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## Index

- Acceptance (and belief), 136–139, 143–147, 154, 156, 159, 200–201, 205–206, 232, 237, 325
- Adams, Robert, 65–66, 224–228, 312, 329
- Adler, Jonathan, 115, 146, 164, 259, 307, 314, 318
- Ainslie, George, 68, 329
- Albert, Hans, 174
- Alston, William P., 41, 43, 45, 125–126, 309, 310, 312, 319, 321
- Anderson, Craig A., 288
- Anomaly (to a theory), 280
- Anti-evidentialism, 3–4, 6, 9, 38–43, 50–51, 84
- Argument(s), 87, 125, 129, 131–133, 173, 184–185, 214–215, 260, 296–297, 302–303, 324, 326
- constraints on, 221–223
- by elimination, 179
- from ignorance, 16, 103–112, 132–133, 314–315
- from inflation, 103–104, 129–133, 228
- from isolation, 103–104, 120–129, 132
- Aristotle, 86, 132, 293–294, 312, 329
- Armour-Garb, Bradley, 317
- Armstrong, David, 78
- Assertion, 7, 27, 67, 89, 221–223, 231, 312
- assertion/belief parallel, 13–14, 30, 34–36, 49–51, 159–161, 196, 203–204, 181–183, 212–213, 235–236, 262–265, 274–277
- challenging an (and default), 50, 159–160, 169, 181–183, 241–243
- implication of knowledge (*see* Knowledge)
- qualified (*see* Epistemic qualifiers)
- Audi, Robert, 318
- Austin, J. L., 309, 321, 326
- Axelrod, Robert, 318, 324
- Bach, Kent, 154, 314
- Background beliefs. *See* Belief(s) (believe that), background
- Baier, Annette, 140, 316
- Belief(s) (believe that)
- action (guide to), 77
- “as if,” 234
- assertion to oneself (*see* Assertion, assertion/belief parallel)
- automatic formation (reliable sources), 22, 28, 55, 76, 121, 135, 137, 145, 150, 153, 161, 231, 280
- background (evidence, knowledge), 9, 17, 106–108, 112, 133, 136–137, 140, 145–154, 159–161, 186–187, 205–206, 227, 229, 231, 246, 277, 297, 318
- basic (*see* Foundationalism)
- betting criterion, 325, 327
- “bracketing” of, 227–228, 260, 281, 291
- “cannot” (can, must) be believed (as conceptual), 2, 10, 20–21, 25–26, 29–32, 49, 52–53, 60, 86, 120, 133, 264, 311

