It is not easy to identify precisely the place of Joseph Rykwert in the international architectural academy. It is difficult even to compare him with such contemporaries and friends as John Hejduk and Colin Rowe (both recently deceased), who have taken up ideological positions in architecture and pedagogical methods in its academy that are sufficiently familiar to be recognizable even in the hands of their many protégés. The analogy that Rykwert made between buildings and the human body, which underpins the chapters in this book, is undoubtedly a powerful one. Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to identify a Rykwert “school” in contemporary architecture, let alone a Rykwert “style,” such as one can do with the approaches to design that have been associated with Rowe and Hejduk at the Cornell University and Cooper Union Schools of Architecture, respectively, over the past two or three decades.

If there is an intellectual method to be characterized as “Rykwertian,” it will be one that is neither as definitively articulated nor as readily transmissible as those of such figures as Hejduk and Rowe. It is probably symptomatic of this lack of ready transmissibility of his ideas, moreover, that he has been criticized for intellectual obscurantism. In a 1973 review of *On Adam’s House in Paradise*, for example, Kenneth Frampton concluded that the chief problem with the book was the author’s “failure to make himself clear.” Contemporary architecture students often see him as an esoteric, acquired academic taste: a highly literate and historically knowledgeable figure, but not a promulgator of design ideas that will influence them as Rowe and Hejduk have done.

This view of him is, of course, a popular one, but it seems to me that it is also pragmatically and professionally narrow, not to say intellectually uninquisitive. Even on its own terms, it fails to take account of certain notable manifestations of and responses to the ongoing Rykwert project—for example, how it is that a scholar whose career has been largely
1.1
Charles M. Correa, Mandala, 1996.
Ink on hand-made rice paper. Gift of the architect in honor of Joseph Rykwert. (Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania)
spent in the field of architecture should be held in such high regard outside that field. The long list of distinguished intellectuals who have followed his career with interest includes the Nobel Prize winner Elias Canetti (an important mentor for the young Rykwert) and the social philosopher and historian of ideas Ivan Illich (a close intellectual collaborator and admirer in recent years).2

This popular view also fails to explain how Rykwert should have developed—despite his putative failure to establish an identifiable school in contemporary architecture—a following of students of such variety and intellectual distinction as he has done.3 Finally, and perhaps most surprising, this sometime “populist” view curiously fails to take account of the long-standing second career of this alleged esotericist as a “reviewer of furniture and fashion” in architectural and other journals. This last failure is perhaps the most curious of all, since Rykwert’s second career has involved him in polemical controversy on surprisingly frequent occasions, even with architects, critics, and historians who have also been friends.

An examination of a collection of Rykwert’s essays, The Necessity of Artifice, makes evident this little-recognized feature of his activities: two of the texts included were rejected by the sponsors who had requested them in the first place! In attempting to get beyond the conventional, esotericist characterization of Rykwert, it will be useful to examine a few of these essays more closely, beginning with the essay from the mid-1950s with which Rykwert chose to open The Necessity of Artifice, “Meaning in Building.” It was initially commissioned by Eugen Gomringer for an anniversary issue of the Basler Nachrichten to commemorate the forty-fifth birthday of the design organization the Schweizer Werkbund. Given that he was unsympathetic to the minimalist, neofunctionalist policy of Gute Form that typified both the Werkbund and the new Hochschule für Gestaltung at Ulm at that time, Rykwert was doubtful as to the suitability of his views for such a publication, and said so when Gomringer extended the invitation to him. But Gomringer insisted, and so Rykwert went ahead and prepared his text, attacking what he saw as architects’ undue “preoccupation with rational criteria” for the design process. He argued that there was instead an acute need for them to “acknowledge the emotional power of their work,” and he insisted that such acknowledgment led to “investigation of a content, even of a referential content in architecture.”4 As Rykwert had suspected, these observations proved too inflammatory to be included in the commemorative publication being planned, and the essay was rejected, seeing publication instead in the Italian journal Zodiac in 1957.

Then, some two decades later, there is the essay on a Tate Gallery retrospective of the works of two European artists, Yves Klein and Piero Manzoni: “Two Dimensional Art for Two-Dimensional Man.” It was written in 1974 for Domus, the Italian magazine to which
Rykwert was a regular contributor for a decade. In this case, one suspects that Rykwert’s status as a sort of “London correspondent” for the Italian magazine contributed to the controversy that eventually ensued, given that this status might have led his Milanese editors to fail to anticipate the intensity of what he had to say on this particular topic. Be that as it may, the dismayed editors at Domus eventually refused to publish his essay. It appeared only in 1975 in another Italian journal, Casabella.

Distancing himself at the outset from the art world phenomenon he characterized as “full-scale canonization,” Rykwert launched a comprehensive attack on the exhibition, summing it up as a “sad and squalid affair.” Sketching a brief critical account of the careers of the two neo-avant-gardists to whom the show was devoted, Rykwert concluded that when all was said and done, both were only vacuous reprises of the original Duchampian avant-garde of the early twentieth century:

There are many ways forward from the zero that was reached fifty years ago: the understanding that everything is art is perhaps the most important of them. Klein and Manzoni worked against such an understanding. In the present climate, I cannot accept the operating of the art-market in the interest of exhibitionist personalities, however charismatic, as an entertaining and harmless diversion. It is a camouflage for the sinister forces which degrade the quality of our lives, and to tolerate it means that you accept the alibi of the despoilers of our visual environment.5

The editors at Domus declined to publish Rykwert’s review, even though they had supported him through another polemical controversy only a few months before. This was the occasion of the publication of his review of the Fifteenth Triennale in Milan in January 1974. This text publication embroiled Rykwert in a controversy with two of his Italian friends, the architect Aldo Rossi and the historian Manfredo Tafuri. Rossi responded to Rykwert’s challenge with a sardonic reference to “servile academics and reviewers of furniture and fashion.” For his part, Tafuri objected to having been quoted by Rykwert second- as opposed to first-hand.

Although it escaped the fate of editorial rejection, this text is surely among the most impassioned polemics that Rykwert ever published. “Like an ageing primadonna,” he began, “every time the Triennale reappears, it seems a farewell; every Triennale, we are told by its critics, is so much worse than the others, that it must surely be the last.”6 From this initial assault, he then went on to describe the ongoing deterioration that he saw as having typified a number of recent Triennales. The Thirteenth he saw as problematically cynical, and the Fourteenth, held in 1968, as ending in “the squalor of defeat.” But for him, even these,
in their respective unsatisfactorinesses, were only precursors of the “waste of talent and resources of a Triennale like the present one,” which he could only describe as “unbearable.”

