## Index

A	alternative explanation for,
ABM Treaty of 1972, 130, 141, 172,	129–139
177	external factors and, 129-130
modifications, 104, 199	skeptical explanations for,
mutual deterrence and, 202	111–129
U.S. withdrawal, 183	U.S. commitment to, 128
Active operations capabilities, 3-6,	Arms control policy, Chinese, 12
3n, 5f	after January 1999, 172
Agreement on Producing New Weapons and Military Technical Equipment	position, supporting documents for, 173–174
and Building Comprehensive Nuclear Industry in China, 56	post-CTBT until March 1999, 172
Aircraft, nuclear capable, 39–40, 61, 80	B
Aldridge, E.C. "Pete," 157	Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 29–30, 34
Alert operations, 164–169	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Algeria, 104	(BMDO). See Missile Defense
"Always/never dilemma," 8	Agency
Amorim, Celso, 106	Ballistic missiles. See also specific types of ballistic missiles
Andropov Solution, 159	Chinese, 62, 65, 128
Anthropomorphism, 113	development of, 195, 196
Antisatellite	first generation, 92
Chinese, 128, 159-165, 168, 187	number of, 197
countermeasures, 159-163	<i>'</i>
direct-ascent weapons, 162, 163	production of, 78, 188
Anti-submarine warfare, 35	size and quality of forces, 29
Armageddon Syndrome, 4	solid-fueled, 131–132, 156, 197
Arms control agreements, 130, 197.	vulnerability of, 81
See also specific arms control agree- ments	deployments
Arms control negotiations	protective tunneling for, 34
adaptation vs. learning debate,	during 1990s, 73
112–113, 124–125	deterrent balance and, 13
agenda, 14-16, 204	enhanced targeting of, 157
Chinese participation in, 22, 87,	land-based, 80
109–110, 171	laser programs, Chinese, 161

 $\mathbf{C}$ Ballistic missiles (cont.) launches, accidental, 164-165 Casualties, deterrence effect and, 4n-5nlaunch orders, content of, 38 CAV (common aero vehicle), launch vehicles, 34, 188 148-149 long-range, 65 CD. See Conference on Disarmament mating with thermonuclear device, CD/579 (China's Basic Position on 62,63 the Prevention of an Arms Race in medium-range, 65 Outer Space), 173-176, 181 mobile, 47, 85, 131-132 CD/1606 (China's Position on and prioritization, 59 Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race silo-based, 67 (See also CSS-3; in Outer Space at the Conference on CSS-4) Disarmament), 173, 176-178 solid-fueled, 65, 67, 69, 131-132, CD/1645 (Possible Elements of the 156, 197 (See also CSS-5; CSS-Future International Legal Instru-NX-3; CSS-X-10) ment on the Prevention of tactical, 80 Weaponization of Outer Space), 173, 176-178, 181 test monitoring, 20 CD/1679 (Possible Elements of the tests, 34 Future International Legal Agreewarheads for, 65 ment on the Prevention of the Basing modes, 32-33, 67, 68, 78, 83 Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space), 173, 178-182 Bei Dou satellite system, 43n Central Committee, 58–59, 92, 167, Biden, Joseph, 144-145 195, 198 Biographies of the Founders of the Central Military Commission, 25, 29, Nuclear, Missile, and Satellite Program (Yuanxunzhuan), 21, 55, 72 36, 44, 67–68, 167 BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense solid-propellant ballistic missiles Organization). See Missile Defense and, 72-73 Agency strategic intentions of, 76 Bolton, John, 107 Certification, of first thermonuclear Britain. See United Kingdom weapons, 64 Bundy, McGeorge, 4, 7, 11–12 China Bush, George W., 183, 203-204 assessment of U.S. nuclear arsenal, 12 - 13CTBT and, 128-129 attitudes toward U.S. nuclear FMCT and, 106, 107 threats, 13 missile defenses and, 145-147 border crisis with Soviet Union Moscow Treaty and, 143 (See Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969) civil-military relations in, 14n confidence in small deterrent force, 13 - 14

cooperative agreements with Soviet Union, 56 defense investments, 2 defensive measures against nuclear attack, 13 diplomatic initiatives, 2 early warning assets, 42-43 economic development, nuclear weapons development and, 65 first nuclear device, 61 Five Year Economic Plan (1981-1985), 69 industrial capacity, 50-51 intercontinental ballistic missile, 17 major defense project of 1995, 74 military strategy of, 25 modernization plan proposal, national economic development, national security issues, 136, 137 network of C2 facilities, 37 nuclear counterattacking capability, 25, 26, 29, 52 nuclear declaratory policy, 60 nuclear policy of, 16 nuclear strategic theory of, 53, 75 nuclear weapons and arms control policy, 2 peaceful nuclear explosions and, 97,99 policy statements, 3 purpose of nuclear arsenal, 26 reputation/image of, 113 CTBT and, 114, 116, 120 FMCT and, 121, 123, 124, retaliatory nuclear counterstrike, 25