- Belief(s) (believe that) (cont.)  
 claim (to truth), 5, 28, 41  
 deciding (willing) to believe (see Vol-  
 untarism)  
 demands of, 27, 31, 38  
 distorted, 16, 71, 73–75, 86–87,  
 89–90, 95, 99, 101, 186–187, 213  
 doubt (compatibility with), 19, 21,  
 224–228, 249–273  
 duality (attitude and epistemic; *see*  
*also* Confidence), 22, 46, 244–245,  
 255, 268  
 explicit (vs. tacit), 168–172, 318  
 full and partial (degrees of), 11, 19,  
 35–36, 38, 40–43, 45–46, 56, 69,  
 172–173, 212, 216–218, 231–236,  
 276, 325  
 “groundless,” 17, 84, 131, 176,  
 179–180, 185, 320  
 justified (*see* Justified belief)  
 neighbors of (e.g., belief in, nonrepre-  
 sentational), 10–11, 23, 123–124,  
 128  
 paradoxes of (*see* Paradoxes of belief)  
 perseverance studies, 288–290  
 rational (irrational) (*see* Rationality)  
 reactive attitude, 215–221  
 responsibility for, 55–56, 64–67,  
 80–83, 92, 275  
 revision of, 165–166  
 scope negation over, 118–120  
 stability of (instability), 62–63,  
 80–81, 85, 186, 299  
 transparency of (*see* Transparency)  
 “way-out,” incredible, unbelievable,  
 104–116, 126, 131, 152–153, 209,  
 308 (*see also* Belief[s] [believe that],  
 “cannot”)  
 weakness of will (*akratic* belief), 15,  
 56, 67–72, 166, 185
- Bem, Darryl, 94  
 Bennett, Jonathan, 298, 311  
 Betting as measure of belief. *See* Be-  
 lief(s) (believe that), betting criterion  
*Bible Code, The* (Drosnin), 90–92, 98  
 Blais, Michael, 317  
 Blanshard, Brand, 77, 303–304, 308, 329
- Bonjour, Laurence, 321  
 Bovens, Luc, 322  
 Braithwaite, Richard, 253  
 Broom, Robert B., 86, 181, 309,  
 317  
 Bratman, Michael, 234  
 Bryan, C. D. B., 104, 110  
 Burdens of proof, 43, 121–123, 159,  
 181, 272, 316, 326  
 Burge, Tyler, 77, 144–146, 151, 313,  
 317, 319, 326  
 Burnyeat, Myles F., 324
- “Cannot” as conceptual. *See* Belief(s)  
 (believe that), “cannot”  
 Carey, Susan, 315  
 Carlsmith, J. M., 93  
 Carnap, Rudolf, 309, 325  
 Carroll, Lewis, 97  
 Certainty. *See* Confidence; Belief(s)  
 (believe that), doubt  
 Cherniak, Christopher, 313–314, 326,  
 328  
 Clifford, W. K., 25, 34, 120, 308  
 Coady, C. A. J., 139, 146, 316–317  
 Code, Lorraine, 310  
 Cognitive dissonance, 93–96, 99, 121,  
 157, 181, 213, 316  
 Cognitive economy, 84, 108, 142, 153,  
 155, 161, 216, 223, 239, 243–246,  
 277, 283, 290, 325. *See also* Con-  
 straints to fully believe; Limits  
 Cohen, L. Jonathan, 309, 324, 326,  
 328  
 Cohen, Stewart, 307, 323, 327  
 Coherentism, 17, 178  
 Collins, Arthur W., 323  
 Commitment(s), 23, 74, 89, 91–93,  
 98–99, 122–123, 130, 172,  
 222–224, 265, 299–303, 308  
 Conceptual scheme, framework,  
 11–12, 128, 131  
 Conee, Earl, 309, 310  
 Confidence (certainty), 19, 250–256,  
 260, 301. *See also* Belief(s), duality  
 Conflict of interest reasoning. *See* Self-  
 control(s), conundrums