The reviewer of furniture and fashion struggled to find some components of the exhibition to admire, including a series of reconstructions of Mackintosh chairs and selections of studio pottery and jewelry. But in between these, and looming over everything else exhibited—at least for Rykwert—was the architectural presentation of the work of the Italian neorationalists or, to use Massimo Scolari’s term, the Tendenza. Here I quote Rykwert on the movement in question:

It has been coming for some time, of course. Its theoretical basis, however, was formulated recently. Manfredo Tafuri, from his splendidly isolated monastery of the Tolentini in Venice, proclaimed the death of architecture. Some time later, he modified his opinion. Aldo Rossi’s competition scheme for the cemetery at Modena was another focus: a rigid arrangement of elementary geometries which still dominates the panorama (literally) in this exhibition. The conjunction was not accidental. Rossi, who heads the team which has organized the most important part of this exhibition, that concerned with “rational” architecture and the building and the city, has often and loudly proclaimed the independence, the abstraction of architecture from all ideology, and from any “redemptive” role. His is a “pure” architecture, form without utopia which at best achieves a sublime uselessness. These are Tafuri’s words, his apologia for Rossi: “We will always prefer, to any mystifying attempt at decking architecture in ideological dress, the sincerity of him who has the courage to speak of its silent and irrelevant purity.”

Responding to Tafuri, Rykwert concluded, “So that’s it then. Architecture may stay alive as long as she stays dumb. Dumb and beautiful maybe, but dumb.”

Later in the same text, Rykwert returned to Rossi’s ideas in an intriguing way, this time attacking his views on the role of function in architecture, particularly in certain ancient Roman buildings. He began by quoting Rossi:

“Indifference to functional considerations is proper to architecture: the transformation of antique buildings . . . is its sufficient proof. [This indifference] has the force of a law . . . Transformation of amphitheaters (Arles, Coliseum, Lucca) before the transformation of the (Roman) cities, means that the greatest architectural precision—in this case that of the monument—offers the greatest functional liberty potentially.”

To this, Rykwert responded:
Here is as monstrous a *petitio principii* as one could wish to find. Has Aldo Rossi only looked at ancient buildings in Canina’s engravings? Has he ever thought how they were used? Or that “the architecture of the Romans was from first to last, an art of shaping space around ritual” (and I quote the most brilliant interpreter of Roman architecture of recent times, Frank E. Brown). Does he not remember from his childhood, the procession of lights and incense at the reading of the gospel? Does he not realize that he was looking at the perpetuation of a Roman civil law-court’s ceremonial over 2,500 years, or thereabouts? The buildings of which he speaks, the amphitheaters, theaters, sanctuaries, baths, cannot be understood as “types” in the way he uses the word at all. They are not void forms, repeated in and out of different contexts. They are living forms, elaborated over centuries of use, and polished by it as are the pebbles in a stream.7

It seems to me that a few interim conclusions follow reasonably directly from the juxtaposition of these polemical controversies that Rykwert launched. First, it is surely not surprising that both Rossi and Tafuri were taken aback at the intensity of Rykwert’s attack on them (even if, for reasons I will demonstrate, it is quite consistent with the basic premises of his moral and intellectual position). Second, this collection of controversies surely makes it just as evident that the familiar characterization of Rykwert as an esotericist and an obscurantist is too easy, based as it is on a reading of his works that both ignores his journalism and fails to see the manifold ways in which his “reviews of furniture and fashion,” and the more complex arguments of his books, are in fact conceptually interrelated. Moreover, another conclusion—one that logically precedes the two just cited also follows—is this: a closer examination of the relationship of these three journalistic polemics may enable us to grasp some of these more complex contemporary implications of Rykwert’s larger intellectual project.

To start with, we may observe that Rykwert would, in the late 1950s, oppose the “rationalist neofunctionalism” of the Ulm school and the Schweizer Werkbund (this from the perspective of 2001) may not appear surprising, given the current unfashionableness of such ideas. But this observation has to be qualified by an acknowledgment of the widespread acceptance in those years of such ideas and of Rykwert’s bravery in declaring his dissent at that time—before the broad-based revival of interests in symbolism and in “referential content” in architecture that he called for did in fact arise a decade later.

By comparison, his 1974 refusal to participate in the art world “canonization” of Yves Klein and Piero Manzoni continues to look somewhat tendentious now, even if these particular artists are not currently seen as among the strongest representatives of neo-avant-gardism, which remains a subject of considerable intellectual interest and admiration. That
he would launch such a vigorous attack on neo-avant-gardism only a few years after the one on neofunctionalism is further food for preliminary thought. While it might be thought that his aversion to so many modern architects’ “preoccupation with rational criteria” for the design process would make him an ally of artistic neo-avant-gardism, Rykwert rejected both of these tendencies. It seems to me that an awareness of this complex, dual refusal is an early pointer in the direction of a deeper, fuller reading of his oeuvre.

Let us now turn to the most passionate, and (still today) the most controversial of these polemics: that against the Italian Rationalist architectural movement that came to be known as the Tendenza, as it presented itself at the 1974 Milan Triennale. In this case, Rykwert is least in concurrence with contemporary opinion, since the conception of typology that underpinned Rossi’s characterization of the antique buildings he cited—particularly his provocative argument for a comprehensive, transhistorical disengagement of function from architectural form—continues to be a central component of the broad antifunctionalist theoretical consensus now widely accepted in advanced architectural circles. Just as Rykwert’s early opposition to 1950s “neofunctionalism” does not look at all out of step today, so his opposition to the Tendenza’s antifunctionalist conception of typology most assuredly does. Let us take a closer look at what was at stake in this apparently paradoxical dissent.

There are, after all, several premises of the Rationalist and Rykwertian positions in architecture that are held in common. Like the Rationalists, Rykwert has opposed the long trajectory of architectural theory in the twentieth century that has turned old-fashioned, first-generation modernist “functionalism” first into “operations research” and then eventually into the purely economic “cost-benefit analyses” that typify contemporary development pro-formas. He is equally as dismayed as the Rationalists at the powerful, parallel tendency of much architectural production in recent decades to evolve into a widespread system of consumer-oriented imagery that is increasingly difficult to distinguish from that of advertising. Indeed, if we were to add to this list of concurrences the specific subset of the second tendency, which has seen certain formal approaches to architectural design during this same period appropriated by governments and power elites for explicitly political purposes of institutional representation, then I think we could be said to have summarized a number of the key premises of the Tendenza that would have inclined a more sympathetic observer than Rykwert to have endorsed the provocative statement of Tafuri to which he instead took such dramatic exception. After all, would not many of us read Tafuri’s objection to “the decking of architecture in ideological dress” and his corresponding argument in favor of its “silent and irrelevant purity” as being cogent consequences of the powerful set of premises I have just summarized? And if this is so, then it means that in attempting
to come to a deeper understanding of what was at issue in this particular polemic of Rykwert, we need to move to another plane of the discourse in question.

