a conscious thought makes its own distinctive contribution to the phenomenal character of a thinker’s mental state. This has the very counterintuitive consequence that my molecular duplicate on Putnam’s famous planet, Twin Earth, who thinks that twin water (or twater) is wet, rather than that water is wet, *thereby* differs from me at the level of phenomenal experience or feeling. I accept, of course, that what my twin thinks is different from me. He has a thought with a different content from mine, and if he is conscious of what is thinking then his thought has a different conscious

content. But this is not a difference in *phenomenal* consciousness, at least in any sense that I intend. The difference, rather, is one of *higher-order* consciousness. He believes that he is thinking that twater is wet whereas I believe that I am thinking that water is wet.

2. I do not wish to deny that attending to a sensory experience can sometimes *causally* influence its phenomenal character. For more on attention and phenomenal consciousness, see chapter 1, pp. 13–14; also chapter 3, pp. 60–61.