- Conjunction rule. *See* Paradoxes of belief, conjunction rule
- Consistency (contradiction, inconsistency) among beliefs, 3, 12, 20–21, 29–33, 48–49, 80, 91, 98–99, 106, 109, 114, 130, 196–201
- Constraints to fully believe, 18, 148–149, 211–229, 238, 240–241, 249, 264–267, 285
- Contextual variation in standards (contextualism, costs of error, importance of being correct), 19, 75, 83, 98, 138, 149, 223, 228, 231, 238–244, 249, 275, 299–301, 328
- Cook, J. Thomas, 311
- Credulity. *See* Gullibility
- Crimmins, Mark, 318
- Cruz, Joseph, 319
- Curley, E. M., 312
- Damasio, Antonio R., 313
- Danto, Arthur, 57
- Darmstadter, Howard, 313
- Dauer, Francis W., 327
- Davidson, Donald, 68–69, 146, 236, 307–308, 316, 319
- Defaults (default reasoning), 41–42, 154, 164, 183  
     special (specific) reason to overrule, 211–212, 229, 247, 326
- Dennett, Daniel, 62, 78, 296–297, 308, 312, 319
- DeRose, Keith, 307, 314, 323, 326
- Descartes, Rene, 76–77, 84–85, 88, 92, 97, 243, 312, 329
- de Sousa, Ronald, 220, 310
- di Sessa, A., 167
- Distraction, 74, 83–86, 89, 92, 129, 133, 180, 187
- Division of epistemic labor (diversity of opinion), 97, 135, 154, 222, 282, 297
- Donaldson, Margaret, 116
- Doubt. *See* Belief(s) (believe that), doubt
- Dretske, Fred, 168, 309, 314, 316, 320
- Duhem, Pierre, 318
- Dummett, Michael, 323
- Elgin, Catherine Z., 313, 318
- Elster, Jon, 294
- Epistemic (defined), 5  
     circularity, 177–178, 321  
     vs. non-epistemic reasons (*see* Reasons, epistemic)  
     position, 50, 60, 73, 120, 153, 183  
     possibility (*see* Possibility, epistemic)  
     practice(s), 143–148, 158, 160–162, 167–168, 174–178, 180, 182, 212–213, 215, 221–224, 228–229, 231–236, 265, 270, 273, 277, 285, 302  
     qualifiers, 42, 217–218, 221–222, 231–238, 244, 276, 324  
     “reasonism,” 5–6
- Epistemology  
     normative, 15–16, 73–101  
     reformed, 3–4, 26
- Ethics of belief, 1, 25, 305  
     extrinsic, 1, 9, 11, 26, 41, 43–49, 55, 104  
     intrinsic, 1, 10, 26, 45, 49, 55, 75, 96, 105  
     fundamental thesis (basic claim), 3, 35, 38, 249  
     modesty, 6–14  
     and rationality, 2, 26, 47, 55
- Evans, Gareth, 307
- Evidence. *See also* Reasons  
     “absent,” 107–109, 164–165, 172  
     background (*see* Belief[s] [believe that], background)  
     indeterminacy of, 46–47, 60–61, 119–120  
     and methodology, 6  
     specific, 157–159, 206, 175, 182–183, 237, 259  
     weight of, 250–253, 326 (*see also* Fallacies, directionality of weight)
- Evidentialism  
     arguments for, 29, 33, 40, 163  
     challenges to, 2, 18, 40, 135, 182–183, 211–212, 228–229  
     too demanding, 17, 19, 38, 168, 228, 231, 238, 243  
     conceptual (strong, conceptual

- Evidentialism (cont.)  
 defense of), 2–4, 15, 25–26, 44, 49,  
 51–53, 63, 74, 120, 256, 306  
 denials of (*see* Anti-evidentialism)  
 deontological (“ought”), 43, 47–49,  
 51–52  
 foundationalism, relation to (*see*  
 Foundationalism)  
 innocence of, 44, 174  
 moderate, 4, 20  
 traditional, 2–3, 25, 34, 40, 46, 51–53  
 “Experience machine,” 77  
 Explicitness, recommendation of (vs.  
 implicitness), 15, 74, 86–90,  
 113–116, 168–172, 271, 287, 299  
 selectivity of recommendation,  
 96–101, 153
- Factive (factivity), 39, 194–196,  
 218, 236, 323–324
- Faith, 117, 223–228
- Fallacies (fallacious reasoning), 87–89,  
 96, 103–105, 112, 131–132, 190,  
 214, 268, 271, 288, 297, 303  
 directionality of weight, 251–257,  
 266–267, 272–273
- Fallibility (fallibilism, infallibility), 21,  
 76, 205–208, 246, 255–257, 272,  
 285  
 meta-fallibility, 294–295, 297,  
 299–300, 306 (*see also* Self-  
 control[s], conundrums)
- Fallibility (“each, but some not”)  
 structure, 284–286, 289–298,  
 302–306
- Falsifiability (testability), 61, 120–129,  
 164, 167, 303, 316. *See also* Meta-  
 criteria
- Fanaticism, 297–303, 314
- Faulkner, Paul, 317
- Feldman, Richard, 309, 310
- Festinger, L., 93, 314
- Field, Hartry, 318, 319
- Fingarette, Herbert, 80
- First-order (and second-order) judg-  
 ments, 49–51. *See also* Self-  
 control(s), second-order account
- First-person methodology. *See*  
 Methodology, first person
- Fischer, John Martin, 312
- Flanagan, Owen, 191
- Flew, Antony, 124
- Focal assumption, 260–265
- Fogelin, Robert J., 309, 320, 321, 323,  
 327
- Foley, Richard, 137–138, 146, 205,  
 310, 317
- Foundationalism, 17, 44, 84, 104, 130,  
 163–164, 173–178, 184–185, 310,  
 320–321
- Free will, 65, 67, 140, 160
- Frege, Gottlob, 309
- Fricker, Elizabeth, 316
- Full awareness. *See* Methodology, full  
 awareness
- Garver, Eugene, 316
- Gettier, Edmund (Gettier Problem),  
 38
- Gigerenzer, Gerd, 250
- Gilbert, Daniel, 160, 325
- Gilovich, Thomas, 264–265
- Ginet, Carl, 59–60, 311, 328
- Goldman, Alvin I., 288, 313, 319, 321,  
 325, 328
- Goodman, Nelson, 166, 318
- Govier, Trudy, 136, 310
- Greenspan, Patricia, 220
- Grice, H. Paul, 151, 309, 319, 323
- Griffin, Dale, 250, 327
- “Groundless” beliefs. *See* Belief(s) (be-  
 lieve that), “groundless”
- Gullible (gullibility, credulity), 21,  
 148, 152–153, 161, 229
- Gutting, Gary, 131, 316
- Haack, Susan, 319
- Hacking, Ian, 309, 314, 325, 327
- Hamblin, C. L., 88
- Hardwig, John, 136–137, 140, 317
- Hare, Richard M., 314
- Harman, Gilbert, 289–290, 307, 309,  
 310, 323, 324, 325, 326, 328
- Hawthorne, James, 322