It seems to me that his key concerns with the project of the Rationalists do not stem so much from their basic intellectual position as from their rhetorical cultural demeanor. For example, Tafuri’s inclination to deliver architectural and political edicts clearly irritated Rykwert—hence his aversion to the Italian’s putative “splendid isolation” and his “proclama­tions.” Deeper still, Rykwert was obviously unable to accept that the Tendenza’s objection to the same dimensions of Enlightenment rationality that troubled him led it to adopt an overall cultural stance of ironical self-reflexivity. He might have been able to go so far as to accept the idea of an architecture that was abstracted from any “redemptive” role, but once it became apparent that one of the consequences of this abstraction was that its purity would be “irrelevant,” then Rykwert was bound to object. As troubled by the architectural self-reflexivity of the Tendenza as he was by the artistic one of Klein and Manzoni, Rykwert balked.

It seems to me also that it was this concern that caused him to refuse to accept Rossi’s characterization of Roman buildings, notwithstanding the widespread influence that characterization has had. It is surely not insignificant that the authority Rykwert chose to cite to buttress his refutation of Rossi was the “the most brilliant interpreter of Roman architecture of recent times” (the American classical scholar Frank E. Brown) or that the citation in question unequivocally eschewed irony and self-reflexivity, insisting instead that the “architecture of the Romans was from first to last, an art of shaping space around ritual.” It is equally interesting in this regard that in pursuing his critique of Rossi’s conception of typology, Rykwert went directly on to amplify the conception of ritual he found so important in the writings of Brown—and the absence of which was so troubling for him in the work of the Tendenza. Surely it is in a Brownian perspective that we are meant to read Rykwert’s impassioned observation on the long acculturation of form over time that sees buildings being “polished . . . as are the pebbles in a stream.” Finally, Rykwert was as troubled by the declamatory representational character of the projects of the Tendenza as he was by the polemical rhetoric of its intellectual promoters—hence, I think, his acute unease with the “rigid arrangement of elementary geometries,” which typified the project of Aldo Rossi for the Modena Cemetery, another focus of the exhibition.

If we look again at the emergent set of temperamental and intellectual aversions that appear thus far to typify the stance of the reviewer of furniture and fashion, we can already see that they begin to form a coherent pattern. Provisionally, I summarize them as follows: undoubtedly opposed to the positivist idea of function as a comprehensive measure of the worth of the things of the world, Rykwert is nevertheless troubled by any idea of the
ultimate “uselessness” of architecture. Deeply committed to the necessity of “referential content” in architecture and design, he is at the same time wary of modalities of discourse that proceed onward from the idea of “reference” toward ironical self-reflexivity, be those discourses either avant-gardist or “rationalist.” Intrigued by the original Duchampian idea that “everything is art,” he is prepared to concur that nothing can be ruled out as potential raw material for art, but he is especially engaged by forms of artistic expression that eschew any preoccupation with the individual artistic signature and are instead “elaborated by centuries of use.”

A significant clue to the development of this distinctive constellation of convictions can be found in the acknowledgments that appear at the beginning of the 1982 collection of Rykwert’s writings, The Necessity of Artifice. The “two most important” of the debts that he considered himself to have incurred in his intellectual career up to that point were “to Rudolf Wittkower and Siegfried Giedion, whose wayward pupil I count myself.” To begin my account of this biographical trajectory, it is appropriate to ponder the intellectual obligation implied by the term “wayward pupil.” There is no doubt that one of the pivotal episodes in Rykwert’s intellectual formation occurred during the early 1950s, in connection with a review of Giedion’s Mechanization Takes Command that he was then preparing for Burlington Magazine. That this is so is evident (among other ways) in the fact that when the 1954 review was reprinted in Rassegna 25 in 1986, it was accompanied by an introductory commentary by Rykwert himself. A part of it reads as follows:

When Mechanization Takes Command first appeared in 1948/9 copies were hard to come by in post-war Great Britain. Benedict Nicolson, editor of the Burlington Magazine . . . obtained a copy, and knowing of my enthusiasm for Giedion’s writing, asked me to review it. . . . I was an untried reviewer, and grateful to Nicolson for the confidence. It seemed to me however, that more than a mere book-review was required: sniping at Giedion had already begun, and hostility to him seemed to me to be based on a misunderstanding of his enterprise. I therefore asked if I could do an assessment of the book in the body of Giedion’s work. Nicolson readily assented. Being young and insecure, I even bothered Giedion himself; in the autumn of 1952 I visited him in Doldertal, handed him my article and asked him to read it.

Giedion demurred, and proposed instead that Rykwert read it aloud, to Giedion as well as to his wife, Carola, who had joined them. Rykwert nervously complied and began to read, coming eventually to a paragraph in which he commented on the distinctive intellectual method that he saw Giedion having employed in his earlier book, Spätbarocker und
Romantischer Klassizismus (1922). Giedion responded to this part of Rykwert’s commentary with particular enthusiasm, since it had the effect, as he remarked at the time, of liberating him from the legacy of his own intellectual mentor, Heinrich Wölfflin. The passage from Rykwert’s review that so gratified Giedion reads as follows:

Spätbarocker und Romantischer Klassizismus was written as a doctoral thesis in Wölfflin’s school, and in it the method of contrasts and of the autonomy of works of art is used, not for the refinement of connoisseurship, but almost as a weapon against itself. Giedion is concerned to demonstrate that Neoclassicism which had hitherto been considered by historians—if at all—as a style, was actually a blanket term to cover two divergent tendencies: the end of the Baroque era, and the first two decades of the Romantic movement. So that in his first work, by following Wölfflin’s method Giedion inverted the achievement of Burckhardt. Where Burckhardt had demonstrated the internal unity of an epoch that had been studied fragmentarily, Giedion demonstrated this internal cleavage in a period which had been accorded an apparent unity.

In amplifying his view of this methodological breakthrough as it appeared in Giedion’s Mechanization, Rykwert argued that it was

achieved, not by conjuring up a string of generalizations from the familiar facts out of the usual text-books, but by a method which existed already in a somewhat more primitive form in Space Time and Architecture; that of fixing an apparently insignificant section of the field (keys and locks, for instance) and demonstrating in the treatment of an entirely fresh case-history the process which, allowing for differences, operates also in the rest of the field: a method which is as different from the scissors-and-paste kind of historical writing as a Picasso collage is from a Victorian scrapbook.10

It would appear evident from Rykwert’s depiction of Giedion’s method, Giedion’s gratified recognition of its identification, and Rykwert’s having chosen, some three decades later, to depict in such considerable detail the episode in which this occurred that a key moment in his intellectual formation had occurred.