retaliatory operational doctrine, 1, 41-46,57retaliatory capability, 142 Second Artillery or strategic rocket forces, 14*n*, 15 security concerns, 152–154 security policy, 90, 125-126 support for zero-yield test ban, 98 tactical nuclear forces, absence of, 1 third front campaign, 83 tracking sites, 160 "war preparations campaign" of 1969, 67 China Builds the Bomb (Lewis & Xue), 55 China's Basic Position on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (CD/579), 173, 174-176, 181 China's National Defense (2000), 25, 26, 29, 36, 41 China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1606), 173, 176-178 China's Strategic Seapower (Lewis & Xue), 55 China Today: Defense, Science and Technology, 21, 55, 62-64, 93-94 China Today: Nuclear Industry, 20-21, 55, 71-72 Chinese Air Force, 39–40 Chinese Communist Party, 14, 15n, 22-23, 26, 92. See also Central Committee Chinese declaratory policy, 2 Chinese defense modernization, 19 Chinese leadership. See also specific

Chinese leaders

Chinese leadership (cont.)	realpolitik worldview, 111-112,
alert operations and, 166	129
arms control preference, 187-188	resource focus in 1980s, 80–81
attitudes toward nuclear weapons, 109–110	response to U.S. nuclear posture changes, 125, 152–164
balance of military capabilities and,	1964 statement, 60-61
111	strategic decisions
ballistic missile concerns, 40, 72	assessment of, 195–199
communication with national nuclear forces, 37	implications for U.S. policy, 200–206
confidence of, 79	susceptibility to international pres-
consistency of nuclear doctrine	sure, 113, 120, 123–124
and, 81–82	threat perceptions and, 70
control over nuclear forces, 81	U.S. intelligence community
countermeasures and, 49–50	assessment of, 31–32
decision-making, 20	Chinese Military Power, 32–38, 44, 46, 51, 163
deterrent balance issue, 79–80, 112, 116, 142	Chinese National Defense University, 11, 21
insensitivity to change, 137, 187	Chinese nuclear and ballistic missile programs, 19
loss of confidence in, 201-202	Soviet assistance, 56
stability of balance, 130	withdrawal of Soviet assistance, 58,
disarmament campaigns and, 130–131	61, 88, 104, 195
divisions in, 58	Chinese nuclear arsenal
first generation, 57	capabilities of, 59–60
intent to "ride out" nuclear attacks, 42–43	configuration (See Chinese nuclear posture)
interest in survivability of forces,	countermeasure programs, 49–50, 153–155, 159–160
military officials, 13	defensive operational doctrine, 75, 76–77
no-first-use nuclear strategy, 132	deployments, 18, 28, 39-41, 45
nuclear testing issue and, 63–64, 117, 131–132	restrictions on, 177
policy of, 22	U.S. estimates of, 201
position on weaponization of	design principles, 75–85
space, 174–182	efficacy of, 78–81
proposals on preventing	estimates, unclassified, 19
weaponization of space, 183–192	limited testing and, 118

modernization, 114–115, 122, 125, 143	in 1986, 197
CTBT constraints on, 115	in 1994, 96
deterrence and, 201	completion of, 95 continuation in 1995, 98
external constraints, 126–127	
intelligence community esti- mates of, 49–50	extremely-low-yield, 119 first, 60
internal factors, 126–127	high-yield, 91, 94
Soviet Union threat and,	hydronuclear, 97, 119
153–154	low-yield, 91, 94, 119
sufficiency of, 153-154	of missile armed with live war- head, 63–64
U.S. strategic policy and, 153	status of, 21–22
operational doctrine, 194	subcritical, 119
parity with U.S., 144-145	very-low-yield, 119
pre-launch exposure for launch sequence, 39, 42	Chinese nuclear policy, 1–2, 23, 126–127
purpose of, 19, 145	bilateral to multilateral shift,
quality estimates, 29	183–184
retaliation capability, 19, 68	consistency of, 85
safety/security of, 38-39, 81	in 1970s, 66
size, 108, 158, 200, 201	Chinese nuclear posture, 52, 167,
counterforce missions and, 42	194, 195, 200
estimates of, 26–28, 27 n, 29	Chinese nuclear strategy, 57
expansion, 136	Chinese operational practices, 200
fissile material stockpiles and,	Chinese strategic forces, 1, 2, 52
103, 115, 122, 127	alert operations, 164-166
numerical parity with U.S.,	capabilities of, 16
survivability and, 77–78	capability of, 16
solid-fueled ballistic missiles, 19	command and control arrange-
survivability of, 83	ments, 36–39
tasks for retaliatory strike, 42	continuity over time, 81–82 current, 25–52
tests, 59, 61	deployments, 10–12, 39–41, 195,
unauthorized nuclear launch, 206	196
vulnerability of, 83-84	by 2015, 47, 48, 49
weapons tests, 41, 89–90, 93, 114–115	from 1955–1966, 55–64
	from 1967–1981, 55, 64–68
from 1982–1996, 90–92	estimates of, 29–31

