Voluntary Clubs: An Introduction

Matthew Potoski and Aseem Prakash

In recent years, voluntary programs have captured policy and scholarly attention. Firms participating in these programs promise to create positive social externalities beyond what government regulations require. Thousands of firms around the world have joined a voluntary program of one sort or another. This is an enticing phenomenon because it suggests a way to persuade firms to do socially desirable things at lower costs and with fewer conflicts than sometimes accompany government regulation. Voluntary programs are also perplexing, and perhaps even counterintuitive, precisely because governments regulate firms on the assumption that firms’ pursuit of profit hinders them from doing socially desirable things in the first place. In exploring this puzzle, scholars have found that sometimes voluntary programs are successful in the sense that participation induces firms to increase their production of social externalities, but at other times programs fail to induce any positive change among the participating firms. It is time to move beyond examining whether these programs work and focus instead on identifying the conditions under which they work. Systematic inquiry along these lines requires a theoretical framework that helps identify ex ante the necessary conditions and institutional features of credible and effective voluntary programs.

This volume proposes an analytic framework for studying voluntary programs based on the economic theory of clubs, and rooted in social science theories of collective action and institutional design (Prakash and Potoski 2006b). Three features of our conception of voluntary programs are noteworthy: government regulations do not mandate that firms join voluntary programs; these regulations require members to adopt specific policies that are either not required by law (that is, the
law is silent) or are beyond the legal requirements; and the objective behind the adoption of such policies is the production of positive social externalities. Through extensive theoretical and empirical analyses drawn from a variety of industries and regions of the world, the empirical chapters in this book show how the club approach can shed light on why firms join voluntary programs, why only some programs are successful, and what policy designers can do to harness voluntary programs’ policy potential.

Building a social science–based analytic framework is important because voluntary programs are a fast-growing and crucial policy tool, and because the programs raise fundamental public policy questions. Firms, governments, businesses, and NGOs have all created and participated in a large variety of programs (Webb 2004; Vogel 2008). In the environmental field alone, Richard Morgenstern and William Pizer (2007) report that about three hundred voluntary programs have been negotiated between firms and national governments in Europe, and more than eighty-seven voluntary agreements have been sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

The club approach to voluntary programs presented in this volume builds on the economic theory of clubs (Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler [1986] 1996) in a novel way. Instead of treating clubs as organizations, we view clubs as institutions or rule systems (North 1990). We propose that voluntary programs can be viewed as rule systems that generate benefits having the characteristics of club goods. Firms that join a program enjoy the value of affiliating with the program’s brand name. Brand affiliation is an excludable benefit because nonmembers are unable to receive these benefits. For members, the brand benefits are nonrival because their association with the club does not necessarily diminish the value others receive from the brand. Indeed, as we discuss subsequently, one firm’s membership can often enhance the value that other members receive.

Membership in a well-regarded voluntary program allows firms’ stakeholders to identify firms that are producing social externalities beyond the legal requirements by virtue of their club membership and differentiate them from nonmembers that are less likely to produce such social externalities. Effective voluntary programs that induce members to produce positive social externalities produce win-all-around outcomes: stakeholders win because firms produce the social externalities they desire, firms win because membership produces goodwill and other
rewards from stakeholders, and club sponsors can share some credit for inducing firms to produce positive social externalities.

Of course, and importantly so, voluntary programs are not always successful. They can fail if their “brands” are not strong enough to attract firms to join or if they lack institutional mechanisms to ensure that firms live up to their obligations as program participants. In fact, the variability in program design and performance suggests the need for a framework that can help both scholars and practitioners make ex ante assessments of programs’ potential strengths and weaknesses. Studies of voluntary program efficacy typically focus on describing the characteristics of program members or industries in order to identify causal lessons about program efficacy; rarely do these studies look at voluntary program attributes as exogenous drivers of program efficacy. Our club framework seeks to bring attention to this important but neglected issue of scholarly inquiry. The empirical chapters presented in this volume examine voluntary programs in specific industries and issue areas using the club framework. In doing so, they examine the value of the club framework in explaining the efficacy of the voluntary program in a range of contexts and with different types of membership.