I have concluded that such an approach is central also to Rykwert’s own methodology. Moreover, one can even see encapsulated in his commentary on Giedion how his own early career comprised a series of efforts to develop a method of historical interpretation of the things of the world that would be as compelling and as revelatory as Giedion’s had been in its explorations of the “apparently insignificant.”
These early encounters with Giedion’s thought are later paralleled in a 1967 review Rykwert wrote on Giedion’s late, and very controversial, two-volume publication, The Eternal Present (1962, 1964). Here again we find Rykwert noting Giedion’s preoccupation with the “profound changes that were taking place beneath” the surface of neoclassicism and with “the meanings below the surface ornament.” In another passage in the same pair of reviews, we find him focusing on Giedion’s method in Mechanization. According to Rykwert, Giedion succeeded in conceptualizing a historical account of

the furnishings of a room, the mechanical services of a house, and so on; he even follows the transformation in treating seriously the matter of bathing. But to Giedion the compact bathroom is only the atrophied, individual descendant of a great social institution. The Roman and the Islamic baths are perhaps familiar enough; but Giedion dwells on the function of the bath in societies which are both technically primitive and stuck with unfavourable climates, like the Scandinavian and North Russian peasants. He considers the Medieval bath and its relation to Reformation moralizing, its banishment to the well-provided home, its elaboration within a tiny scale through the development of the American hotel, and finally its part in the prefabricated service core.  

Here, surely, we find evidence of an intellectual and methodological lineage that links Rykwert not only to his mentor Giedion, but also to his student Robin Evans. For can we not recognize in Rykwert’s characterization of Giedion’s account of the “atrophied, individual descendant of a great social institution” a striking precursor of Evans’s account of the sad historical emergence of functional zoning and “circulation” in domestic architecture, as he depicted it in his much-admired essay, “Figures, Doors, Passages”—a text viewed until now as an apparently purely Foucauldian one?

Prior to Rykwert’s fateful early encounter with Giedion, his long and wide-ranging intellectual search began when, still a secondary school student, he attended lectures by Rudolf Wittkower on “the Classical Tradition.” Indeed, Wittkower proved to be a durable interest for Rykwert, for when he made a stormy departure from the Architectural Association in London some years later in 1947, he turned instead to two Wittkower seminars at the Warburg Institute—the first on the topography of Rome and the second on Raphael’s Stanze. In retrospect, it would appear that Wittkower provided the young Rykwert with an early realization of the renewed intellectual potential of interpretative procedures in architectural history, even prior to the publication of his precedent breaking Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism in 1949.
But such was Rykwert’s characteristically restless methodological inquisitiveness that the encounter with Wittkower proved to be only one of an ongoing series. By 1949, for example, Rykwert had already met Giedion and soon complemented Wittkower’s distinctive historical approach with Giedion’s much more anthropological one. Yet this still does not complete my account of the wide-ranging intellectual search of the young Rykwert. For example, in the years immediately after the end of World War II, he spent considerable time at the Gower Street premises of the Student Christian Movement (SCM), then a center of intellectual activity for young thinkers who saw themselves as on the left politically but wished to dissociate themselves from a communism that increasingly was intellectually discredited. Rykwert met a number of individuals there who became long-standing friends, among them Elias Canetti. Older than Rykwert, Canetti had already published *Auto da Fé* in the late 1930s and was working at the time on *Crowds and Power*. Other strong influences from the SCM period are the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, the anthropologist Fritz Steiner, and the psychoanalyst Franz Elsik. In response to them, Rykwert not only deepened his already established interest in anthropology but also expanded it to take on that precocious modality of contemporary discourse, psychoanalysis.

A last distinct strain of contemporary thought that came to interest Rykwert was phenomenological philosophy. In 1957–1958 he was an academic visitor to the Hochschule für Gestaltung in Ulm. It was there that he wrote the now well-known essay “The Sitting Position: A Question of Method,” which launched his modern analogy between buildings and the human body. During his stay in Ulm, Rykwert became friends with the philosopher and sociologist Hanno Kesting (besides himself, the only other “nonrationalist” on the faculty at the time). As a result of Kesting’s encouragement, Rykwert extended his reading in this area from Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre, with whose works he already had some familiarity, to Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

As the 1950s were drawing to a close, Rykwert’s intellectual formation thus took on the coloration that is now recognizable as definitive. During those key years, an increased unification of his complex set of interests occurred. In a telling comment, Rykwert has observed that he was provoked by Canetti around this time to read Arnold van Gennep’s *Rites of Passage*, just as Canetti was himself completing the manuscript of *Crowds and Power*. In a sense both deep and broad, this led Rykwert to understand that the distinctive approach he had been seeking could be to read architecture as a field of meaning.

During this period of his mature formation, Rykwert grew increasingly dissatisfied with the tenor of discussion of architecture then proceeding in London. Particularly disturbing to him was “the Picturesque Tradition,” which was being promulgated during those years by a group of writers associated with the *Architectural Review*. Troubled enough by the
shallowness of this tendency as it applied to British subject material, Rykwert was more disturbed when its protagonists took on Italian urban form as a topic. By this time he had become a serious Italophile, and his anthropological interests had provoked him to try to understand the ancient origins of Italian urban form. He had been surprised in this regard to discover that the most up-to-date study on the subject remained Fustel de Coulanges’s *The Ancient City* from 1864.

In 1963 Rykwert’s dissatisfaction with current English discourse coalesced with his growing Italophilia and the maturation of his own intellect. The result was the first version of the now-famous text, “The Idea of a Town,” published that year as a special issue of *Forum*, the Dutch architectural magazine edited by Aldo van Eyck.

