PREFACE

Like our earlier study, The Dynamics of Soviet Society,* this volume tries to serve two purposes. It aims to pull together in the compass of a short volume what we know about Communist China; and it aims to assist in the making of a forward-looking American policy by offering a unified interpretation of Peking's intentions and its ability to achieve them.

Specifically we set out to answer these key questions:
1. What are the operative motivations of the Chinese Communist regime?
2. What are its current intentions with respect to the society of the mainland and to the external world?
3. What problems does it confront in achieving its purposes?
4. What is the likelihood of Chinese Communist success or failure, in terms of the regime's apparent objectives?
5. What are the prospects for change in Chinese Communist society over the foreseeable future?

To answer these questions we have found it necessary to review the modern history of China from the perspective which 1954 affords; to assess the changing human response to Communist rule on the mainland from 1949 to the present; to examine in detail the character of Peking's network of ties to Moscow, and the relationship to the external world implicit in those ties; and to consider the economic foundations for the regime's power aspirations. The interconnection among these elements as they are likely to affect the future course of Chinese Communist society is our ultimate theme in Chapter 16.

The conception underlying the book's structure is the following: Parts 1 and 2 narrate the major facts of modern Chinese history and set out our interpretation of them; Parts 3, 4, and 5 focus intensively on the three great strategic factors likely to determine the future evolution of Chinese Communist society—the interplay between the regime and the people, the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Chinese economy; Part 6 weaves together our conclusions as a whole. This

method involves a degree of repetition both of fact and argument; but we have felt that an examination of Chinese Communism from different perspectives gave us the best chance of emerging with balanced conclusions.

We have built this synthesis from the full range of materials available to us. We have exploited the considerable possibilities which the Communist press itself offers, the growing monographic materials covering parts of the Chinese Communist performance since 1949, and the rich literature on modern Chinese history, including the pre-1949 history of Chinese Communism. We have not attempted to footnote in detail the sources used, although a bibliography is included in the volume. This is an interpretative essay rather than a scholarly monograph.

It is a general conviction of the Center for International Studies (CENIS) that answers to such basic and difficult questions as those we have posed demand a unified view of a whole society in motion; and that the formulation of such a view must be, in the end, the responsibility of one person. It follows directly that our unified view, however clear it may be, will not be definitive. Any other scholar charged with this task would have emerged with a synthesis somewhat different in emphasis and perhaps even different in substance. And so, although I assume full responsibility for the body of the text and the conclusions, I do so in full awareness that there are alternative ways of looking at the phenomena of Chinese Communist society and that other perspectives may prove more legitimate than mine.

It has been encouraging to us all that on many of the key issues the views of a wide range of experts and observers whom we have consulted have tended to converge. The difference among experts, as is often the case, proved on dispassionate examination to be somewhat less than they sometimes believed. Nevertheless, the selection of materials, their organization, and the character of the conclusions drawn have been inevitably arbitrary.

There has been a wide and comforting consensus among my principal collaborators and myself—so substantial, in fact, that important segments of the text are wholly theirs. Chapter 5 is the work of Mr. Frank A. Kierman, Jr. His historical essay so converged with the main lines of our analysis of current Chinese Communist society that it has been included in Part 3 of this study, in summary form. This is not the simple happy accident it might appear. At every stage in our work we have benefited enormously from Mr. Kierman's rare combination of historical scholarship and contemporary insight, made
available to us with endless patience and generosity. He is responsible for a considerable part of whatever virtues this study may have.

This study owes an incalculable debt to Mr. Richard W. Hatch. Working with different materials, we talked out and agreed on the general perspective which suffuses this analysis. The view of the top leadership of Chinese Communism is largely based on his special research. And in his function as editor, besides making the reader's task vastly more easy than it would otherwise have been, Mr. Hatch has extended his contribution far beyond mechanical matters. At many points substantive passages are his. It might be noted that, in editing Part 5, and subjecting himself to the economist's jargon, Mr. Hatch rendered services over and beyond the call of a humanist's duties.