The Rationale for Voluntary Programs

Voluntary programs’ policy potential is to stimulate the creation of positive externalities and mitigate the production of negative ones. Externalities are negative or positive consequences of transactions experienced by those not involved in a transaction. Externalities imply that the social costs and benefits of a transaction differ from the private costs and benefits that the actors receive. Actors tend to underproduce goods with positive externalities because they cannot capture (all or most of) the benefits that society enjoys, yet they bear all the costs. For example, if I pay all the costs of a streetlight that I install at the end of my sidewalk, my neighbors enjoy the positive externalities of a safer neighborhood and an easier nighttime path to their homes. Actors likewise tend to overproduce goods with negative externalities because while they enjoy the benefits, they only partially bear the costs that society incurs, such as when factories pollute the air and water. Voluntary programs seek to alter firms’ cost-benefit calculus to channel their private self-interests in ways that lead to the reduction of negative externalities and/or production of positive externalities.
Externalities imply a market failure because the socially optimal quantity of the good has not been produced. The traditional response to market failure has been government intervention in market transactions (Pigou [1920] 1960), though markets can solve some externality problems without governmental intervention. If the producers and receivers of externalities could bargain easily—that is, if there are few information asymmetries, and low transaction costs for negotiating and writing contracts—externality receivers could compensate externality producers, leading to socially optimal production levels (Coase 1960). But such bargains are difficult and perhaps impossible to strike where there are many actors with large information asymmetries among them. A consumer might be willing to pay extra for goods produced in environmentally friendly ways, but only if he or she can identify the goods and firms making them. For example, a prospective groom might pay extra for an engagement diamond if he is confident that proceeds from the sale would not be supporting military conflicts in Africa (see chapter 5). Consumers sometimes need assurance that the money they spend is indeed supporting firms that produce goods in ways that cohere with their preferences.

Firms can unilaterally declare that their goods have been produced in socially responsible ways. While consumers might trust some firms, for most people such self-declarations might not be persuasive on their own simply because consumers are unable to verify which firms are telling the truth. More broadly, information asymmetries coupled with the lack of assurance mechanisms prevent actors from transacting business. In such situations the market has “failed,” and the gains from win-win exchanges have not been realized.

The term “market failure” is somewhat unfortunate because it seems to imply that all markets have failed. A market is a specific rule configuration: market failure suggests that a specific rule system is not working in a specific context. In the same setting, a different market with a different rule system might successfully facilitate transactions.

This is where voluntary programs add value. They seek to reconfigure the institutional space between the potential exchange participants by providing new rules and a new mechanism to facilitate exchange. In effect, they create a new market for corporate reputation—one could perhaps call it a “market for virtue” (Vogel 2005). To consumers and other firm stakeholders, voluntary programs signal that the participating firm has agreed to adopt polices that lead to the production of social externalities beyond legal mandates. Program membership may also pro-
vide assurance that the firm is abiding by its commitment to produce positive externalities. If firms’ consumers and stakeholders favor the production of such externalities, they can reward the firms that become members. Voluntary program membership allows participating firms to appropriate benefits from appreciative consumers and stakeholders that they would not be able to enjoy without joining the program. In other words, joining a voluntary program confers a branding benefit on firms, allowing their stakeholders and consumers to reward them for producing the social externality program that membership requires.

As institutional responses to market failures, voluntary programs facilitate a bargain among three categories of actors: firms that produce social externalities beyond legal requirements and receive the excludable branding benefits that the program offers; program sponsors that establish the program and create mechanisms to ensure participants follow the program rules; and firms’ stakeholders who value the externalities that the participating firms generate and reward them for doing so. To illustrate with examples presented in this volume, Tim Bartley (chapter 6) shows that apparel companies joined a fair labor practices program to protect their brand image and escape criticism from social activists. The voluntary programs were expressly created to show that participating firms were using fair labor practices, and stakeholders who wanted labor conditions improved in overseas facilities received a signal about firms’ labor practices. The chapters by Virginia Haufler on the diamond industry (chapter 5), Elizabeth DeSombre on the shipping industry (chapter 7), Tim Büthe on the accounting industry (chapter 8), and Mary Kay Gugerty (chapter 12) all show how voluntary programs were created in response to pressures from stakeholders who wanted firms to produce more positive social externalities. The analytic approach to the study of voluntary programs proposed in this volume takes into account the institutional and stakeholder context in which programs function.