Continuing the critique of functionalism that had been at the heart of the essay “Meaning in Building,” “The Idea of a Town” moved the argument to the plane of urbanism. Opposed to the shallow pictorialism of the picturesque tradition, Rykwert sought to identify the fundamental anthropological and psychological underpinnings of all urban form, ancient and contemporary. He noted in his first paragraph:

Very occasionally a new town is created. We are then treated to a display of embarrassment on the part of authority and planners who seem incapable of thinking of the new town as a totality, as a pattern which carries a meaning other than commonplaces of zoning . . . or circulation. To consider it, as the ancients did, a symbolic pattern seems utterly alien and pointless. If we think of anything as “symbolic,” it is of an object or action that can be taken in at a glance.15

Following this polemical opening, Rykwert went on to explore in detail the principles that, as far as he had been able to deduce, had underpinned the overall design of many ancient, and particularly Roman, towns, using as a key part of his evidence documentation from diverse sources on town foundation rituals. Presaging the dispute he was later to have with Tafuri and Rossi, he remarked on the origins of the foundation rite itself:

I am not at all sure that anything so complex and at the same time so hoary and vigorous can be traced back to two or three clearly identifiable sources; it is surely a syncretic phenomenon, made up of bits originating in different parts of the world,—the whole thing growing through many centuries and altering in flavour and emphasis as the context of religious ideas in general changed and developed.16
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The idea of such “a syncretic phenomenon—growing through many centuries and altering in flavour and emphasis” is surely closely related to the image of Roman architecture he framed in 1974 in opposition to Rossi. This conception of the power of cultural forms, so strongly associated with long duration, multiple authorship, and evolitional transformation, had clearly become early on a central part of Rykwert’s distinctive historiography.

The editorial sponsor of the original publication of “The Idea of a Town” was Rykwert’s friend and ally, van Eyck. One of the key figures in the revisionist modernist architectural movement Team Ten, van Eyck was far and away the most intellectual, the most anthropological, the most poetic member of the group. He was also among the earliest of Rykwert’s admirers to sense the potential created by the combination of anthropology and contemporary psychology evinced in his work. Historical anthropology though it may be, “The Idea of a Town” also served as a contemporary rallying cry for van Eyck. In his introduction to the special issue of *Forum*, he noted,

If we, to-day, are unable to read the entire universe and its meaning off our civic institutions as the Romans did—loss or gain—we still need to be at home in it; to interiorize it, refashion it in our own image—each for himself this time. To discover that we are no longer Romans, and yet Romans still is no small thing.17

Commenting on Rykwert’s conclusion, van Eyck saluted the combination of anthropological and psychoanalytic methods of interpretation that had appealed to him so much, and he pointed directly to Rykwert’s recurrent and potent analogy of buildings with persons:

As we read the closing paragraphs, the “ground of certainty” which our time can still neither find nor face—call it shifting centre or lost home—momentarily reveals its whereabouts. “It is no longer likely that we shall find this ground in the world the cosmologists are continuously reshaping round us, and so we must look for it” Rykwert concludes, “inside ourselves, in the constitution and structure of the human person.”18

With the publication of “The Idea of a Town,” Rykwert launched the mature approach that was to typify his entire oeuvre from then on. Indeed, he recently remarked to me that the argument of his more recent work, *The Dancing Column* (1996), is, among other things, a response to the implicit question about cosmology he had posed to himself at the end of the earlier work.
While I will not discuss that text, in timely celebration of which the festschrift in his honor was convened, I will conclude with a series of observations on the two major texts that Rykwert published in the years between: *On Adam's House in Paradise* (1972) and *The First Moderns* (1980). In doing so, I strive to elucidate the ways they manifest the characteristic historiographical methods I have attributed to him thus far.

*On Adam's House in Paradise*, like “The Idea of a Town,” was first published on mainland Europe rather than in Rykwert’s home base, Britain, by a sponsor who was also a personal friend. The place of publication was Milan, and the friend was Roberto Calasso, the editorial director of Adelphi, to whom, together with his wife, *Adam’s House* was dedicated. Even as late as 1972, British intellectuals evidently still did not take Rykwert as seriously as continental ones did. Then too, this Milanese episode is a direct extension of his long relationship with Italy. Even his first encounter with Siegfried Giedion in 1949 had an Italian venue, the Eighth Meeting of the International Congress of Modern Architecture, being held in Bergamo. At this same event, he also made the acquaintance of the young Italian architect who was to become a lifelong friend, Vittorio Gregotti.

Rykwert saw the English architectural scene as typically looking to Scandinavia for inspiration. He looked instead to Italy. Having worked for two years in the London offices of Fry Drew and Partners, and Richard Sheppard, he found himself more interested in the work of Persico and Pagano, Figini and Pollini, Gardella, Albini and BBPR, than he was in that of his London employers and their local contemporaries. Together with John Turner (with whom he had traveled to Bergamo in 1949), he even contemplated in those years a joint project to write a book on modern Italian architecture. So admiring was he of Ernesto Rogers that he even hoped to write for Rogers’s magazine, *Casabella*. He did, in fact, eventually meet Rogers, but despite his admiration and his own journalistic inclinations, he never struck a chord with Rogers sufficiently strong to be invited to write for him. Unexpectedly, he did strike such a chord with Gio Ponti. As a result, he became the correspondent for *Domus*, where his two controversial texts from 1974 and 1975 were published. Rykwert’s interests in Italy and anthropology also led him to spend the summers of 1962 and 1963 working in Rome with Frank E. Brown on his archaeological studies of the Forum. Indeed, it was on one of these trips to Rome that he attended a dinner party that happened to be attended also by Roberto Calasso.

The intellectual bond forged between the revisionist Londoner and the Italian who went on to write *The Ruin of Kasch* (1994) was evidently a powerful one, for clearly, the two shared a number of intellectual inclinations. Among these are a skepticism with regard to the supposed cultural superiority of modernity as a project, as compared with its European historical predecessors, a keen curiosity as to the revelatory potential of comparisons of
historical and literary phenomena from non-European cultures, and a disinclination to privilege any one art form—or, for that matter, any one form of knowledge—over any other.

*On Adam's House in Paradise* begins with a provocative quotation from René Daumal: “In order to return to the source, one is obliged to travel upstream.”¹⁹ Faithfully following this injunction, Rykwert took as his theme the curiously insistent and morally compelling idea of the origin of architecture. He explained first the extent to which such an apparently anachronistic idea has preoccupied some of the most notable of twentieth-century architects and then traced the complex lineage of the idea back through the centuries to antiquity.