Chinese strategic forces, deployments	Limited Test Ban Treaty, 194
(cont.)	National Missile Defense Act, 176
exaggeration of, 20	Cohen, William, 104, 138, 172, 176,
first generation ballistic missiles, 92	199
	Cold War, 132
future projections, 50, 51	alerts, 8, 164, 165
historical pattern of, 1, 2, 10–11, 20, 52–85, 142	U.S. operational practices, 16, 17
of nuclear warheads, 115–116	Command and control, Chinese, 166
organizational bias, 82–84	Common aero vehicle (CAV),
projections for 1984–1994, 69	148–149
in 1990s, 77	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 21, 87–88
since 1981, 55, 69–75	Chinese participation, 89, 108,
of "tactical" nuclear weapons,	111
40n	completion by 1996 and, 94–96, 116
development process, 162–163	conclusion of testing "no later
evolution of, 55–75	than 1996," 95–96,
first generation, 1967–1981, 64–68	116–117, 128–129
future capabilities, 46	international pressure and, 120 123–124, 134
historical development of, 53–54, $54f$	military force constraint from,
modernization proposal, 46-52	motives for, 139
purpose of, 75	national security interests and,
rationale for, 196	134
second generation, after 1981, 68–75	nonproliferation rationale, 132, 134–135
size of, 75	reassurance, signal of, 189
survivability of, 78–79, 115	reputation/image and, 113,
technological requirements,	114, 116, 120
changes in, 80	signing, 114, 128, 132,
Christopher, Warren, 102, 189	134–135
Churchill, Winston, 7	support for, 22
Clinton, Bill, 183, 205	treaty-killing proposals, 97, 98
ABM Treaty and, 199	views on testing, 131–132
C1 architecture proposal, 146-147	entry-into-force, 97–99
CTBT and, 100-102	Executive Council, 100
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and, 104, 106, 107	International Monitoring System data, 135

international satellite monitoring	1999 negotiations, 105-106
and, 97	2000 negotiations, 106
June 28 draft, 99–100	2001 negotiations, 106-107
negative security assurances, 97, 176	2003 negotiations, 107
1994 negotiations, 97	"non-papers," 173
1995 negotiations, 98	Persiani and, 107
1996 negotiations, 98–99, 102,	progress, lack of, 203
116	U.S. participation, 123
nuclear weapons development,	working papers, 173-183
131–133	"Contract with America," 198–199
on-site inspection issue, 99–101, 116, 118–120, 134–135	Council on Foreign Relations, 109–110
peaceful nuclear explosions and, 97	Counterforce strategy, 151-152
political significance of, 132-134	Counter-value targeting, 42
ratification, 99	Cox Report of 1999, 162, 184
signing of, 109, 194, 198	CSS-1 (DF-2) missiles, 63, 65, 66,
strategic issues, 203	68, 81
U.S. rejection of, 133-134	CSS-2 (DF-3) missiles, 31, 33, 90
verification issue, 117-118	alert operations, 167
Conference on Disarmament (CD),	deployments, 30, 66, 68, 71
21–22, 87–102	development of, 65
Amorim formula, 106	launchers, 34
Chinese participation, 2, 87,	modification program, 69
89–90, 93–102	prelaunch exposure, 68
ad hoc committee demand, 105–106, 128, 171–172, 197	projections for future Chinese mis sile threats, 51 <i>t</i>
	reentry vehicle, 33
anticipation of test ban negotiations, 93	replacement by CSS-5, 34-35, 68
Jiang Zemin address, 138,	tests, 65
183–184	CSS-3 (DF-4) missiles
PAROS and, 199	basing mode, 67, 68, 83
research mandate, 107	in China, 30t, 31, 32, 33, 47
CTBT negotiations (See Compre-	deployment, 67, 68, 69, 70, 78
hensive Nuclear Test Ban	development of, 65-66, 67
Treaty)	projections for future Chinese mis
Dembri formula, 105–106	sile threats, 51
FMCT negotiations ( <i>See</i> Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty)	range of, 66, 80
material Cut-off Treaty)	reentry vehicle, 33