While governmental interventions play a valuable role in correcting market failures (Pigou [1920] 1960), governments themselves can also fail (Wolf 1979). In this light, voluntary programs can be viewed as correctives to both market and government failures (although these programs are also vulnerable to their types of institutional failures, as we will discuss), and can be seen as creating a new public policy domain (Falkner 2003). We do not mean to suggest that a proliferation of voluntary programs will or should lead to the “retreat of the state” (Strange 1996), or “governance without government” (Rosenau and Czempiel
Carefully designed voluntary programs can actually support public regulation given that governments seldom have the resources to legislate and monitor every detail of human activity (Ruggie 2004). Regulatory gaps exist in all governance systems. Perceptions of governmental failures (or successes) in one area tend to spill over to other issue areas. By filling in regulatory or governance gaps, voluntary programs can improve the broader regulatory and governance climate. While the extant research has not yet quantified the value or welfare gains via such “soft effects,” this is an interesting research area for scholars who study spillovers facilitated by institutional linkages.

It is fair to say that some voluntary programs have the potential to help governments and public authorities to focus resources on areas where public regulations are most effective (Gunningham and Sinclair 2002; Wilson 2002). Dan Fiorino (chapter 10) and Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash (chapter 11) show how the EPA has been in the forefront of establishing voluntary programs in the United States. For one, these programs can aid government regulation by requiring firms to go beyond the government’s regulations—an important contribution especially in jurisdictions where governmental enforcement capacities are limited or where international agreements such as the World Trade Organization constrain governmental action (Bartley’s chapter 3 on labor codes in the apparel industry, and Daniel Drezner and Mimi Lu’s chapter 9 on ISO 14001). Nevertheless, despite potential complementarities with public regulations, there are theoretical reasons to believe that some voluntary programs might be designed to preempt and shape governmental regulation in ways that reduce social welfare (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000; Heritier and Eckert 2008). This is an important area that merits careful empirical investigation.

Some critics charge that voluntary programs create “democracy deficits” on the grounds that governments can be “democratic” in ways that voluntary programs cannot (Porter 2001). For example, a voluntary program’s rule-making procedures might not be open to public input, or interested stakeholders might not be allowed to review the program’s rules. Voluntary programs might not reflect the “public will” to the same extent as government regulation. While some voluntary programs are amenable to “capture,” and may not afford adequate opportunity to all stakeholders to participate in rule making and enforcement, such sweeping generalizations are difficult to support. For one, democracy is a recent invention. Even in 2006, most countries could not be termed as
fully functioning democracies; the *Economist* (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007) labels only 28 of the 167 countries it examined as full democracies. And even in established democracies, there is debate regarding the degree to which governments respond to public concerns. Indeed, the significant literature on capture was first developed in the context of the United States (Stigler 1971), often touted as a well-functioning democracy. Instead of praising or criticizing any ideal governance type, the analytic challenge is to explore conditions under which any institution can function democratically and effectively.

While some voluntary programs might substitute for governmental regulation, as the chapters by Haufler (chapter 5), DeSombre (chapter 7), Bartley (chapter 6), and Büthe (chapter 8) demonstrate, the two can coexist and even complement one another, as illustrated in the chapters by Fiorino (chapter 10), Coglianese and Nash (chapter 11), and Drezner and Lu (chapter 9). Public laws and regulations influence voluntary programs as well as vice versa. Voluntary programs operate not just in the shadow of government regulations but also in coordination with them. Some voluntary programs may induce participants to comply better with public regulations (Börkey, Glachant, and Lévéque 1998; Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler 2000; Potoski and Prakash 2005)—an important issue in countries where the laws are weakly enforced. As we discuss below, from the stance of potential program participants, the value of joining a program is often contingent on its fit with public institutions and regulatory culture. While some voluntary programs are certainly shams, it is critical to assess voluntary programs on their analytic and policy merit and deficiencies—a task admirably accomplished by the empirical chapters in this volume.