We have profited greatly from the presence in Cambridge of Mr. Alexander Eckstein, now engaged at the Harvard Russian Research Center on a basic study of the Chinese economy. His responsibilities do not extend beyond Part 5, although he has been a most valued critic of the study as a whole. Part 5 has been worked out between Mr. Eckstein and myself. Chapter 12 is our joint work; Chapters 13 and 14 are wholly products of Mr. Eckstein's scholarship. Chapter 15 is solely my work. If Mr. Eckstein were summing up the economic position in relation to the regime's objectives and prospects, his emphasis and interpretation would differ somewhat from mine. His views will be available at book length in the not too distant future.

Part 3 of the study owes much to the painstaking accumulation of evidence on attitudes toward the regime done by Mrs. Elizabeth Whittington, and to her measured evaluation of those difficult materials. In this work Miss Martha Henderson and Miss Ann Murphy have participated in the course of performing their other tasks at CENIS.

Miss Henderson is responsible for developing the detailed bibliography at the end of the volume. The scattered and piecemeal character of research and reporting on Communist China appeared to require and justify this extensive effort.

I have, of course, benefited from the ideas, comments, and criticisms of my CENIS colleagues. Although they have had urgent responsibilities of their own, they have turned aside to educate me and make available their time and working papers. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Benjamin Schwartz, who helped lay out the research plan for this study, and Messrs. K. C. Chao, Ronald Hsia, John Kautsky, Harold Isaacs, Douglas Paauw, and Toshio Tsukahira, and Miss Martha Henderson. Although they bear
no responsibility for the final form of this study, their suggestions, often accepted, have contributed to whatever value it may have. Out of their studies of Communism in Asia, Mr. Kautsky and Mr. Tsukahira have made an additional direct contribution to Part 4, there explicitly acknowledged.

In addition we have had the benefit of criticisms from a wide range of academic and other experts. To these readers of an earlier draft, and their wonderful tolerance of this intrusion by an outsider into the field of China studies, we owe a substantial debt: L. F. Chen, S. Y. Chen, Ai-li Sung Chin, Richard Eckaus, John Fairbank, George Kennan, John Pelzel, David Rowe, Raymond Sontag, John Carter Vincent, and Richard Walker. Although they bear no responsibility for the final text their criticisms and suggestions have improved it at many points.

To one of our critics we are particularly grateful. Standing in for the non-expert reader, Miss Harriet Peet examined our initial draft with great care; and her suggestions, both of presentation and substance, have made it a substantially better book than it would otherwise have been.

We have been supported indispensably throughout this venture, accomplished under forced draft, by an admirable secretarial team: Miss Anne Sartorio, its chief of staff; Miss Nancy Lou Grimes, and Mrs. Barbara Mahoney. We have been similarly aided by the untiring and often miraculously swift mobilization of research materials by our library staff: Mrs. Mildred Lamson, its chief; Mrs. Arlene Dagenais, and Mrs. Nan Yaldstein.

This book is about Communist China, not about American policy. But we wish to note in this Preface a conviction that is shared by all centrally concerned with this venture.

Militarily and ideologically Communist China, now fully joined to the Soviet Union, presents an enormous challenge to the United States and to the Free World. Peking's pretensions to power in Asia and its claim as a model of theory and practice for Asia are unlimited.

We do not underrate the power and confidence of Peking's top leadership; but we are deeply persuaded that, from the common basis of ultimate humanistic values which, though different in form, ultimately bind the nations of the Free World, there can be fashioned societies whose strength and resilience will ultimately make Communism a tragic aberration of this century. Specifically, it is our conviction that a vigorous Free World policy—political, economic, and military—can contain the military threat of Chinese Communism, defeat its pretensions to political and ideological leadership in Asia,
and, in time, diminish or even remove the danger we now confront. But this requires an American policy prepared to join sympathetically in efforts to solve the great revolutionary problems of Asia, and an American people prepared to sustain such a policy: to sustain it not merely with guns and armed men, but also with capital and technique, with energy, and with a sense of human fellowship.

It is our hope that this book may contribute marginally to the development of the understanding and the will which must underlie such an American policy.

W. W. Rosrow

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