CSS-4 (DF-5) missiles, 31, 32, 48, 64, 80, 165	CSS-X-10 (DF-31/JL-2) missiles, 157, 165, 167
airframes, 188	deployment, 30, 47-48, 52
basing mode, 68, 83	development, 197, 200
deployment, 8, 30, 67-70, 81	flight testing program, 73
development, 65-67	follow-on extended range versions,
flight-testing program, 66	48
in modernization proposal, 48-49,	full yield of, 95
49 <i>n</i> number, from 1994–1998, 73	in modernization proposal, 48–49, 49 <i>n</i>
penetration aids, 155	smart dispenser, 32n-33n
projections for future Chinese missile threats, 51	testing of, 34, 35–36, 71–73, 94–95
upgrades, 32, 73–74, 200–201	warhead, 34, 94-95
CSS-5 (DF-21) missiles, 30, 31, 46	CTBT. See Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
alert operations, 167	Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, 7, 11,
basing mode, 67, 84	81, 164, 165, 168
conventional payloads, 77	Cultural Revolution, 62, 64, 65, 67,
deployment, 71	81, 82
emphasis on, 70, 80, 83	D
launchers, 34 Mod 1, 33–34	Declassification, 19
Mod 1, 35–34 Mod 2, 34	DEFCON (U.S Defense Condition system), 164, 165
penetration aids, 155	Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
replacement of CSS-2, 34-35	39–41, 45–46, 65, 69
testing, 34, 71–72	Defense Science and Technology
warheads, 71, 77	Commission (DSTC), 68, 83
yield, 34	Defense Science Board, 8, 151, 154,
CSS-NX-3 (JL-1) missiles, 30, 33, 68,	156, 157, 169 The Delicate Palance of Towner
80	The Delicate Balance of Terror (Wohlstetter), 13
deployment, 47–48, 69, 71, 83	Delivery vehicles, 3
penetration aids, 155	Chinese, 26–36
problems with, 35	long-range, 62
range limitation, 84	Dembri, Mohamed-Salah, 105–106
research, 67	Deng Jiaxian, 92–94, 114, 131–132
testing, 70–72	Delig Jiaxiali, 92–94, 114, 131–132
warheads, 77	Deng Xiaoping, 70, 82, 90

Department of Defense (DoD), 201	modernization plan, 17-18
Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 29 Chinese plutonium stockpile estimates, 103	mutual, 202
	on-site inspections and, 118-119
	quality of, 9–10
	secure vs. accidental war preven-
2005 deployment deadline, 147	tion, 8
2002 estimate of Chinese ICBMs, 49	sensitivity to technical balance, 9–10, 129–130
estimates Chinese deployed weapons, 28	from small nuclear arsenals, 12 ( <i>See also</i> "Minimum means of reprisal")
Deterrence, 1-2, 4, 196-197, 200	stability, Chinese confidence in,
under asymmetric conditions, 150–152	139
balance	sufficiency of Chinese forces for, 2–3
ballistic missiles and, 13	technical balance and, 6-7
capabilities balance and,	two schools of thought on, 7-8
129–130	U.S. nuclear weapons testing and, 92
insensitivity, 53 nuclear testing and, 137	,
robust character, confidence in,	vs. accidental war prevention, 8 DF-2 missiles. See CSS-1 (DF-2)
13	missiles
beyond minimal retaliatory capability, 4	DF-3 missiles. See CSS-2 (DF-3) missiles
Chinese	DF-4 missiles. See CSS-3 (DF-4)
in 1994, 84	missiles
modernization and, 201	DF-5 missiles. See CSS-4 (DF-5) missiles
retaliatory nature of, 77 in 1970s, 84	DF-21 missiles. See CSS-5 (DF-21) missiles
costs of, 5–6, 14	DF-31 missiles. See CSS-X-10
enhanced, 150-152	(DF-31) missiles
"enough," 3–10	DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), 39–41, 45–46, 65, 69
escalation of, 4	Digital microwave communication
extended, 4	systems, 37–38
from first deployment, 7 insensitivity, Chinese confidence in, 13–14, 20	DSTC (Defense Science and Technology Commission), 68, 83
limited nuclear, 126–128	"Dual-use" technology, 191
loss of confidence in, 201–202	
,	

E	U.S. support for, 107, 128, 136–137
Economic factors	verification procedures, 122
in Chinese security policy in mid- 1980s, 90	Fissile materials
minimization of burdens, 14	highly enriched uranium, 103
Egypt, 104	plutonium (See Plutonium)
Eight Year Plan for the Development of Rocket Technology, 65	production
Environmental sensing devices	Chinese, 58, 102–103, 127, 136
(ESDs), 38	treaties and, 131
Escalation, 4, 17, 164–165, 168 Espionage, 115, 189	stockpiles ( <i>See</i> Stockpiles, fissile materials)
Expenditures, Chinese	uranium, 58, 61, 64, 103
on ballistic missile deployment, 78	"596 <u>,</u> " 61
for strategic programs, 58	France, 16, 78, 98, 117
Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS), 190	G
	Gang of Four, 64, 81
F False alarms, 5	General Staff Department command center, 37
Feaver, Peter, 8	Gorbachev, Mikhail, 90, 112
Feith, Douglas, 193	Gray, Colin, 4
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty	Gray, Robert, 106
(FMCT), 87, 102–107 advocate view, 131	Great Leap Forward campaign (1958–1960), 58
Chinese participation, 89, 111,	Guerilla warfare, weapons for, 70
121–129, 136, 139	Guidelines for Developing Nuclear
economic concerns, 121	Weapons (1958), 57, 62, 76,
image concerns, 121	81–82
obstruction of negotiations, 124–126, 137–140	Н
support for, 136-137, 199	Habiger, General Eugene, 31, 32, 35, 39 <i>n</i>
non-nuclear weapon states and, 104	Hague Code (International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
nonproliferation benefits, 135-136	Proliferation), 178, 179, 189
nuclear disarmament and, 102	H-6 aircraft, 62
opponent view, 130–131 PAROS and, 104–105, 129	Haiyan nuclear weapons complex, China, 41