**Book Outline**

This book seeks to contribute to the growing literature on voluntary programs, also termed as private authority regimes, private law, and private regulation (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1998; Coglianese and Nash 2001, Mattli and Büthe 2003; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004; Prakash and Potoski 2006b). The book has three theoretical chapters and nine empirical ones. Building on Prakash and Potoski (2006b), the book outlines a deductive, theoretical approach rooted in club theory to examine voluntary programs and then submits this approach to empirical examination. The three theoretical chapters (2–4) explore the club
approach to the study of voluntary programs. Chapter 2 presents the core ideas in a broad and general form. Chapters 3 and 4 select portions of the club approach for rigorous, formal analysis. These two chapters look at the trade-offs between the stringency of the obligations that a voluntary program imposes on its members (a proxy for the levels of social externalities that the members produce) and programs’ ability to attract participants. The nine empirical chapters examine the usefulness of the club framework for the study of voluntary programs that vary across issue areas, sponsorship, and the object of governance. These chapters scrutinize programs in diverse policy areas, including shipping, labor, accounting, diamonds, human rights, and the environment. The chapters include programs that have been sponsored by industry, NGOs, and governments. While clubs are predominantly targeted to shape the behaviors of firms, Gugerty’s chapter (12) explores how clublike programs are proliferating to regulate the practices of nonprofits. Thus, the wide diversity of empirical studies across sectors, sponsoring organizations, and objectives of governance provides a broad assessment of the robustness of the club framework, and generates new insights for the future research on voluntary programs.

To preview the empirical chapters to come, Haufler (chapter 5) focuses on the diamond industry, Bartley (chapter 6) on the labor sector, DeSombre (chapter 7) on the shipping industry, Büthe (chapter 8) on the accounting industry, and Drezner and Lu (chapter 9) compare an environmental club (ISO 14001), a social responsibility club (United Nations Global Compact), and a human rights club (the Free Burma campaign). The chapters by Fiorino (chapter 10) and Cogalianese and Nash (chapter 11) study programs in the environmental arena, where voluntary programs have proliferated in recent years in the United States. Given the important role of the EPA in sponsoring voluntary programs, these chapters present comparative case studies of different programs sponsored by this agency as well as state governments, with the recently discontinued National Environmental Performance Track program being the common case discussed by the two chapters. The EPA has launched over sixty voluntary programs. As the central actor in U.S. environmental policy, the EPA has the potential to shape voluntary programs’ future in significant ways. Indeed, its experience with voluntary programs has much to inform other actors that have sponsored voluntary programs in other policy areas. What emerges overall from the empirical research in this volume are lessons about when programs are more likely to
fail—weak monitoring and enforcement programs are the most frequent culprits—and how political, economic, and policy conditions shape voluntary programs’ performance.

Chapter Outline
The book has twelve chapters divided into three parts. Part 1 presents three theoretical perspectives on voluntary programs. Chapter 2, “A Club Theory Approach to Voluntary Programs,” by Potoski and Prakash, introduces the club theory of voluntary programs that is at the heart of this book. It describes voluntary programs’ two central institutional features: club standards that specify how members are to produce social externalities, and monitoring and enforcement rules to ensure that the members live up to their program obligations. The chapter then investigates the analytic features of different types of programs and program brands. It ends with a discussion of how the club approach fits with other voluntary program research.

Chapter 3, “Clubs, Credence Standards, and Social Pressure,” by Baron, presents a theory of industry collective action in the face of social pressure arising from “private politics” led by an activist NGO seeking to change the practices and policies of the firms in the industry. An example would be environmental NGOs campaigning to change the practices of timber companies to conform to the NGO-sponsored forestry club, the Forest Stewardship Council. The response of the U.S. industry (under the aegis of the American Forestry and Paper Association) was to counter by developing its own forestry club, the Sustainable Forest Initiative. This chapter seeks to explain which firms would join an industry-sponsored club and which would not, the governance rules for such a club, what standard the club would choose, and how the firms would perform. In addition, the theory attempts to explain whether social pressure would be directed to the firms in the club or those not in the club.

Chapter 4, “An Economics Perspective on Treating Voluntary Programs as Clubs,” by Kotchen and van ’t Veld, outlines a research agenda for nesting club theory within a model of more general public goods provision. Specifically, it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of existing club theory for understanding voluntary programs and takes initial steps to show how club theory can be expanded to account for the provision of more general public goods. Finally, it discusses how the broader conceptualization of club theory draws our attention to new questions and
answers about the increasingly important role of voluntary programs for solving collective action problems. Using a formal model, the chapter demonstrates how standard club theory illuminates several important features of voluntary programs, including but not limited to the following: a membership condition that clarifies the trade-offs associated with the decision to join a club, a level of provision condition that shows how club standards emerge, and a congestion mechanism that shows how club benefits are increasing in the number of members, but only to a point, after which rivalry begins to take effect. In addition, the chapter shows how heterogeneity among potential members can result in the formation of clubs with differing standards. The analysis underscores the conceptual distinction between clubs and standards that emerge endogenously, and those that can be established exogenously by a third party.