Documenting the surprising hold this idea has had on such notable figures as Le Corbusier, Adolf Loos, and Frank Lloyd Wright, Rykwert then demonstrated how each had considered the idea within a frame of reference derived (consciously or not) from debates that had taken place among European historians of the preceding generation, including the German historian and theorist Gottfried Semper and his most assiduous critic, Alois Riegl. Working his way back from Riegl and Semper through the writings of Viollet-le-Duc, Pugin, and Quatremère de Quincy, Rykwert proceeded to an account of a controversial figure of the early nineteenth century, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand, whose thought, he argued, had been framed in conscious opposition to that of Marc-Antoine Laugier. At the beginning of chapter 5, Rykwert arrived at a point where, in his words, “I cannot avoid a discussion of the text which all the writers I have quoted are forced to allude, and which must be regarded as the source of all the later speculations about the primitive hut: that of Vitruvius on the origins of architecture.”²⁰

Following an explanation of the influence of Vitruvian thought on fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italian writers on architecture, especially Alberti, Palladio, and Filarete, Rykwert turned his attention to one of the two profoundly deeply rooted images of the “first building” as it has long been imaged in Western thought. Minimally documented historically but of great importance for cultural thought and religious practice, the “first building” in question was the ancient Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem. Having demonstrated the extraordinary significance of this building for generations of Western clerics, historians, and architects, Rykwert described the intensive efforts made by a group of them between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries to devise a convincing reconstruction of the temple, one that would be compelling both as a project of contemporary archaeology as well as of durable religious conviction. Especially notable among those whose efforts are described are the sixteenth-century Jesuit scholar Juan Bautista Villalpando and the eighteenth-century Austrian architect Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach.
At the end of his “upstream” historical account, Rykwert turned to more anthropological matters. Chapters entitled “The Rites” and “A House for the Soul” make explicit what had been up to that point in his argument only a subtext: the sheer psychological, not to say ontological, urgency of the origin of architecture in Western European thought. It is no wonder then that Ernst Gombrich saw Rykwert in *On Adam’s House in Paradise* as having adopted “the methods of the psychoanalyst.” For all this, Rykwert never saw his project as a Platonic or a transcendental conception. Rather, he observed, “An object which has always been lost cannot—in any ordinary sense of the word—be remembered. The memory of which we speak, however, is not quite of an object but of a state—of something that was; and of something that was done, was made: an action. It is a collective memory kept alive within groups by legends and rituals.”

If Rykwert’s method in *On Adam’s House in Paradise* can be seen as a psychoanalytic and diachronic section through history, then that of his next major text was an equally ambitious, complementary one. *The First Moderns* (1980) seeks to isolate a specific, synchronic layer of the history of ideas, this one being the intellectual and psychological prehistory of what we now think of in the broadest sense as “modernism” in architecture.

The period during which this layer is formed is the eighteenth century. Thus, Rykwert’s account focuses on arguments put forward by a diverse group of writers stretching from Claude Perrault at the end of the seventeenth century to Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand at the beginning of the nineteenth. And as his account makes clear, the psychological anxiety about architecture that first manifests itself during those years still marks the substratum of what we think today.

Rykwert returned to a theme Giedion had explored in his *Spätbarocker und Romantischer Klassismus* and began with an etymological account of the differences between the terms classic and neoclassic in accepted architectural history, quickly making it clear once again how labile the term neoclassic really is as a means of description and analysis. Indeed, reading *The First Moderns* as a coded account of the dilemmas concerning thoughtful architects today, in attempting to re theorize their praxis, one cannot help but see it as a Giedionesque effort to bring the unacknowledged subconscious of contemporary theory in architecture directly to the forefront of conscious understanding.

Rykwert used the project of reconstruction of the Temple of Solomon, one of the key themes of *On Adam’s House in Paradise*, again in *The First Moderns* to launch a commentary on the complex series of disorienting revisionisms that typify the theory of architecture in the century and a half to follow. He cited the work of Fréart de Chambray, but only to set the stage for the revolutionary ideas of Claude Perrault, who, in his influential translations of Vitruvius of 1674 and 1684 and his *Ordonnance de cinq espèces de colonnes* of 1683,
laid down challenges to European architects that haunt them still. Arguing that ancient precedent was no longer a sufficient guide for contemporary practice, Perrault put forward two new categories of “beauty,” characterized as “positive” on the one hand and “arbitrary” on the other. Rykwert then used the disorientation caused by Perrault’s intervention to characterize the anxious quest for a new ground of architectural certainty by some, and the frivolous but equally anxious play engaged in by others, in a series of episodes of style, theory, and polemic in architecture that typify the century and a half to follow.

The particular, relativist, and playful “orientalist” episode of chinoiserie is tabled, only to be set against an anxious new quest for a so-called universal architecture. But this effort at an ontological reconstruction is challenged in its turn by experiments described under the rubric of the “pleasures of freedom,” including work of the painter François Boucher and, especially, the architects Juste-Aurèle Meissonier in France and Vanbrugh and Hawksmoor in England. Finally, the last stage of these parallel eighteenth-century trajectories is what Rykwert calls a “return to earnestness,” typified in France by Servandoni’s project for St. Sulpice and in Britain by the later eighteenth-century work of the new “Palladians,” Colen Campbell and William Kent.

And if this oscillation is not disorienting enough, it is followed by a pragmatic new philistinism at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the vastly influential work of Durand. Although Rykwert shows this to be a decisive conclusion to the vast synchronic portrayal of anxiety of the eighteenth century, Durand’s new instrumentality is nonetheless not permitted to have the last word. In his conclusion, Rykwert takes considerable pains to refute it:

Seen from the vantage point of the 1970’s and 1980’s, Durand’s positive dismissal of the problems which engaged and worried seventeenth- and eighteenth-century architects does not seem quite final. The nature of our responses to the world of artifacts, the way in which groups and communities appropriate space, occupies sociologists and anthropologists, and we acknowledge these human scientists as important and wholly serious people. Yet their studies are, in the last reduction, almost inevitably about problems of form. . . .

Perhaps, if there is a place for the architect’s work within a future social fabric, he will have to learn how to deal with such problems again.23

I will not here propose any analysis of The Dancing Column, but will instead essay a few provisional conclusions with respect to the intellectual influences that I see as contributing
seminally to his intellectual formation, as well as to the structure of his typical methods, as I have been able to identify them.

Rykwert began with an intense interest in the new potentials of historical analysis in architecture as they were pioneered by Rudolf Wittkower in the late 1940s, and then went on to complement this interest with equally intense ones in the potentials of anthropology, archaeology, psychoanalysis, and phenomenological philosophy. It seems to me that it is in a complex hybrid of archaeology and psychoanalysis that we can delineate most aptly an image of the method that he was eventually able to formulate for himself, on the model of the one of Siegfried Giedion that he admired. These two disciplines have in common a method that always looks below the ostensible surface of things in an attempt to derive significance from that which lies beneath. What is more, both archaeology and psychoanalysis share with anthropology a manifest interest only in an indirect relationship of cultural production to individual authorship.