Hard and deeply buried targets	methodology of, 19-20
(HDBTs), 147	safety measures of Chinese, 38–39
Hsieh, Alice Langley, 44	secondary sources, 20
Hua Di, 20	unclassified assessments, 46
Hua Hongxun, 44	Interactive complexity, 3 <i>n</i>
Hu Renyu, 92	Intercontinental ballistic missiles
Hu Side, 92	(ICBMs), 30, 31, 33. See also
Hu Xiaodi, 171, 177, 188	CSS-3; CSS-4
Hydronuclear tests, 97–98, 119	Chinese, number of, 49
I	deployments, 49–50, 52, 69
	funds for deployment, 69
IADS (integrated air defense system), 187	mobile, liquid-fueled, 73
IAEA (International Atomic Energy	short-range, modernization of, 47
Agency), 99	silo-based, 49
ICBMs. See Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), 30, 68. See also CSS-
IFICS (in flight interceptor communi-	1/CSS-2
cations system), 148	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 33
Implosion devices, 59–62	International Atomic Energy Agency
India, 99, 104, 134, 136, 206	(IAEA), 99
INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty), 33	International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Prolifera-
In flight interceptor communications	tion (Hague Code), 178, 179, 189
system (IFICS), 148	International Space Station, 191
Intelligence community, 15 <i>n</i> , 19, 48–49, 61, 63	Iran, 104
assessment of Chinese leadership, 31–32	IRBMs. See Intermediate-range ballistic missiles
assessments, 26	Isomorphism, 113
bias in interpreting Chinese intentions, 50–51	Israel, 99, 104
Chinese Air Force assessments,	J Jane's, 20
39–40	Japan, 98
deployment estimates, 71, 201	Javits, Eric, 106–107
estimates of number of Chinese nuclear weapons, 27–28	Jiang Zemin, 87, 100–101, 105, 138.
gaps/biases in, 20	183–184, 205
history of anticipated deployment dates, 52	JL-1 missiles. See CSS-NX-3 (JL-1) missiles
leaks, 41	

JL-2 missiles. See CSS-X-10 (DF-31/JL-2) missiles	Middle East War of October 1973, 164
Johnston, Iain, 44, 112	Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (Blackett), 13
K	Military Balance, 20
Kadish, Ronald, 157	Military exercises, 45
Kahn, Herman, 4	Miniaturation technologies, 92, 94–95, 115
Kennedy, John F., 7, 79, 168	Minimum deterrent posture, adoption
Korea, 130	by Chinese leadership, 57
Korean War, 12, 13 Kosovo, 105, 138	"Minimum means of reprisal," 11, 53, 154, 158, 171, 194, 203, 206
L	MIRVs (multiple independently tar-
Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant, $61n$	getable reentry vehicles), 32–33,
Large phased array radar (LPAR), 43	Missile defense, 145–147
Legal agreement, to prevent space	C1 architecture, 145–146
weaponization, 128	C2 architecture, 157
Levin, Carl, 157–158	C3 architecture, 157
Lewis, John Wilson, 20, 22, 55, 80	countermeasures
Liang dan ("two weapons"), 65 Li Changhe, 105	Chinese programs, 49–50, 153–155, 159–160
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 60–61, 87–88, 108, 194	endoatmospheric reentry decoys, 34
Lin Biao, 64, 81	penetration aids, 20, 155–156
LPAR (large phased array radar), 43 Lui Shaoqi, 59	Global Protection against Limited Strikes System, 176
Eur onword, 67	gravity bombs, 39, 62
M	ground based interceptors, 148
"Madman Alert" of 1969, 164	Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
Major Doctrines of Communist China (Lewis), 22–23	System, 157
Mao Zedong, 13, 14, 55–56, 59, 61, 83	Missile Defense Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-38), 176
McNamara, Robert, 7, 11–12	Missile Defense Agency (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization), 145,
Medium-range ballistic missiles	146, 147, 151, 185, 190
(MRBMs), 30, 31, 34, 68. See also CSS-1; CSS-2	BDMO countermeasure study of 1995, 155, 160
Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, 21	Missile silos, dummy, 32
Microsatellite technology, 191	Moscow Treaty, 138, 143–144, 145, 185, 200

MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles), 30, 31, 34, 68. See also CSS-1; CSS-2

MRVs (multiple reentry vehicles), 32-33, 32n, 48-49, 80, 115

M-9 short range ballistic missiles, 77

M-11 short range ballistic missiles, 77

MSX (U.S. Midcourse Space Experiment) Satellite, 190

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 32-33,

Multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs), 32-33, 32n, 48-49, 80, 115

N

NASIC (National Air and Space Intelligence Center), 29-30

National Academy of Sciences, 3n, 8,

National Air and Space Intelligence Center (formerly National Air Intelligence Center), 29-30, 52