Part 2 addresses industry and international clubs, and has five chapters. Chapter 5, “The Kimberley Process, Club Goods, and Public Enforcement of a Private Regime,” is contributed by Haufler. The Kimberley Process is an example of an effective voluntary program and shows the value of the club perspective for analyzing how voluntary programs work. The Kimberley Process’s club standards are rules for verifying diamonds’ chain of production and custody so that certified diamonds are “clean,” as distinct from the “blood diamonds” whose proceeds are used to fund violent civil wars and rebellions. The program thus provides a positive social externality—a more peaceful world—through the production of a club good—a “brand” signal that identifies clean diamonds and thereby boosts the collective reputation of the legitimate diamond industry. The history of the Kimberley Process’s struggle against blood diamonds is itself fascinating and suggests some reason for optimism: many people point to the way that funds dried up after the Kimberley club was put in place as a factor that brought combatants to the negotiating table in Sierra Leone. Yet the case also shows the importance of designing and maintaining effective institutions to solve collective action problems. The program relies on public sector monitoring and enforcement, which on paper appears to be a strong sword, although it may have weaknesses in practice. And the program has struggled to build the strength of its brand signal, although the success of the movie Blood Diamond may have helped the Kimberley Process brand penetrate public consciousness.
Chapter 6, “Standards for Sweatshops: The Power and Limits of the Club Approach to Voluntary Labor Standards,” by Bartley, examines the apparel industry’s struggles to establish and maintain voluntary programs. The apparel industry’s collective reputation suffered greatly in the early 1990s when activists accused Nike, Wal-Mart, the Gap, and others of profiting from exploitation, brutality, and child labor in their supply chains. Early voluntary programs to rebuild the industry’s reputation were largely failures, with weak club standards and weaker monitoring and enforcement. Even the subsequent later voluntary programs, created through multistakeholder processes, have had little positive consequence, perhaps due to weak club standards that require participants only to “pay attention” to labor problems, or perhaps due to monitoring and enforcement regimes that while moderately strong on paper, are weak in practice. Club theory reveals its analytic power in this case by showing that effective institutions must be as strong in practice as in theory. Yet as Bartley points out, the club theory of voluntary programs laid out in the first chapter of this volume has a blind spot to the crucial questions about the often political process of establishing and governing voluntary programs—a limitation we take up as well in chapter 13.

Chapter 7, “Voluntary Agreements and the Shipping Industry,” by DeSombre, examines several voluntary programs in this industry where the absence of a global sovereign government makes externality problems particularly difficult to solve. DeSombre’s analysis shows that while voluntary programs can address different types of problems—lax labor standards, inadequate safety, overfishing, and environmental protection—and provide different types of private and public benefits, effective programs have in common strong club standards as well as effective monitoring and enforcement regimes. In a sector otherwise characterized by the kind of “race to the bottom” that others hypothesize but rarely find in practice, these clubs, largely voluntary, have been the only successful mechanisms for raising environmental, safety, and labor standards in international shipping. DeSombre’s careful account of these programs reveals the importance of aligning voluntary programs’ standards and enforcement with existing governance structures.

Chapter 8, “Technical Standards as Public and Club Goods: Who Is Funding the International Accounting Standards Board and Why?” by Büthe, examines the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and how it provides rule systems for the international finance and
The accounting industry. Büthe’s analysis shows the value of the club approach to voluntary programs: firms join the program and thereby finance the public goods it produces, in exchange for the excludable club goods that membership provides. Sovereign governments ceded authority to the IASB to induce industry acceptance of regulations by granting them standing in the rule-making process. The IASB, in turn, exploited governmental institutions to strengthen the monitoring and enforcement of its club standards. The IASB’s success in providing public benefits stems largely from how well its institutional design matched both the policy problem and its political and policy context.