It may by now go without saying that Rykwert shares in a generally understood episteme of our era that I call Foucauldian. That is, like most of his contemporaries, he has lost confidence in the efficacy or legitimacy of grand intellectual systems or systematic social or historical projects. By the same token, he is of a generation that abandoned teleological notions of progress in history and has particularly eschewed any interest in the once apparently potent forms of instrumentality in human affairs.

All this having been said, Rykwert’s oeuvre, given the formulation of his characteristic method described above, has nevertheless been deeply marked by his conviction as to the power of the subconscious in history—in some respects, even of a subconscious that in some sense is collective. What is more, there is no doubt that he is also convinced of the powerful cause-and-effect relationship produced by that subconscious in the broad playing out of human events across time.

Thus, although his view of the sheer stuff of history is neither teleological nor deterministic, I think he sees it as possessing an apparently intractable density and thickness that commands the sustained attention and curiosity of the engaged intellectual. Indeed, I would be inclined to argue that it has been his lifelong intellectual project to employ the distinctive analytic methods he has devised, to bring to the conscious awareness of his contemporaries, the implications and potential consequences of the assumptions lying within the beliefs, social forms, and artifacts that form their horizon of existence, however individualized or however collective those forms may at first seem to be.

What is more, it seems to me clear that he sees those beliefs and forms as themselves being the product of a complex formation, as he put it, “altering in flavour and emphasis as the context of . . . ideas changed” and “polished by [centuries of use] as [are] the pebbles
in a stream.” Given this, and given the relatively modest roles particular individuals in history will have been able to play in their evolution, we may understand that the techniques of interpretation required to elucidate their significance will require a Rykwertian ellipsis. But this having been said, it will also be true that while not straightforward, such techniques will surely also be neither self-reflexive nor ironical.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the tasks his methods have been formulated to address, it surely remains a matter for admiration that Rykwert continues to hold such high hopes for the project of architectural design in human affairs. Indeed, it can be said that he sees the relationship of interpreting to designing to be not only possible but even ontologically urgent. If, for Rykwert, it remains as true as it ever was that the project of architecture is to create a “house for the soul,” then his intriguingly McLuanesque sympathy for the avant-garde conviction that “everything is art” (for him, it is admittedly only potentially so) comes to be understandable. For, in these terms, it is surely impossible ever to be able to determine in advance what the limits of any tectonic accommodation of the “soul” might be. Hence his keen curiosity in regard to the range of manifestations of creative activity extant in the world, furniture and fashion among them.

If this effort at a provisional delineation of Rykwert’s historiography has succeeded in some measure, then it seems to me also that it can explain the absence of an obviously Rykwertian school in contemporary architecture or history. After all, the central analytic focus of his research is (speaking almost archaeologically) several levels below the operative layer within which most cultural and, even more particularly, design praxes have been promulgated by such contemporaries as Hejduk and Rowe. Indeed, Rykwert’s distinct, intense, long-standing engagement with the long acculturation of architectural forms, coupled with his decidedly lesser curiosity with respect to the signature of the individual designer, make it clear that such readily visible praxes would not have been an appropriate result of his methodology in any event. It seems to me instead that the Rykwertian school will surely lie for some indeterminate period of time largely operationally invisible, obscured in that very phenomenological thickness of history that I have called the central focus of his personal historiographical project. Only at some future historical moment will its effects be able to be clearly discerned.

In the end, it is for me the intensity of Rykwert’s engagement with the sheer phenomenological thickness and historical embeddedness of reality that is so exhilarating. How astute it is of his Italian colleague Gregotti, at the end of this book, to label him “an anthropologist of architectural history.” There is no doubt that Rykwert’s own oeuvre, like so many of the complex historical phenomena that have been the subject of his interpretative projects over the years, indeed constitutes “a promise as well as a memory.”
**Introduction to the Chapters**

The chapters in this book, written and compiled in honor of Rykwert, can be organized into three broad groups. The first three focus on embodiment and on revisionist readings of architectural and other artifacts from the ancient world. These are followed by a group that looks at a series of cultural products across Europe between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries: paintings, buildings, sculpture, fortifications, and texts. The last group studies a wide series of contemporary phenomena, both social and cultural.

In “The Architectonics of Embodiment,” Dalibor Vesely reviews concepts of the body in pre-Platonic philosophy, before giving an account of that philosopher’s own reading as a “process of ordering.” He demurs at Vitruvius’s characterization, arguing that the primary tradition of the body (and for that matter of “embodiment” itself) has not been a Vitruvian one. This leads him to a phenomenological and a hermeneutic characterization: “Together they suggest a fusion of horizons in which the nature of the human body, and its relation to architecture and to the rest of reality, changes into one of embodiment and its structure.” Reviewing a series of interpretations of both the body and proportion, Vesely argues that even proportion must be seen as a “deeper level of articulation of the world as a whole.”

In “Greek Temple and Greek Brain,” John Onians develops a hypothesis regarding the manner of looking at temples, which for him must have been operative in the ancient world. Developing his argument in considerable detail, Onians makes a case that contemporaries would have been likely to see Greek temples as, among other things, phalanxes of warriors. Pursuing his hypothesis, he argues that the Doric temple would be read as a phalanx of land-based warriors and the Ionic as a naval one.

Mark Wilson Jones begins “Doric Figuration” by citing a turn-of-the-century observation of Otto Wagner to the effect that architectural forms always arise from constructional considerations. He then seeks to refute this claim definitively in arguing that ritual, as formulated by Rykwert, is actually a far more powerful generator of form than construction. To demonstrate this, Wilson Jones pursues an argument regarding the characteristic triglyph of the frieze of the Doric temple. Downplaying other scholars’ “constructional” readings of its formation, Wilson Jones proposes instead that it can be seen as derived from the form of the tripod cauldron, so central to many ancient religious rituals.

In the first of the second group of essays, Robert Tavernor undertakes a close reading of Piero della Francesca’s painting *The Flagellation of Christ*. Arguing for its status as a definitive representation of bodily perfection, he explains how the construction of the space of the painting is a complex hybrid of emergent systems of proportion and perspective. He concludes that Piero’s methods have the effect of creating a figure equally Christian and
In her “Figural Ornament in Italian Renaissance Architecture,” Alina Payne begins by speculating on the surprising fact that the sculptural program of architecture in Renaissance Italy is nowhere theorized in contemporary treatises. Nor, she observes, is it much interpreted in modern scholarship. Attributing this last fact to modernist art historical biases against ornament, she then sets herself the task of retrospectively theorizing this extensive Renaissance practice. Simon Pepper follows Payne with an account of a series of commentaries on fortifications and the treatises to which they relate, from Francesco di Giorgio Martini to Filarete. Showing how the image of the human body suffused even the most militaristic of architectural and urban forms during this period, Pepper accounts for a range of examples throughout the Mediterranean, including the Ottoman Empire.