- Heil, John, 68, 312  
 Helm, Paul, 34  
 Hempel, Carl, 312, 319, 321  
 Hintikka, Jaakko, 323  
 Hoffrage, Ulrich, 250  
 Hogarth, R. M., 314  
 Holism, 165–166  
 Holton, Richard, 67, 140  
 Honesty, intellectual (truthfulness),  
     122, 127, 150–153, 158, 274, 317  
 Hook, Sidney, 314  
 Horn, Laurence, 326  
 Horwich, Paul, 236  
 Hubbard, M., 288  
 Hume, David (Humean), 25, 34, 40,  
     77, 136–137, 139, 151–152,  
     157–158, 186, 256, 314, 323, 324  
 Hypothetico-deductive model, 164  
  
 Incoherence test, 2, 9, 13, 15, 29–34,  
     45, 48–51, 58, 73–101, 114, 200,  
     299–300, 303. *See also* Conceptual  
     defense of evidentialism  
 Infinite regress problem (argument),  
     17, 22, 40, 163–164, 167,  
     173–183, 320–321  
 Inquiry, 61, 112, 131, 171, 212, 215,  
     219–223, 228–229, 232, 239, 246,  
     269, 282, 302  
  
 James, William, 16, 59–60, 63–64,  
     116–120, 131, 223–224, 309  
 Janis, I., 282, 314  
 Jeffrey, Richard, 251–252, 327  
 Jones, Karen, 316  
 Justification (justified/unjustified be-  
     lief), 6, 19, 38–39, 42, 82,  
     137–138, 173–175, 184, 241, 246  
     entitlement, contrast to, 17, 144–146  
  
 Kagan, Jerome, 319  
 Kahneman, D., 264, 288, 328  
 Kamin, Leon, 317  
 Kant, Immanuel (Kantian), 79  
 Kaplan, Mark, 323  
 Karlsson, Mikael, 327  
 Katz, Jerrold J., 318  
  
 Kelley, H. H., 213  
 Kevles, Daniel J., 317  
 Keynes, John Maynard, 251  
 Kim, Jaegwon, 310  
 Kiparsky, Kay, 195, 324  
 Kiparsky, Paul, 195, 324  
 Kirkham, Richard L., 319  
 Kitcher, Philip, 317–318, 325, 328  
 Klein, Peter D., 328  
 Kleinbolting, Heinz, 250  
 Kohlberg, Lawrence, 170  
 Kornblith, Hilary, 10, 313  
 Knowledge, 8, 36–40, 207, 229, 241,  
     275  
     as aim of belief, 7, 8, 77, 228, 238,  
     322, 309  
     assertion, implication of, 36,  
     194–195, 218, 262, 309  
     defeasible, 246, 257, 326  
     defeaters, 263  
     externalist/internalist, 22, 168,  
     170–171, 173, 179–180, 310  
     factivity (see Factive)  
     transmission of, 141, 156, 169, 183,  
     235, 259  
 Kretzmann, Norman, 320  
 Kripke, Saul, 109  
 Kyburg, Henry, 198–199, 207, 324  
  