Chapter 9, “How Universal Are Club Standards? Emerging Markets and Volunteerism,” by Drezner and Lu, begins by noting that the focus on voluntary standards has rested on an implicit assumption: most multinational corporations (MNCs) joining voluntary clubs are headquartered in advanced, industrialized democracies. The chapter then asks, if this assumption is correct, are voluntary clubs truly a global phenomenon, or has the predominance of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) multinational firms created a misperception among scholars of the global political economy? Variation in national preferences and institutions could have a profound impact on the club perspective on voluntary programs. Firms based in emerging markets might not value the club benefits of certification as much as Western-based MNCs because citizens in emerging markets might place a lower value on the positive social externalities created by such clubs. Both of these factors might undercut the incentive-based logic of voluntary standards. This chapter engages in a “tough test” of the power of voluntary clubs by examining the participation and compliance of firms headquartered in Pacific Rim developing countries to three different sets of voluntary clubs: the United Nations Global Compact, the Free Burma campaign, and the ISO 14001 regime. Firms demonstrate greater adherence to “strong sword” programs than “weak sword” ones, suggesting the value of the club model for voluntary programs.

Part 3 examines clubs sponsored by governmental and nonprofit actors. It has three chapters. Chapter 10, “Green Clubs: A New Tool for Government?” by Fiorino, analyzes how the EPA and U.S. state governments design voluntary environmental programs, or “green clubs,” to recruit firms to participate and then prevent them from shirking once they have become members. The chapter shows the value of club theory’s analytic lens for comparing across government programs, and
between government and nongovernmental-sponsored programs. Government programs have an important advantage in that they can reward participating firms with not just “soft” club benefits such as greater recognition but also “harder” club benefits such as regulatory flexibility and lower fines for environmental accidents. Green clubs can also reshape conflictual relations between firms and regulators into more cooperative, even relational interactions. Realizing the full potential of government-sponsored green clubs is hampered by laws and regulations that restrict governments’ ability to reward cooperative firms that join green clubs with anything more than soft club benefits. The political free pass that government-sponsored green clubs have enjoyed in the United States has expired; Fiorino suggests ways that governments can adapt their clubs’ standards and enforcement regimes, and perhaps even amend their laws and regulations, to better harness their potential as a policy tool.

Chapter 11, “Government Clubs: Theory and Evidence from Voluntary Environmental Programs,” by Coglianese and Nash, extends Fiorino’s analysis in chapter 10 by first digging more deeply into the EPA’s experience with its recently discontinued Performance Track voluntary program and then examining twenty-eight other EPA voluntary programs through the club theory analytic lens. Where the Performance Track has stringent club standards and strong enforcement swords, the standards of other EPA voluntary programs tend to be more variable, with strong club standards generally coupled with strong enforcement regimes. Like Fiorino, Coglianese and Nash suggest that while governments can offer substantial club benefits in the form of regulatory benefits, political and legal constraints prevent them from doing so, resulting in the limited membership rosters of so many government-sponsored voluntary environmental programs.

Chapter 12, “Self-Regulation and Voluntary Programs among Nonprofit Organizations,” is contributed by Gugerty. Where we traditionally view NGOs as voluntary program sponsors, Gugerty turns the question around, and sees NGOs as actors that demand the type of public and club benefits that voluntary programs can provide; NGOs, for example, use voluntary program membership to signal their quality to donors. Drawing global data from fifteen nonprofit voluntary programs, Gugerty finds that most NGO voluntary programs appear to be at least somewhat effective, which may not be surprising given the premium NGOs place in building and maintaining a credible reputation. Moreover, programs with stronger institutional design—stronger club standards as well
as more effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms—generate more club benefits for their members and more positive externalities for the public at large. Gugerty’s prescriptions for improving NGO voluntary programs suggest both the analytic similarities among NGO, industry, and government-sponsored programs—the importance of strong institutional design, and matching rules to policy and political contexts—and how these issues are manifested differently across settings.

Finally, chapter 13 by Prakash and Potoski outlines the book’s conclusions. First, it examines the terrain covered in the previous chapters, showing how club theory adds value to the study of voluntary programs. Second, while these chapters demonstrate the strengths of applying the club lens to voluntary programs, they also identify some areas where the theory is weak and underdeveloped. For example, they highlight the various types of voluntary programs where the insights from the club perspective are most useful. The concluding chapter summarizes these issues and suggests how future research might address them.