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), 19, 46-47

National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-38), 176, 199

NATO Nuclear Planning Group of 1983, 6

Naxing 1, 162

Neutron bombs. See Warheads, enhanced-radiation

New Defense Technical Accord, 56 "New Triad," 145, 152, 183

Nie Rongzhen, Marshal, 1, 11, 13, 56, 58-59, 79, 171

NIEs (National Intelligence Estimates), 19, 46-47

Nitze, Paul, 9

No-first-use doctrine, 76–77, 132, 172

Nongovernmental organizations, nuclear weapons estimates, 26–27

Non-nuclear strike forces, 145, 147-150

Non-targeting agreement of 1998, 202

North Korea, 6n

No-use-first pledge, 41–46, 97, 194 bilateral, 204-205

China and, 200

U.S. and, 202

Nuclear accidents, 5

Nuclear arsenals. See also under specific countries

CTBT constraints, 88

risks, 3n

size, fissile materials cut-offs and,

Nuclear attack, guarding against, 42

Nuclear balance, 7

Nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 16

Chinese capabilities, 35

construction, 51, 51n

force development, funds for, 69

Type 094, 48

Xia-class, 34-36

"Nuclear blackmail" of the 1950s, 174, 204

Nuclear device, prototype, shipping from Soviet Union to China, 56 - 57

Nuclear disarmament, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and, 102

Nuclear forces

configuration of, deterrence and,

readiness of, deterrence and, 7-8 size of, deterrence and, 7-8

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 1, 25, 26, 27t	pursuit, Chinese decision-making for, 55–56
Nuclear Posture Review, 1994, 143	research orientation, 59
Nuclear Posture Review, 2001, 2, 17-18, 145, 150, 164-165, 170,	security benefit, comparative view of, 10–11
183, 205	testing (See Tests/testing)
Chinese reaction to, 152–153, 156–157, 202	yield data, 72
missile defenses, 145–147	zero-yield test ban, 98
nonnuclear strike forces, 147	Nuclear weapons policy, fundamental
Nuclear sufficiency, 3–19	tension in, 8
Nuclear war	O
accidental, 5	ODA (overseas development assis-
avoidance of, 4	tance), 98
deliberate, 5	Offensive capabilities, 151
destruction from, 11	On-site inspections, 116, 139
fear of destruction from, 79	abuse of, 100
initiation, 1	August 14, 1996 compromise, 101
	Chinese position on, 118
planning	deterrence value of, 118–119
capabilities-based, 6–7 cognitive consistency in, 4, 6 <i>n</i>	green-light or supplementary procedure, 100
political costs of, 130-131	international pressure for, 117
Nuclear weapons	red-light procedure, 100
aircraft-delivered, 45-46, 63	Operational capability of nuclear pos-
control (See Arms control)	ture, measurement method,
design, 71–72	4n-5n, 5-6
design, certification for serial pro-	Operational doctrine, retaliatory
duction, 61	criticism of, 43–44
destructiveness of, 7	flexibility, need for, 43–44
development, arms control agree-	Operation Allied Forces, 105, 138
ments and, 130–131	Operational readiness, 3-4
fission, 45, 61, 63	Operational Studies (2000), 21, 26,
fission bombs, 45, 61, 63	46, 75, 81
fission devices, 62	alert operations, 166, 167
full-yield, 64	command and control arrange- ments, 36–38
high-yield, 55	,
low-yield, 45, 72	doctrinal shift, 44 enemy strategic targets, 77
production capabilities, 45	launch orders, 38
	iauticii otucis, 50

"no first-use" pledge and, 41–42 Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Agreement on the Pretasks for Chinese retaliatory strike, vention of the Deployment of 42 Weapons in Outer Space Oppenheimer, Robert, 4 (CD/1679), 173, 178–182 Overseas development assistance Possible Elements of the Future Interna-(ODA), 98 tional Legal Instrument on the Prevention of Weaponization of Outer P Space (CD/1645), 173, 176–178, 181 Pakistan, 99, 104, 134, 206 Post-boost vehicle (PBV), 32 PALs (Permissive Action Links), 38 PRC (People's Republic of China). Pan Zhenqiang, Major General, 76, See China 79 Precision-strike systems, 17 PAROS. See Preventing an arms race in outer space Preemptive strikes, 151, 153 Party Central Committee, 36 counter-attack capability and, 79-80 Payne, Keith, 4, 17, 150-151 enhancing U.S. capabilities for, PBV (post-boost vehicle), 32 "Peaceful coexistence" debate of limited, 169 1986, 112-113 Pre-launch vulnerability, 200 Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 97,99 Preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS), 171–206 Pentagon, 147-148 as agenda item, 183-186 People's Liberation Army (PLA), 14, 44, 70, 74, 75, 77, 83, 108 China and, 199 professionalization, 204 FMCT and, 104-105, 129 size of, 90 United States and, 136, 186 People's Republic of China. See China Proliferation: Threat and Response, 40-41, 46, 103 Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council (P5), 98, 99 Public Law 106-38 (National Missile Defense Act of 1999), 176, 199 Permissive Action Links (PALs), 38 Persiani, Angelo, 107 Q PLA. See People's Liberation Army Qian Qichen, 102, 189 Plutonium, 58 Qinghua University, 191 Chinese production, 102–103, Quick-reaction alert airplane (QRA), 104 16 civil reprocessing, 104 warheads, 64 R PNEs (peaceful nuclear explosions), Ramaker, Jaap, 98–99 97, 99