 Lamb, Sharon, 319  
 Laudan, Larry, 316  
 Law of the Excluded Middle, 118–120  
 Lepper, M. R., 288  
 Levi, Isaac, 137, 280  
 Levin, Michael, 315  
 Lewis, David, 151, 307, 326  
 Limits (finitude), 43, 271. *See also*  
     Cognitive economy  
 Locke, John, 25, 34, 103, 309  
 Loewer, Barry, 313  
 Logue, James, 326  
 Lottery Paradox. *See* Paradoxes of be-  
     lief, Lottery  
 Lycan, William, 37, 112  
  
 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 87  
 Makinson, D. C., 199–200

- Malcolm, Norman, 123, 126–128, 130–131
- Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 309
- Margolis, Howard, 314
- McCloskey, Michael, 167
- McLaughlin, Brian P., 312
- Meiland, Jack, 47
- Mele, Alfred R., 312, 328
- Meletus (Plato's *Apology*), 53, 81–83, 101
- Mellor, Hugh, 325, 327
- Meno's Paradox (of Inquiry), 285–291
- Meta-criteria, 127, 316. *See also* Falsifiability
- Methodology, 5–14, 33, 37  
 abstractions (idealizations), 9, 14, 34–35, 37, 50–51, 88, 100, 106, 137  
 descriptive and normative, 43, 49, 51–53  
 first-person (vs. third-person), 5, 9–14, 35–36, 40, 73, 145–147, 157, 174, 194–196, 207–209, 236–237, 269, 275, 295  
 full awareness, 9, 21, 31–32, 34–35, 45, 49, 56, 80–81, 100, 120  
 purifying tests, 10–12, 19
- Milgram, Stanley, 187–192, 311, 322
- Mill, John Stuart, 255–257
- Millar, Alan, 319, 320
- Millgram, Elijah, 311
- Mitchell, Basil, 125
- Moore, G. E., 321, 327
- Moore's Paradox. *See* Paradoxes of belief, Moore's
- Moral luck, 218–219
- Moran, Richard, 317, 323
- Morgenbesser, Sidney, 313
- Morris, William E., 297
- Morton, Adam, 325
- Nagel, Thomas, 328
- Necessity, 37  
 natural (practical), 215, 220–221, 229, 305
- Negative clues, 268–273, 286
- Negligence, intellectual, 80–83, 90–91, 99
- Nelkin, Dana K., 323
- Nisbett, Richard, 78, 213, 308, 313, 322, 328, 329
- Nozick, Robert, 77, 311, 314, 324
- Ochs, E., 319
- “On-line” self, reasoning. *See* Reasons, limits on first-person understanding
- Open mind, 105, 109, 111–112
- Paradoxes of belief, 17–18, 193–209  
 conjunction rule (principle), 18, 198–201, 308  
 generality (evidence) constraints, 204–207  
 Lottery, 17, 193, 198–199, 208, 322–323  
 Moore's, 3, 12, 17, 29–31, 36, 193–198, 200, 204, 207–209, 263, 275, 322–323  
 Preface, 17, 193, 199–209, 285, 322–323
- Paradox of ideal evidence, 251–252, 260
- Paradox of inquiry. *See* Meno's paradox
- Pascal, Blaise, 171, 326
- Peacocke, Christopher, 313, 320
- Peirce, C. S., 121, 223, 304
- Petit, Philip, 312
- Piaget, Jean, 115–116, 170, 315
- Pinker, Stephen, 313
- Plantinga, Alvin, 3, 26, 124, 309–310, 316, 320
- Plato, 53, 129, 214–215, 286, 310
- Pojman, Louis, 310
- Pollock, John, 319
- Popper, Karl, 121–122, 283, 316, 327
- Possibility (impossibility), 37, 104–106, 126, 130, 132, 261, 315, 323  
 epistemic (conceivability) and real (metaphysical), 106, 109–112, 116  
 pragmatics for, 112–116
- Post, John, 320–321