Harry Mallgrave and then Vaughan Hart move the discussion from southern to northern Europe and Britain. Tracing the gradual influence of Italian precedent through Germany and the Low Countries, Mallgrave shows how the strong, extant cultural context of the Gothic in which artists like Vredeman de Vries, Dieterlin, and even Rubens were working, together with the significantly lesser commitment to fastidious correctness operative in northern Europe, led to a robust corporeality in their paintings, engravings, and buildings that often surpasses the work of the southerners they ostensibly emulate. Hart takes up the topic of the “Stuart Legal Body,” in Britain in the seventeenth century, showing how, in Inigo Jones’s Banqueting Hall, a quite explicit analogy was drawn between the “column” and the perfect body of the king. Hart proposes that one of the purposes of this corporealism was to reinforce royal power in a period of political instability.

Karsten Harries then contemplates a theme prompted by his personal experience of the Roman Pantheon. He begins by citing observations of Vitruvius that associate human verticality with the “starry firmament”—and, by implication, horizontality with sleep or death. Harries states, “The Roman Pantheon, whose one great eye opens its body to the starry firmament, invites interpretation as an attempt to raise this Vitruvian insight into the verticality of human beings to the level of great architecture.” He qualifies the status of “sublime” verticality in a commentary on a series of later projects. First is a group of directly related utopian proposals by Ledoux, Vaudoyer, and Boullée. A more elliptically related group includes ones by van Doesburg and Le Corbusier. In all of these cases, he sees the ambition of the designers to deny gravity, and thus to privilege the sublime over more intimate, corporeal human considerations. In the end, Harries argues the necessity to join the vertical—the sublime—with the horizontal—the earthbound.

In the concluding essay in this section, Alberto Pérez-Gómez takes up the topic of Charles-Etienne Briseux, the late eighteenth-century architectural theorist who sought to employ the musical theories of his contemporary and friend Jean-Philippe Rameau to
refute the influential arguments of Claude Perrault. Pérez-Gómez makes the argument that in seeking to refute the problematic relativism of Perrault’s construction of “positive” and “arbitrary” beauty in architecture, Briseux nonetheless participates in a further instrumentalization of architectural theory.

The final series of chapters deals with a broad range of contemporary topics. Richard Sennett’s “The Foreigner” begins with a short account of the poles of home and exile in Oedipus Rex and of the two “scars” that make up Oedipus’s psyche. Having set the stage, Sennett gives an account of the rise of nativism as a newly aggressive self-declaration on the part of numerous social groups in the romantic era in Europe, after 1848. He concludes by radically qualifying the claims of nativism, using as his exemplars the two nineteenth-century figures of Edouard Manet, the painter, and Alexander Herzen, the writer. He ascribes to them both a subtle dialectical stance that balances exile carefully against the freedom that is its unanticipated reward.

Neil Leach follows Sennett with a companion argument to Tavernor’s. Here, instead of the conflation of Vitruvian and Christian motifs in painting, we see the appropriation of the image of the ideal Vitruvian man into that of Christ crucified. Leach extends the theoretical reach of his text to explore a post-Freudian, and then a poststructuralist, set of themes focusing on the death instinct. Offering a culturally affirmative reading of the myth of Narcissus, Leach suggests that even narcissism can in part be read as a process of identification with the other that leads to the creation of beauty. In her chapter on the insufficiently discussed Bauhaus teacher Oskar Schlemmer, Marcia F. Feuerstein takes up Rykwert’s famous characterization of the “dark side” of that now canonical institution. Opposing Schlemmer both to Walter Gropius’s and Herbert Bayer’s “rationalism” and to Johannes Itten’s “mysticism,” Feuerstein makes a case for the cogency of Schlemmer’s distinctive hybrid of costume theory and body type. She argues that his position was a bold plea for “openness, incompleteness and playfulness.”

George Dodds undertakes a very close reading of Carlo Scarpa’s Brion Cemetery to make manifest two themes in that project. First is what he sees as a powerful corporeality, especially as focused on the female body, and second is a structured orchestration of visibility of particular long landscape views. Both these themes, Dodds argues, can be tracked in Scarpa’s own sustained personal interpretation of paintings of the school of Venice over several centuries. Marco Frascari follows Dodds with an account of the employment of the body image in the design method of the Italian architect Valeriano Pastor, a student and protégé of Scarpa. Employing a series of Pastor’s own architectural drawings, Frascari argues the possibility of demonstrating a transmissible method for the incorporation of the body image in contemporary architectural projects.
David Leatherbarrow begins his account, “Sitting in the City, or The Body in the World,” with a critical comparison of Frank Lloyd Wright’s and Adolf Loos’s respective ideas of the appropriate role of the domestic interior in architecture. Having readily set Loos’s well-known critique of the Gesamtkunstwerk—the total artwork—against Wright’s more favorable position, Leatherbarrow explores the ideas of two less well-known polemists on this topic, Josef Frank and Rudolf Schindler, an exploration rendered more intriguing still by the facts of Schindler’s own Viennese background, as well as his early collaborations with Wright himself. In his account of Frank’s and Schindler’s subtly modulated contributions to this discourse, Leatherbarrow amplifies an unexpected perspective of the body in the world.

William Braham and Paul Emmons address the topic of posture in relation to two highly rhetorical examples of gymnasias: John Russell Pope’s 1932 Payne Whitney Gymnasium at Yale University and the ubiquitous contemporary phenomenon of the Bally Fitness Centre. They set their argument in a sharply contemporary context by juxtaposing it to the ambition manifested by such contemporary figures as Greg Lynn to use the computer literally to “animate” an architecture bodily in a fashion not hitherto possible. Kenneth Frampton concludes this group of chapters with an account of the theme of corporeality in the work of Tadao Ando. Frampton notes the extent to which Ando attempts to emphasize bodily, as opposed to semantic meanings in architecture, as well as the extent to which the Corbusian promenade architecturale is reinterpreted as ritual in that work. Finally, Frampton strongly endorses Ando’s expressed conviction that architecture today needs to be appropriated in a less visual and much more tactile manner.

The book concludes with a tribute to Rykwert by his colleague of long standing, Vittorio Gregotti, who so insightfully named the figure in whose honor these essays have been prepared “an anthropologist of architectural history.” I think it is clear from my account of Rykwert’s intellectual formation how widely beyond architecture his own intellectual interests have ranged. It is a fitting form of tribute back to him, that his influence and inspiration have provoked such a diverse range of intellectual explorations as the chapters in this book.