Readiness	Ryan, Mark A., 12, 13, 57, 79, 130
alert operations and, 166–168	
bias toward, 16	S 2 5 0 02 04 1 (0
of China's land-based ballistic missile force, 28	Sagan, Scott, 3 <i>n</i> , 5, 8, 82–84, 168 Satellite tracking, 191
Reagan administration, 158, 174	SBIRS (Space-based Infra Red Sys-
Realpolitik worldviews, 111–112, 129	tem) program, 147
Report on Arrangements for Research and Development on Nuclear-	SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), 158, 174
Armed Missiles, 67	Seaborg, Glenn, 61
Report on the Arrangements for	Second Artillery
Research and Development on Strategic Nuclear Missiles and	alert operations, 166–167
Man-Made Satellites and Their Delivery Systems, 68	"bolt from the blue" simulation exercise of 1994, 42
Research, Chinese	construction of network for survivability under nuclear attack, 33
Program 640, 185–186	criticism of operational doctrine,
Program 863, 187–188	43–44
Restraint, 1, 17, 18	CSS-5 unit, 71
Retaliation, 75 benefits of, 7	digital microwave communication system, 37–38
fear of, 79–80	establishment of, 62
launch operations for, 42	headquarters for, 37
risks, 7, 200	large phased array radar site, 43
willingness, demonstration of, 42	launch commands, 38
Risk	long-range firing practice in 1970s 68
balance of, 9	missile units, 48, 75
from deliberate attack, 6 determination of, 5–6	nuclear retaliation campaign, 29, 36, 42
Rumsfield, Donald, 143–145, 163, 203–204	professionalism, 74–75, 81
Russia	readiness/operational imbalances, 126
anti-nuclear deterrence combat, 167	reserve force, 42
anti-submarine warfare capabilities,	"round-the-clock alerts," 74, 81, 165–166
	Rumsfeld's visit to, 203-204
fissile material stockpiles, 135	survivability of ballistic missiles, 83
nuclear arsenal, 143, 200	troop training exercises, 80
strategic assessment of China, 1	,

relations with China, 56-57 Sha Zukang, 11–12, 17, 50, 101, 141, 152, 154, 159, 193 tolerance for nuclear danger, 9 Shenzhou manned space mission, 191 withdrawal of assistance to China, Short-range ballistic missiles 58, 61, 88, 104, 195 (SRBMs), 45, 46 Space-based Infra Red System Silo-based missiles, 49, 72 (SBIRS) program, 147 Silos Space-based parasitic satellites, Chinese, 161-162 for CSS-3 ICBMs, 33 Space launch vehicles, 34, 188 dummy, 32 Space object identification (SOI), 190 Sino-Russian working paper, 182–183, 185 Space radar (SR), 149 Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969, 15-16, 66, Space sensors, 148 79, 80, 195 Space Tracking and Surveillance Sys-SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic tem (STSS), 147 missiles), 30, 51, 69, 83 Special Commission of the CCCPC, "Smart Dispenser," 32, 32*n*–33*n*, 49*n* SOI (space object identification), 190 SR (space radar), 149 Solid-propellant ballistic missiles SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles), 45, 46 deployment, 73 SSBNs. See Nuclear ballistic missile prelaunch exposure, 72 submarines research, 72 START (Strategic Arms Reduction second generation, 72 (See also Treaties), 8, 126 DF-31; JL-2) Stein, Peter, 8 South African HEU production, 103 Stockpiles, fissile material, 102 Soviet Union, 13, 159 Chinese, 46, 59, 115, 122, 127, assistance in Chinese nuclear program, 56-57 plutonium, 103, 104 border crisis with China (See Sinofissile materials cut-offs and, Soviet crisis of 1969) 135 - 137Chinese security concerns and, PAROS and, 137-138 153 - 154treaties and, 131 Communist Party Central Committee, 56 Strategic balance cooperative agreements with global, 193 China, 56 vs. strategic parity, 12 foreign policy adaptation vs. learn-Strategic Defence Review, 16, 16n ing debate, 112-113 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Limited Test Ban Treaty, 60-61 158, 174 perceptions of nuclear superiority, Strategic parity, vs. strategic balance, 9 - 1012

