I first became interested in questions about truth and objectivity during an undergraduate year spent studying philosophy at the University of Glasgow. My intuitive belief then was that there could be more than one true account of some subject matter without that implying that every account is true. I still have that belief today, and I am even more convinced now that any sane human philosophy must account for this fact. This book is an attempt to sketch just such a philosophy—a view that allows for both realism about truth and pluralism about the world.

Philosophers generally have pretensions to populism, and I am no exception, but questions about truth and relativism are undoubtedly in the foreground of contemporary intellectual culture. Such questions are faced in literary criticism, history, and the sciences as much as they are in philosophy. So while this is undoubtedly a book in the area of “analytic” metaphysics and epistemology, my motivation for writing it was not simply the abstract pursuit of truth in those fields. My motivation was to clear conceptual space for a more general dialogue on how to reconcile pluralism and objectivity. Accordingly, I have tried to define technical terms and have confined more esoteric remarks to the notes. Even so, the reader less familiar with technical philosophy may find it useful to skip certain sections initially (e.g., 1.5, 4.2, and the latter half of 5.5), returning to them after having gained an overall understanding of my argument.

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