- Practical reasoning (reasoning to action), 69–70, 118, 252
- Practice(s). *See* Epistemic, practices
- Pragmatic(s), 13, 22, 30, 42–43, 81, 85, 88, 96, 105, 112–116, 132, 169, 235, 276, 308–309, 315, 323, 326–327
- focus (presupposition), 112, 129, 287
- selective relevance, 115–116, 132
- Preface Paradox. *See* Paradoxes of belief, Preface
- Presumptions, 154–155
- Priest, Graham, 48, 206, 310
- Prisoner's Dilemma, 155, 225–226, 303, 324–325
- Psychology, cognitive (social), 27–28, 77, 85, 93–96, 100–101, 172, 187–192, 213, 250, 287–288, 328
- base-rate studies, 259, 264–267, 313, 328
- belief-perseverance studies, 288–290
- dynamic contrasted to synchronic studies, 94–95, 121
- Putnam, Hilary, 109, 257
- Quine, Willard v. O., 128, 165, 307, 310, 318
- Radcliffe, Dana, 311
- Radford, Colin, 328
- Railton, Peter, 309, 325–326
- Ramsey, Frank P., 77–78, 313
- Rationality (rational, irrational), 2, 4, 9, 11, 26–27, 45, 51, 55, 79, 92, 104, 200, 308
- epistemic, 48–49
- Rationalization (confabulation), 28, 78, 289–290
- Rawls, John, 296, 318
- Raz, Joseph, 59, 172
- Reactive attitudes. *See* Belief(s), reactive attitude
- Reasonableness, 274, 303–306
- Reasons (evidence)
- adequate (sufficient), 15, 25, 27, 29, 35–40, 45, 73
- availability of, 69, 168
- conclusive, 36–39, 45–46
- epistemic (vs. non-epistemic), 5, 28, 45, 47, 62, 307
- limits on first-person understanding, 83, 85, 171, 271, 296–297, 302–306
- responsivity to, 66–67
- Reeve, C. D. C., 311, 313
- Regress problem. *See* Infinite regress problem
- Reid, Thomas (Reidian), 41, 43, 136–137, 139, 157, 309, 319, 327
- Reliabilism, 17, 179, 321
- Responsibility. *See* Belief(s) (believe that), responsibility for
- Rey, Georges, 312, 328
- Riecken, Henry W., 314
- Robinson, Richard, 314
- Rogoff, Barbara, 319
- Roord, Jonathan, 326
- Rorty, Richard, 308
- Ross, Angus, 154, 266, 317
- Ross, Lee, 78, 191, 213, 288, 313, 322, 328, 329
- Ryan, Sharon, 323
- Ryle, Gilbert, 319
- Sahlin, Nihls-Eric, 327
- Schacter, Stanley, 314
- Schieffelin, B., 319
- Schmitt, Frederick, 149, 317
- Scott-Kakures, Dion, 311
- Searle, John, 58, 308, 312, 326
- Self-control(s), 20, 72, 123, 279–306, 311, 328–329
- conundrums, 292–293, 306
- and detachment, 20, 290, 297
- and the emotions, 297–299, 313
- second-order account, 300–303
- Self-correction (self-criticism), 20, 260, 279–306, 320
- Self-deception, 47–48, 59, 73–80, 89, 92, 121, 187, 314
- perfect and optimal, 78–80, 94
- Sellars, Wilfrid, 128, 316, 319–320