Strategic posture, solely offensive, 145 Strategic Studies (2000), 21, 26, 75, UEWR (upgraded early warning radar), 148 STSS (Space Tracking and Surveillance System), 147 Unintended DEFCON Alert of 1960, 164 Submarine-launched ballistic missiles United Kingdom (SLBMs), 30, 51, 69, 83 basing modes, 78 Submarines, 70–71, 73. See also SSBNs Limited Test Ban Treaty, 60-61 Sun Xiangli, 53, 85, 158 nuclear policy of, 16 Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, 1998 Strategic Defence Review, 16 land-based (SSM), 28-29 United Nations Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. Conference on Disarmament (See (SSTL), 161–162, 191 Conference on Disarmament) Survivability, of strategic forces, Study On The Application of Confi-67-68, 78-79 dence-building Measures in Swedish Defense Research Establish-Outer Space, 189-190 ment, 64 United States alert operations, 168 Т anti-submarine warfare capabilities, Tactical missile, with conventional 35 payloads, 77 changes in nuclear posture for Taiwan, 19, 158, 194, 205 China, implications of, 125, Taiwan Strait crisis, 151, 152 143-152 Tannenwald, Nina, 6n character/strength of nuclear posture vs. Soviet Union, 9-10 Technical balance, 9 Theater missile defenses, 31, 33, 44, de-alerting nuclear forces in, 8 46, 145 defense capability, 152 Tightly coupled systems, 3n deterrence by Chinese forces, Tracking facilities, 160 17 - 18Transformational communications deterrence commitments, preservsatellite (TSAT), 149, 150 ing credibility of, 17 Transformational systems, 149, 150, failure to address China's security concerns, 125 Transparency, 104, 128 first strike capability, 174 Treaty on the Mutual No-First Use of fissile material stockpiles, 135 Nuclear Weapons (1994), 172n intelligence analyses, 19-20 Trial production, 61 intelligence community (See Intel-Trident II-D5, 72 ligence community) TSAT (transformational communicaintelligence document leaks, 19, tions satellites), 149, 150

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 60-61 modernization, 137-138, 143 missile defense system, 142, 165 reductions, 143-144, 200 modernization, 199 United States nuclear posture, changes in, 203 non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities, 142 United States Office of Naval Intelligence, 35 nonnuclear strike force capabilities, 147-150 United States policy, Chinese strategic decisions and, 200-206 Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, 141-142 United States-Russian agreements, Moscow Treaty, 143-144 offensive strike capability, 152 United States-Russian relationship, PAROS and, 136 126, 138 partisan politics in, 19 United States-Soviet arms control prompt global strike capabilities, agreements, 130 147-150 United States strategic forces strategic assessment of China, 1, 2 crisis stability concerns, 164-169 unclassified documents, 12 declaratory doctrine of, 2, 17 W-70 warhead, 94 missile defenses, 198 United States Air Force, 149, 190 modernization, 22, 170 United States Ballistic Missile Defense Unofficial Annex: Compilation of System, 201 Comments and Suggestions to the United States-China Lab-to-Lab CD Working Paper CD/1679, 173, Technical Exchange Program, 204 178 - 183United States-China non-targeting Upgraded early warning radar agreement of 1998, 187 (UEWR), 148 United States-China relations, 105, Uranium, 58, 61, 64, 103 193, 202 "Usability" paradox, 8 United States General Assembly, 98 U.S Defense Condition system (DEF-United States Midcourse Space Exper-CON), 164, 165 iment (MSX) Satellite, 190 United States Missile Defense Agency, 154 Verification measures, 61, 63, 104, United States missile defense pro-128, 136, 182 grams abuse of, 101–102 deployments, 104, 105, 176 Chinese and, 117-118 plans, 138 fissile materials cut-offs and, political factors, 198–199 135–136 restructuring of, 104–105 FMCT, 122 United States nuclear arsenal, 136 space-based, 188-191 Chinese assessments of, 12–13 Vulnerability, 203

W	China's position on, 174–182
Walpole, Robert, 49–50	forum for, 185–186 (See also Con-
Wang Guangya, 133	ference on Disarmament;
Warheads	PAROS)
for ballistic missiles, 65	scope of obligations, 186–188
Chinese testing of, 131–132	verification, 188–191
CSS-1 (DF-2) missile, 63	Window of vulnerability scenario, 9
deployed in China in 1984, 65	WMD forces, 151, 169
enhanced-radiation, 45, 72, 94	X
high-yield, 72	X-band radars, 148, 189
miniaturized, 67, 71, 77, 115	Xia submarines, 70, 73
low-yield test, 94–95, 115	XSS (Experimental Spacecraft Sys-
missile-delivered, preference for, 59	tem), 190
	Xue Litai, 20, 80, 165
nuclear, storage of, 85 number of, 3, 7	Y
operationally deployed	Yugoslavia, 105
in China, 1, 25–27, 28, 30–32,	Yu Min, 92–94, 114
52	
in France, 27	${f Z}$
in Russia, 27	Zero-yield test ban, 98, 116
in UK, 27	Zhenbao (Damansky) Islands, 13
in U.S., 27	Zhou Enlai, 56, 59, 61–63, 76
options, for modernization plan, 48–49	Zou Yunhua, 109
plutonium, 64–65	
tactical nuclear in China, evidence for, 45–46	
thermonuclear, 34 (See Thermonuclear warheads)	
certification of, 64	
development, 61-62	
India and, 134	
three-megaton, 63	
two-stage, testing of, 62	
Warsaw Pact threat, 6	
Weaponization of space	
agenda, 182–185	