- Shklar, Judith, 214  
 Shoemaker, Sydney, 30, 194–198, 308  
 Sidgwick, Henry, 329  
 Singer, Peter, 291  
 Skepticism, radical, 7, 17, 85, 110,  
 130–131, 140, 207, 239, 243, 307,  
 310, 321–322, 324, 327  
 Skeyrms, Brian, 327  
 Slovic, P., 264, 328  
 Smith, Edward E., 312–313  
 Socrates, 53, 81–83, 100, 129,  
 214–215, 310  
 Solomon, Robert C., 324  
 Sorensen, Roy, 308, 314  
 Sosa, Ernest, 176, 318  
 Sperber, Dan, 316  
 Spinoza, Baruch, 311  
 Stalnaker, Robert C., 307, 323, 326,  
 328  
 Stevenson, Leslie, 136, 157  
 Stich, Stephen P., 313  
 Stocker, Michael, 214, 312  
 Stone, Tony, 308  
 Strawson, Peter, 215–216, 220–221,  
 309  
 Stroll, Avrum, 320  
 Stroud, Barry, 114, 130, 307, 321  
 Subjective principle (of sufficient rea-  
 sons), 26–29, 45, 52–53, 73  
 Swinburne, Richard, 3–4, 45, 234  
 Tacit confirmation, 17, 148, 163–164,  
 167–187, 254, 319  
 too-sophisticated objection to,  
 167–173, 186  
 Tarski, Alfred, 236  
 Taylor, Charles, 65  
 Testability. *See* Falsification  
 Testimony, 16, 135–159, 169, 182  
 a priori defenses, 136, 144–147, 317  
 default rule, 142–148, 151–158,  
 169–183, 211–212, 229, 235, 240,  
 242, 259, 262–264, 276, 285, 316,  
 318  
 null setting, 142–143, 145, 149  
 problem of, 135–136, 145, 157  
 reductionism, 158–159  
 trust (*see* Trust)  
 Theoretical reasoning (reasoning to be-  
 lief), 69, 252  
 conservatism, 310  
 simplicity, 22, 88  
 Thomas, David E., 314  
 Total evidence condition, 69, 205  
 Toulmin, Stephen, 235, 326  
 Transparency of belief, 11, 22, 36,  
 193–196, 201, 209, 274, 276, 326  
 and truth, 6, 39, 236–238  
 Trust, 16, 96, 117, 135–159, 265  
 Truth  
 disquotation, 236–237  
 intrinsic/extrinsic interest in, 76–78,  
 117  
 and transparency (*see* Transparency  
 of belief, and truth)  
 truthfulness (*see* Honesty, intellec-  
 tual)  
 Turner, Derek, 321  
 Tversky, Amos, 250, 264, 288,  
 327–328  
 Ullian, Joseph, 310  
 Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, 154, 313  
 Ulysses (and the Sirens), 293–294  
 Underdetermination, 166  
 Unger, Peter, 218, 307, 309, 326  
 Uniformity assumption, 250, 260–262,  
 270, 273  
 Urmson, J. O., 309, 323, 325  
 van Fraassen, Bas, 308, 325, 327  
 Velleman, J. David, 77, 309  
 Vogel, Jonathan, 308  
 Voluntarism, 14–16, 21, 44, 51,  
 55–64, 104, 174, 311  
 Walton, Douglas, 314, 315, 326  
 Walton, Kendall, 322  
 Weakness of will/belief. *See* Belief(s)  
 (believe that), weakness of will  
 Welbourne, Michael, 138  
 Whyte, J. T., 313



- Wiggins, David, 311  
Williams, B. A. O., 15, 58–59, 62–64,  
70, 219, 309, 311, 312, 313, 323  
Williams, Michael, 307, 310, 318, 326  
Williamson, Timothy, 151, 309, 317,  
322–323  
Wilson, Timothy, 78, 308  
Winch, Peter, 126–128  
Winters, Barbara, 311  
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 17, 113–114,  
121, 123, 126, 130–131, 176,  
179–180, 316, 318–320  
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 3, 17, 43–44,  
173–174, 308, 320  
Wood, Allen W., 314  
Woods, John, 314, 315  
  
Yablo, Stephen, 110  
Young, Andrew G., 308  
  
Zemach, Eddy, 310